State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1336

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Reuel Moshe Yehuda,
Appellant.

Filed August 12, 2019
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-17-3946

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Reuel Moshe Yehuda, Fayetteville, North Carolina (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
In this direct appeal from judg ment of conviction, a ppellant argues that (1) the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he committ ed criminal sexual conduct, and (2) the
trial court erred by convicting him of disorderly conduct because it is a lesser -included
offense of criminal sexual conduct. Appellant also raises numerous pro se arguments. We
affirm.
FACTS
On October 13, 2017, appellant Reuel Moshe Yehuda walked past L.W. and her
friends, C.H. and B.A., as they were sitting on the front stoop of their apartment building.
At this point, t he victim’s and the defendant’s versions of events diverge. According to
L.W., Yehuda came back to talk to her and her friends for approximately twenty minutes.
The group talked about tattoos and L.W. pulled the neck of her shirt aside to show a tattoo
on her shoulder. Yehuda asked if he could touch L.W.’s tattoo, and she agreed. Yehuda
touched L.W.’s tattoo, but then grabbed and cupped L.W.’s breast—without her consent—
for two to three seconds. L.W., C.H., and B.A. went inside their apartment building and
called the police. However, according to Yehuda, he walked down the street and saw L.W.
and her friends, but did not interact with them or touch L.W.’s breast.
The state charged Yehuda with fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1(1) (2016), and disorderly conduct, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2016). The case proceeded to a jury trial; L.W., C.H., and B.A.

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testified for the state and Yehuda testified in his own defense. At the conclusion of trial,
the jury found Yehuda guilty of both counts.
Yehuda appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Yehuda argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him guilty of
criminal sexual conduct because the state did not prove that he acted with the requisite
intent. To convict Yehuda of fifth -degree criminal sexual conduct, the state had to prove
that he engaged in nonconsensual criminal sexual contact , which is defined as the
nonconsensual touching of intimate parts “ performed with sexual or aggressive intent. ”
Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd . 1 (2016). Because intent is a state-of-mind requirement, it
is generally proved through circumstantial evidence. State v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49,
53 (Minn. 2015).
When reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidenc e, appellate courts
apply a two-step test to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Moore , 846
N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). First, we must “identify the circumstances proved.” Id.
(citing State v. Andersen , 784 N .W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010)). In identi fying the
circumstances proved, this court assumes that the fact-finder resolved any factual disputes
in a manner that is consistent with its verdict. Id. Here, the state proved that: (1)Yehuda
walked up to L.W., C.H., and B.A; (2) L.W. showed her tattoo to the group; (3) Yehuda
asked L.W. if he could touch the tattoo on her shoulder; (4) Yehuda touched L.W.’s tattoo
with his fingertips; (4) L.W. did not consent to any other touch; (5) Yehuda grabbed and

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cupped L.W.’s breast with his entire hand for a period of two to three seconds; (6) Yehuda
then smiled at L.W.; (7) L.W., C.H., and B.A. went inside behind a locked door and called
police; and (8) L.W. described and later identified Yehuda.
Second, we independently examine the “reasonableness of the inferences that might
be drawn from the circumstances proved,” and then “determine whether the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted). Yehuda argues that the evidence is consistent with the
rational hypothesis that he accidentally touched L.W.’s breast while attempting to touch
her tattoo. However, it is not reasonable to believe that Yehuda touched L.W.’s breast by
accident when he grabbed L.W.’s breast with his entire hand. Because the circumstances
proved are inconsistent with any r ational hypothesis except guilt, we determine that the
evidence was sufficient to convict Yehuda of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.
II.
Yehuda argues, in the alternative, that his conviction for disorderly conduct must be
vacated because it is a lesser -included offense of criminal sexual conduct. 1 Under Minn.
Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2018), a person may be convicted of either the crime charged or an
included offense, but not both. Here, the district court did not explicitly state on the record
or in its sentencing order whether Yehuda was adjudicated for only one or both charges .

1 Generally, this court does not consider issues that were not presented to the district court.
Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). The supreme court, however, has “held
that an appellant does not waive claims of multiple convictions or sentences by failing to
raise the issue at the time of sentencing.” Spann v. State , 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn.
2007).

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And we cannot look to the warrant of commitment because there is none in this case.2 See
Spann, 740 N.W.2d at 573 (noting that a written judgment of conviction provides
“conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated” ( quotation
omitted)). It is, however, uncontested that the district court imposed a sentence only for
the criminal sexual conduct crime. 3 The supreme court has “long recognized that the
‘conviction’ prohibited by [section 609.04] is not a guilty verdict, but is rather a formal
adjudication of guilt.” State v. Pflepsen , 590 N.W.2 d 759, 767 (Minn. 1999). Because
nothing in the record indicates that Yehuda was formally adjudicated guilty of disorderly
conduct, we need not continue our analysis.4
III.
Yehuda also raises several arguments in his pro se supplemental brief , including
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction , the district court erred in its

