State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1417

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antonio Rashod Baker,
Appellant.

Filed September 3, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-20315

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Adam E. Petras, Special Assistan t Hennepin County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. M artin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Sc hellhas, Judge; and
Peterson, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
After the victim of a robbery identified appellant Antonio Baker as one of the men
who robbed him, Baker was charged with the offense. Before trial, Baker sought to exclude
evidence of the out-of-court identification. The district court admitted the evidence, ruling
that, while the identification procedure was unnecessarily sugg estive, the victim’s
identification was nonetheless reliable. After a jury trial, Ba ker was convicted of first-
degree aggravated robbery. He now appeals, arguing (1) that the district court erred by
admitting the identification evidence and (2) that, even if the evidence was admissible, it
was insufficient as a matter of law to prove his identity as th e perpetrator beyond a
reasonable doubt. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 29, 2016, at around 2:30 in the morning, M.M. was walking along East 29th
Street in Minneapolis when he was approached from behind by two men. The men took
from him a backpack that contained, among other things, a cell phone. The robbery was
violent—M.M. was punched, kicked, and threatened with a gun. Af ter the men ran away,
M.M. used a second cell phone, which had been in his pocket and was not taken from him,
to call 911.
During the 911 call, which was conducted through an interpreter , M.M. provided
descriptions of the men, said that one of them had a gun, and told the operator the direction
in which they ran. M.M. described the men as black, one about 3 0 and the other about 35
or 38 years old. He said that one of the men had long hair but did not describe the other’s

3
hair. While his description of the ir clothing was somewhat jumbled, he made it clear that
one man was wearing a white tee shirt and the other was wearing a white sweatshirt. M.M.
also said that one man was wearing black pants and the other wa s wearing blue shorts or
pants. The 911 call ended when a police officer arrived at the scene.
Shortly after the police officer met M.M. at the scene, other o fficers responding to
the 911 call arrested two men, Baker and Frank Blount, several blocks away. The officers
found a cell phone in Blount’s pocket. M.M. was then driven to the site of the arrest, where
he was shown the cell phone and identified it as his. The police then led Baker and Blount,
separately, to the front of the squad car in which M.M. was sit ting so that he could see
them. M.M. identified Baker and Blount as the two men who had robbed him.
A few days later, Baker was charged with one count of first-deg ree aggravated
robbery, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2014). After an omnibus hearing,
the district court ruled that the show-up identification procedure was unduly suggestive but
that M.M.’s identification of Baker was admissible. Baker was t ried before a jury, which
deadlocked, leading to a mistrial. Baker was retried and found guilty. The district court
entered a conviction on the verdict and sentenced Baker to 41 months’ imprisonment.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err by admitting evidence of the identification.
Baker’s first argument is that the district court denied him due process by admitting
evidence of the identification.

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A. Legal standard and standard of review
In general, “[e]videntiary rulin gs rest within the sound discre tion of the [district]
court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discreti on.” State v. Amos , 658
N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). Bu t “substantive due process proh ibits the admission of
eyewitness identifications the police obtained through unnecessarily suggestive procedures
that create a substantial like lihood of misidentification.” State v. Hill , 871 N.W.2d 900,
907 (Minn. 2015). To evaluate the permissibility of an identification procedure, courts use
a two-step test. The first step requires the court to determine whether the identification
procedure was “unnecessarily suggestive.” State v. Taylor, 594 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Minn.
1999). If the procedure was unne cessarily suggestive, the court then must determine
whether it caused a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “Whether a . . . government action violates substantive due process is
a constitutional question” that is subject to de novo review. State v. Rey, 905 N.W.2d 490,
495 (Minn. 2018).
The state argues that Baker, in his briefing, relies on evidenc e from trial that was
not introduced at the omnibus hearing and that the standard of review is therefore plain
error, because Baker did not again move for exclusion of the id entification after the trial
evidence became known. See State v. Griller , 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)
(describing plain-error test for evaluating an assertion of error not raised before the district
court). But the only mention of M.M.’s trial testimony that app ears in this portion of
Baker’s argument is counterfact ual: Baker notes what M.M. would have said if he had
testified at the suppression hearing. Though Baker, in his briefing, does place great weight

