State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1510

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Juan Carlos Garcia Morales,
Appellant.

Filed July 22, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-17-505

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen Heaney, Sherbu rne County Attorney, Samuel Wertheimer I I, Chief Deputy
County Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Lof tus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Sche llhas, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Early one morning in February 2017, appellant Juan Carlos Garc ia Morales ran a
red light, causing a fatal car accident. Officers applied for and received a search warrant

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for Garcia Morales’s blood. His blood tested positive for amph etamine and
methamphetamine. Garcia Morales moved to suppress the results of the blood test because
the search warrant lacked probable cause. The district court denied his motion, and Garcia
Morales was convicted of criminal vehicular homicide and reckle ss driving following a
jury trial. On appeal, Garcia Morales challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress the results of his blood test. We affirm.
FACTS
Around 7:55 one morning in February 2017, appellant Juan Carlos Garcia Morales
was involved in a two-vehicle collision at the intersection of County Road 81 and Highway
10 in Sherburne County. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement responded to the scene. At
the time of the crash, it was li ght outside and the road condit ions were good. Two
witnesses’ statements established that Garcia Morales ran a red light and crashed into the
side of another car, killing the driver.
According to witnesses, following t h e a c c i d e n t , G a r c i a M o r a l e s appeared to be
dazed. But he was oriented to time and place and able to answe r law enforcement’s
questions. When asked about the crash, Garcia Morales stated t hat “somebody ran a red
light,” but he did not know if it was him or the other driver. He said that he was distracted
at the time of the crash, because he was thinking about an argu ment he had with his
girlfriend earlier that morning. After seeing the severity of the crash, Garcia Morales
became less cooperative. He asked about the other driver. Garcia Morales’s demeanor at
the scene of the accident did not suggest that he was under the influence of alcohol. While

3
in the ambulance, Garcia Morales was asked if he remembered wha t happened, and he
responded that he did not. He was then taken to the hospital.
At the hospital, Minnesota State Patrol Sergeant David Stadthe r interviewed Garcia
Morales. Sergeant Stadther testified that Garcia Morales went in and out of consciousness
and would need to be woken up. After being asked about what co lor the light was at the
time of the crash, Garcia Morales answered that he did not know , according to Sergeant
Stadther, and denied that he had been drinking. At some point during the interview, Garcia
Morales lost consciousness and became unresponsive.
Meanwhile, Captain Sam Olson of the Big Lake Police Department w e n t t o t h e
address listed on Garcia Morales ’ s d r i v e r ’ s l i c e n s e i n a n a t t e mpt to obtain information
about his mental state or whereabouts prior to the crash. Upon arrival at the address,
Captain Olson noticed a car in fr ont of the residence, belongin g to Garcia Morales’s
ex-girlfriend, G.S., but he did n ot receive a response after kn ocking.1 After returning to
his office, he made contact with G.S. via telephone, who report ed that she and Garcia
Morales were no longer dating and that he no longer lived with her, but his mail was still
delivered to her address. G.S. confirmed that Garcia Morales dropped her off at her home
that morning after 7:00. He was upset because he had seen her with another man, according
to G.S.
Captain Olson then asked about Garcia Morales’s drug and alcoh ol use. G.S. replied
that she and Garcia Morales had used methamphetamine on the wee kends together in the

1 Captain Olson testified that he was aware that G.S., Garcia Morales’s ex-girlfriend, lived
at that address.

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past. But when asked about the last time she knew Garcia Morales used methamphetamine,
G.S. responded that she did not know of him using methamphetamine since he was released
from jail in October 2016, four months before. And when Captai n Olson asked whether
Garcia Morales had “used any type of drugs in the last couple days,” G.S. was “hesitant to
answer but stated that she did not believe so.” Captain Olson briefed the lead investigator,
Minnesota State Trooper Jason Curtis, on his conversation with G.S.
Trooper Curtis followed up with G.S., who stated that she and Garcia Morales had
breakfast at a restaurant in Becker that morning. She also con firmed that prior to Garcia
Morales being released from jail in October, they used methamph etamine together. G.S.
stated that they were no longer together. And she admitted that, because she no longer sees
Garcia Morales, she probably would not know if he recently used drugs.
Trooper Curtis then provided the information from his investig ation—including the
information he received from Captain Olson—to Sergeant Stadther, who was assigned to
prepare the affidavit in support of a search warrant for a sample of Garcia Morales’s blood.
When asked about drafting the affidavit, Sergeant Stadther testified that he used a special
search warrant template that had been created for use in drivin g-while-impaired and
criminal-vehicle-operation cases. And that it was his first ti me using this template. The
warrant template used fill-in and drop-down boxes for the information.
The supporting affidavit and app lication for the search warran t stated that at
approximately 7:55 a.m., Garcia Morales was involved in a car c rash, which resulted in

