In re the Marriage of: David Michael Kedrowski, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1529

In re the Marriage of: David Michael Kedrowski, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Olga Kedrowski,
Respondent.

Filed July 1, 2019
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-15-6991

David Kedrowski, Saint Louis Park, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Alex Brusilovsky, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
In this marital -dissolution action, appellant -father argues that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his new -trial motion, refusing to disqualify the judicial
officer for bias, awarding spousal maintenance to respondent-mother, dividing the parties’
debt, awarding parenting time, and awarding conduct-based attorney fees. We affirm.

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FACTS
This appeal arises out of a marital-dissolution action between appellant-father David
Michael Kedrowski and respondent -mother Olga Kedrowski , who are the parents of a
minor child born in 2011 . The parties were married in March 2010, and separated in
August 2015. Following their separation, father drafted a petition for dissolution , but did
not file the petition with the court. Instead, the matter was opened upon the filing of
mother’s answer and counter-petition for dissolution of marriage on October 8, 2015. The
parties reached an agreement regarding interim parenting time , and t his parenting -time
agreement was incorporated into a court order dated June 9, 2016. The district court issued
an order for temporary relief on September 22, 2016, requiring father to pay temporary
spousal maintenance and temporary basic child support.
The district court held a trial in December 2017, and issued its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, order for judgment, and order on April 5, 2018, dissolving the parties’
marriage. The court made determinations on the issues of physical custody, parenting time,
spousal maintenance, child support, and related issues. The court granted sole physical
custody of the child to mother and ordered the parents to share joint legal custody of the
child. The court found that mother had demonstrated a need for tem porary spousal
maintenance, and that father had the ability to meet his own needs while contributing to
her needs. The court awarded mother $2,000 per month in temporary spousal maintenance
for a period of four years. The court found that the parties’ co mbined basic support
obligation for their child was $1,791 per month, and that father’s share of that obligation
was $1,072 per month. Lastly, the court found that father had “unreasonably contribute[d]

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to the length or expense of the proceeding” and awar ded mother conduct -based attorney
fees of $10,000.
Following the court’s April 5, 2018 judgment and de cree, father moved for a new
trial, for sanctions against mother’s attorney, and for amended findings. Mother moved to
declare father a frivolous litigan t and stay adjudication of his motions. The court denied
the motions on August 24, 2018. On September 17, 2018, father appealed the April 5,
2018 judgment and decree, and the August 24, 2018 order denying his post-decree motions.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied father’s
motion for a new trial.
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
a new trial. An appellate court generally defer s to the district court’s broa d discretion in
deciding whether to gra nt a new trial . Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 472
(Minn. App. 2000).
Father’s motion for a new trial cited Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 59.01(a),
(b), (d), (f), and (g), which allow for a new trial for irregularity in the proceedings depriving
the moving party of a fair trial, misconduct, newly -discovered material evidence, legal
errors, or where the decision is not justified by the evidence or is contrary to law
(respectively). Generally, whether to g rant a new trial is discretionary with the district
court. Peller v. Harris, 464 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. App. 1991). Here, the district court
noted that while father filed a 43 -point motion seeking a new trial, father specifically
connected “none of those [43] points” to any of the bases he cited for a new trial. When a

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party seeks a new trial, the bases under rule 59.01 for that new trial must be identified
“explicitly and with specificity.” Swartwoudt v. Swartwoudt, 349 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Minn.
App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Sept. 12, 1984); see Minn. R. Civ. P. 7.02(a) (requiring
motions to “state with particularity the grounds therefor”); see also City of E. Bethel v.
Anoka Cty. Hous. & Redev. Auth. , 798 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Minn. App. 2011) (citing these
authorities when reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion for a new trial). While
father’s motion explicitly identified five bases for a new trial under rule 59.01, his
undifferentiated argument did not address why any of his 43 points merited a new trial
under any of the cited bases. Thus, his argument lacked the requisite specificity, and the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion on that basis. 1
Despite the defects in father’s motion for a new trial, the district court addressed, as
best it could, the merits of each of the bases set forth in rule 59.01 for a new trial mentioned
by father. While our affirmance of the district court’s determination that father’s motion
was fatally defective makes it unnecessary to rev iew the district court’s decision on the
merits of father’s motion, in the interest of completeness, we review the bases father argues
to this court.

