Lisa M. Sarazin, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1355

Lisa M. Sarazin,
Relator,

vs.

Ruth Strickers Fitness Unlimited Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed May 13, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 36183327-4

Lisa M. Sarazin, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Ruth Strickers Fitness Unlimited Inc., Minnetonka, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Developmen t, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judg e; and Cochran,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Relator Lisa Sarazin appeals the determination of an unemploym ent-law judge
(ULJ) that she is ineligible for unemployment benefits because she quit her job without
good reason caused by her employer, respondent Ruth Strickers F itness Unlimited Inc.
(Ruth Strickers). We affirm.
FACTS
Ruth Strickers operates a wellness center called The Marsh. T he Marsh offers
several amenities to guests, including a restaurant. From March 15, 2017 to December 26,
2017, Sarazin was an executive chef at the restaurant.
On December 13, 2017, Ruth Stric kers’ general manager and director of operations
(the general manager), terminated a Marsh employee (the termina ted employee) for
stealing money. The terminated employee was “quite angry” at b eing terminated. That
afternoon, the terminated employee sent a text message to Saraz in, who was his direct
supervisor at the time he was terminated. The text message stated:
Congrats on having no one to work the front thanks for cutting
hours and giving us sh[-]t for pay checks that no one can live
off of but hey we all make our own beds have fun with all the
pissed off members ur gonna g et to deal with no longer my
problem or care.

Sarazin was concerned about the message and showed it to the general manager.
On December 15, the terminated employee came back to The Marsh to get his final
paycheck. A human resources employee (the human resources empl oyee) gave the
terminated employee his paycheck and asked how he was doing. The terminated employee

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told the human resources employee that his “first thought” afte r being terminated was to
“get back at” Sarazin. The human resource employee told him that was “not a very good
idea.” The terminated employee said that, although he was angry, he “didn’t want to fight
for his job.” He then told the human resources employee that h e was going to pursue a
different career. The human resources employee told the genera l manager and Sarazin
about the conversation. Sarazin was concerned about her safety after hearing about the
terminated employee’s comments.
In response, the general manager called the Minnetonka Police Department in an
effort to obtain a no-trespass or der against the terminated emp loyee. The Minnetonka
Police Department, located only three blocks from The Marsh, ag reed to patrol The
Marsh’s parking lot more frequently.
On December 18, the general manag er sent an email informing th e department
heads, night auditors, and front desk staff about the situation with the terminated employee.
The email directed the staff to call 911 immediately if they sa w the terminated employee
at The Marsh.
On December 20, the general manager sent a certified letter to the terminated
employee telling him that he was not allowed at The Marsh. Also on that same day, Sarazin
spoke with a private security consultant regarding security at the facility. The consultant
made several recommendations about how to improve security at T h e M a r s h . T h e
consultant sent the recommendations to Sarazin’s direct supervi sor, who forwarded the
recommendations to the general manager. One recommendation was to install an alarm on
a back door in The Marsh’s kitchen. Rather than installing an alarm, the general manager

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instructed the kitchen staff to keep the door shut. The door a utomatically locked when it
was shut. Another recommendation was to hire a temporary on-si te security guard to
ensure that the staff felt safe. The general manager did not a dopt that recommendation
because the Minnetonka Police Department was only a few blocks away and had agreed to
patrol the area more frequently.
Still feeling unsafe at work, Sarazin quit her job on December 26. Sarazin sought
unemployment benefits. A hearing took place before a ULJ. The ULJ determined that
Sarazin was not eligible for unemployment benefits because she quit her job without a good
reason caused by her employer. Sarazin later submitted additional evidence and requested
reconsideration and an additiona l hearing. The ULJ denied the request for an additional
hearing and affirmed his prior decision that Sarazin was not el igible for unemployment
benefits.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Sarazin argues that the ULJ erre d in determining that she was n ot eligible for
unemployment benefits. When reviewing a ULJ’s decision, this c ourt may affirm the
decision of the ULJ, remand the case for further proceedings, o r reverse and modify the
decision if the substantial rights of the relator have been prejudiced because, among other
things, the decision is affected by an error in law or is unsupported by substantial evidence.
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2018). When we review a ULJ ’s determination on
eligibility for unemployment benefits, we view “findings of fact in a light most favorable
to the decision, and will not disturb the findings so long as t here is evidence in the record