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one fatality. And the application stated that Garcia Morales w as one of the drivers based
upon the following facts:
[Garcia Morales] was observed at the scene by witnesses
driving west on Hwy. 10 running a red light at CR 81.
Witnesses observed him exit his car looking at the vehicle he
hit in a daze. He also advised T/Sgt. Stadther that he didn’t
know what color the light was at the time. It was later learned
from Big Lake Officers that his live in girlfriend [said] that he
has been a know[n] meth user in the past. He had just been in
a verbal domestic with his girlfriend just prior to the crash and
left his residence around 0730. She advised Trooper Curtis that
when he left the residence he didn’t look tired. It is unknown
what he did between the time he left the residence and the time
of the crash, which was around 0755 am. It is also unknown
why he would run a red light at a very open intersection with
good visibility.

The affidavit also stated:

From their investigation, Troopers/officers formed the belief
that at the time of the collision, the suspect [Garcia Morales]
was the driver and was under the influence of alcohol in
violation of Minnesota law based on the following facts:

T/Sgt. spoke with Garcia Morales at the St. Cloud Hospital and
he was unaware of what color light he had. It was later learned
by officers [sic]

At the contested omnibus heari ng, Sergeant Stadther testified that it appeared that
the last sentence was cut off, but he did not know why the rema inder of the sentence was
missing. And while Sergeant Stadther could not explain why the rest of the sentence was
missing, he had no reason to believe that the signing judge had been presented with
anything different. He also testified that the statement in the affidavit about officers having
reason to believe that Garcia Morales was “under the influence of alcohol” at the time of

6
the crash was an error and the affidavit should have stated that there was a reason to believe
that Garcia Morales was “under the influence of drugs.”
After being presented with the application for and affidavit i n support of a search
warrant, the signing judge autho rized a search warrant for a sa mple of Garcia Morales’s
blood. The results of the blood sample test indicated the pres ence of amphetamine and
methamphetamine. Garcia Morales was charged with reckless driv ing and criminal
vehicular homicide.2
Garcia Morales moved to suppre ss the results of the blood test, arguing that: (1) the
search warrant application lack ed probable cause on its face, a nd (2) the search warrant
was invalid because there were material misstatements of facts and omissions that were
made deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth. Following a contested omnibus
hearing, the district court denied Garcia Morales’s motions, finding that the search warrant
was facially valid and that any misstatements or omissions were not material and were not
done deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth. Th e case proceeded to a jury
trial, where Garcia Morales was found guilty on both counts. Garcia Morales appeals.
D E C I S I O N
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that sear ch warrants must
be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. C onst. art. 1, § 10. This
court provides great deference to the district court’s determin ation, and we review only
whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concludin g that probable cause

2 In violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 169.13, subd. 1(a), (c) (reckle ss driving), 609.2112,
subd. 1(a)(6) (criminal vehicular homicide) (2016).

7
existed. State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 384-85 (Minn. 2016). To determine if there
was a substantial basis, this court looks to the totality of the circumstances. State v. Wiley,
366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985). And this court defers to the signing judge,
“recognizing that doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the
preference to be accorded to warrants.” Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 385 (quotations omitted).
G a r c i a M o r a l e s m a k e s t w o a r g u m e n t s a t t a c k i n g t h e b a s i s f o r p r o bable cause: that a
substantial basis did not exist to believe that he operated his car negligently with drugs in
his body, and that material omissions in the affidavit invalida ted the search warrant. We
address each issue in turn.
Substantial Basis
Here, the facts presented to the district court in the search w arrant application
included that Garcia Morales was one of the drivers involved in a fatal crash that occurred
in February 2017 at 7:55 in the morning at the intersection of Highway 10 and County
Road 81. Witnesses observed Garc ia Morales driving west, runni ng the red light, and
crashing into another car. Then, he got out of his car and looked at the other car in a daze.
He did not know what color the light was at the time. The accident occurred after a verbal
dispute with his ex-girlfriend, and he left her house around 7: 30 a.m. The ex-girlfriend
stated that he used methamphetamine in the past. She also stated that Garcia Morales did
not look tired when he left her house that morning. It is unknown both what Garcia Morales
did between when he left his ex-girlfriend’s house and the crash and why he ran a red light
at an open intersection with good visibility. Based upon these facts, the signing judge
authorized the search warrant.

