Dewey Hill III Townhomes Association, Inc., Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1562

Dewey Hill III Townhomes Association, Inc.,
Appellant,

vs.

Auto-Owners Insurance Company,
Respondent.

Filed July 1, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge
Dissenting, Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-16-1182

David J. McGee, Christopher P. Renz, Gary K. Luloff, Chestnut C ambronne PA,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Joseph F. Lulic, Lindsey Streicher, Brownson Norby, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg , Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Following a court trial on stipulated facts, appellant and cro ss-respondent Dewey
Hill III Townhomes Association Inc. argues that the district court erred in determining the
date from which preaward interest should be calculated under Minn. Stat. § 549.09 (2018)

2
and Minnesota caselaw. Responden t and cross-appellant Auto-Own ers Insurance
Company argues that the district court erred by granting preawa rd interest based on an
appraisal award. We affirm.
FACTS
Dewey Hill owns eight townhome buildings insured by Auto-Owners. A hail and
wind storm damaged the buildings on August 6, 2013. An Auto-Owners insurance policy
protected against storm loss, and the policy sets forth Dewey Hill’s duties in the event of a
loss with the following language:
(a) You must see that the following are done in the event of
loss or damage to Covered Property:
. . . .

(2) Give us prompt notice of the loss or damage.
Include a description of the property involved.

(3) As soon as possible, give us a description of how,
when and where the loss or damage occurred.
. . . .

(7) Send us a signed, sworn proof of loss containing
the information we request to investigate the
claim. You must do this within 60 days after our
request. We will supply you with the necessary
forms.

Dewey Hill notified Auto-Owners of the loss on August 9, 2013. Dewey Hill’s
insurance agent submitted writte n property loss notices (one fo r each building) to Auto-
Owners on August 19. On or before August 21, 2013, Auto-Owners assigned a claim
number to Dewey Hill’s storm-loss claim. On or before August 2 1, 2013, Auto-Owners

3
assigned Cunningham Lindsey U.S. Inc. to adjust the claim. Both parties hired companies
to inspect and estimate the damages.
Auto-Owners made a first payment of $138,707.34 to Dewey Hill on May 6, 2014,
and made a second payment of $103,772.12 on September 9, 2014. Dewey Hill disputed
the sufficiency of these paymen ts, while Auto-Owners asserted t hat it had fulfilled its
obligations under the policy. Following considerable back-and-forth between the parties,
Auto-Owners demanded an appraisal of the loss on March 26, 2015.
Following a July 7, 2015 appraisal hearing, an “appraisal panel issued an award of
$379,437.76 for the replacement cost of the damaged property an d $329,437.76 for the
actual cash value of the damaged p roperty.” Auto-Owners sent a t h i r d p a y m e n t o f
$76,958.30 to Dewey Hill on July 31, 2015, representing the full and final amount of the
appraisal award.1
Dewey Hill then sued Auto-Owners in district court, claiming pr eaward interest
under Minn. Stat. § 549.09. Dewey Hill moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied Dewey Hill’s motion, and determined that Dewey Hill is e ntitled to preaward

1 Both parties’ briefs recite tha t these three payments totaled $329,437.76. And in their
stipulation to the district court, the parties likewise stipula ted that the total of the Auto-
Owners payments “equaled $329,437.76, the actual cash value of the Award.” In fact, the
payments total $319,437.76. The difference appears to be accounted for by the insurance
policy having provided for a $10,000 deductible amount. The parties also agreed that the
three payments represented full payment “after consideration of the [p]olicy terms and
conditions.” Our review of the record convinces us that the payments totaling $319,437.76
satisfied Auto-Owners’ obligation for the principal amount due on a loss of $329,437.76,
because the parties stipulated to the amount of interest owing based on the district court’s
determination of the date from which Dewey Hill is entitled to interest. The issues on
appeal are limited to whether and from what date interest is ow ed. In the end, this
arithmetic problem makes no difference to the issues on appeal.

