State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1597

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

William Daniel Finley,
Appellant.

Filed January 13, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-3125

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree aggravated robbery, arguing that
the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he inflicted bodily harm on the victim
during the robbery. Appellant also challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court
improperly counted his North Carolina conviction as a felony when calculating his
criminal-history score. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant William Daniel Finley with
aggravated and simple robbery. The state alleged that A.B. arranged to sell an iPhone to
Finley online and that they met at a restaurant in Minneapolis to complete the transaction.
The state further alleged that Finley took the phone from A.B., “elbowed [A.B.] in the face
in order to take the phone ,” causing A.B.’s mouth to bleed , and ran from the restaurant
with the phone.
Finley waived his right to a jury trial , and the case was tried to the district court.
A.B. testified at trial , and the district court received s everal exhibits, including video
recordings from surveillance cameras at the crime scene.
The district court found Finley guilty as charged, entered judgment of conviction on
the aggravated-robbery charge, and sentenced Finley to serve 88 months in prison. Finley
appealed. This court granted Finley’s motion to stay his direct appeal and remand ed to
allow Finley to pursue postconviction relief.

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Finley petitioned for postconviction relief, asserting that the district court
improperly calculated his criminal -history score by giving him a “felony criminal history
point for a North Carolina conviction when the imposed sentence and probationary term
from the North Carolina case [were] more consi stent with a gross misdemeanor sentence
rather than a felony sentence under Minnesota law.” The postconviction court denied
Finley’s petition for postconviction relief, and this court reinstated his appeal.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Finley contends that the ev idence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of
aggravated robbery. When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
conviction, an appellate court carefully analyzes the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit
the fact-finder to reach the verdict that it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.
1989). An appellate court uses the same sufficiency standard of review in both bench and
jury trials. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018). The appellate court assumes
that the fact -finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved c ontrary evidence.”
State v. Brocks , 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1998). An appellate court will not disturb a
guilty verdict if the fact -finder, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, co uld reasonably conclude that

4
the state proved that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged. 1 Bernhardt v. State,
684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
Finley was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2016), which provides
that a person who, “while committing a robbery, . . . inflicts bodily harm upon another, is
guilty of aggravated robbery in the first degree.” A robbery occurs if an individual
having knowledge of not being entitled thereto, takes personal
property from the person or in the presence of another and uses
or threatens the imminent use of force against any person to
overcome the person’s resistance or powers of resistance to, or
to compel acquiescence in, the taking or carrying away of the
property . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (2016). “‘Bodily harm’ means physical pain or injury, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2016). “[T]he phrase
‘any impairment of physical condition’ in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7, means any injury
that weakens or damages an individual’s physical condition.” State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d
518, 522 (Minn. 2003).
Finley argues that the state’s evidence “failed to establish that [he] inflicted bodily
harm while taking [A.B.’s] iPhone.” Specifically, he argues that “[A.B.] was injured while

1 Finley cites the sufficiency standard that applies to convictions based on circumstantial
evidence, but he does not actually apply that standard on appeal. See State v. Al -Naseer,
788 N.W.2d 469, 471, 473 (Minn. 2010) (s tating that if an element of an offense was
proved with circumstantial evidence, appellate courts analyze “whether the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved support a rational hypothesis
other than guilt” (quotation omitted)). C ircumstantial evidence is “evidence from which
the factfinder can infer whether the facts in di spute existed or did not exist,” and direct
evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true,
proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599
(Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted). Because the state proved the element that is contested
in this appeal with direct evidence, we do not apply the circumstantial-evidence standard.

5
attempting to apprehend Finley” and that although he attempted to pull his legs out of
A.B.’s grasp, “he did not strike [A.B.].” Finley concludes that because “[A.B.’s] injuries
occurred as a conseq uence of [A.B.’s] at tempt to apprehend Finley” and because he “did
not commit a ‘battery’ in his attempts to escape . . . in that he did not ‘lay a blow’ on
[A.B.], his actions cannot satisfy the ‘inflicts bodily harm’ element.”
Finley relies on State v. Dorn, a first-degree assault case, in support of his argument.
887 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 2016). In Dorn, the defendant pushed the victim two times in the
chest, causing the victim to fall and land in the burning embers of a bonfire and sustain
significant injuries. Id. at 828-29. The defendant was convicted of first-degree assault. Id.
at 829. On appeal, the defendant argued that, because “her actions did not directly cause”
the victim’s injuries, “the evidence was insufficient to satisfy the definition of assault-harm
under section 609.02, subdivision 10(2),” which required “the intentional infliction of or
attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.” Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10
(2014)).
The supreme court explained that given the actus reus element of the assault -harm
statute, the action that results in bodily harm must “constitute a battery.” Id. at 831-32.
The supreme court noted that the assault -harm statute re quires the “infliction” of bodily
harm, and it defined “inflict” as “‘to lay (a blow) on’ or ‘cause (something damaging or
painful) to be endured’” and as “[t]he act or process of imposing or meting out something
unpleasant.” Id. at 832 (first quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1160
(2002); and then quoting The American Heritage Dictionary 900-01 (5th ed. 2011)). The
supreme court noted that “[t]he definitions of ‘b attery’ and ‘inflict’ are . . . similar,

