Veterine Nicole McGhee, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1478

Veterine Nicole McGhee, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 13, 2019
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-19846

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief, appellant argues that the
postconviction court should have granted her plea withdrawal based on the inaccuracy of

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her plea because the factual basis failed to establish that, by her conduct, she knowingly
encouraged, caused, or contributed t o her children need ing protection or services. We
affirm.
FACTS
On June 1, 2014, Minneapolis police officers visited a residence in response to a
call requesting a welfare check. Officers met with the caller at the residence, who told the
officers that she had been caring for the two children of her neighbor, appellant Veterine
Nicole McGhee, and could no longer do so. No other suitable caregiver could be located,
so the police took the children to St. Joseph’s Home for Children.
The children received an intake interview, a medical exam, and met with a child -
protection worker. One of the intake staff observed red marks and scarring on the body of
one of the children. When questioned by staff, the child stated that appellant hit her with
a belt, broom, and a hanger. The state charged appellant with one count of gross
misdemeanor malicious punishment of a child and one count of gross misdemeanor
endangerment of a child.
The district court deemed appel lant incompetent to stand trial and suspended the
criminal proceedings. Appellant later regained competency, and the district court
reinitiated the proceedings in her case. Appellant reached a plea agreement with the state
in which she agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of contributing to her children’s
need for protection or services under Minn. Stat. § 260C.425, subd. 1(a) (201 2). As part
of the plea agreement, the state dismissed the two original charges.

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At the plea hearing, appellant offered, in her own words, the following on-the-record
account of the incident:
On June 1, 2014 . . . I picked up my kids from their grandma’s
house, my neighbor is the one wh o keep, who - - on June 1,
2014, I left my home and left my kids in the [care] of my
boyfriend Cyrus. . . to go out into the community, and yes, I did
use some substances while out in the community.
I passed out on. . . 32nd and Emerson. I got tooken [sic] to the
hospital [and] was hospitalized overnight. My boyfriend which
is Cyrus. . . who had my children wanted to come to the
hospital and bring my medication because the doctors, you
know, searched my stuff, found my phone, called my home and
they wanted him to bring the medications I was on so they
could see what medicine I was on because they were trying to
figure out what was wrong with me. He asked my neighbor
next door to keep an eye on the baby while he went to the
hospital and she ended up giving him to St. Joe’s. So what I’m
trying to get at here is if -- no, I did not do drugs in my home
around my children, I always got a babysitter so I can go out
and do what I wanted, but yes, I did use controlled substances
and it made me unable to make it home to my children and I
ended up being at the hospital and –

Defense counsel interrupted appellant and asked “[a]nd that caused child protection
to be involved?” To which appellant responded, “[t]h at caused them to be in St. Joe’ s,
because if I had been home with them none of this would ever happen.” The district court
asked appellant if she understood which rights she relinquished by signing the plea
agreement. Appellant responded affirmatively, adding , “I can plead guilty to that charge
and know that tha t’s something I had done but I wasn’ t going to plead guilty to things I
don’t feel like I really did.” The district court sentenced appellant to a stay of imposition
for a period of two years with several conditions.

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On March 23, 2018, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that
she entered an invalid guilty plea and should be allowed to withdraw it. Appellant argued
that the factual basis of her guilty plea did not demonstrate that she encouraged, caused, or
contributed to her children needing protection or services. The postconviction court denied
appellant’s petition, determining that appellant failed to present evidence to dispute the
facts t hat arose from the plea hearing and that the record demonstrated no abuse of
discretion by the district court. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The postconviction court did not err in determining that a sufficient factual
basis supported appellant’s guilty plea.

Appellant argues that she entered an inaccurate guilty plea, constituting a manifest
injustice, because the plea record does not prove that she encouraged, caused, or
contributed to her children’s need for protection or services. 1 We disagree.
Whether a guilty plea is valid is a question of law which we review de novo. State
v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). The court shall allow a defendant to withdraw
a plea of guilty upon a timely motion and proof, to the satisfaction of the court, that
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
A manifest injustice exists if a defendant enters a constitutionally invalid guilty plea.

1 Normally, a determination of the mental state required by a statute precedes an analysis
as to whether appellant entered an accurate guilty plea pursuant to that statute. See State
v. Mikulak , 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 -04 (Minn. 2017). This would require us to address
appellant’s second argument (whether she entered a valid guilty plea when the plea record
failed to show that she knew her conduct would subject her to criminal liability) first;
however, because our discussion of the first issue resolves the second issue, we address
appellant’s issues in their original order.