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interest pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.09, but also concluded that Dewey Hill failed to meet
its burden of proving that it is entitled to preaward interest from the date of August 9, 2013.
The district court determined there was an unresolved issue of material fact concerning
whether Dewey Hill submitted a wr itten notice of claim on that date. The parties agreed
to submit the unresolved issues to the district court on stipulated facts.
Based on these facts, the distric t court determined that Dewey Hill is entitled to
preaward interest from March 26, 2015, the date of the demand for appraisal. The parties
agreed to an interest calculati on based on the March 26, 2015 d ate, and the district court
entered judgment accordingly.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err in determining that Dewey Hil l was entitled to
preaward interest under Minn. Stat. § 549.09.

Auto-Owners argues that the district court erred in determining that Dewey Hill is
entitled to preaward interest. The availability of preaward in terest presents an issue of
statutory interpretation wh ich is reviewed de novo. Poehler v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. , 899
N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. 2017).
Except as otherwise provided by contract or allowed by
law, preverdict, preaward, or pr ereport interest on pecuniary
damages shall be computed . . . from the time of the
commencement of the action or a demand for arbitration, or the
time of a written notice of claim, whichever occurs first, except
as provided herein. The action must be commenced within two
years of a written notice of claim for interest to begin to accrue
from the time of the notice of claim.

Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b).

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Auto-Owners argues that Dewey H ill is entitled to no preaward i nterest because
none of the events that trigger preaward interest under section 549.09 occurred.
Specifically, Auto-Owners argues t h a t t h e d e m a n d f o r a n a p p r a i sal does not trigger
preaward interest under section 549.09 because an appraisal is neither an arbitration nor an
“action,” and a written notice of claim could not trigger preaw ard interest here because
Dewey Hill did not commence an action “within two years of a written notice of claim.”
Auto-Owners’ argument is contrary to Poehler, 899 N.W.2d at 139-41. We
considered and rejected in K & R Landholdings, LL C v. Auto-Owners Ins. t h e s a m e
argument that Auto-Owners raises here. 907 N.W.2d 658, 664 (Minn. App. 2018). There,
we determined that Auto-Owners’ argument conflicts with the majority holding in Poehler
that section 549.09 unambiguously provides for preaward interest on the appraisal award.
Id. The “supreme court interpreted section 549.09 and held that it ‘plainly and
unambiguously provides preaward in terest on pecuniary damages—i ncluding those
awarded in insurance appraisals—that are not otherwise excluded by the statute.’”2 Oliver
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 923 N.W.2d 680, 684-85 (M inn. App. 2019) (quoting
Poehler, 899 N.W.2d at 140), review granted (Minn. Apr. 16, 2019).
Much of Auto-Owners’ argument on appeal tracks Justice Anderson ’s dissent in
Poehler, wherein Justice Anderson noted that “appraisal” is not included in section 549.09
as one of the events that “trigger” interest under the statute. Poehler, 899 N.W.2d at 148-

2 Parties are free to contract concerning preaward interest, but absent contractual language
in the policy explicitly prohib iting preaward interest, an insu red may recover preaward
interest on appraisal awards. See Poehler, 899 N.W.2d at 143. Neither party here contends
that the policy affects the availability of preaward interest.

6
49 (Anderson, J., dissenting). In an exchange of battling foot notes, the Poehler majority
posited that, because the insurer did not challenge the distric t court’s finding that the
“demand for appraisal was . . . a triggering event,” the “trigg ering-event issue . . . is not
properly before us.” Id. at 140 n.2. Justice Anderson’s d issent noted that the petition for
review, granted without modification, presented the issue: “[u ]nder what circumstances
does [section 549.09] apply to insurance appraisal awards?” Id. at 147 n.2 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting). Therefore, according to Justice Anderson, the supreme court was necessarily
resolving the triggering-event i ssue by holding that interest u nder the statute is available
after an appraisal. Id. And Poehler would not have be en entitled to any interest if t he
statute did not apply to appraisal awards.
Auto-Owners’ argument supposes that we are reading section 549. 09 without the
benefit of the Poehler holding. Were that so, Auto-Owners would find some support for
its argument in the statutory lan guage, interpreted in light of the cannon expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, that the statute ought not per mit interest to be awarded exce pt when
one of the statutorily enumerated triggers is present. But the Minnesota Supreme Court
has made it abundantly clear that we are bound by its decisions, State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d
342, 343 (Minn. 2018), and Auto-Owners’ argument here is a naked invitation to disregard
the supreme court’s holding in Poehler. In the words of the supreme court’s own syllabus,
Poehler holds that “[a]bsent contractual language explicitly precluding preaward interest,
an insured may recover preaward interest on an appraisal award” in circumstances
substantially identical to those present here. 899 N.W.2d at 137. We decline to disregard
the supreme court’s Poehler holding.