5
on M.M.’s trial testimony, he does so in support of his argument that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the jury’s conviction. Baker’s argument against admission of the show-
up identification evidence does not rely on M.M.’s testimony at trial, and so plain-error
review does not apply.
B. The evidence at the omnibus hearing
At the omnibus hearing, the sta te introduced testimony from two officers who
responded to the 911 call and exhibits consisting of the recording and transcript of M.M.’s
911 call, squad-car video of the identification, and a map of t he area. At the beginning of
the hearing, defense counsel stipulated that, for the purposes of the hearing, when M.M.,
during the 911 call, used the word translated as “t-shirt,” he actually meant “tank top,” and
that, when M.M. used the word translated as “sweatshirt,” he actually meant “t-shirt.”
The first witness to testify was Officer Charles Cape. Cape said that, when he spoke
to M.M. at the scene, M.M. described the two men who attacked h im as black men, one
with a bald head and a white shi rt, the other with dread-locked hair. M.M. told Cape that
he was confident he could recognize the men. After this brief conversation, another squad
car reported that they had two possible suspects, so Cape drove M.M. to their location for
a show-up. Both the drive to the location and the show-up itself were recorded by the squad
vehicle’s camera. Cape testified that he did not say anything t o M.M. outside of the
recording that could have influenced M.M.’s identification during the show-up.
The squad video shows the drive to where Baker and Blount were being detained.
In the video, when Cape and M.M. arrive, another officer walks up to M.M.’s window,
outside the view of the camera, a nd asks M.M. for the passcode to his phone. The officer

6
leaves, then walks back, and asks M.M., “Is that yours?,” apparently referring to the stolen
phone. M.M. responds, “Yes.” After some further conversation about the phone, Cape says
to M.M., “We’ve got some guys here. They’re gonna pull them out. They can’t see you. I
just need you to tell me if . . . that’s the person that did th is, okay?” Baker, handcuffed, is
walked in front of the squad vehicle by a police officer. He is illuminated both by headlights
from the squad car recording the show-up and by a spotlight on the side of a nearby
ambulance. He has a shaved head and is wearing a white tee shir t and gray sweatpants.
M.M. can be heard identifying him as one of his assailants. Then Blount, also handcuffed,
is taken from another police vehicle; he has mid-length dreadlocks and is wearing a white
tank top and black shorts with white stripes. M.M. says that the second man also is one of
the men who attacked him. M.M. finally says that he believes that the first man—Baker—
had the gun. The video then ends.
The state’s second witness was Officer Luke Eckert. He describe d the search for
suspects that he conducted. After briefly driving around the ar ea, Eckert and his partner
saw two men, both wearing white shirts, one of whom had dreadlocks. The police officers
stopped the men, and other officers arrived. The officers then found the victim’s phone in
Blount’s pocket. Eckert did not testify about the conduct of the show-up itself.
C. The identification evidence was admissible.
After hearing argument from the parties, the district court rul e d t h a t , w h i l e t h e
identification procedure was unnec essarily suggestive, the tota lity of the circumstances
nonetheless established that the identification was reliable. T he district court declined to

7
suppress either the show-up identification or any in-court iden tification of the defendant
by M.M.
1. The identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.
A procedure is unnecessarily suggestive if “the defendant was u nfairly singled out
for identification.” State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. 1995). One-person show-
ups and single-photograph line-ups are recognized as being sugg estive, but not per se
unnecessarily suggestive. Taylor, 594 N.W.2d at 161-62; Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d at 921. But
when police single out a suspect “from the general population based on a description given
to them by the victim, and then proceed[] to present him to the victim, in handcuffs, for
identification in a one person show-up,” such presentation is q uite likely to be
unnecessarily suggestive. Taylor, 594 N.W.2d at 162.
Here, the state concedes that the procedure was unnecessarily s uggestive, and we
agree. The procedure here closely followed Taylor’s description of an unnecessarily
suggestive show-up: Baker was singled out from the general popu lation, handcuffed, and
shown to M.M. under police control, surrounded by police vehicles. Cf. id. (describing, in
dicta, an unnecessarily suggestive show-up). Further, just befo re the show-up, M.M. was
shown a phone (which he identifie d as his), implying that it ha d been recovered from the
men that he was about to be shown. Cf. State v. Anderson , 657 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Minn.
App. 2002) (holding that an ide ntification procedure was unnece ssarily suggestive when
police comments “suggested to the eyewitness that the police actually had one of the
burglars in custody”).

