Daniel Leith Renville, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1392

Daniel Leith Renville, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 10, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-12-852

Daniel Leith Renville, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jenna Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Brat vold, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg , Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Daniel Leith Renville appeals from an order denying his petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that the district court erred by denying relief without an

2
evidentiary hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate- counsel claim, and by
denying relief on grounds that his claim is time-barred. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 13, 2013, a jury found appellant guilty of first-degre e criminal sexual
conduct. Appellant directly appealed, arguing that the distric t court erred by excluding
evidence that illuminated appellant’s relationship with the victim, and by allowing the state
to impeach him with prior felony convictions. State v. Renville , A13-1265, 2014 WL
3799058, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 4, 2014), review denied (Minn. Oct. 14, 2014). Appellant
argued pro se that his trial counsel admitted his guilt in the presence of the jury and failed
to obtain exonerating evidence. We affirmed appellant’s convic tion, holding that the
district court did not abuse its d iscretion in its evidentiary rulings, that the evidence was
sufficient to support appellant’s conviction, and that a thorou gh review of the record
showed appellant’s pro se claims to lack merit. Id. at *1, *4.
On March 5, 2015, appellant p etitioned for postconviction reli ef, alleging that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to obtain exonerating
evidence and witnesses. The distr ict court denied appellant’s petition for postconviction
relief. Appellant appealed that decision, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel in his direct appeal. Renville v. State, A15-1223, 2016 WL 3222834, at
*1 (Minn. App. June 13, 2016). Specifically, appellant argued that his appellate counsel
was ineffective in not ordering pretrial transcripts and for failing to argue that appellant’s
trial counsel was ineffective for not advising him of a plea of fer. Id. We affirmed the
denial of appellant’s petition for postconviction relief, decli ning to consider appellant’s

3
ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel argument because appellant did not include this
argument in his postconviction petition. Id. (citing Azure v. State, 700 N.W.2d 443, 447
(Minn. 2005) (“It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal
from denial of postconviction relief.” (quotation omitted))).
Appellant again petitioned for postconviction relief on June 11, 2018, requesting an
evidentiary hearing, and arguing th at his appellate counsel was ineffective both for not
having ordered pretrial transcr ipts and for not arguing that ap pellant’s trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer.
The postconviction court conclu ded that appellant’s claims of error concerning the
issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the direct appeal were known but not
raised during appellant’s direct appeal and are therefore proce durally barred from
consideration in a s ubsequent petition for postconviction relie f. Alternatively, the
postconviction court concluded, after a thorough analysis of th e record, that appellant did
not allege facts that, if proven, would entitle appellant to relief and therefore an evidentiary
hearing is not warranted on appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims.
Finally, the postconviction court determined that appellant’s c laims are not so novel that
their legal basis was not reasonably available to counsel at th e time of appellant’s direct
appeal, and that fairness does not require a postconviction pro ceeding given the nature of
appellant’s claims. It denied appellant’s petition for postconviction relief.
This appeal followed.

4
D E C I S I O N
A district court may deny a petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary
hearing if “the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that
the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2018). We review the
denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well as a request for an evidentiary hearing,
for an abuse of discretion. Henderson v. State, 906 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Minn. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 271 (2018).
Where a direct appeal has been taken, all matters raised therei n, and all claims
known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction
relief. State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). Also not considered are claims
that were not known, but should have been known at the time of the direct appeal.
Hathaway v. State, 741 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 2007). Claims that were raised, or could
have been raised, in a previous postconviction petition are als o procedurally barred.
Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn. 2015).
Appellant, by his own admission, discussed his trial counsel’s alleged failure to
communicate a plea offer and the need for pretrial transcripts with his appellate counsel at
the time of his direct appeal. As the postconviction court noted, appellant cites in his 2015
brief to this court conversations between himself and appellate counsel where counsel
allegedly told him that there is not “a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”
Appellant also argued in that brief that counsel refused to look into his claim and appellate
counsel would not accept his ideas about such issues raised on direct appeal. Appellant
specifically referred to his knowledge of the plea-communication issue before in his direct

5
appeal, and his latest brief to this court reflects the same. These issues, known to appellant
at the time of his direct appeal, are Knaffla-barred. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741.
Regardless of whether appellant could have raised his ineffecti ve-assistance-of-
appellate-counsel claim on direct appeal,1 appellant’s claim is still Knaffla-barred because
the claim could have been raised in appellant’s previous postco nviction petition. See
Colbert, 870 N.W.2d at 626 (stating that the Knaffla rule bars consideration of claims that
were raised, or could have been raised, in a previous postconviction petition).
There are two recognized exceptions to the Knaffla bar, but neither is applicable
here. First, a postconviction court may consider a claim that was previously known but not
raised on direct appeal if the claim is so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably
available at the time of direct appeal. Roby v. State, 531 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn. 1995).
Appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is not nove l at all, and its legal basis
was clearly evident at the time of his direct appeal. Second, a postconviction court may
consider a claim when fairness requires it and the petitioner d id not “deliberately and
inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal.” Id. (quotation omitted). Appellant has
not provided a colorable explanation for why he did not raise t hese claims in either his
direct appeal or in his first postconviction petition, and fair ness does not require
consideration of these claims.

1 When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim can be determi ned on the basis of the
trial record, it must be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred. Andersen v. State,
830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). But when the claim requires the court to consider
evidence outside the trial record, it is not Knaffla-barred. Id.

6
The district court acted within its discretion in denying appel lant’s petition for
postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, because t he record conclusively
shows that appellant is not entitled to postconviction relief.
Affirmed.