State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1525

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ayanna Laverne Coleman,
Appellant.

Filed October 7, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-24719

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin Coun ty Attorney, Jabari Barner, As sistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Lydia Mar ia Villalva Lijó,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judg e; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After smashing the front and rear windshields of her ex-boyfri end’s car with a
landscaping brick, appellant Aya nna Laverne Coleman was convict ed of first-degree

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damage to property. Coleman challenges her conviction on the g rounds that a written
vehicle repair estimate, as the primary evidence of the value o f property damage, was
inadmissible without the testimony of the person who prepared i t. Because we conclude
that Coleman’s substantial rights were not affected by the admission of the repair estimate,
we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Ayanna Laverne Coleman and T.K. were in a relationsh ip. Though how,
when, and by whom is disputed, the relationship ended. 1 Sometime after the relationship
ended, T.K. parked his 2014 Chevy Malibu in front of his apartment building in Brooklyn
Park. When T.K. left the car, it was not damaged.
Later, the caretaker of the apa rtment building—who was outside—saw a “silverish
gray Pontiac” drive up to the front of the building. According to the caretaker, there were
about four or five women in the car talking loudly and laughing. The caretaker observed
one woman get out of the car and throw a decorative landscaping brick at the front
windshield of T.K.’s parked car. The woman then threw a brick at the back windshield.
The caretaker reported the even t to police, and police alerted T.K. that the front and rear
windshields of his car were damaged, as was the body of the car.
The caretaker identified Coleman from a photographic lineup as the woman who
threw the brick at T.K.’s car. The state charged Coleman with first-degree damage to

1 It is disputed as to how long the two were together and who ended the relationship. T.K.
testified that he ended the re lationship and Coleman took it ba dly, but Coleman testified
that she was the one who ended the relationship because of T.K.’s abuse.

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property,2 and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, the district court heard testimony from T.K., several police officers and
detectives, Coleman, and a defense investigator. T.K. testified that Coleman damaged his
car by throwing a brick at the fro nt and rear windshields after he told her that he did not
want to be with her. And during T.K.’s testimony, the state in troduced an automobile
repair estimate indicating that the total damage to his car was $4,354.99. After the $500
deductible, the damage amounted to $3,854.99.
Coleman testified that she had not seen T.K. since they broke up. According to
C o l e m a n , s h e w a s n o t n e a r T . K . ’ s c a r w h e n i t w a s d a m a g e d , a n d she denied being in
Brooklyn Park on the day of the incident.
The jury found Coleman guilty on the count of first-degree dam age to property. The
district court stayed imposition of sentence for three years and ordered Coleman to serve a
20-day workhouse sentence, with credit for time served, as a co ndition of the stayed
sentence. Coleman appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Coleman challenges the district court’s admission of the vehicl e repair estimate
without testimony from the individual who prepared the estimate.3 Specifically, Coleman

2 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(3) (2016) (dama ge reduced the property’s
value by more than $1,000 as measured by the cost of repair and replacement).
3 Coleman also contends that the admission of the repair estimate constituted inadmissible
hearsay. But Coleman did not object to the admission of the estimate at trial, making this
argument subject to plain-error review. State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 649-50 (Minn.
2018). And in applying the plain error standard of review to hearsay evidence, the supreme
court has stated that “[t]he number and variety of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion make
objections to such testimony parti cularly important to the crea tion of a record of the trial

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asserts that the admission of the estimate violated her Confrontation Clause rights because
she was unable to cross-examine t h e p e r s o n w h o p r e p a r e d i t . A ddressing Coleman’s
argument requires us to evaluate whether the Confrontation Clause was violated, a question
of law we review de novo. State v. Warsame, 735 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Minn. 2007).
At trial, Coleman did not object to the admission of the vehicle repair estimate. And
when an alleged error is raised for the first time on appeal, it is subject to plain-error review
and warrants reversal if: (1) an error occurred in the district court, (2) the error was plain,
and (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller , 583 N.W.2d
736, 740 (Minn. 1998). If the defendant satisfies this three-part test, this court asks whether
the error seriously affects “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceeding” before granting relief. State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Minn. 2004).
The district court plainly erred by adm itting the vehicle repair estimate without
testimony from the individual who prepared it.

The Confrontation Clause provides a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; see
also State v. Hull , 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010) (“We apply an identical analy sis
under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses.”). The re are three prongs for a
successful Confrontation Clause claim: (1) the statement at iss ue was testimonial, (2) the

court’s decision-making process in either admitting or excludin g a given statement.”
State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006). Because of the “complexity and
subtlety” of the hearsay rule, the supreme court determined in Manthey that the statements
at issue were not clearly or obviously inadmissible hearsay. Id. Similarly here, given the
lack of objection and the number of exceptions to the hearsay r ule, we conclude that
Coleman has not shown plain error in the admission of the repai r estimate on hearsay
grounds.