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that substantially supports them.” Gonzalez Diaz v. Three Rivers Cmty. Action, Inc. , 917
N.W.2d 813, 815-16 (Minn. App. 2018). We review the ULJ’s inte rpretation of the
unemployment statutes and the ultimate question of whether the relator is eligible to receive
unemployment benefits de novo. Id. at 816.
An applicant is ineligible for unemployment benefits if she quits her job unless one
of several exceptions applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2018). The only exception
at issue in this case is the exception that applies to an applicant who “quit the employment
because of a good reason caused by the employer.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1). A
good reason caused by the employer is a reason “(1) that is dir ectly related to the
employment and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker;
and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed
rather than remaining in the employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.09 5, subd. 3(a) (2018). If
the applicant was subjected to adverse working conditions, she must complain to the
employer and give the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the conditions before
the conditions constitute a good reason to quit. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c) (2018).
The ULJ determined that Sarazi n did not quit for a good reason caused by the
employer because the conditions tha t motivated Sarazin’s decisi on to quit would not
compel an average, reasonable wo r k e r t o q u i t . S a r a z i n a r g u e s on appeal that this
determination was error because an average, reasonable worker would be compelled to quit
under these circumstances. Thus, the only issue raised by Sarazin on appeal is whether the
ULJ’s legal conclusion was erroneous.

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We agree with the ULJ’s determination that an average, reasona ble worker would
not be compelled to quit under these circumstances. “In order to constitute good cause, the
circumstances which compel the decision to leave employment must be real, not imaginary,
substantial, not trifling, and r easonable, not whimsical; there must be some compulsion
produced by extraneous and nec essitous circumstances.” Rowan v. Dream It, Inc. , 812
N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn. App. 2012) (quoting Ferguson v. Dep’t of Emp’t Serv. , 247
N.W.2d 895, 900 n.5 (Minn. 1976)). The circumstances at issue here involve the
terminated employee’s text message to Sarazin and his discussio n with the human
resources employee. He sent the text message to Sarazin complaining about her and stating
that “we all make our own beds,” and he told the human resources employee that his “first
thought” after being terminated w as to “get back at” Sarazin. Sarazin notified Ruth
Strickers about her concern over the terminated employee’s stat ements. Ruth Strickers
took reasonable steps to prevent the terminated employee from coming back to The Marsh.
The general manager called the police to implement a no-trespas s order. He also sent a
letter to the terminated employee indicating that the terminated employee was not allowed
at The Marsh.
Sarazin argues that an average, reasonable worker would have b een compelled to
quit under these circumstances because (1) Ruth Strickers allowed the terminated employee
back onto the property to pick up his last paycheck, (2) the ge neral manager did not send
the email about the terminated e mployee to all employees, and ( 3) Ruth Strickers did not
implement the recommendations of the private security consultan t . W e d o n o t f i n d
Sarazin’s arguments persuasive.

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The terminated employee returni ng to the property without incid ent contradicts
Sarazin’s argument that he posed a real or substantial threat to her safety. During the time
that the terminated employee was at The Marsh to pick up his paycheck, he made no effort
to harass or even contact Sarazin.
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e e m a i l , t h e g e n e r a l m a n a g e r e m a i l e d d e p a r t m e nt heads, night
auditors, and the front desk staff. He also spoke with the kit chen staff about keeping the
back door shut. Considering the groups of employees who receiv ed the email and the
discussion with the kitchen staff, we conclude that the fact th at the general manager did
not send the email about the term inated employee to all Marsh e mployees to be
insignificant and immaterial.
Finally, Ruth Strickers’s decision not to adopt the security improvements suggested
by the private security consultant is not dispositive as to whe ther an average, reasonable
worker would have felt compelled to quit under these circumstances. Ruth Strickers gave
legitimate reasons for not adopting the recommendations. It did not install an alarm on the
back door because the door locked when it was closed. The gene ral manager instructed
employees to keep the door shut. Ruth Strickers did not hire o n-site security because it
was costly and the Minnetonka Police Department, which agreed t o patrol The Marsh
parking lot more often, was only three blocks away. Even accep ting that Ruth Strickers
adopted none of the recommendations, an average, reasonable wor ker would not be
compelled to quit under these circumstances.
In sum, Sarazin quit her employment because she feared for her safety after the
terminated employee sent one vague, possibly threatening text m essage to her and made

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one comment to another Ruth Strickers employee that he had a “t hought” to get back at
Sarazin. Ruth Strickers took reasonable steps to ensure that t he terminated employee
would not return to The Marsh and instructed the department hea ds and other staff to call
911 if they saw the terminated employee at The Marsh. There wa s no evidence that the
terminated employee returned to The Marsh or made any threats o r attempts to harass
Sarazin from December 15 (when the terminated employee returned to The Marsh to pick
up his last paycheck) to December 26 (when Sarazin quit her job ). We conclude that an
average, reasonable worker would not have been compelled to qui t under these
circumstances and that the ULJ correctly determined that Sarazi n was not eligible for
unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.