State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1354

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rashad Eric Spicer,
Appellant.

Filed January 21, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-2020

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of felony malicious punishment of a child,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
inflicted substantial bodily harm and that the district court erred by refusing to conduct a
postconviction in -camera review of the victim’s confidential records. Because the
evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to reach its verdict and because the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s petition for postconviction in -camera
review, we affirm.
FACTS
A.M., now 12, was born in May 2007. His mother is A.M.S.; his paternal
grandmother is C.M. When A.M. was five or six, appellant Rashad Spicer began living
with him and A.M.S.; she and appellant later married.
In December 2015, when A.M. was eight, C.M. noticed severe bruising on his arms,
back, and legs and asked him what caused it. A.M. told her that appellant had hit him with
a belt.
C.M. took A.M. to a doctor who was a member of a child -protection task force on
abuse. After examining A.M ., the doctor said his bruising was more extensive th an she
had ever seen on an assault victim and his injuries included multiple bruises on the back,
bruises on the left side, a horseshoe-shaped bruise consistent with a belt buckle on the left
calf, scattered bruising on the lower left leg, confluent bruising (completely covered with
bruising) on the left lateral thigh, a horseshoe -shaped bruise on the front right thigh,

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confluent bruising on the front and back of the right thigh, confluent bruising on the entire
left side of the left arm; a puncture wound on the left wrist, a horseshoe -shaped bruise on
the left wrist, and confluent bruising on the upper and lower side of the right arm.
A.M. said he did not want to go back to his mother or appellant, and he was released
into the custody of C.M., with whom he felt safe. A.M. was interviewed at CornerHouse1
in January 2016. Appellant and A.M.S. were arrested and were each charged with one
count of malicious punishment of a child.2
In October 2016, the di strict court granted appellant’s Paradee3 motion for in -
camera review of A.M.’s behavioral and child -protection records and issued an order
directing A.M.’s current caregiver to provide the defense with the name of A.M.’s care
providers so the defense coul d obtain the records it wanted. In May 2017, in response to
appellant’s notice to remove t he district court judge, a second district court judge w as
assigned.
In March 2018, the second district court judge and the parties address ed the nine
motions appellant had filed. None of them mentioned in -camera review. Appellant’s
counsel mentioned the October 2016 order and said he told the district court judge about

1 CornerHouse is “a nonprofit child abuse evaluation center.” State v. Zulu, 706 N.W.2d
919, 923 (Minn. App. 2005).
2 A.M.S. was convicted of terroristic threats against A.M., and her conviction was affirmed
in State v. McIntosh-Spicer, No. A17-1565, 2018 WL 439473 (Minn. App. Sept. 17, 2018),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018).
3 See State v. Paradee , 403 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn. 1987) (hold ing that the “in camera
approach strikes a fairer balance between the interest of the privilege holder in having his
confidences kept and the interest of the criminal defendant in obtaining all relevant
evidence that might help in his defense”).

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the previous judge’s October 2016 order and said the defense had not obtained the records
it wanted. The state pointed out that the order had been issued 18 months earlier and that
appellant had done nothing about it since then. The complaint was amended to charge
appellant with two counts of malicious punishment of a ch ild, t wo counts of domestic
assault—misdemeanor, and one count of third-degree assault. Appellant again notified the
district court that he never received the items mentioned in the October 2016 order, but he
then proceeded to trial without seeking a continuanc e or an order directing production of
the records.
At trial, A.M. testified that appellant and A.M.S. hit him with a belt, made him stand
for long periods in a squat position and kicked him if he moved, lifted him and threw him
to the ground, and denied him food and water. Appellant testified that A.M.S. did not allow
him to punish A.M. physically because he was not A.M.’s biological father and that he
never physically punished A.M. or denied him food and water.
The jury found appellant guilty as charged. He waived a trial on the Blakely factors
and was sentenced on one count of malicious punishment of a child to a stayed prison term
of 42 months, an upward durational departure, and placed on probation. He filed a notice
of appeal. An order of this cou rt stayed the appeal to enable appellant to file a second
motion for in-camera review of materials not provided to the previous district court judge
who had granted appellant’s motion for in-camera review and remanded the matter to the
district court. The district court denied appellant’s motion for in -camera review, and an
order of this court reinstated the appeal.

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On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, was not sufficient to permit the jurors to reach their verdict and that the district
court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s postconviction petition for in -camera
review of A.M.’s documents.
D E C I S I O N
1. Sufficiency of the evidence
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate
courts carefully examine the record to determine whether the
facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he
was convicted. The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact -
finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the
verdict. The verdict will not be overturned if the fact -finder,
upon applicati on of the presumption of innocence and the
State’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the
charged offense.4

State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation and citations omitted). All
inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the state. State v. Budreau , 641
N.W.2d 919, 929 (Minn. 2002).

4 Appellant argues that the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence of substantial
bodily harm, an element of malicious punishment and of third -degree assault, is de novo.
But Minnesota appellate courts have applied a deferential standard of review to a jury’s
finding on this issue . See, e.g ., State v. Harlin, 771 N.W.2d 46, 51 (Minn. App. 2009)
(“When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is sufficient evidence for a
jury to re asonably conclude that [the victim] suffered substantial d isfiguration and
therefore substantial bodily harm as the result of appellant’s attack.”), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 17, 2009).