7
The district court did not err in determining that Dewey Hill was entitled to preaward
interest. The question remains at what date preaward interest properly began to run.
II. The district court’s selection of March 26, 2015, as the da te from which interest
should be calculated is not erroneous.

Dewey Hill argues that preaward interest began to accrue when i t first sent Auto-
Owners its written notice of the loss. Section 549.09 provides that interest begins to accrue
“from the time of the commencement of the action or a demand for arbitration, or the time
of a written notice of claim, whichever occurs first.” Minn. S tat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b).
However, “[t]he action must be commenced within two years of a written notice of claim
for interest to begin to accrue from the time of the notice of claim.” Id.
Here, Dewey Hill did not commence an action within two years of the written notice
of claim; instead, Dewey Hill requested an appraisal. See Lucas v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 403 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Minn. 198 7) (“[W]e conclude that ‘action ’ in section 549.09
refers only to a judicial proceeding.”). Consequently, preawar d interest under section
549.09 cannot accrue from the time of written notice of the claim. 3
In Poehler, preaward interest was computed from the date of the demand fo r
appraisal. 899 N.W.2d at 139. Poehler involved no demand for arbitration and no action
commenced within two years of a notice of claim. Id. The district court in that case found
that there was no written notice of claim sufficient to trigger preaward interest. Id. at 148
(Anderson, J., dissenting). The supreme court concluded that s ection 549.09 interest is

3 While Dewey Hill did commence an action to obtain preaward int erest, it did not
commence an action on the underlying claim. And the action it did commence came more
than two years after the notice of claim.

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available on an appraisal. Id. at 140. Poehler can only be read to hold that a demand for
arbitration is the equivalent of a demand for appraisal for pur poses of preaward interest.
Oliver, 923 N.W.2d at 684-85.
The district court properly det ermined that preaward interest began to accrue on
March 26, 2015, the date of the demand for appraisal.
III. Dewey Hill is not entitled to preaward interest under common law.

Dewey Hill also argues that the district court erred by not considering common law
as an available alternative to s tatutory preaward interest. De wey Hill quotes Minn. Stat.
§ 549.09, subd. 1(b), as providing for preaward interest “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
contract or allowed by law.” Dewey Hill asserts that, because the contract (policy) does
not address preaward interest, preaward interest is governed by common law and statute—
both of which provide a basis for calculating preaward interest a s a c c r u i n g f r o m
September 26, 2013.
Dewey Hill cites to Hogenson v. Hogenson , where we stated that section 549.09
was meant to supplement, not supplant, the common law. 852 N.W .2d 266, 273 (Minn.
App. 2014). In Hogenson, we concluded that the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise . . . allowed
by law” in section 549.09 “requires that preverdict interest be calculated under existing
common-law principles whenever possible.” Id. at 273-74. We determined that,
“[b]ecause preverdict interest w as allowed for conversion claim s under common law,
preverdict interest should be cal culated from the date of conve rsion at 6% under section
334.01 to the date of the verdict if the damages are ascertainable or liquidated.” Id. at 274.
Where damages were not readily ascertainable or where a claim did not allow for preverdict

9
interest prior to the 1984 amendment,4 “preverdict interest should be calculated exclusively
under” section 549.09. Id. All other prejudgment interest “should be calculated under the
appropriate subdivision of section 549.09 in every case.” Id. Hogenson provides no help
to Dewey Hill here.
Dewey Hill cites no controlling authority for the proposition that preaward interest
was allowed for appraisal awards at common law. 5 See K & R Landholdings, LLC , 907
N.W.2d at 663 (noting lack of authority to show that preaward i nterest was allowed for
appraisal awards under common law). The district court did not err in declining to locate
a common-law basis for an award of interest here. It properly applied section 549.09 as
interpreted by Poehler and K & R Landholdings, LLC.
Affirmed.

