Ronnie Jerome Jackson, III, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1393

Ronnie Jerome Jackson, III,
Appellant,

vs.

Michelle Smith,
Respondent,

Keith Ellison,
Respondent.

Filed April 15, 2019
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-18-487

Ronnie Jerome Jackson, III, Stillwater, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison , Attorney General, Kelly S. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Ronnie Jerome Jackson, III appeals the district court’s denial of his writ
of habeas corpus petition, arguing the district court erred when it concluded the Minnesota
Department of Corrections (DOC) did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2012, appellant was committed to the commissioner of corrections for 115
months following a conviction for first -degree arson. On November 26, 2013, appellant
spat on two correctional officers as the officers were removing a mattress from his cell. As
officers restrained appellant, he resisted and attempted to bite the hand of a third
correctional officer.
On November 27, 2013, appellant was served with a notice of violation, an offender
rights list, and a witness request list. The notice of vi olation informed appellant that he
was being charged with disobeying a direct order, d isorderly conduct, and assaulting staff
with a weapon. Appellant was advised of the hearing date and his right to attend the
hearing. He was also informed that he may face criminal charges for the November 26
incident. Appellant refused to sign the notice of violation and remained silent.
On December 3, 2013, a disciplinary hearing was held. Appellant did not attend the
hearing and a denial was entered on his behalf. At the hearing, the notice of violation,
incident reports, and a video of the incident were entered into evidence. The hearing officer
found appellant guilty of the violations by a preponderance of the evidence; appellant was

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assigned 540 days in segregation and 180 days of extended incarceration. Appellant was
informed of his right to appeal the decision to the warden but he did not appeal.
In January 2018, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus naming warden
Michelle Smith, Minnesota Correctional Facility -Oak Park Heights, and the Minnesota
Attorney General, as respondents. Appellant alleged that the DOC violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self -incrimination and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process by failing to grant him immunity during the disciplinary hearing. Appellant sought
a writ releasing him from the additional 180 days of incarceration imposed as a resul t of
the disciplinary hearing.
The district court denied the habeas petition, concluding that because appellant was
not disciplined for remaining silent, his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated. The
district court found appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment claim to be duplicative of the Fifth
Amendment claim and dismissed the Minnesota Attorney General as a respondent.
This appeal follows. Appellant challenges only the dist rict court’s decision
regarding his Fifth Amendment rights.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant contends that the district court erred in concluding that the DOC did not
violate his Fifth Amendment rights by failing to offer him immunity during the disciplinary
hearing. “A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty . . . may apply for a writ
of habeas corpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint.” Minn. Stat. § 589.01
(2016). A writ of habeas corpus may also be used to challenge conditions of confinement
or to raise claims involving fundamental constitutional rights or significant restraints on

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liberty. Guth v. Fabian, 716 N.W.2d 23, 26-27 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 15, 2006).
In reviewing an order denying a habeas petition, this court gives great weight to the
district court’s findings of fact and will uphold the findings if they are reasonably supported
by the evidence. Northwest v. LaFleur , 583 N.W.2d 589, 59 1 (Minn. App. 1998). This
court, however, reviews questions of law de novo. Id.
The DOC did not violate appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights.
Appellant contends that the DOC violated his Fifth Amendment rights because he
was not granted immunity for his testimony at the disciplinary hearing. The Fifth
Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The privilege allows an individual to
refuse to “‘answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal,
formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future crimi nal
proceedings.’” Minnesota v. Murphy , 465 U.S. 420, 426 , 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1141 (1984)
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S. Ct. 316, 322 (1973)).
For the Fifth Amendment privilege to apply, “two distinct elements must be
present—compulsion and incrimination.” Johnson v. Fabian, 735 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn.
2007). Only statements that are compelled and that present a “real and appreciable” risk
of incrimination are prohibited by the privilege. Id. (quotation omitted).
“Compulsion” is present “when the state attaches sufficiently adverse consequences
to the choice to remain silent that a person is compelled to speak.” Id. at 300. “[W]hen a
State compels testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional

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privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment
. . . .” Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805, 97 S. Ct. 2132, 2135 (1977).
In addition to “compulsion,” the Fifth Amendment requires that “the information
the claimant would be compelled to divulge is incriminating.” Johnson, 735 N.W.2d. at
309 (emphasis added). “Answers that would in themselves support a conviction or that
would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant are
incriminating for purposes of the privilege.” Id.
Appellant focuses on Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1557
(1976), in which an inmate claimed that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because
an adverse inference was drawn from his silence during a prison disciplinary hearing. The
court held that the Fifth Amendment could only be violated where the prisoner’s silence,
“standing alone and without r egard to the other evidence,” had resulted in discipline. Id.
at 318, 96 S. Ct. at 1557 -58. In its explanation, the court noted that while disciplinary
hearings are not criminal proceedings, “if inmates are compelled in those proceedings to
furnish testimonial evidence that might incriminate them in a later criminal pr oceeding,
they must be offered whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege and may not
be required to waive such immunity.” Id. at 316, 96 S. Ct. at 1557 (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that because he was informed that he may face cr iminal charges
for the incident, the DOC should have granted him immunity at the disciplinary hearing.
Although he was informed he might face criminal charges, the DOC did not compel
appellant to testify. The DOC’s policy provides that an inmate has the right to be present
at the discipline hearing, but the inmate is not required to attend. If an inmate refuses to

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attend, the hearing proceeds without him; there are no negative consequence s for an
inmate’s decision not to testify. The hearing officer must make findings solely on the
information presented at the hearing and the preponderance of the evidence standard
continues to apply. The DOC therefore did not compel appellant’s testimony by penalizing
him for his silence; rather, the DOC penalized appellant solely for his conduct.
Because appellant was not compelled to testify, his Fifth Amendment rights were
not violated. The district court properly applied Minnesota and United States Sup reme
Court law and did not err.
Affirmed.