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After reviewing the affidavit in support of the search warrant, and because of the
great deference this court provides to the district court’s decision, we conclude that, based
on the totality of the circumstan ces, there was a substantial b asis to support the district
court’s finding that probable cause existed to support the sear ch warrant for Garcia
Morales’s blood. See Fawcett , 884 N.W.2d at 385. But in our reading of the facts
contained in the affidavit, we give little, if any, weight to G arcia Morales’s past drug use
because the search warrant application does not indicate how long ago in the “past” he used
methamphetamine. And being dazed following a major car accident is not an uncommon
experience. As a result, we accord that fact little weight as well. Disregarding the past
drug use and his dazed demeanor, we turn to the balance of information before the district
court. The affidavit contains the information that the officers formed the belief that Garcia
Morales was the driver and was under the influence of drugs bec ause of their interactions
with him. And it implies that, because there is no other reasonable explanation as to why
Garcia Morales ran a red light, on a clear day, through an open intersection with good
visibility, that the officers suspected drug use by Garcia Morales.
Without question, these facts present a doubtful case of probable cause—a case that
causes us concern. But the resol ution of doubtful or marginal cases “should be largely
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 109, 85 S. Ct. 741, 74 6 (1965). Accordingly—keeping in mind the great
deference given to the district court’s decision and the prefer ence accorded to search
warrants—we determine that a substantial basis existed to suppo rt the district court’s
finding of probable cause to support the search warrant for Garcia Morales’s blood.

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Because the warrant’s affidavit provided a substantial basis to conclude that Garcia
Morales had been under the influence of drugs at the time of th e crash, we conclude that
the district court did not err when it denied his motion to suppress the blood test results.
Material Omissions

Garcia Morales further contends t hat the search warrant was inv a l i d b e c a u s e i t
omitted the fact his “past” drug use was four months prior to the crash and that G.S. stated
that “she didn’t know of [Garcia Morales] using meth” in those four months. Under Franks
v. Delaware, warrants supported by deliberately falsified or misrepresented material facts
lack probable cause. 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676 (1978); see also State v.
Doyle, 336 N.W.2d 247, 250, 252 (Minn. 1983) (including omissions as a form of
misrepresentation). To determine if the warrant is invalidated on these grounds, courts use
a two-prong test: (1) whether the affiant deliberately made statements that were false or in
reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) whether the omission was material. State v.
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn. 2010). An omission is material if , when the
omitted facts are included, the warrant would lack probable cause. Id. We review the first
prong of deliberate misrepresentations under the clearly-errone ous standard, and the
second prong of materiality de novo. Id.
Here, the omitted information about Garcia Morales’s past drug use did not rise to
the level of a material omission. Even if the information dati ng his past known drug use
to October was included in the search warrant application, prob able cause to search his
blood would still remain, as addressed above. Further, if one were to include the omitted
information regarding Garcia Morales not using methamphetamine for four months,

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provided by G.S., we would need to include all of the omitted information provided. This
information includes G.S.’s hesitation in answering the officer’s questions, her caveats that
she “didn’t know if he used meth” in those four months, and her agreement that she
“probably really wouldn’t know if [Garcia Morales] was using dr ugs just because [she
doesn’t] see him.” And when all of the information provided by G.S. is included in the
search warrant application, it does not rise to the level of ma teriality. See Andersen, 784
N.W.2d at 327 (stating that an om ission is material if, when su pplied, “probable cause to
issue the search warrant no longer exists”). Because the omiss ions were not material, we
do not need to reach the issue of whether the omissions were made in reckless disregard of
the truth.3 Id. at 329.
In sum, given the great deference this court gives to the district court’s decision, and
the preference accorded to search warrants, the district court did not err when it found that
probable cause existed to support the search warrant. There was a substantial basis for the
district court to determine that Garcia Morales had been under the influence of drugs at the
time of the crash and the omission of the timing of his past drug use was immaterial.
Affirmed.

3 The application and supporting affidavit for the search warran t contained an incomplete
sentence and a box, which was marked, indicating that officers had a reason to believe
Garcia Morales was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the crash. But there is no
evidence as to what the complete sentence would have stated. A s such, we are unable to
determine whether the omitted in formation is material. And reg arding the incorrectly
marked box, citing the suspected i nfluence of alcohol rather th an drugs, Garcia Morales
concedes that the record supports a conclusion that it was an “ innocent or negligent”
misrepresentation that does not invalidate the search warrant. See State v. Moore , 438
N.W.2d 101, 105 (Minn. 1989) (stating that a search warrant wil l not be invalidated by
innocent or negligent misrepresentations).