The holding in the court’s own words
On this record, we hold that Meta has not shown any reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had the state previously disclosed the report.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Scanlon 719 N.W.2d 674
- State v. Palubicki 700 N.W.2d 476
- State v. Spann 574 N.W.2d 47
- State v. Kaiser 486 N.W.2d 384
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1434
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Biyalfew Fekado Meta,
Appellant.
Filed July 29, 2019
Affirmed
Ross, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-3686
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
Forty-year-old senior-center employee Biyalf ew Meta followed a sixteen- year-old
coworker outside the workplace. Meta grabbed the teenager’s penis and buttocks, kissed
2
him, and engaged in a humping action against his body . An investigating police sergeant
testifying at Meta’s trial for fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct spoke about a report he
had written summarizing a meeting he had with the juvenile victim and supportive adults
three months after the assault. The prosecutor had not known about the report and so had
not provided it to Meta’s attorney. The jury found Meta guilty. Meta argues on appeal that
the district court should have ordered a mistrial for the discovery violation. We affirm
because the violation did not prejudice Meta’s defense or result from egregious conduct.
FACTS
In spring 2017, a sixteen-year-old boy began work at a St. Paul senior living center.
One evening when he took out the garbage, fellow employee Biyalfew Meta followed him
to the dumpster. Meta told the boy, “I love you,” put his hand on his lower back, and told
him that “everything is okay” and would “be all right.” Meta grabbed the boy’s penis over
his clothes with one hand and grabbed his buttocks with the other. Meta then began a
humping motion against the boy. The boy tried to push Meta away and open the door, but
the door was locked. The boy banged on the door for help, and Meta kissed him several
times on the lips. Meta said again, “Everything’s gonna be all right .” Meta pulled a key
from his pocket and unlocked the door.
The boy left crying and reported Meta’s conduct to family members, who contacted
police. The state charged Meta with fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota
Statutes, section 609.3451, subdivision 1(1) (2016). Meta pleaded not guilty.
The prosecutor presented the state’s evidence at trial and rested. Meta called the
lead investigator, Sergeant Darren Johnson, to testify. The sergeant testified about a report
3
he wrote summarizing a meeting three months after the incident with the boy, his mother,
his uncle, and a victim advocate. The prosecutor had not known about the report and
therefore had not provided it to the defense. Meta’s counsel moved for a mistrial but told
the district court that he was “an experienced attorne y” who could “deal with this.” The
district court denied the motion. The jury found Meta guilty.
Meta appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Meta argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion
for a mistrial based on the discovery violation. The state concedes that the prosecutor had
a duty to disclose the report. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(3)(c) (requiring prosecutor
to disclose police reports). But it defends the district court’s decision not to order a mistrial
as a remedy. We revi ew a district court’s decision whether to impose sanctions for
discovery violations for an abuse of discretion. State v. Scanlon, 719 N.W.2d 674, 685
(Minn. 2006).
Meta argues that the violation prejudiced his case. Unless a defendant can show that
he was prejudiced by a discovery violation, a new trial is generally unwarranted. State v.
Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489 (Minn. 2005). And the defendant is not prejudiced unless
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had
the violation not occurred. State v. Spann, 574 N.W.2d 47, 53 (Minn. 1998). The record
supports the district court’s finding that the violation caused Meta’s defense no prejudice.
The district court ordered a recess after the omission was revealed. Meta’s counsel
reviewed the previously undisclosed report, questioned the sergeant who wrote the report,
4
and cross-examined him about the information in the report. The district court concluded
that the attorney then “aptly pointed out to the jury that some of this information was not
produced previously.” On this record, we hold that Meta has not shown any reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different had the state previously disclosed
the report.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Meta’s assertion on appeal that defense counsel
might have taken a different approach when cross-examining the victim had the disclosure
been timely. He identifies nothing in the report that suggests his questioning about it would
have led to different testimony. He does imply that having the report sooner would have
bolstered the “cultural misunderstanding” defense argued by trial counsel, but we see no
basis for thinking so; the jury heard and implicitly rejected the defense, and Meta has not
shown how an earlier disclosure would have added anything to the argument.
Meta argues that even if we find no prejudice, we should overturn his conviction in
the interests of justice. We recognize that some violations are so unjust that, even without
a showing of prejudice, reversing a conviction is fitting to curb the manifest bad faith of
the prosecutor. See, e.g., State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384, 386–87 (Minn. 1992). This is
certainly no such case. The prosecutor was unaware of the report, the report did not contain
any apparently exculpatory information, and, by all accounts, the omission was inadvertent.
There being no prejudice or egregious prosecutorial concealment, we affirm the
district court’s refusal to order a mistrial.
Affirmed.