1 Father is a pro se litigant. While pro se litigants may receive some latitude, they are held
to the same standards as attorneys. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn.
App. 2001). The district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting its consideration of
the issues to only the information provided by father. See Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668
N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003) ( “[A] party cannot complain about a district court ’s
failure to rule in [the party’s] favor when one of the reasons it did not do so is because that
party failed to provide the district court with the evidence that would allow the district court
to fully address the question.”), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).

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First, father claims he is entitled to a new trial because the district court violated the
law by requirin g the parties to obtain preapproval from the court before filing motions.
The district court denied the motion on th at ground, finding that limitations on father’s
motions “fall into the category of what can be considered case management.” We agree.
The district court is responsible for case management and has broad discretion to determine
the procedural calendar of a case. McIntosh v. Davis, 441 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. 1989).
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure vest the district court with significant latitude
regarding the management of its cases. See generally Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.01 (noting that
the purpose of pretrial case -management hearings and orders includes “establishing early
and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of
management”). The Minnesota Rules of Family Court Procedure further grant the district
court discretion to limit the amount of time parti es may use to present oral arguments and
evidence supporting or opposing a motion. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(d). During the
pretrial phase of the case, the district court issued a scheduling order containing a general
provision regarding motion practice and stating that, “In the event either party desires to
bring a formal motion during the pendency of the proceeding, that party shall make a
request to schedule such a motion by letter. The letter shall only identify the issues a party
is requesting be a ddressed by formal motion.” Given the broad discretion afforded to
district courts to manage their cases, we determine that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying father’s new-trial motion related to pretrial orders.
Second, f ather argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
request for a new trial, and argues that he was deprived of a fair trial by the district court’s

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refusal to allow him to depose mother. In November 2017, husband filed correspondence
with the court requesting leave to take mother’s deposition. Mother’s counsel requested
that the deposition be suspended because husband’s motion for r emoval of the judicial
officer was under advisement at the time. The court offered to suspend the deposition
request until husband’s motion to remove the judicial officer was addressed, or to proceed
with the request to depose mother with another judicial officer. Father failed to respond to
the court’s communication. In light of father’s failure to respond, th e district court
suspended the request until the matter for removal of the judicial officer was resolved.
Father did not take any action regarding the deposition after the removal issue was
addressed. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his request
for a new trial on that basis.
Lastly, father contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
request for a continuance. District courts should liberally grant continuances to allow for
sufficient discovery. Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 412 (Minn. 1982). Nevertheless, the
district court has great discretion to set its calendar, and we will not reverse its decision to
deny a continuance request absent an abuse of discretion. Id. Upon review of the record,
we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny father’s
continuance motion.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied father’s
motion to remove a judicial officer for alleged bias.
Father challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to remove the judicial
officer for bias. A motion to remove a judicial officer for bias must first be heard by the

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officer who is the subject of the motion; and if denied, the motion may be reconsidered by
the chief judge of the judicial district. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 106. A judicial officer who has
presided at a motion or other proceeding may not be removed absent an affirmative
showing of prejudice demonstrated by the presiding judge. Minn. R. Civ. P. 63.03. Absent
an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a district court’s decision to deny a motion to
remove a judge for alleged bias. Matson v. Matson , 638 N.W.2d 462, 469 (Minn. App.
2002).
Father argues that the judicial officer demonstrated bias by refusing to hear him,
disregarding his right to parent, flouting the law, treating the parties disparately, and
participating in the Family Court Enhancement Project (FCEP). Father failed to adequately
support these allegations, and nothing in the record suggests that the judicial officer
demonstrated prejudice or bias. A judge who can preside fairly over the proceedings is not
“required to step down upon allegations of a party which themselves may be unfair or
which simply indicate dissatisfaction with the possible outcome of the litigation.” Carlson
v. Carlson, 390 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. App. 1986) (quotation omitted), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 20, 1986). And the suggestion that the district court’s decisions do not favor
father does not, standing alone, indicate bias. See Olson v. Olson , 392 N.W.2d 338, 341
(Minn. App. 1986) (adverse rulings are not sufficient to demonstrate bias for the purpose
of removing a judge). On this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying father’s motion to remove the assigned judge. Accordingly, father
is not entitled to relief on this ground.