4 In 1984, the Minnesota Legislatu re added language to section 5 49.09, subd. 1, allowing
for preverdict interest on pecuniary damages from the time of commencement of an action,
where the statute had previously only provided for interest from the time of verdict. 1984
Minn. Laws ch. 339, § 1, at 35-36.

5 Dewey Hill cites to a Dakota County District Court decision th at is neither binding nor
persuasive. The insurer in that case refused to participate in the appraisal (despite the fact
that appraisal was a right under the policy), refused to honor the appraisal, and—unlike
here—the insured was forced to commence an action to recover the principal amount of its
claims. Charleswood Ass’n v. Harleysville Ins. Co. , No. 19HA-CV-10-7373, 2013 WL
2150892, at *3-7 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 17, 2013).

D-1

REYES, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. Cross-appellant and respondent Auto-Ow ners Insurance
Company presents a two-part question on appeal: (1) whether an insured is entitled to
preaward interest on an appraisal award under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (2018), and
if so, (2) when does that preaward interest begin to accrue? The Minnesota Supreme Court
answered the first part of this question in the affirmative in Poehler v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.,
899 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Minn. 2017) while leaving the second unres olved. In K&R
Landholdings, LLC v. Auto-Owners Ins., we applied Poehler’s broad holding that “section
549.09 ‘unambiguously provides for preaward interest’ on the appraisal award” but we did
not substantively analyze when preaward interest becomes available. 907 N.W.2d 658,
664 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting Poehler, 899 N.W.2d at 140). I write separately to express
my concern that the Poehler decision places lower courts in a quandary of applying its
broad holding or applying the plain language of section 549.09 as to when preaward interest
becomes available. Because appellant and cross-respondent Dewey Hill cannot satisfy any
of the triggering events to begin accrual of preaward interest under the plain language of
section 549.09, I would reverse.
Dewey Hill suffered a loss as a result of storm damage to eight townhome buildings
insured by Auto-Owners and notified Auto-Owners of the loss on August 9, 2013. The
parties agreed that the insuran ce policy covered the damage, bu t could not agree on the
total loss Dewey Hill suffered. After Auto-Owners made two pay ments, Dewey Hill
disputed the sufficiency of both payments, and Auto-Owners demanded an appraisal of the
loss pursuant to the policy on March 26, 2015. An appraisal pa nel issued an award to

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Dewey-Hill. Auto-Owners made a third and final payment to Dewey Hill on July 31, 2015,
representing full satisfaction of the award.
Dewey Hill sued Auto-Owners in January 2016, claiming that it i s entitled to
preaward interest on its award under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd . 1(b). The district court
determined that Dewey Hill is entitled to preaward interest fro m the date Auto-Owners
demanded an appraisal and rejected Dewey Hill’s argument that i t is entitled to preaward
interest from the date it notified Auto-Owners of the loss. I agree with Auto-Owners that
none of the events that trigger the accrual of preaward interes t set out in section 549.09,
subd. 1(b) occurred here. But the statutory language is the start, not the end, of the analysis.
See Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud , 853 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn. 2014) (“Judicial
construction of a statute becomes part of the statute as though it were written therein.”);
see also Jendro v. Honeywell, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 688, 691 n.1 (Minn. App. 1986) (“We are
obligated to follow the statutory interpretation of the Minnesota Supreme Court.”).
The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted section 549.09 and conc luded that it
“plainly and unambiguously provides preaward interest on ‘pecun iary damages’—
including those awarded in insurance appraisals—that are not ot herwise excluded by the
statute.” Poehler, 899 N.W.2d at 140. The supreme court held that “absent contr actual
language explicitly precluding preaward interest, an insured may recover preaward interest
on an appraisal award for a fire insurance loss.” Id. at 142. We are bound by that holding,
State v. Curtis , 921 N.W.2d 342, 342 (Minn. 2018), and it is now settled that preaward
interest is available on appraisal awards. But neither the Poehler court nor the K&R court