8
2. The identification procedur e did not create a substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
The parties’ dispute focuses on the second prong. “An unnecessa rily suggestive
identification procedure does not preclude admission of the identification testimony unless
there is a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id. at 851. To determine
whether identification evidence is reliable despite improper procedure, courts are instructed
to examine the totality of the ci rcumstances via five factors. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d at 921.
The five factors are:
1. The opportunity of the witn ess to view the criminal at
the time of the crime;
2. The witness’ deg ree of attention;
3. The accuracy of the witne ss’ prior description of the
criminal;
4. The level of certainty demons trated by the witness at the
[show-up];
5. The time between the crim e and the confrontation.
Id.
a. Opportunity to vie w the perpetrator
Whether a witness had a good opportunity to view a perpetrator is evaluated based
on the amount of time that the witness could see the perpetrator, State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d
903, 913 (Minn. 1996) (holding that this factor cut against adm ission where the witness
had only a brief opportunity to view the perpetrators), the adequacy of the lighting and the
witness’s distance from the perpetrator, Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d at 922 (holding that this factor
favored admission when the witness saw the perpetrator “during daylight hours from
relatively close range”), and whether the two faced each other, Seelye v. State, 429 N.W.2d
669, 673 (Minn. App. 1988) (holding that this factor favored ad mission when the witness

9
saw the perpetrator “through a glass door on a well-lit porch,” talked “face-to-face” with
the perpetrator, and “saw him as he pushed his way into the house”).
Here, M.M. had an adequate, if not perfect, opportunity to view the men who robbed
him. While the robbery did occur at night, this fact does not automatically mean that M.M.
lacked the opportunity to view the robbers. See McDuffie v. State , 482 N.W.2d 234, 236
(Minn. App. 1992) (holding that the victim of a nighttime robbe ry had an opportunity to
view his assailants), review denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1992). Though the men approached
him from behind, M.M. was able to see enough to know that one had a gun. And M.M. was
also in very close proximity to the men—close enough that they could punch him—a fact
that also favors M.M.’s opportunity to view the robbers. Thus, M.M.’s opportunity to view
the robbers weighs, albeit not heavily, in favor of admission.
b. Degree of attention
Baker argues that the facts of this crime suggest that M.M. wou ld not have paid
close attention to the robbers, because the presence of a weapon can lead a witness to focus
on the weapon rather than other c ircumstances, and because the assault on M.M. would
have led him to focus on defending himself rather than on the p hysical characteristics of
the robbers.
Caselaw has not established that the presence of a weapon neces sarily reduces a
victim’s degree of attention. In the case Baker relies upon, th e witness testified to having
focused on the weapon. Jones, 556 N.W.2d at 913. That is not the case here.
And the fact that a strange or threatening event occurs has, in other cases, been
deemed to lead a victim to pay closer attention to surrounding circumstances. See, e.g.,

10
State v. Lushenko, 714 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. App. 2006) (reasoning that a stran ge and
suspicious event led the witness to pay a high degree of attent ion), review denied (Minn.
Dec. 12, 2006). Here, the fact that M.M. was robbed by two men likely led him to pay a
higher degree of attention to the men than he would have had they merely been passersby.
Several cases treat this degree -of-attention factor as inquirin g into whether the
witness’s attention was impaired in some way. State v. Adkins, 706 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Minn.
App. 2005) (holding that this factor weighed in favor of admiss ion because the witness
“was coherent, aware, and attentive”); Seelye, 429 N.W.2d at 673 (holding that a witness
paid adequate attention to a per petrator despite having consume d four or five beers and
having smoked half a joint). In this case, M.M.’s conversations with the 911 operator and
Officer Cape indicate that M.M. was “coherent, aware, and attentive.” Adkins, 706 N.W.2d
at 63.
The degree-of-attention factor weighs in favor of admitting the identification.
c. Accuracy of prior description
The third factor is the accuracy of prior descriptions. M.M. described his assailants
as two black men, one around 30, the other in his later 30s. One man was wearing a white
tank top, the other was wearing a white tee shirt; one had long black pants, the other had
blue shorts; one had dreadlocks, and the other was bald. The on ly part of this description
that did not match Baker and Blo unt was the pants: Baker was we aring gray sweatpants,
and Blount was wearing black shorts with white stripes.
Baker argues that the accuracy of the description does not weig h i n f a v o r o f
admissibility because M.M.’s description to the 911 operator did not match Baker’s pants

