A18-1453 Precedential Affirmed Processed

In re the Marriage of: Sheila L. Duhn, n/k/a Graff, petitioner, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed June 24, 2019

The holding in the court’s own words

We conclude that the district court did not err by finding that Graff demonstrated a need for spousal maintenance or by determining the amount of the maintenance award.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1453

In re the Marriage of:
Sheila L. Duhn, n/k/a Graff, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Kurt D. Duhn,
Appellant.

Filed June 24, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-15-460

John R. Hill, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Shane C. Perry, Perry & Perry, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Presiding Chief Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Sheila L. Graff and Kurt D. Duhn were married for approximately 23 years before
their marriage was dissolved. The district court ordered Duhn to pay Graff permanent
spousal maintenance in the amount of $1,31 6 per month. We conclude that the district

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court did not err by finding that Graff demonstrated a need for spousal maintenance or by
determining the amount of the maintenance award. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Graff and Duhn were married in June 1994. They have three children, all of whom
now are adults. Graff petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in January 2015. At that
time, she was 48 years old, and Duhn was 52 years old.
The case was tried on multiple partial days between April and October 2016. In
early 2017, the district court dissolved the marriage and determined that Graff is entitled
to an award of permanent spousal maintenance but reserved ruling on the amount of the
award because each of the parties was unemployed. The district court scheduled a review
hearing for September 2017 and ordered Duhn in the meantime to pay Graff temporary
spousal maintenance of $617 per month.
After conducting the review hearing, the district court issued its final order in July
2018. The district court found that Graff’s net monthly income is $2,649, which consists
of a disability retirement benefit of $1,703 and imputed income of $946, which is the
amount the district court found she could earn by working part -time. The distr ict court
found that Graff’s reasonable monthly expenses are $4,400. Accordingly, Graff would, on
her own, have a monthly deficit of $1,751.
The district court found that Duhn’s net monthly income is $ 5,762 and that his
reasonable monthly expenses are $4,881. Accordingly, the district court found that Duhn
has a monthly surplus of $881.

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In the final paragraph of its analysis, t he district court noted that Duhn’s monthly
surplus “is not enough for Wife to meet her reasonable budget.” The district court
concluded as follows: “The Court finds that it is reasonable to have each of them share
this shortfall. Thus, Husband should pay maintenance of $881 + $435 = $1,316 a month.
This will leave Wife $435 short of her budget and Husband $435 short of his bud get.”
Accordingly, the district court set the amount of the award of permanent spousal
maintenance at $1,316. Duhn appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Duhn argues that the district court erred in two ways. His first argument challenges
the district court’s ruling that Graff is entitled to an award of permanent spousal
maintenance. His second argument challenges the district court’s determination of the
amount of the award of permanent spousal maintenance.
Spousal maintenance is defined by statute to mean “an award of . . . payments from
the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the other.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2018). If a party requests spousal maintenance, a district
court engage s in a two -step analysis. First, a district court must consider whether the
spouse seeking spousal maintenance either:
(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reasonable
needs of the spouse considering the standard of livi ng
established during the marriage, especially, but not limited to,
a period of training or education, or

(b) is unable to provide adequate self -support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circumstanc es, through appropriate

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employment, or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2018). This threshold inquiry asks, in essence, whether the
party seeking spousal maintenance has demonstrated a “showing of need.” Curtis v. Curtis,
887 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 2016). A party demonstrates a need for spousal maintenance
if, considering the standard of living during the marriage, the party is unable to provide for
his or her reasonable expenses through employment income or disability benefits or a
combination of both. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1; Doherty v. Doherty, 388 N.W.2d
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, 2-3 (Minn. App. 1986). “Once a spouse has made a sufficient showing of need, only
then will a court consider the amount and duration of a maintenance award by weighing
the factors enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2.” Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 252. If
a district court awards spousal maintenance, its award “shall be in amounts and for periods
of time, either temporary or permanent, as the court deems just, . . . after considering all
relevant factors.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2018); see also Erlandson v. Erlandson,
318 N.W.2d 36, 39-40 (Minn. 1982).
A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to award spousal
maintenance, and this court reviews such a decision for a clear abuse of that discretion.
Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 252. A district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact
that are not supported by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the matter in a manner
that is contrary to logic and the facts on record . Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202
(Minn. 1997). To the extent that a maintenance decision dep ends on findings of fact, this

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court applies a clear-error standard of review to those findings of fact. Gessner v. Gessner,
487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. App. 1992).
A.
Duhn first argues that the district court erred by awarding spousal maintenance on
the ground that Graff did not demonstrate that she is in need of spousal maintenance. He
contends that she did not demonstrate a need for spousal maintenance because the district
court found that her claimed expenses were unreasonable and there is no evidence to
support the district court’s findings of her reasonable expenses.
Graff submitted a proposed monthly budget with 34 categories of expenses, totaling
$6,785 per month. The dis trict court made the following finding concerning Graff’s
proposed budget:
Wife presented a budget of monthly living expenses of
$6,785 which the Court finds is not reasonable under the
circumstances. The Court finds that her rent should be no more
than $1,350 rather than $1,650. There is no substantiation for
most of her expenses. The Court finds that there is no basis to
conclude that her related housing expenses such as electricity
and gas should be more than what Husband pays for a house.
She is not entitled to include the cost of cell phones for her
children. Her grocery bill at $550 a month is high and the
Court finds that $300 is more reasonable. Given the lack of
resources, it is not reasonable for her to buy life insurance since
her children a re now adults. It is also unreasonable to spend
$340 a month on gifts. She has provided no documentation to
support her alleged expense for gas and she has testified that it
is difficult for her to travel which makes it unclear as to why
she would be driving so much.