5
statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and (3) the declarant was unable
to be cross-examined by the defendant. Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2013)
(citing Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 59 & n.9, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 & n.9
(2004)).
Here, the evidence at issue—the ve hicle repair estimate—was int roduced during
T.K.’s testimony. The evidence consists of three screen shots of the repair estimate from
a cell phone, detailing the cost to repair T.K.’s damaged car. Shown on the estimate is the
name of the body shop. During his testimony, T.K. provided no information as to the
estimate’s origin.
Turning to the first prong of our Confrontation Clause analysis, we consider whether
the vehicle repair estimate wa s testimonial, guided by Minnesot a caselaw. And our
caselaw explains that when evaluating the testimonial nature of evidence, courts look to
the three formulations of “core ” testimonial hearsay mentioned in Crawford—ex parte
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent, extrajudicial statements, and “statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial”—as well as the critical
factor of whether the statement was prepared for trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124
S . C t . a t 1 3 6 4 ; State v. Caulfield , 722 N.W.2d 304, 308-09 (Minn. 2006). When
considering whether a statement was prepared for trial, courts also examine its nature and
substance and whether the document had an evidentiary purpose o f proving a fact.
State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 444 (Minn. App. 2017); see, e.g. , Caulfield,
722 N.W.2d at 307, 309 (holding that a lab report “functioned a s the equivalent of

6
testimony” because it was offered to prove a substance was cocaine). And it is the state’s
burden to prove the evidence was nontestimonial. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 308.
Here, the vehicle repair estimate was prepared for litigation. During trial, a police
detective testified that he directed T.K. to “go and get an estimate to—to complete charging
on [the incident]” because he “needed a damage amount to see what level [the crime] was.”
Accordingly, the vehicle repair estimate was prepared at the di rection of police and was
prepared to prove an essential element of the crime: that the damage reduced the value of
the car by more than $1,000 as measured by the cost of repair a nd replacement.
Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(3). As such, we conclude that t he vehicle repair estimate
“functioned as the equivalent of testimony” on the value of the damage caused to the
vehicle and therefore was testimonial. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309.
Having concluded that the vehicle repair estimate was testimoni al, we turn to the
second prong of our Confrontation Clause analysis: whether the statement was admitted to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. And here, it is clear from the record that the state
offered the vehicle repair estimate to establish the amount of damage to T.K.’s car. The
state introduced the vehicle rep air estimate during T.K.’s test imony to prove that the
damage to the car totaled more than $1,000. And during its clo sing argument, the state
referenced the vehicle repair estimate to prove that it met its burden regarding the element
of loss. Accordingly, it is evident that the vehicle repair es timate was admitted to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.
Finally, considering the third prong of our Confrontation Clause analysis—whether
the defendant could cross-examine the declarant—we conclude that Coleman was unable

7
to cross-examine the person who prepared the vehicle repair estimate. The individual who
prepared the vehicle repair estimate did not testify at trial, leaving Coleman without the
ability to conduct a cross-examination.
Because the vehicle repair esti mate was testimonial, offered fo r the truth of the
matter asserted, and Coleman was unable to cross-examine the declarant, we conclude that
the admission of the estimate violates the Confrontation Clause . And the admission of
evidence that violates the Confro ntation Clause constitutes an error, satisfying the first
prong of the plain-error standard of review. State v. Tscheu , 758 N.W.2d 849, 864
(Minn. 2008).
Having concluded that the distr ict court erred by admitting the vehicle repair
estimate, we turn to whether th at error was plain. Plain error is one that was clear or
obvious, which may be the case if the error “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of
conduct.” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017). Here, the district court’s
error—admitting the vehicle repair estimate without requiring t estimony from the person
who created it—was plain becaus e it violates the Confrontation Clause and caselaw
interpreting and applying it. See Crawford , 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S. Ct. at 1364;
Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 308-09.
The error did not affect Coleman’s substantial rights.
Because the district court plainly erred by admitting the vehicle repair estimate, we
turn to the third prong of the plain error standard of review: whether the error affected
Coleman’s substantial rights. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. It is Coleman’s burden to
establish “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had

8
a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). And “[i]n e valuating the reasonable likel ihood that the erroneously
admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict, this cour t must consider the
persuasiveness of that evidence . . . [and] the manner in which the evidence was presented.”
State v. Jackson , 764 N.W.2d 612, 620 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied
(Minn. July 22, 2009).
Here, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the damage to
T.K.’s vehicle exceeded $1,000. In support of this element, in addition to the repair
estimate, the state introduced photographs of the damage done to the car. The photographs
show a completely shattered back windshield, a significantly da maged front windshield,
and damage to the body of the car. Additionally, an officer te stified that based on his
experience, the damage to the car exceeded $1,000. Given the a dditional evidence of
damage, we do not believe it reasonably likely that the jury’s verdict would have been
different had the error not occurred. As a result, we conclude that Coleman’s substantial
rights were not affected by the admission of the vehicle repair estimate.4 And because
Coleman’s substantial rights were not affected, we affirm her conviction.
Affirmed.

4 Because we conclude that Coleman’s substantial rights were not affected, we do not reach
whether the error seriously affe cted “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceeding.” Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. But even if we had reached the issue,
based upon our review of the record it appears Coleman made a s trategic decision to not
object to the admission of the vehicle repair estimate because it did not fit with her theory
of the case at trial. As such, the interests of justice do not require a new trial.