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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded mother
temporary spousal maintenance.
Husband challenges the district court’s temporary -spousal-maintenance award of
$2,000 per month to mother. We review a district court’s spousal maintenance award for
an abuse of discretion. Erlandson v. Erlandson , 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). We
review a district court’s factual findings regarding spousal maintenance for clear error.
Maiers v. Maiers, 775 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. App. 2009). “Findings of fact are clearly
erroneous where an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has bee n made.” Goldman v. Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008)
(quotation omitted). We view the record in the light most favorable to the district court’s
findings. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472.
Spousal maintenance is “an award made in a dissolution . . . proceeding of payments
from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the
other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a ( 2018). A district court may award spousal
maintenance if it finds that the party seeking maintena nce “lacks sufficient property,
including marital property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for [the] reasonable needs
of the spouse” or “is unable to provide adequate self -support . . . through appropriate
employment.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2018). If the district court awards
maintenance, it must consider eight statutory factors to determine the duration and the
amount of the award. Id., subd. 2 (2018). “No single factor is dispositive.” Maiers, 775
N.W.2d at 668. The district court ba lances the financial needs of the spouse seeking

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maintenance and the ability to meet those needs against the financial condition of the
spouse from whom maintenance is sought. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d at 39-40.
Father challenges the district court’s calculation of the parties’ incomes and
expenses. “A district court’s determination of income for maintenance purposes is a
finding of fact and is not set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Peterka v. Peterka , 675
N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. App. 2004). Based on our review of the record, we determine
that the district court’s factual findings regarding father’s income and expenses are not
clearly erroneous. Father ’s financial disclosure statement shows that he is employed full
time and earns $11,666.68 per mon th. The parties stipulated that father’s gross annual
income is $140,000. Father did not offer a list of his monthly living expenses into evidence
during trial. However, based upon the evidence that was presented, the court found that
father’s reasonabl e monthly living expenses are $5,389. The district court’s factual
findings are supported by uncontested evidence in the record.
The court found that mother worked part-time time as a Russian tutor and earned
$8,860, in 2016 and $5,662 in the first 11 mon ths of 2017. Father argues that the district
court erred by declining to impute income to mother because she was employed full -time
at the time of trial . See Carrick v. Carrick , 560 N.W.2d 407 , 412 (Minn. App. 1997)
(providing that maintenance obligation should be calculated based on income at the time
of trial). However, the court found—and the evidence supports this finding—that mother’s
job was a temporary job and ran from November to December 2017. Mother testified that
she was not a permanent employee. The district court did not clearly err by refusing to
impute income to mother. The court also made factual findings related to mother’s monthly

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living expenses and found that her current reasonable monthly living expense s are
approximately $4,002. The court awarded wife $2,0 00 per month in temporary spousal
maintenance to satisfy mother’s basic needs. The court’s factual findings are supported by
witness testimony and by the exhibits entered into evidence at trial.
Based upon its careful analysis of the eight statutory factors and in light of the record
as a whole, we determine that the district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous.
We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to award mother $2,000 per month in
temporary spousal maintenance.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it divided the parties’
marital debt.
Father challenges the district court’s division of marital debt. “District courts have
broad discretion over the division of marital property and appellate courts will not alter a
district court’s property division absent a clear abuse of discretion or an erroneous
application of the law.” Sirek v. Sirek , 693 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn. App. 2005). In
dividing marital debts, the district court follows the same principles that it follows when
dividing marital property. Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 358 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. App. 1984).
Father argues that the district court erred and made insufficient findings in
determining that he was solely responsible for a 2016 tax debt. The parties filed separate
tax returns for tax year 2016. Father’s 2016 tax return indicated that he paid $14,851 in
federal taxes, but owed an additional $29,201 in federal taxes for the same year. The court
found that father took a tax distribution of $60,706 in 2016, and reported $18,370 in spousal
maintenance payments , when his total court -ordered temporary spousal maintenance