11
and because M.M. did not describe his assailants’ height, weigh t, facial features, or skin
tones. But one inaccurate detail does not make a description un reliable as a whole. See
Seelye, 429 N.W.2d at 673 (classifying a description as “on the whole , accurate” even
though “[t]he height was off, and [the witness] did not notice a mustache”). And, while
there are cases in which a witne ss provides a high degree of de tail, see, e.g., Ostrem, 535
N.W.2d at 918, less detailed descriptions have also been held t o favor admission. For
example, in State v. Adkins, a burglar was described as “an older African-American man
who had ‘larger lips and larger e ars,’ and who was wearing a la rge coat.” 706 N.W.2d at
61. The Adkins description provided no more des criptiveness than did the desc ription in
this case, and the accuracy of that description was deemed to favor admission. Id. at 63.
Thus, Baker’s sweatpants notwithstanding, M.M.’s description of his assailant was
a sufficiently accurate descripti on of Baker to we igh in favor of admission of the
identification evidence.
d. Level of certainty
The fourth factor is the witness’s level of certainty. At oral argument, Baker’s
attorney argued that M.M. actually was not certain, because he only said that he was certain
in response to a question by O fficer Cape and not independently . But the fact that M.M.
was asked if he was certain does not weigh against reliability. In cases where uncertainty
has weighed against reliability, the witness has affirmatively expressed such uncertainty.
See, e.g., Seelye, 429 N.W.2d at 673 (quoting the witness as saying, “If this ma n had a
thinner mustache and weighed 160 pounds and about five foot sev en inches, I would say
that’s definitely your man,” and noting that the defendant was “five foot nine”); Jones, 556

12
N.W.2d at 906, 913 (holding that a witness’s statement that she wasn’t “sure if that’s him
or not because [she] really didn’t get a good look at his face” weighed against reliability).
M.M. did not express any uncertainty when he said that Baker wa s one of the men who
robbed him. And when Officer Cape asked if he was certain, M.M. said that he was. Thus,
it is clear that M.M. was certain.
Nonetheless, Baker argues that this court should give this factor less weight because
social-science research has shown that there is little relation s h i p b e t w e e n a w i t n e s s ’ s
certainty and the accuracy of an identification. But Baker cites no caselaw suggesting that
this court may adjust the law according to social-science research. This court is “bound by
supreme court precedent.” State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018). Previous
attempts to persuade this court to change the rules regarding a dmission of identification
evidence have been rejected because “we are an error-correcting court and it is not the role
of this court to abolish established judicial precedent.” Adkins, 706 N.W.2d at 63. We
cannot, and therefore will not, alter the established test. M.M .’s certainty in his
identification favors the reliability of the identification.
e. Temporal proximity
The final factor is the amount of time between the observation and the identification.
A period of 48 hours between the observation and the identification has been held to favor
admission of an identification. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d at 922. Here, the identification took
place within 30 minutes of the crime, so it strongly favors reliability.

13
Overall, despite the unnecessar ily suggestive method of conduct ing the
identification, M.M.’s identification of Baker was sufficiently reliable to be admitted, and
the district court did not err by admitting it.1
II. The evidence is sufficien t to support the conviction.
Baker argues that his conviction must be reversed because the e vidence is
insufficient to prove his identity as one of the perpetrators.
A. Standard of review and legal standard
As an initial matter, the state a rgues that, so long as out-of- court identification
evidence is admissible, its sufficiency is a question of credibility for the jury, to which this
court must defer.
The state’s argument is not wholly without support. The United States Supreme
Court has suggested that, if an unnecessarily suggestive identi fication process results in
evidence that is nonetheless admissible because of its independent reliability, the evidence
is sufficient to prove identity as a matter of law, and whether to rely on it becomes a jury
question. Manson v. Brathwaite , 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2254 (1977) (“[W]e
cannot say that under all the circumstances of this case there is a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification. Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh.”
(quotation omitted)). And in State v. Gluff, a case on which Baker relies in arguing against
the sufficiency of the evidence, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded for

1 Baker argues that this court should consider the fact that thi s was a cross-racial
identification, which he argues is a factor that can reduce the reliability of an identification.
But, as discussed above, this court lacks the authority to change the law. The supreme court
set out a five-factor test, so this court applies the five-factor test.

