In Regards to the Conditional Use Permit Application of Mark H. Bauman.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1403

In Regards to the Conditional Use Permit Application of Mark H. Bauman.

Filed June 10, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Wright County Planning Commission
File No. PR2018-0000258

Mark Thieroff, Siegel Brill, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relators Aaron and Jean
Milton)

Scott T. Anderson, Kristin C. Nierengarten, Rupp, Anderson, Squires & Waldspurger,
P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Wright County)

Mark H. Bauman, Delano, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Delano Sportsmen’s Club, Delano, Minnesota (respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm the grant of a conditional use permit (CUP) to respondents to construct
and operate a shooting range, because we conclude that the use is authorized and the
conditions are not inconsistent with the Wright County zoning ordinance.
FACTS
On March 8, 2018, respondent Mark H. Bauman filed an application for a CUP to
operate a shooting range on property located in Wright County. The property is owned by
respondent Delano Sportsmen’s Club (the club) and located along the border of Wrig ht
County and Hennepin County. At the time the application was filed, the club had been
operating a shooting range directly on the other side of the county line in Hennepin County
for over 50 years. The club sought to expand the shooting range onto the property in Wright
County, and applied for a CUP to construct and operate three trap ranges, a parking lot,
and a building.
The Wright County Planning Commission (the planning commission) held four
public hearings on the CUP application. The planning c ommission received submissions
and heard testimony both in support of and against the proposed shooting range. Several
neighboring landowners, including relators Aaron and Jean Milton, submitted letters
opposing the application. The members of the public opposed to the project submitted a
petition signed by 98 residents summarizing their concerns, including increased noise,
safety problems, and that the property was not suitable to be used as a shooting range. The
Milton’s counsel also submitted a letter that argued that the use as a shooting range and

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proposed gravel parking lot were not permitted under the zoning ordinance. Members of
the club, representatives of the school district, and other members of the public supported
the proposal, arguing it wo uld benefit the high school trap shooting teams and that the
shooting would not substantially increase from the current level at the existing range in
Hennepin County.
On July 19, 2018, the planning commission held the final public hearing on the CUP
application. After closing the hearing to further comments from the public, a motion was
made and seconded to direct the county attorney and staff to draft proposed findings and
conditions for approving the CUP application. The planning commission voted 5 -2 to
adopt the motion. On April 9, the planning commission adopted the findings and
conditions for approval and granted the CUP. This certiorari appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
We review the grant of a CUP under a deferential standard because counties have
“wide latitude in making decisions about special use permits.” Schwardt v. C ounty of
Watonwan, 656 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn. 2003). We independently review a county’s grant
of a CUP “to determine if it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capr icious.” Loncorich v. Buss,
868 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. App. 2015). A county acts unreasonably if the reasons for
its decision are legally insufficient or lack a factual basis in the record. RDNT, LLC v. City
of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75-76 (Minn. 2015).

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I. The use is authorized under the zoning ordinance.
The Miltons argue that the use approved in the CUP is not permitted under the zoning
ordinance. The property is zoned General Agriculture (AG)/Residential -Recreational
Shoreland (S -2). Under the zoning ordinance, one of the uses that is conditionally
permitted in this zone is commercial outdoor recreation. Wright County, Minn., Zoning
Ordinance § 155.048(D)(13) (2018) (WCZO). The Miltons argue that the shooting range
does not fall under the definition of “commercial outdoor recreation.”
The interpretation of an ordinance is a question of law that this court reviews de
novo. Prior Lake Aggregates, Inc. v. City of Savage , 349 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. App.
1984). The goal of our interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislative body. State
v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017) (interpreting city ordinance). When
interpreting an ordinance, “we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.”
Id. (quotation omitted). The ordinance should be read and construed as a whole, with each
section interpreted in light of the surrounding sections to prevent a conflict. Am. Family
Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616 N.W. 2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000). If the ordinance is
unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d at 556.
The WCZO defines “commercial outdoor recreation” as “[c]ommercial recreation
which requires large land areas or location in a rural setting such as golf courses, driving
ranges, flea markets, shooting ranges and the like, but not to include campgrounds, nor
recreational vehicle camps.” WCZO § 155.003(B)(119) (2018). The ordinance also
provides a definition of “commercial recreation,” which is a use that is conditionally
permitted in other zones. The ordinance defines commercial recreation as including “all

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uses such as bowling alleys, driving ranges and movie theaters that are privately owned
and operated with the intention of earning a pro fit by providing entertainment for the
public.” WCZO § 155.003(B)(118) (2018).
The Miltons acknowledge that a shooting range is a conditionally permitted use
under the definition of “commercial outdoor recreation.” But they argue that the definition
of “commercial outdoor recreation” incorporates the definition of “commercial recreation.”
They assert that based on the incorporation of that definition, “commercial outdoor
recreation” must also be “operated with the intention of earning a profit by provi ding
entertainment for the public.” They argue that because the club is both a registered
nonprofit and membership based, it cannot meet the definition of commercial recreation
because it is not intended to earn a profit and provide entertainment to the public.
The county argues that the planning commission appropriately rejected this
argument because “commercial recreation” and “commercial outdoor recreation” are
distinct uses that are permitted in different zoning districts. We agree with the county.
“Commercial recreation” and “commercial outdoor recreation” are separately defined in
the zoning ordinance and permitted in different zoning district s. The definitions are in
distinct subdivisions and do not reference one another; “commercial outdoor recreation” is
not a subsection of “commercial recreation” as the Miltons contend. See WCZO
§ 155.003(B)(118), (119). The property is located in a General Agriculture
(AG)/Residential-Recreational Shoreland (S -2) zone, and one of the uses that is
conditionally permitted in this zone is commercial outdoor recreation. WCZO
§ 155.048(D)(13). Because the zoning ordinance authorizes the property for use for

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commercial outdoor recreation, and a shooting range falls under the definition of
commercial outdoor recr eation, we conclude that the planning commission did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in granting the CUP.
II. The conditions of the CUP are not inconsistent with the zoning ordinance.
The Miltons argue that the condition of the CUP that permits the parking lot to be
composed of “a hard surface such as gravel or bituminous” is impermissible under the
WCZO. The WCZO requires that off-street parking “shall be improved with a durable and
dustless sur face.” WCZO § 155.081(A) (2018). The ordinance further provides that
“[d]urable and dustless surface may include crushed rock and similar treatment for parking
accessory to one -, two -, three - and four -unit residential structures; all other uses shall
utilize asphalt, concrete or other surface (water -sealed) as approved by the Zoning
Administrator.” Id. The Miltons argue that the approved gravel parking lot does not
constitute a parking lot utilizing “asphalt, concrete or other surface (water-sealed).”
The county argues that the parking -lot condition is not a basis to reverse the grant
of the CUP because the parking -lot material still needs to be approved by the zoning
administrator. We agree. The WCZO leaves final approval for the materials of a park ing
lot to the zoning administrator, see id., and the zoning administrator has not issued a permit
for construction of the parking lot. The zoning administrator is required by the ordinance
to “[e]nfore and administer” the WCZO and therefore there is no reason to suggest that he
will issue a permit that is contrary to the zoning ordinance. WCZO § 155.025(B)(1)
(2018). And when the zoning administrator issues a permit for the parking lot, relators
may appeal the decision to the board of adjustments if they believe the approved material

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is unauthorized by the ordinance. WCZO § 155.026(B)(1) (2018). Because a final
decision has not been made, we conclude that the condition addressing the parking lot for
the shooting range does not warrant reversal of the CUP.
Affirmed.