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Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A guilty plea is constitutionally valid if it is accurate ,
voluntary, and intelligent. Id. To be accurate, a guilty plea must have a proper factual
basis. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). The factual-basis requirement
is satisfied if the record contains credible evidence supporting a jury verdict that the
defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as to which she has pleaded guilty. State v.
Genereux, 272 N.W.2d 33, 34 (Minn. 1978).
Minn. Stat. § 260C.425, subd. 1(a), provides that “[a]ny person who by act, word,
or omission encourages, causes, or contributes to the need for protection or services is
guilty of a gross misdemeanor.” The statute recognizes sixteen different circumstances in
which a child is deemed to be “in need of protection or services.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007,
subd. 6(1) -(16) ( 2012). A child meets the statutory definition of “a child in need of
protection or services” under § 260C.007, subd. 6, only if one of t he enumerated child -
protection grounds exists and the child needs protection or services as a result. In re
Welfare of Child of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 732 (Minn. App. 2009).
The amended complaint prepared pursuant to the plea agreement fails to indicate
which of the 16 enumerated child-protection grounds is implicated in the charge. Appellant
argues that two of the 16 circumstances “are arguably relevant” to the facts of her case;
namely when children:
(1) [are] abandoned or without parent, guardian, or
custodian; . . . [or]

(3) [are] without necessary food, clothing, shelter,
education, or other required care for the child [ren’s]
physical or mental heal th or morals because the

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child[ren’s] parent, guardian, or custodian is unable or
unwilling to provide that care[.]

Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(1), (3) (emphasis added). The state argues that, in addition
to the two circumstances above, the following circumstances apply:
(8) [the children are] without proper parental care
because of the emotional, mental , or physical disability, or
state of immaturity of the child[ren’s] parent, guardian, or other
custodian; [or]

(9) [the defendant] is one whose behavior, condition, or
environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the
child[ren] or others. An injurious or dangerous environment
may include, but is not limited to, the exposure of a child to
criminal activity in the child[ren’s] home.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8)-(9). Because proof of only one circumstance is required
to find appellant guilty under Minn. Stat. § 260C.425, subd. 1(a), we will analyze the plea
record under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8), as it is the most applicable to the facts of
this case.
Appellant admitted that “none of this would have happened if I wouldn’t have went
out into the community and used [controlled substances] and I had been home with my
children.” The record also contains additional evidence that satisfies the definition of “in
need for protection or services ” under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8). See Lussier v.
State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. 2012) (plea petition and discussion may be
supplemented by other evidence to establish factual basis necessary for guilty plea).
Specifically, the complaint reflects appellant’s physical disability through a report of her
chemical dependency . Further, the Competence to Proceed Evaluation demonstrates
appellant’s mental disability through the evaluator’s opinion that appellant suffers f rom

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mental illness. Because t he record as a whole contains evidence to support appellant’s
guilty plea under Minn. Stat. § 260C.425, subd. 1(a), the postconviction court did not err
in determining that a sufficient factual basis supported appellant’s guilty plea.
II. The postconviction court did not err in determining that appellant entered a
valid guilty plea.

Appellant argues that she entered an invalid guilty plea because the plea record fails
to show that she knew her conduct would subject her to criminal liability under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.425, subd.1. Appellant’s argument lacks merit.
Mens rea is the element of a crime that requires that the defendant know the facts
that make her conduct illegal. State v. Rohan, 834 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Minn. App. 2013).
An offense is considered a general-intent crime “[w]hen a statute simply prohibits a person
from intentionally engaging in the prohibited conduct.” State v. Jama, 923 N.W.2d 632,
634 (Minn. 2019) (citing State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012)) (other citation
omitted). In contrast, “[a] specific-intent crime requires a mental state above and beyond
any me ntal state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime .” Id. (citations
omitted). The fact that a statute lacks an intent element does not create a strict liability
crime; rather, it simply creates a general-intent crime. State v. Hart, 477 N.W.2d 732, 736
(Minn. App. 1991).
Appellant contends that Minn. Stat. § 260C.425, subd.1 (a), does not expressly
contain a mens rea element and that interpreting the statute without a mens rea “would
criminalize a broad range of otherwise legal conduct.” She requests that t his court read a
mens rea element into the statute and conclude that a person can only be guilty of the

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offense if the person knows that their conduct will contribute to a child’s need for
protection or services. In essence, appellant requests that we read into the statute a specific-
intent element. This is not necessary because appellant’s plea colloquy sufficiently
demonstrated that her actions satisfy the language of Minn. S tat. § 260C.425, subd. 1(a),
because she testified that she left her children in the care of her boyfriend so that she could
use controlled substances, and this “caused [her children] to be in St. Joe’s.” Even if we
were to read into the statute a specific-intent element, appellant’s existing plea coll oquy
demonstrates specific intent. Appellant admitted that she “can plead guilty to that charge
and know that tha t’s something [she] had done.” Because appellant’s plea colloquy
satisfies the statute as written, the postconviction court did not err in de termining that
appellant entered a valid guilty plea.
Affirmed.