6
requiring the State to show that the defendant engaged in nonconsensual physical contact.”
Id.
The supreme court concluded that the evidence in Dorn was “sufficient to show that
[the defendant’s] conduct constituted a battery or ‘infliction’ of harm,” reasoning that the
defendant “had committed a battery because she intentionally applied nonconsensual force
against [the victim]” and that her pushing the victim “also ‘inflicted’ harm because she
imposed something unpleasant, ‘a blow.’” Id. The supreme court further concluded that,
“[a]ssuming without deciding that an ‘infliction’ requires direct causation,” the evidence
was sufficient to show that the defendant caused the victim to experience bodily harm
because the defendant “pushed [the victim] hard enough to cause him to lose his ba lance
within a few feet of hot embers, and [the victim] fell into the fire within moments of [the
defendant’s] push.” Id. at 833.
Finley argues that “the pushing and pulling actions [that he used] to extricate himself
from [A.B.’s] grasp squarely present s the avoided question in Dorn of what does it mean
to inflict bodily harm.” Although the supreme court did not decide whether an “infliction”
of bodily harm requires direct causation, the supreme court defined “inflict” as explained
above. We apply that definition to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to
prove that Finley “inflict[ed] bodily harm” upon A.B. within the meaning of the first -
degree aggravated robbery statute. See Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1.
At trial, the stat e presented two theories to prove that Finley inflicted bodily harm
on A.B. First, the state argued that when A.B. initially “grabbed on to [Finley] . . . [Finley]
used force, both by trying to pull himself away and by pushing back at [A.B.]” and that

7
“[t]he amount of force used by [Finley] caused [A.B.] to fall to his knees, causing a knee
injury that is still ongoing today.” Second, the state argued that Finley “fell back on top of
[A.B.]” and “at that point, caused injury to [A.B.’s] face, that being a swollen lip that was
slightly bleeding.”
The state’s argument s were based on A.B.’s testimony and the surveillance -video
recordings from the crime scene. A.B. testified that he grabbed Finley when Finley started
to run away with his phone and that, “as soon as [Finley] tried to pull away from [A.B.],
[A.B.] fell down on [his] knee.” A.B. testified that after he fell, Finley “started . . . grabbing
and pushing and trying to . . . get rid of [A.B.’s] grip and . . . get away.” A.B. testified that
when he “fell down and . . . was trying to hold [Finley] . . . , [Finley] used [his] arm or . . .
elbow to hit [A.B.’s] face” and “the front of [A.B.’s] lip and inside of [his] mouth got a
little tor[n] up by that force.” A.B. further testified that he felt a “burning” in his lip and
that there was blood on it.
Finley does not dispute that A.B. sustained an injury to his lip during the incident
or that the injury constitutes “bodily harm.” But Finley argues that the “surveillance video
recording[s] show[] that [he] did not inflict bodily harm on [A.B.].” Specifically, Finley
argues that “the video recording does not corroborate [A.B.’s] belief that [A.B.] was struck
with power in the face, in that, the recording does not show Finley throwing a punch or
elbow at [A.B.’s] head.” Finley further argues that his “loss of balance was caused by
[A.B.] pulling [him] back onto [A.B.]” and that “[t]his action most likely resulted in the
cut lip.”

8
The video recordings do not clearly show whether Finley struck A.B.’s face after
A.B. pulled Finley on top of him, partly because the view of Finley and A.B. is obscured
by a table and chairs at that point in the recordings. However, the recordings do not refute
A.B.’s testimony that Finley str uck him in the face. W hen considering a sufficiency
challenge, this court views the evidence “in a light most favorable to the [conviction]” and
assumes that the fact -finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary
evidence.” Brocks, 587 N.W.2d at 42; Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430. Under that deferential
standard of review, we assume that the fact-finder believed A.B.’s testimony that Finley
“used [his] arm or . . . elbow to hit [A.B.’s] face” and that “the front of [A.B.’s] lip and
inside of [his] mouth got a little tor[n] up by that force.”
Finley argues that his conduct is analogous to “[a] child wriggling out of a parent’s
grasp,” “[a] running back escaping the tackle of a defender,” and “[a] wrestler using
leverage and technique to undo a takedown.” Finley’s analogy is not on point. As the state
notes, Finley was “not playing with a parent or playing football.” Fi nley was attempting
to rob A.B.
When viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, the evidence shows that
Finley hit A.B.’s face with his arm or elbow and injured A.B.’s lip. Because that
nonconsensual physical contact “cause[d] (something damaging or painful) to be endured,”
it constitutes an infliction of bodily harm. See Dorn , 887 N.W.2d at 832 (quotation
omitted) (defining “inflict”). And b ecause the fact-finder, acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could