14
a new trial, instructing the district court to consider the adm issibility of the lineup
identification in light of several supreme court cases regardin g the admissibility of
identifications that are made via suggestive procedures. 172 N. W.2d 63, 65-66 (Minn.
1969). Thus, even t hough the court in Gluff described the identification as being without
“probative value,” id. at 65, its holding, in fact, concerned admissibility, not sufficiency.
But there is Minnesota caselaw a nalyzing the sufficiency of evi dence separately
from its admissibility. See, e.g., State v. Stauffacher, 380 N.W.2d 843, 848-50 (Minn. App.
1986) (determining, first, that an identification was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict
and, second, that the identification was admissible), review denied (Minn. Mar. 21, 1986).
And there does not appear to be caselaw explicitly holding that t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f a n
identification may not be considered apart from the admissibility of such an identification.
Thus, we will address Baker’s ar gument that the evidence was in sufficient as a matter of
law to sustain the jury’s verdict.
“In considering a claim of insuf ficient evidence, this court’s review is limited to a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jury to reach the verdict it
did.” State v. Yang , 627 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn.
July 24, 2001). “The general rule in Minnesota is that a witness must have an opportunity
for accurate observation.” State v. Hicks, 380 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Minn. App. 1986). “[A]
conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness.” State v.
Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 20 04) (quotation omitted). But, wh en there are

15
“additional reasons to question th e victim’s credibility,” corr oboration may be required.
See id. (describing cases in which there were reasons to question the victim’s credibility).
B. The trial evidence
At trial, M.M. testified to the robbery and his identification of Baker. M.M. testified
that he spoke with Officer Cape until Cape received a call sayi ng that other officers had
picked up two people and wanted M.M. to identify them. Police t old M.M. that they had
found a phone, and M.M. identified it as his. M.M. described identifying Baker and Blount
as his attackers. However, M.M. also admitted that he lost his glasses when the assault
started and had not recovered them, so he recognized the men on ly by their clothing,
hairstyles, and physical stature.
O n c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , M . M . s a i d t h a t h e h a d d e s c r i b e d o n e o f t he men as bald
during the 911 call and that he had initially described one of the men’s pants as black but
later corrected himself to say that they were gray. The transcr ipt of the call shows that he
only described one man as having long hair and did not mention the other man’s hairstyle;
it also does not contain any mention of gray pants. Finally, M. M. agreed that, during the
assault, it was pitch-black outside, the men started punching h i m w i t h i n s e c o n d s o f
arriving, he immediately covered his face to protect it, and he had never seen either of the
men before the robbery.
Other evidence at trial showed that Baker was found with Blount near the scene of
the robbery and that M.M.’s cell phone was found on Blount.

16
C. The evidence is sufficient.
The evidence of M.M.’s identification of Baker as the perpetrator, his presence with
Blount near the scene immediately after the robbery, and the presence of M.M.’s cell phone
on Blount tend to show that Baker was one of the perpetrators. Baker argues that the
evidence is insufficient because M.M.’s identification of him w as insufficient. Although
he does not describe them as such, Baker identifies four reason s that were “additional
reasons to question the victim’s credibility.” See id. Specifically, he argues that M.M.’s
identification (1) was based on a limited opportunity to view the robbers, (2) was adversely
affected by stress, (3) was not bolstered by his confidence, an d (4) was likely influenced
by the suggestive police procedure.
Baker’s first argument is that M.M. had a limited opportunity t o view the robbers.
But, in each of the cases on which Baker relies, this court con cluded that an eyewitness
had an adequate opportunity for accurate observation when the witness saw the perpetrator
“face-to-face for several minutes.” Yang, 627 N.W.2d at 672; Hicks, 380 N.W.2d at 873.
Here M.M. testified that he struggled with the two men for 5 or 10 minutes and that,
throughout the confrontation, all three were close enough for p unching and grappling.
These circumstances gave M.M. an adequate opportunity to view the men who robbed him.
Baker next argues that the presence of a gun during the robbery inherently means
that M.M.’s identification was adversely affected by stress, re lying on State v. Gluff , in
which an eyewitness’s identifica tion was held insufficient in p art because the robber
pointed a gun at the eyewitness. 172 N.W.2d at 64-65. But the c ourt in Gluff d i d n o t
speculate that the gun may have c aused the eyewitness stress; i t relied on the witness’s

