State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1387

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Scott David Quall,
Appellant.

Filed June 24, 2019
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-16-16616

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Publi c Defender, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgment of conviction and sentence for being an
ineligible person in possession of a firearm , appellant argues that he must be permitted to

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withdraw his guilty plea because his plea was not intelligently made when he did not
understand why he was ineligible to possess a firearm. Appellant alternatively argues that
the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional
departure. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2016, appellant Scott David Quall had three active warrants for his
arrest. Police officers contacted Mystic Lake Casino, where they knew Quall frequented,
to help them locate Quall. That month, when casino employees reported to the police that
Quall was at the casino, officers arrived and arrested Quall.
Officers conducted an invent ory search of Quall’s vehicle and found
methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and a stolen, loaded firearm. Quall waived his
Miranda rights and told officers that he knew the gun was in the vehicle, but stated that it
did not belong to him. He also stated that the drugs and paraphernalia were his and that he
had used a few hours earlier.
The state charged Quall with one count possession of a firearm by an ineligible
person for committing a crime of violence under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016),
and two counts fifth -degree possession of drugs under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1)
(2016). In 2017, the state amended the complaint to add a second count of possessing a
firearm or ammunition as an ineligible person, and one count of receiving stol en property
under Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2016).
In November 2017, on the date set for a jury trial, Quall pleaded guilty to possession
of a firearm as an ineligible person in exchange for dismi ssal of the other four charges.

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The district court found his plea to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, but stated it
would wait to accept the plea following a presentence investigation. Quall failed to appear
for sentencing in February 2018. Two months later , the district court denied Quall’s
motion for a downward dispositional departure and sentenced him to the presumptive 60
months in prison. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Quall first argues that his guilty plea is invalid because it was unintelligent. A
defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But a defendant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea
for the first time on direct appeal. Brown v. State , 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989);
State v. Newcombe, 412 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Nov.
13, 1987). To be valid, a plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 94 . We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. State v. Johnson , 867
N.W.2d 210, 214–15 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015).
Quall argues that his plea was unintelligent because he did not understand the charge
against him. “[T]he intelligent requirement insures that the defendant understands the
charges, his or her rights under the law, and the consequences of pleading guilty.” State v.
Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 522 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).
Quall pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm as an ineligible person. Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(2) (prohibiting “a person who has been convicted of . . . a crime of
violence” from possessing a firearm). He argues on appeal that his plea was unintelligent
because he “did not understand that [this] charge against him did not require a felo ny

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conviction on his record.” We note that at the time Quall pleaded guilty, he stated that he
understood the charge against him. He stated that he understood th at his prior conviction
of terroristic threats made him ineligible to possess a firearm. But months later, at his
sentencing hearing, Quall argued to the district court that he could not be convicted because
he was not ineligible to possess a firearm. On appeal, Quall does not argue that his
terroristic-threats conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence under Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(2), but he argues that he did not understand that he was ineligible to
possess a firearm when he pleaded guilty, therefore rendering his plea unintelligent.
Quall’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the record demonstrates that Quall
understood his plea when he pleaded guilty. “Whether a plea is intelligent depends on
what the defendant knew at the time he entered the plea.” Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d
873, 877 (Minn. 2017). The Dikken court held that because the defendant “understood
(and confirmed on the record) each of the characteristics of an intelligent guilty plea,” his
plea was valid. Id. at 878. And even though “other irregularities arose during the course
of the proceedings,” the supreme court upheld Dikken’s plea as valid. Id. at 877.
Similarly, Quall confirmed on the record that he understood that his previous
terroristic-threats conviction was a crime of violence and that it made him ine ligible to
possess a firearm. He confirmed that he possessed a firearm following his terroristic -
threats conviction. Quall confirmed that he understood his current charge carried a 60 -
month sentence. Months later, contrary to what he had stated at the time of his plea, he
asserted that he did not understand why he was charged with ineligible possession of a