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“Substantial bodily harm” is an element of felony malicious punishment of a child;
“less than substantial bodily harm ” is an element of gross misdemeanor malici ous
punishment. Minn. Stat. § 609.377, subds. 2, 5 (2018). Appellant argues that A.M.’s
injuries were not “substantial bodily harm,” i.e., “bodily injury which involves a temporary
but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of
any bodily member,” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a (2018) , but only “bodily harm,” i.e.,
“physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of phy sical condition,” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 7 (2018). The doctor who examined A.M. testified that he had bruising all
over his body, some areas had “confluent” bruising, or were completely covered in bruises,
and some areas had deep bruises that went down to the bone. A.M.’s ability to walk, sit,
or use his arms was impaired, and, at trial in March 2018, he still had a scar from a puncture
wound caused when a belt buckle punctured his skin in December 2015.
Appellant concedes that these injuries were “more pervasive than [the] black eye”
that was classified as “bodily injury ” rather than “substantial bodily injury ” in State v.
Whaley, 389 N.W.2d 919, 926 (Minn. A pp. 1986), but argues that “something more than
bruising and a small puncture wound is needed to prove substantial bodily harm.” Among
the cases appellant relies on is Harlin, but that case explicitly concludes that a scar on the
victim’s head and bruisin g on 15% of her back were sufficient evidence for a jury to
reasonably conclude that the victim suffered substantial bodily harm. Harlin, 771 N.W.2d
at 51. The injuries to A.M. were at least as extensive as those of the victim in Harlin: the
doctor testified that A.M. had “extensive bruising, more than I’d ever seen . . . [m]ore than

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I’ve seen probably on any other victim of assault . . . On the mid upper back, there was a
10 [centimeter] x 3 area of bruising. Another 10 x 4 and another 10 x 8. So, probably this
big area of bruising. And he was a small child.” 5 When asked if this was “more so than
you’d ever seen on a patient in terms of bruising,” the doctor answered, “Yes. There were
multiple areas where there was no normal skin. It was just all bruised.”
There was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that A.M. suffered
substantial bodily harm.
2. Denial of appellant’s motion for in-camera review
Appellant asks this court to order the district court to grant h is postconviction
motion for in-camera review. As a threshold matter, the state argues that this motion was
actually a motion for postconviction relief. Appellant did not file a reply brief refuting this
argument. As happened here, “[w]hen a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then
moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s
decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.” State v. Beecroft, 813
N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012). This cou rt will “review the denial of a petition for
postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. . . . [It does] not reverse the postconviction
court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
The district court concluded that appellant had waived his right to in-camera review
of A.M.’s medical and behavioral records by choosing to proceed to trial without them and

5 A.M., who weighed 56 pounds at the time, was about waist -high on appellant, who is
6’2” and then weighed about 310 pounds.

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that “[s]ince [appellant] waived the in camera review and elected to proceed to trial, the
[c]ourt cannot find at this time that he has made a plausible showing that the information
would still be material and favorable to his defense.” See State v. Burrell , 697 N.W.2d
579, 605 (Minn. 2005) (holding that a defendant requesting in-camera review must make
a plausible showing that the information sought to be reviewed would be material and
favorable to the defense). The district court concluded:
Although [the judge formerly assigned to this case]
ordered the disclosure of documentation pursuant to a Paradee
motion, [appellant] chose not to have such records provided to
the [c]ourt, and instead elected to proceed to trial without the
assistance of any relevant documents that may have been
provided from such process. Accord ingly, [appellant’s]
motion for an in camera review of those same records is denied.

Appellant argues that he is entitled to one review by either an appellate or a
postconviction court and that the denial of his m otion for in-camera review impedes this
process. In his direct appeal, appellant raised the issue of sufficiency of the evidence,
which this court addresses in this opinion. Arguably this satisfied appellant’s right to one
review. However, in the interest of completeness, we address his other arguments.
He argues on appeal that in -camera review is nece ssary to determine whether:
(1) his counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure that the review had been completed prior
to trial, (2) there was a Brady violation because material favorable to appellant was
suppressed, and (3) there was newly discovered evidence. But none of these arguments
was raised to the district court, either in connection with appellant’s motion for in-camera
review, or in his pretrial motions, or in the pretrial statement that the documents had not
been produced, or in the postconviction motion for in -camera review. Therefore, the

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district court did not address these arguments, and there is nothing for this court to review.
“[A] party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction
relief.” Azure v. State , 700 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. 2005) (quotation and citations
omitted).
Nor did appellant show the district court that there was anything materia l to
appellant’s defense in A.M.’s school, medical, and therapy records. A.M. testified
repeatedly that the bruises on his body had been caused by appellant’s and A.M.S.’s
treatment of him; there was nothing to suggest an alternative perpetrator was respo nsible.
Appellant’s argument that such information could have undermined A.M.’s credibility has
been rejected. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3104 (1974)
(“Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insuffici ent to require its
production in advance of trial.”). In addition, appellant declined to cross-examine A.M.’s
therapists or personnel from his school who were witnesses at trial, indicating that
information in these areas would not have been “material and favorable” to his defense.
See Burrell, 697 N.W.2d at 605.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s postconviction
motion to reopen discovery and grant in -camera review of A.M.’s school, medical, and
therapy records.
Affirmed.