9
reasonably conclude that Finley was guilty of aggravated robbery, we do not disturb the
verdict. See Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d at 476-77.
II.
Finley contends that the postconviction court erred by denying his challenge to the
district court’s criminal-history-score calculation because his prior North Carolina
conviction should have been counted as a gross misdemeanor, and not a felony. This court
reviews a denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. State , 925
N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn. 2019). In doing so, this court reviews the postconviction court’s
legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Brown v. State, 895
N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017).
When computing an offender’s criminal -history score for sentencing under th e
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
the offender is assigned a particular weight for every felony
conviction for which a felony sentence was stayed or imposed
before the current sentencing or for which a stay of imposition
of sentence was given for a felony level offense, no matter what
period of probation is pronounced, before the current
sentencing.

Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.B.101 (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added).
Convictions from other jurisdictions must be considered in calculating a defendant’s
criminal-history score. Minn. Sent. G uidelines 2.B.5.a (Supp. 2017). An out -of-state
conviction is counted as a felony in a criminal-history score only if it would be defined as
a felony in Minnesota and the offender received a sentence that would be a felony -level

10
sentence in Minnesota, “which includes the equivalent of a stay of imposition .” Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.B.5.b (Supp. 2017).
In Minnesota, a felony is defined as “a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment
for more than one year may be imposed.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 2 (2016). In contrast,
a misdemeanor is defined as “a crime for which a sentence of not more than 90 days . . .
may be imposed,” and a gross misdemeanor is defined as “any crime which is not a felony
or misdemeanor.” Id., subds. 3-4 (2016).
“A ‘stay of imposition’ occurs when the court accepts and records a finding or plea
of guilty, but does not impose (or pronounce) a prison sentence.” M inn. Sent. Guidelines
1.B.19.a (Supp. 2017) . “If the offender successfully completes the stay, the case is
discharged, and the conviction is deemed a misdemeanor . . . but is still included in criminal
history under section 2.B.” Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(1) (2016) (stating that
notwithstanding that a conviction is for a felony, “the conviction is deemed to be for a
misdemeanor or a gross misdemeanor if the sentence imposed is within the limits provided
by law for a misdemeanor or gross misde meanor as defined in section 609.02”). In
contrast, a “‘stay of execution’ occurs when the court accepts and records a finding or plea
of guilty, and a prison sentence is pronounced, but is not executed.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines
1.B.19.b (Supp. 2017).
When sentencing Finley, the district court used a criminal -history score of three,
which included one felony point for Finley’s 2017 North Carolina conviction of “Common
Law Robbery Conspiracy.” Finley argues that the district court erred because “the sta te

11
cannot prove that [he] received a sentence that in Minnesota would qualify as a felony -
level sentence under Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines.”
Finley received an 8-to-19 month suspended sentence for his 2017 North Carolina
conviction. The postconvi ction court concluded that Finley’s North Carolina conviction
was properly counted as a felony in his criminal-history score, reasoning that the sentence
“is comparable to a stay of imposition in Minnesota,” because “[s]imilar to a stay of
imposition in Minnesota, the court in North Carolina accepted and recorded a plea of guilty
to a felony offense, but did not pronounce a definitive prison sentence.”
Finley argues that “[t]he post-conviction court was wrong because the sine qua non
of a stay of imposition is that no sentence is imposed and no number is pronounced .” He
notes that “[his] North Carolina sentence was in fact imposed and an imposed number
range was announced.” Finley further argues that “because it is impossible for the state to
show that he will actually serve a sentence longer than one year,” “the state cannot prove
that [he] received a sentence that in Minnesota would qualify as a felony-level sentence.”
Finley relies on State v. Stewart, 923 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. App. 2019), review denied
(Minn. Apr. 16, 2019 ). In Stewart, the defendant received a stay of imposition and was
placed on probation for theft of property exceeding $5,000 in value, a felony. 923 N.W.2d
at 678. The district court l ater “amended the sentence and executed a sentence of 342
days.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). This court concluded that because that amended
342-day sentence was “within gross misdemeanor sentencing limits . . . [the defendant’s]
prior conviction is deemed a gross misdemeanor” and should have been counted as a gross
misdemeanor when calculating his criminal-history score. Id. at 678, 680; see Minn. Sent.