D-3

addressed the second question that Auto-Owners now asks us to a nswer—when does that
preaward interest become available?
Section 549.09 provides that one of three predicate or triggering events must occur
before preaward interest accrues on pecuniary damages. Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b).
Specifically, preaward interest on pecuniary damages begins to accrue “from the time of
commencement of [an] action or a demand for arbitration, or the time of a written notice
of claim, whichever occurs first.” Id. However, “[t]he action must be commenced within
two years of a written notice of claim for interest to begin to accrue from the time of the
notice of claim.” Id. I n o t h e r w o r d s , i n t e r e s t i s computed from the time of
(1) commencement of an action; (2) demand for arbitration; or (3) written notice of claim,
provided the party commences an action within two years of that claim. Auto-Owners
argues here that none of these “triggering events” occurred, an d therefore, preaward
interest never began to accrue.
The majority opinion in Poehler expressly stated that the triggering-event issue was
not properly before the court because the parties did not chall enge on appeal the district
court’s determination that the demand for appraisal was the triggering event. Id. at 140 n.
2 (“[T]he district court found that Poehler’s demand for appraisal was the triggering event.
Notably, Cincinnati never challe nged the validity of Poehler’s demand for appraisal or
argued that the demand was not in writing. Nor has Cincinnati contended that Poehler’s
demand for appraisal was not a triggering event. Because the parties have not challenged
this finding of the district court, the triggering-event issue raised by the dissent is not
properly before us.”). Consequently, it is an open question as to what event triggers the

D-4

accrual of preaward interest on an appraisal award under sectio n 549.09. To resolve this
question, we must first determine whether the statutory language is ambiguous. Staab, 853
N.W.2d at 716-17. And only if the statute is ambiguous do we look to the legislative intent.
Id. at 717. Neither party here contends that the statute is ambiguous, and I agree.
Beginning with the first of three possibilities that trigger preaward interest, Dewey
Hill’s action of filing in district court is not a triggering event to begin accrual of preaward
interest for purposes of section 549.09, subd. 1(b). Here, an appraisal panel issued an award
to Dewey Hill, and Auto-Owners paid the full amount of the appraisal award in July 2015,
before Dewey Hill commenced an ac tion against Auto-Owners in Ja nuary 2016. As a
result, the commencement of the action simply could not serve a s the triggering event to
accrue preaward interest under section 549.09, subd. 1(b), beca use it occurred after the
award and full payment of the claim.
As to the second possible tri ggering event, Dewey Hill argues t hat the demand for
appraisal is a triggering event under section 549.09 because a demand for an appraisal is
analogous to a demand for arbitr ation. But “arbitration” and “ a p p r a i s a l ” a r e t w o v e r y
different concepts, with only the former mentioned in section 5 49.09. See Minn. Stat.
§ 604.18, subd. 4(b) (2018) (“An award of taxable costs under this section is not available
in any claim that is resolved or confirmed by arbitration or appraisal.” (emphasis added));
Johnson v. Mut. Se rv. Cas. Ins. Co. , 732 N.W.2d 340, 345-46 (Minn. App. 2007)
(acknowledging that while some Minnesota courts have referred t o arbitration and
appraisal interchangeably, it is w ell settled that statutorily required appraisal provision is
not an agreement to arbitrate gove rned by the Uniform Arbitrati on Act), review denied