Duhn contends that the “finding that [Graff’s] proffered budget was unreasonable
and unsubstantiated is fatal to any award of spousal maintenance.” In essence, he contends

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that the evidence is insufficient to show that she has any reasonable expenses in excess of
her income and, thus, she has not established a need for spousal maintenance.
In response, Graff contends that there was considerable evidence in the record about
both parties’ expenses, both in the form of exhibits and testimony. Graff also contends that
Duhn’s own attorney suggested that, in the absence of any other source, the district court
should use Duhn’s reasonable expenses as a guide in determining Graff’s reasonable
expenses. Indeed, the record reveals that , during the Se ptember 2017 review hearing,
Duhn’s attorney made the following suggestion to the district court with respect to this
issue:
[I]f you look at what [Graff’s] reasonable budget is and how it
differs from Mr. Duhn’s, using his budget as a standard that
that’s the standard at which her budget could be and adjusting
her need because of the differences between their living
expenses. . . . If you were to use Mr. Duhn’s budget as the ruler
and then adjust down for those expenses she doesn’t have like
spousal maintenance of $617. She doesn’t pay property taxes
of $573 a month, which Mr. Duhn pays.

The district court responded to the suggestion favorably:

Yeah. But she has other expenses that he doesn’t have. . . . She
has medical expenses that he doesn’t have. Okay. I hear what
you’re saying. . . . You’ve now explained to me one way I
could consider doing this, which is to use Mr. Duhn’s budget
as a baseline and subtract things off that she d oesn’t have to
pay.

The district court implemented Duhn’s suggesti on in its finding by stating, in the
penultimate sentence, “Certainly his expenses are a guide, and the Court has assumed many
of those.” In short, Duhn asked the district court to do exactly what Duhn now argues is
error. If it is an error, it is an inv ited error and, thus, is not a ground for reversal . See

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Majerus v. Guelsow, 113 N.W.2d 450, 457 (Minn. 1962); McAlpine v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 158 N.W. 967, 970 (Minn. 1916); In re Hibbing Taconite Mine and Stockpile
Progression, 888 N.W.2d 336, 344 (Minn. App. 2016).
Thus, the district court did not err on the ground that its finding of Graff’s reasonable
monthly expenses is without a sufficient evidentiary basis.
B.
Duhn also argues that the district court erred by “equalizing” his monthly surplus
and Graff’s monthly deficit when determining the amount of the maintenance award . He
characterizes the district court’s approach as “applying the doctrine of ‘sharing the pain’”
and asserts that there is no legal authority for that approach.
The district court found, either impliedly or expressly, that, given the parties’
respective incomes and reasonable expenses, Graff would have a monthly deficit of $1,751,
and Duhn would have a monthly surplus of $881. The district court essentially identified
the mid-point between those two outcomes , a monthly deficit of $435 , and imposed that
outcome on both parties by ordering Duhn to pay Graff $1,316 per month in permanent
spousal maintenance. Duhn contends that the sharing -the-pain approach, as he describes
it, “has not been explicitly adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court.” Our research
confirms the truth of that statement. It also is true, however, that the supreme court has not
disapproved of a spousal-maintenance award that resembles the award in this case.
We resolve Duhn’s argument by reference to general principles. “The purpose of a
maintenance award is to allow the recipient and the obligor to have a standard of living that
approximates the marital standard of living, as closely as is equitable under the

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circumstances.” Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation
omitted). “The maintenance order shall be in amounts . . . as the court deems just.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2. The amount is to be determined by considering multiple factors.
Id. A district court must balance the recipient’s need against the obligor’s ability to pay.
See, e.g., Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d at 38-40. A district court has “broad discretion” in the
matter. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 252, 254. The supreme court has stated that “ equity does
not demand absolute parity in . . . post-dissolution positions” but also has stated that “the
bulk of the economic burden should not be visited on o ne party without regard to the
parties’ standard of living during the marriage.” Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 198
(Minn. 1987). There is no caselaw stating that, in imposing a spousal -maintenance
obligation on a party who would have a monthly surplus by himself or herself , a district
court may not award maintenance in an amount that would cause the obligor to experience
monthly deficits. The matter simply is not subject to bright lines; it depends on the
circumstances of the case. See Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 254.
In this case, the district court found that the parties’ standard of living in the later
years of their marriage was no longer sustainable given the significant reduction in each
person’s income. T he district court determined that the sum of the parties’ incomes was
less than the sum of the parties’ reasonable expenses. The court determined that “it is
reasonable to have each of them share this shortfall.” Although the district court did not
elaborate on why that is a reasonable outcome, it is apparent that the district court exercised
its discretion and considered the relevant factors in the course of fixing the amount of
permanent spousal maintenance. Although the district court might reasonably have chosen

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to award a lesser amount, th ereby preserving more of Duhn’s standard of living at the
expense of Graff’s, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion not to do so.
Thus, the district court did not err by ordering permanent spousal maintenance in
the amount of $1,316 per month.
Affirmed.