12
Guidelines 2.B.1.h (Supp. 2017) (stating that if “a prior felony conviction resulted in a non-
felony sentence (misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor), the conviction must be counted in
the criminal history score as a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor conviction”).
Finley argues that “[t]he same reasoning as used in Stewart supports the conclusion
that [his] North Carolina conviction and sentence should be construed as a gross
misdemeanor for purposes of criminal history in this case.” We disagree. In Stewart, the
district court amended the sentence and impo sed an executed , determinate gross-
misdemeanor term of incarceration. 923 N.W.2d at 678 . Unlike the circumstances in
Stewart, the North Carolina court did not impose a determinate gross-misdemeanor term
of incarceration, that is, fewer than 366 days. In stead, the North Carolina court imposed
an indeterminate sentence that could result in either a gross-misdemeanor or felony term
of incarceration. Thus, the reasoning of Stewart—that a defendant should not receive a
felony point for a felony conviction th at resulted in a gross -misdemeanor sentence—does
not apply here.
However, we agree with Finley that his North Carolina suspended sentence does not
constitute a “stay of imposition” under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines . A s noted
above, a stay of imposition occurs when the court “does not impose (or pronounce) a prison
sentence,” M inn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.19.a (Supp. 2017) . The North Carolina court
pronounced an indeterminate stayed prison sentence.
Nor is Finley’s North Carolina sentence “ the equivalent of a stay of imposition ”
under Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.5.b (Supp. 2017). Equivalent means “[e]qual, as in
value, force, or meaning” and “[b]eing essentially equal, all things considered.” The

13
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Langua ge 602 (5th ed. 2018). Because
Finley’s prison sentence was pronounced, it lacks the key distinguishing feature of a stay
of imposition. Moreover, there is no indication that the North Carolina conviction will be
deemed a misdemeanor upon successful completion of probation . See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.13, subd. 1(1) . In sum, Finley’s sentence is not “essentially equal, all things
considered” to a stay of imposition under Minnesota law. See American Heritage, supra,
at 602. Instead, beca use Finley’s prison sentence was pronounced but not executed, it
constitutes a stay of execution. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.19.b (Supp. 2017).
Nonetheless, caselaw supports counting Finley’s North Carolina conviction as a
felony in his criminal-history score. For example, in State v. Watson, the district court in
Illinois sentenced the defendant “ to a probationary term but reserved the right to revoke
probation and impose a sentence of up to three years in prison. ” 925 N.W.2d 6 58, 660
(Minn. App. 2019), review denied (Minn. May 28, 2019) . This court concluded that the
sentence was “the equivalent of a stay of imposition for a felony” and that the district court
therefore did not abuse its discretion by counting it as a felony in Watson’s criminal-history
score. Id.
Even though Watson involved the equivalent of a stay of imposition and the North
Carolina sentence in this case is a stay of execution, the circumstances of both cases share
one important feature: the possibility of more than one year of imprisonment. We do not
discern a reason why a stay of imposition with the possibility of more than one year of
imprisonment should be treated any differently than a stay of execution with the possibility

14
of more than one year of imprisonment. In either case, a felony sentence is possible , and
the offenses should be weighted the same, that is, as felonies.
Finley’s argument that the state must show “that he will actually serve a sentence
longer than one year” before his conviction may be counted as a felony is unsupported by
legal authority. It is also inconsistent with the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.2 When
a district court stays imposition of sentence for a felony offense , the precise term of any
future incarceration is unknown. Thus, the state generally cannot show that an offender
with a stay of imposition “will actually serve a sentence longer than one year” as Finley
demands in his case. Nonetheless, the underlying conviction is counted as a felony under
the sentencing guidelines. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1 (Supp. 2017).
If a prior out-of-state offense would be defined as a felony in Minnesota and more
than one year of imprisonment is a possibility, either because the sentencing court stayed
imposition of sentence or because it imposed an indeterminate range that exceeds one year
of imprisonment, the offense should be counted as a felony when calculating the offender’s
criminal-history score. Any other approach—including Finley’s—would yield a result that
is inconsistent with the purpose of the sentencing guidelines. See State v. Reece , 62 5
N.W.2d 822, 824 (Minn. 2001) (stating that the sentencing guidelines “provide uniform
standards for the inclusion and weighting of criminal history information that are intended

2 The sentencing guidelines do not appear to address t he precise circumstances here: a
stayed sentence with a pronounced range of incarceration that is both below and above the
demarcation for a felony sentence (i.e., 366 days).

15
to increase the fairness and equity in the consideration of criminal history” (quotation
omitted)).
In sum, even though Finley’s North Carolina stayed sentence is not the equivalent
of a stay of imposition, it warrants similar treatment beca use it authorizes more than one
year of imprisonment . Thus, the district court did not err by counting it as a felony in
Finley’s criminal-history score, and the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Finley’s petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.