D-5

(Minn. Aug. 21, 2007); Oliver v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. , 923 N.W.2d 680, 684
(Minn. App. 2019) (noting that “there are important differences between arbitration panels
and appraisal panels” such as arbitration panel’s ability to ma ke liability and legal
determination, in contrast to appraisal panel’s limited authority to determining amount of
actual value and loss under policy), review granted (Minn. Apr. 16, 2019). It is not the
proper role of this court to determine that the legislature, by writing “demand for
arbitration,” intended the phrase to mean “demand for arbitrati on or appraisal.” See
Graphic Comm’ns Local 1B Health & We lfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corp. , 850
N.W.2d 682, 696 n. 10 (Minn. 2014) (explaining that when interpreting statutes, courts will
not add words that legislature did not supply). Consequently, under the plain language of
section 549.09, subd. 1(b), Auto-Owner’s demand for an appraisal is not a triggering event.
As to the last of the three possible triggering events, Dewey Hill argued that
preaward interest began to accrue on August 9, 2013, when it provided a written notice of
claim, rather than March 26, 20 15, the date Auto-Owners demande d an appraisal. 1 A
written notice of claim could not trigger the accrual of preawa rd interest in this case
because Dewey Hill commenced an action on January 2016, more than two years after the
written notice of claim. Section 549.09 provides that “[t]he a ction must be commenced
within two years of a written notice of claim for interest to b egin to accrue from the time
of the notice of claim.” 2 Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b ). In other words, the statut e

1 Dewey Hill argued on appeal that, in the alternative, preaward interest began to accrue
on September 26, 2013, when it provided a written notice of claim.
2 The Poehler supreme court did not include or analyze the application of this sentence in
section 549.09 to appraisal awards.

D-6

requires commencement of an “action” within two years of the wr itten notice of claim to
trigger interest accrual. Notab ly, that sentence contains no r eference to a demand for
arbitration (or appraisal). Id. Thus, even assuming that the supreme court interpreted
arbitration and appraisal to be interchangeable, a written noti ce of claim within two years
of an appraisal demand could not serve as the triggering event under a plain reading of the
statute. Therefore, under the pl ain language of section 549.09 , Dewey’s Hill’s written
notice of claim could not serve as the triggering event.
Dewey Hill claims that “the sensible reading of this portion of the statute, consistent
with Poehler, is that the demand for apprais al, which leads to the resoluti on of the
underlying issue in the same manner as commencement of a legal action does, must be
within two years of the notice of claim.” This reasoning ignor es the distinction between
notice of claim and demand for a dispute-resolution process. Appraisal panels do not
resolve disputes in the same manner as a lawsuit. The supreme court has “emphasize[d]
that the appraisal is a process that is generally intended to take place before suit is filed. It
is generally understood to be a condition precedent to suit.” Quade v. Secura Ins. , 814
N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2012). The scope of appraisal is limite d to damage questions
while liability questions are reserved for the courts. Id. at 706. And caselaw is clear that
a demand for appraisal is not an “action.” Lucas v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d
646, 650 (Minn. 1987) (“[W]e conc lude that ‘action’ in section 549.09 refers only to a
judicial proceeding.”); Spira v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 361 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Minn. App.
1985) (noting that an “action” is “confined to judicial proceedings.”), review denied (Minn.
Mar. 29, 1985).

D-7

The supreme court has explaine d that courts should not disregar d a statute’s clear
language to pursue the spirit of the law. Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc. , 741 N.W.2d
117, 123 (Minn. 2007). But even if the language of the statute is ambiguous, the
interpretive cannon expression unius est exclusion alterius applies when items are
expressed as an associated group or series, and justifies the i nference that items not
mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S.
149, 168, 123 S. Ct. 748, 760 (2003). The legislature’s choice in providing three separate
events that trigger the accrual of interest and excluding among them the demand for an
appraisal must be regarded as deliberate.
In short, the plain language of section 549.09 requires that one of the three triggering
events must occur for preaward interest to accrue. The parties in Poehler did not raise, and
the supreme court did not address, this issue . None of the triggering events occurred in
this case. The result is, in answering the question left open by Poehler, that Dewey Hill is
not entitled to preaward interest on the appraisal award under the plain language of section
549.09.