Jenny Pierce, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1565

Jenny Pierce,
Relator,

vs.

Egan Company,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed July 15, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 36497037-2

Jenny L. Pierce, Rochester, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Egan Company, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (for respondent employer)

Lee B. Nelson, Anne B. Froelich, Department of Employment and E conomic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Jess on, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After a meeting to discuss her job performance, relator Jenny Pierce left her
employment as a project associate for respondent Egan Company (Egan). She then applied
for unemployment benefits and indicated three times that she ha d quit her job with Egan.
The department of employment and economic development (DEED) de termined Pierce
was ineligible for unemployment benefits. Pierce now challenge s the unemployment law
judge’s (ULJ) decision that she is ineligible, claiming it was error to find that she quit.
Because substantial evidence in the record supports the ULJ’s finding, we affirm.
FACTS
Pierce worked for Egan between September 2017 and April 2018. In March 2018,
Pierce’s supervisor, Jeff Young, gave her a performance review during which he identified
several areas where Pierce was in need of improvement. On April 25, 2018, Young called
a meeting with Pierce. Young told Pierce he “was concerned tha t the position was not
working out for her” and stated he did not want to “have to go to the next level.” Pierce
responded, “If that is the way you feel,” and left her employment that day. Pierce claims
she was discharged. But Egan asserts that Pierce quit.
Pierce subsequently applied for unemployment benefits with DEED. In filling out
her application, Pierce checked boxes three times indicating th a t s h e h a d q u i t h e r
employment with Egan. In May 2018, DEED determined that Pierce was ineligible for
unemployment benefits. Pierce appealed the determination, and an evidentiary hearing
was held. Testimony was provided by Pierce and an Egan human-resources representative

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who had not been present for the April 25, 2018 meeting between Pierce and Young.
Egan’s representative testified that Pierce verbally and voluntarily quit her employment on
April 25, that Egan had no inten tion to terminate her employmen t during the
job-performance meeting, and that, when an employee quits, it is standard practice for Egan
to handle all paperwork and recommend that the employee apply f or unemployment
benefits. The ULJ found Egan’s representative credible. And t h e U L J f o u n d t h a t o n
April 25, 2018, Pierce quit her employment in anticipation of discharge, which constituted
a “quit for reasons other than a good reason caused by the empl oyer under Minnesota
Statutes section 268.095.” 1 A s a r e s u l t , t h e U L J c o n c l u d e d P i e r c e w a s i n e l i g i b l e f o r
unemployment benefits.
Pierce filed a request for rec onsideration, and the ULJ issued an order affirming its
initial decision. The ULJ found that Pierce had not submitted any evidence that would
likely change the outcome of its decision. Pierce appeals.
D E C I S I O N
An individual who quits employm ent is ineligible for all unempl oyment benefits
unless an exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2018). One exception applies
if an employee quits “because of a good reason caused by the em ployer.” Id., subd. 1(1).
A good reason to quit caused by an employer “is a reason: (1) that is directly related to the
employment and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker;

1 Minnesota Statutes section 268.095, subdivision 1 (2018) provi des that “[a]n applicant
who quit employment is ineligible for all unemployment benefits ” except when the
applicant quit for a good reason caused by the employer or for a number of other reasons
that do not apply to these facts.

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and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed
rather than remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(a)(1)-(3) (2018).
Whether an employee quit employment is a question of fact for a ULJ to determine.
Posey v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2016). “This
court reviews a ULJ’s findings of fact in a light most favorabl e to the decision, and will
not disturb the findings so long as there is evidence in the record that substantially supports
them.” Gonzalez Diaz v. Three Rivers Cmty. Action, Inc., 917 N.W.2d 813, 815-16 (Minn.
App. 2018). Credibility determinations are also within “the exclusive province of the ULJ
and will not be disturbed on appeal.” Bangtson v. Allina Med. Grp., 766 N.W.2d 328, 332
(Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Pierce argues that the ULJ erred in finding that she quit her job at Egan and therefore
also erred in finding her ineligible for unemployment benefits. We disagree.
I n her online application Pierce indicated three times that she had quit her job with
Egan. Pierce testified that she mistakenly marked that she had quit while filling out the
forms on her phone, but the ULJ did not credit this testimony. Instead, the ULJ found
Egan’s representative credible because her testimony was “strai ghtforward, logical and
plausible.” What Pierce says transpired on April 25 and what E gan’s representative says
occurred cannot both be true. We defer to the ULJ’s findings, especially on the credibility
of witnesses, in concluding that no error occurred.
Pierce identifies four factual arguments to support her positi on that there is not
sufficient evidence in the record to prove she resigned from he r position at Egan: (1) that
no one from Egan who had first-hand knowledge of the April 25 m eeting provided

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testimony at the June 1 hearing; ( 2) that she provided contempo raneous text messages
stating she was let go from her job without reason or warning; (3) that Young offered to
pay her for the remainder of the week of April 25; and (4) that no exit interview was
provided and therefore no signed documentation exists that attests to the circumstances of
her leaving Egan.
The ULJ reviewed all of these arguments and found them unpersua sive. Egan’s
representative was credible, Pie rce’s text messages do not show what was said in the
April 25 meeting, Young’s offer is consistent with testimony re garding his “generous”
personality, and Egan’s representative testified that, in the case of an employee resignation,
“[Egan will] take care of the paperwork.” Pierce offers no new evidence to overcome this
court’s broad deference to the ULJ’s findings. She also provides no argument that a good
reason existed for her to quit that was caused by Egan. Theref ore, because sufficient
evidence in the record exists that tends to sustain the ULJ’s f indings, the ULJ did not err
in finding that Pierce quit her employment with Egan and is ine ligible for unemployment
benefits as a result.
Affirmed.