17
testimony that, once the gun was pointed at her, “her eyes were riveted on the gun.” Id. at
64. In contrast, M.M. testified that he was barely able to see the gun, which was pointed at
his back. M.M.’s identification is not insufficient under Gluff.
Baker’s third argument—that M.M.’s certainty in his identificat ion does not make
it sufficient—is unsupported by any citation to legal authority . None of the cases Baker
cites considering the sufficiency of eyewitness testimony relie s on the eyewitness’s
certainty as a factor. And, because the general rule is that su fficiency depends on the
adequacy of the eyewitness’s opportunity for observation, Hicks, 380 N.W.2d at 873, our
analysis does not depend on M.M.’s certainty in any event.
Baker’s final argument is that the suggestive identification procedures so tainted the
identification as to render it insufficient to support the jury ’s verdict. This argument is
similarly unsupported by a citation to governing law and essent ially transposes his
argument against admissibility int o the context of sufficiency. But this court has not
considered the suggestiveness of an identification procedure wh en evaluating the
sufficiency of the identification. See Yang, 627 N.W.2d at 672-73; Hicks, 380 N.W.2d at
873. The suggestiveness of a lineup goes to admissibility, not sufficiency, and Baker’s
attempt to rely on it here fails.
The evidence of M.M.’s identification of Baker as one of his robbers was sufficient
to support the jury’s verdict.

18
III. Baker’s pro se arguments
Baker submitted a pro se supplemental brief. It begins by listi ng 15 issues.2 Some
of the issues have no apparent connection to this appeal, some lack any record support, and
some have already been argued by Baker’s appellate counsel. But it does not appear that
any of these issues are argued in the rest of his brief.
After the initial list of issues, the first portion (and the ma jority) of Baker’s brief
consists of a series of citations to hearing transcripts or the state’s brief. These are
accompanied by, first, either a quotation or sentence fragment summarizing that part of the
record and, second, a case citation. But the cases he cites hav e no apparent connection to
any relevant issue, and Baker does not even assert error, much less provide argument
connecting the cases he cites to the portions of the record he identifies. “An assignment of
error in a brief based on mere assertion and not supported by a rgument or authority is
waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Wembley , 712
N.W.2d 783, 795 (Minn. App . 2006) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 728 N.W.2d 243 (Minn.
2007). Thus, the first portion of Baker’s brief fails to present any reviewable claim of error.
Following this portion of his brief, Baker appears to assert tw o errors. First, he
asserts that he was found guilt y “with unconstitutional jury in structions, tainted false
evidence (identification), and no physical evidence.” But the o nly cases he cites are

2 These are, as identified by Baker: 1. Theories; 2. Hearsay; 3. Racial Profiling; 4. Racial
Discrimination; 5. Wrongful Arrest; 6. Brady Violation; 7. Spoliation of Evidence;
8. Suppressed Evidence; 9. Destr uction of Evidence; 10. Lack of Evidence; 11. Double
Jeopardy; 12. Perjury; 13. Tampering of Evidence; 14. Wrongful Imprisonment; and
15. Conspiracy.

19
Slutzker v. Johnson , 393 F.3d 373 (3rd Cir. 2004), which concerns the requirements for
prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and a trio of cases concerning alternative-
perpetrator evidence: Troxel v. State, 875 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2016); State v. Jones, 678
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2004); and State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 1977). These cases
do not appear to support his assertion of error in any way, and Baker provides no argument
explaining his citation to them.
Finally, he asserts that the identification was unduly suggesti ve and that M.M. did
not say anything about one of the robbers being bald until after the show-up procedure. But
the record shows that M.M. told Officer Cape that one of the ro bbers was bald before the
show-up took place. And the argum ent that the show-up identific ation was inadmissible
has been considered and rejected above.
Affirmed.