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obligation was only $4,000. Based on these findings, the district court determined that
father was responsible for his own tax liability for 2016. A review of the record reveals
that the court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, and we discern no abuse of discretion
by the district court.
V. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding parenting time.
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by only awarding father
twenty-five percent of parenting time . “The district court has broad discretion in
determining parenting -time issues and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that
discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl , 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009). A district court
abuses its discretion if its findings are unsupported by the evidence or if it misapplies the
law. Id. We will uphold the findings of fact underlying a parenting -time decision unless
they are clearly erroneous. Id.
The best interests of the child are central to awarding parenting time. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2018). When evaluating whether a parenting-time schedule is in the
best interests of the child, the district court must consider the same best -interest factors
used in custody determinations, make detailed findings with respec t to each factor, and
explain how each factor led to its conclusions. Id., subd. 1(a)-(b) (2018). No single factor
is dispositive, and the court must consider that the factors may be interrelated. Id., subd.
1(b)(1).
Here, the district court carefully considered each statutory factor and made detailed
findings supporting each factor. The district court found that: (1) the child did not have
special needs requiring spec ial arrangements; (2) the child could not express an

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independent, reliable preference regarding custody ; (3) the parties had “ a volatile
relationship history;” (4) neither parent had mental health conditions interfering with his
or her parenting capacity; (5) mother was primarily responsible for the child’s day -to-day
needs; (6) each parent provided the child with appropriate structure, guidance, nurturance,
and challenge; (7) there would be no change to the child’s school or communi ty under
either party’s custody; (8) neither party’s proposed arrangements would significantly
impact the child’s other family relationships; (9) the child “still needs to spend a significant
amount of time with mother given the history of caregiving ”; (10) it was “difficult” to
ascertain whether father would be able to move forward from the acrimonious divorce and
focus on child, rather than mother; and (11) there were significant concerns about father’s
ability to cooperate in the rearing of the child.
Father claims that the district court placed too much emphasis on two orders for
protection mother obtained a gainst father in August 2015. But the record shows that the
court considered these orders in the context of analyzing the statutory factors as a whole.
The court found mother’s allegations of domestic abuse against father to be “credible,”
although it coul d not conclude that such abuse was “pervasive or ongoing.” The court
noted that father “alluded that mother had committed domestic abuse against him,” but that
father failed to present any direct evidence supporting those allegations. This court gives
deference to the district court’ s assessment of credibility where the parties present
conflicting evidence. Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). Here, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by considering mother’s allegations of a buse as
one of many best-interest factors relating to parenting time.

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Based on its analysis of the statutory factors, the court found that it was in the child’s
best interest for father to have regular parenting time during the school year on every other
weekend, on every other Tuesday to Wednesday at school time, and on every other
Tuesday from Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. During the summer, father was granted regular
parenting time for every other weekend from Thursday until Monday , and for Tuesday
after daycare until Wednesday morning at daycare. The court also set forth a parenting
time schedule for holidays and for vacation time. In reaching its decision regarding
parenting time , the district court properly applied the law and considered the statutory
factors enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a). Because the district court’s findings
are supported by the record evidence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in its parenting-time award.
VI. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded mother
conduct-based attorney fees.
Father challenges the district court’s award of conduct -based attorney fees to
mother. A district court may levy conduct -based attorney fees “against a party who
unreasonably contributes t o the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.14, subd. 1 ( 2018). The requesting party bears the burden of establishing that the
other party’s conduct unreasonably contributed to the length or expense of the proceeding.
Geske v. Marcolin a, 624 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn. App. 2001). The district court must
make findings explaining the basis for the award. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471,
477 (Minn. App. 2007). A district court’s award of attorney fees will not be reversed absent

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an abuse of discretion. Haefele v. Haefele , 621 N .W.2d 758, 767 (Minn. App. 2001 ),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001).
Here, the district court found that father ’s conduct contributed to the lengt h and
expense of the proceedings, and those findings are amply supported by the record. Father
filed several motions for sanctions against mother’s attorney, filed civil actions against
mother asserting claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and attempted to
depose mother’s attorney and call him as a wit ness at trial. The court found that mother
incurred $17,396.67 in attorney fees and costs, excluding fees and costs incurred for trial.
The court found that father “unreasonably contribute[d] to the length or expense of the
proceeding,” and that it was “appropriate for father to pay conduct -based attorney fees in
the amount of $10,000.” We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award of
conduct-based attorney fees, and we affirm the award.
Affirmed.