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firearm based on his prior crime. But because he understood the charges against him when
he pleaded guilty, we conclude that his plea was intelligent.
Second, Quall’s argument also fails because he misconstrues the law. By asserting
that his guilty plea is unintelligent based on what he knew about his eligibility resulting
from his prior “c rime of violence,” he implicitly also argues that he had to know he was
ineligible at the time he possessed the firearm. But Minn. Stat. § 624.713 does not require
that the defendant know he is ineligible when he possesses a firearm. See 10A Minnesota
Practice, CRIMJIG 32.17 (2018) (providing the elements of ineligible possession of a
firearm as: (1) knowingly possessing a firearm and (2) having a crime -of-violence
conviction as defined in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2018)). A person is guilty of t his
offense even if he does not know that his prior charge attaches the consequence of being
ineligible to possess a firearm. C.f. Sames v. State , 805 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. App.
2011) (holding that ineligibility to possess a firearm is a collateral conse quence of a
conviction because it is civil and regulatory in nature and a defendant need not be aware of
this consequence to plead guilty to an offense) , review denied (Minn. Dec. 21, 2011) .
Because Quall’s plea was valid, no manifest injustice occurred that requires withdrawal of
his guilty plea.
Quall also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a downward dispositional departure. This court reviews a sentence to “determine
whether the sentence is inconsistent wi th statutory requirements, unreasonable,
inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact
issued by the district court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2016). This court will not

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reverse a district court’s sentencing decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v.
Oberg, 627 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Aug. 22, 2001).
The district court must impose the presumptive sentence unless “substantial and
compelling circumstances” justify departure. State v. Kindem , 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 ( Minn.
1981). “When factors that may justify departing from the presumptive sentence are
present, a court must exercise its discretion and consider the factors.” State v. Kier, 678
N.W.2d 672, 677 (Minn. App. 2004). But “the mere fact that a mitigating factor is present
in a particular case does not obligate the court to place defendant on probation.” State v.
Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted). And a “district court
is not required to explain its reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence.” State v.
Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
In considering whether to grant a dispositional departure, the district court must
consider the defendant ’s “particular amenability to individualized treatment in a
probationary setting.” State v. Trog , 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). Relevant
considerations, known as the Trog factors, may include the defendant’s age, prior record,
remorse, cooperation, attitude in court, and the available support network of friends or
family. Id. A district court is not required to depart “from a presumptively executed prison
sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to
probation.” State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Minn. App. 2009).
Quall argues that the district court relied on mistaken informatio n in denying his
motion for departure, asserting that his criminal history showed amenability to probation,
and that the district court erroneously believed Quall was “intentionally misrepresenting

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his past .” But, there is substantial support in the record supporting the district court’s
determination that Quall is not amenable to probation. In State v. Carter, this court held
that the defendant was not particularly amenable to probation because he had five criminal-
history points from prior convictions, had been in treatment programs before but only
completed one, and had two DWI convictions. 424 N.W.2d 821, 824 –25 (Minn. App.
1988). Quall had a criminal -history score of three points, was assigned to probation in
fourteen separate cases since 2000, and had th ree drug possession charges in the past five
years. Although he was ordered to follow through with probation in order to finish the
presentence investigation, he failed to do so. At the time of sentencing, h e was charged
with additional crimes and had warrants for his arrest. Quall’s extensive history with
probation, his refusal to participate in the presentencing investigation as ordered, and his
new charges, show that probation had not rehabilitated him. But see State v. Hickman, 666
N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. App. 2003) (noting that, when an offender is able to comply with
probation conditions, probation affords offenders the benefit of rehabilitation). The district
court was well within its discretion in denying Quall’s motion for departure and executing
the presumptive sentence.
Further, the district court was properly concerned with whether Quall took
responsibility for his criminal conduct. Cf. id. (“Admitting guilt, and taking responsibility
for one’s criminal conduct, is a critical factor in an offender’s amenability to treatment.”).
The district court stated that it was concerned with Quall’s criminal history and his arrest
prior to sentencing on a separate charge. The district court noted that Quall did not disclose
this arrest, even though it was the reason Quall appeared before the judge. After admitting

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during his plea hearing that his terroristic -threats conviction rendered him ineligible to
possess a firearm, he argued at sentencing that he did not know that the charge made him
ineligible. At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that it was concerned about
the things Quall told him about his prior criminal history, as well as the things he was not
telling the court. Because the offender’s ability to take responsibility is a relevant factor
in determining whether an offender is particularly amenable to probation, it was proper for
the district court to comment on Quall’s lack of forthrightness. When determining whether
an offender is particularly amenable, “credibility determinations are crucial, [and] a
reviewing court will give deference to the primary observations and trustworthiness
assessments made by the district court.” State v. Aviles -Alvarez, 561 N.W.2d 523, 527
(Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. June 11, 1997).
Because of Quall’s prior criminal history, lack of success with probation, lack of
follow-through with probation during the presentence investigation, further criminal
charges while awaiting sentencing, and failure to take responsibility for his conduct, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Quall’s motion for a downward
departure.
Affirmed.