2 A warrant of commitment is required when a court “sentences a defendant for a felony or
gross misdemeanor to the custody of the commissioner of corrections or to the
superintendent of the workhouse or work farm.” Minn. Stat. § 243.49 (2018). Though
Yehuda was sentenced to 216 days in jail, he had credit for 216 days served, and therefore,
no warrant of commitment was required.
3 If a person is charged with multiple offenses arising from the same behavioral incident,
punishment may be imposed for only one of the off enses. Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1
(2018); see also State v. Bakken , 871 N.W.2d 418, 423 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d, 883
N.W.2d 264 (Minn. 2016). Here, the state does not dispute that both the criminal sexual
conduct and the disorderly conduct arose out of the same course of conduct, but because
Yehuda was only sentenced for one count, the parties do not raise a section 609.035
argument in this case.
4 We also note that it is not clear from this record that the victim of the criminal sexual
conduct, L. W., was the only victim of disorderly conduct because the state presented
evidence that L.W.’s friends, C.H. and B.A., were also alarmed by Yehuda’s offensive
conduct.

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exclusion of evidence, and his constitutional rights were violated because he did not have
an impartial jury or a line-up.
a. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Yehuda argues that “the testimony [of three] college girls who m were intoxicating
themselves at the time [of] the alleged incident . . . doesn’t prove any element of the
crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” We interpret this argument as an additional
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. We note that b ecause Yehuda , L.W., and
witnesses, C.H. and B.A., testified, we must assume that the jury considered and
disregarded Yehuda’s version of events. State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1998)
(An appellate court “assume[s] that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved
contrary evidence.”). Therefore, Yehuda’s argument is without merit.
b. Exclusion of Evidence
Yehuda argues that the district court erred when it excluded the testimony of his
witness on relevance grounds.5 This court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Jenkins , 782 N.W.2d 211, 229 (Minn. 2010). The district
court wrote its pretrial order:
Defendant may not call [M.A.] as a witness because his
testimony is irrelevant. In November 2017, the alleged Victim
called police because someone was throwing rocks at her
window. The police talked to [M.A.] and found he was trying
to reach his friend, who lived in a different apartment. No
arrests were made and no charges were filed. Further, [M.A.]’s

5 Generally, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any
[material] fact . . . more probable or less probable.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. All parties are
entitled to present relevant evidence at trial so long as the probative value of the evidence
is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Minn. R. Evid. 403.

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current charges for criminal sexual conduct have no relation to
the alleged victim or Defendant’s current case.

Yehuda claims that M.A.’s testimony was relevant because the victim identified both
himself and M.A. as the perpetrator of the crime. Because n othing in the record supports
Yehuda’s claim, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the
witness’s testimony was irrelevant.
c. Impartial Jury
Yehuda next argues that he was not provided an impartial jury because the jury was
composed of “all females of European descent.” Yehuda argues that the state
systematically excluded all male jurors and therefore the Duren test was violated. In Duren
v. Missouri, the Supreme Court held that,
[i]n order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair -cross-
section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the
group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury-selection process.

439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S. Ct. 664, 668 (1979). Here, after Yehuda passed the jury panel for
cause and all peremptory challenges had been exercised, he argued that the jury was biased
because there were no males on the panel. Yehuda’s argument lacks merit because he has
not alleged any facts that tend to show that the jury selection was improper or that the lack
of men on his jury panel was due to systemic exclusion . Moreover, the record indicates
that Yehuda himself exercised preemptory strikes on males from his jury pool.

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d. Due Process Violation

Lastly, Yehuda argues that he was entitled to a photographic or in-person line-up.
We interpret this argument to mean that the district court erred in admitt ing the
identification of Yehuda because it was impermissibly suggestive. As a preliminary
matter, Yehuda waived this argument by failing to support it with citation to legal authority.
See State v. Krosch , 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002) (holding if the b rief does not
contain an argument or citation to legal authority in support of the allegations raised, the
allegation is deemed waived); see also State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Minn. App.
2017) (“Arguments are forfeited if they are presented in a su mmary and conclusory form,
do not cite to applicable law, and fail to analyze the law when claiming that errors of law
occurred.”).
Even if we determined that that the officer’s action s constituted an impermissibly
suggestive identification procedure, Yehuda’s argument is unpersuasive because there is
little likelihood of misidentification in this case. See State v. Porter, 411 N.W.2d 187, 190
(Minn. App. 1987) (analyzing the unlikeliness of misidentification in its analysis of the
identification procedure). Here, the responding officer testified during trial that the victim
and witnesses provided a description of the man, and reported that he was wearing a
headlamp and had told the group that he lived in a camper that was parked on the street
around the corner. The officer located the camper, ran the license plate of the attached
vehicle, pulled up a photograph of the owner, and noted that the photograph matched the
description that the victim had provided earlier. The officer showed the victim and the
witnesses the photograph, and they positively identified the man in the photograph as the

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man that assaulted L.W. Yehuda was wearing a headlamp when he answered the door of
the camper and all three witnesses identified Yehuda at trial. There is little likelihood of
misidentification in this case.
Affirmed.