State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1599

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rufo Hamid Mumed,
Appellant.

Filed June 15, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-17652

Keith Ellison, Attorney Genera l, Krista Barrie, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Beau D. McGraw, McGraw Law Firm, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnes ota Court of Appeals, servin g by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After pleading guilty to iden tity theft and theft by false representation for receiving
more than $35,000 through a medical-assist ance-billing scheme, appellant Rufo Hamid
Mumed seeks to withdraw her guilty plea. Th e postconviction court denied her request.
Mumed argues that she should be permitted to withdraw her plea because it was inaccurate
and involuntary. We affirm.
FACTS
This case is about a fraudulent medica l-assistance-billing scheme conducted by
appellant Rufo Hamid Mumed. 2 The Minnesota Attorney Ge neral’s Office investigated
allegations of medical-assistance-billing fra ud related to Mumed and a personal care
attendant company, Limay Home Care, Inc. (Limay). The investig ation revealed that,
beginning in 2014, Mumed ma naged and controlled Limay. But while Mumed ran the
business, Limay was registered under her form er husband’s name. This was intentional.
In 2012, the government investigated Mume d for fraudulent billing practices with her
previous personal care attendant company, AAA Plus Home Health Care, LLC (AAA). In
that investigation, authorities learned that AAA overbilled fo r services. Because of this

2 The parties refer to Minnesota’s medical-assistance program as Medicaid. Medicaid is a
federal program in which Minnesota cooperate s with the federal government to provide
health care and services to qualifying Minnesotans. See Young v. Jesson, 796 N.W.2d 158,
164 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. June 28, 2011); see also Minn.
Stat. §§ 256B.01, .02, subd. 8 (2018). Medi cal assistance is Minnesota’s version of
Medicaid. In re Carlisle Tr., 498 N.W.2d 260, 263 n.1 (Minn. App. 1993). We use medical
assistance throughout this opinion.

3
fraud, AAA was terminated from participa ting with medical assistance, and Mumed
pleaded guilty to fraud-relate d felonies in 2015. Before AAA was barred from medical
assistance participation, Mumed attempted to open a second personal care attendant
company. But Mumed was not eligible, and he r request was denied. After that denial,
Mumed opened Limay under her former husband’s name, with the knowledge that having
the company under her name would make it in eligible to enroll as a medical-assistance
provider.
Through Limay, Mumed coor dinated billing and reimbu rsement through medical
assistance for personal care attendant hours th at were fabricated. For example, Mumed
submitted claims for more hours than staff had worked. And she billed medical assistance
using the names of people who were not Limay staff. Mume d did not pay the staff for
these hours, but instead kept the money. In total, the investigation revealed that Mumed
fraudulently obtained over $130,000 in medical-assistance funds.
Based on her conduct, the state charged Mumed with four felony counts: theft by
false representation of over $35 ,000 (counts one and two), id entity theft of over $35,000
(count three), and identity th eft of over $2,500 (count four). Mumed pleaded guilty to
counts one and three, in exchange for counts two and four being dismissed. In support of
her plea, Mumed submitted a plea petition and prov ided testimony on the factual basis of
her plea. The district court found that her plea was sufficient.
There was no agreement on sentencing, but the presumptive sentence for count three
was 48 months in prison. Defense counsel e xpressed Mumed’s intent to seek a departure
at sentencing. At the sentencing hear ing, while Mumed moved for a downward

4
dispositional departure with no incarceration, the state presented additional evidence from
a fraud investigator in support of its request that Mumed serve time in prison.3 The district
court denied Mumed’s departure request and sentenced her to 42 months in prison on count
three. For count one, the court ordered a concurrent 33-month sentence stayed for one day.
About four months after her sentencing, Mumed moved to withdraw her guilty plea.
The district court construed th is request as a petition for po stconviction relief and set the
matter for a hearing. At the hearing, the parties did not present testimony or evidence, but
rested on their respective filings. In a wr itten order, the postco nviction court denied
Mumed’s request, finding that her plea was valid and that she was not entitled to withdraw
it. This appeal follows.4
D E C I S I O N
Mumed challenges the postconviction court’s denial of her request to withdraw her
guilty plea. The court found that her plea was accurate, intelligent, and voluntary and that
she was not entitled to withdraw it. In situations where our review comes after a defendant
filed a direct appeal that was stayed to permit her to pursue postconviction relief, as is the
case here, “we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that we
apply on direct appeal.” State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012). Applying

3 In an apparent effort to demonstrate her re morse, Mumed told the court at this hearing
that she was “so guilty,” that she knew she “did wrong,” that she made “this mistake,” and
that she “did bad.” And her attorney stated, “[ t]here’s no question as to my client’s guilt.
Absolutely no question to that.”
4 Mumed originally filed this appeal after her sentencing. But the appeal was stayed, at her
request, pending the district c ourt’s consideration of her request to withdraw her guilty
plea. After the court denied her relief, the stay was dissolved and this appeal proceeded.

5
that standard, we review legal questions de novo and findings of fact for clear error.
Sanchez v. State, 890 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. 2017). And we review the validity of a plea
de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).
Criminal defendants do not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Id. at
93. But the court must permit withdrawal if it “is necessary to correct a ‘manifest
injustice.’” Id. (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, su bd. 1). If a plea is not accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent, it is constitutionally invalid, and a manifest injustice exists.
State v. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Minn. 2004); see Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. And
a defendant—like Mumed—bears the burden of showing that her guilty plea was invalid.
See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. In this appeal , Mumed argues that her plea was neither
accurate nor voluntary. We address each argument in turn.
Accuracy
First, Mumed challenges the accuracy of her plea because “she did not commit the
crimes alleged.” To support this assertion, Mumed submitted an affidavit with her motion
to withdraw her guilty plea, stating that she “disagree[s] with some of the allegations
against” her.5 In order to be accurate, a plea must be established with a proper factual basis.
Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (M inn. 2012). Said another way, the record must
contain facts sufficient to support a conclu sion that the defendant’s conduct meets the
elements of the offenses to which she pleaded guilty. See Kelsey v. State, 214 N.W.2d 236,
237 (Minn. 1974). This requirement is in tended to prevent “a defendant from pleading

5 We note that Mumed did not indicate which allegations she disagrees with, and she did
not plead guilty to the whole complaint, only two of the four counts.

6
guilty to a more serious offens e than [she] could be convicte d of were [she] to insist on
[her] right to trial.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983).
To determine whether the factual basis is su fficient, we consider what is required
for each offense. Here, to support a convicti on for theft by false representation, the state
had to prove that Mumed obtained the pr operty of a third person—valued at over
$35,000—by intentionally deceiving that person with a false representation. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.52, subds. 2(a)(3), 3(1) (2014). It must also prove that Mumed knew the
representation was false, that she made it with the intent to defraud, and which did defraud,
a third person. Id., subd. 2(a)(3). False represen tation includes filing a claim for
reimbursement for medical care provided to a recipient of medical assistance, “which
intentionally and falsely states the costs of or actual services pr ovided by a vendor of
medical care.” Id., subd. 2(a)(3)(iii).
Turning to the facts underlying her plea to theft by false representation, Mumed
acknowledged that she owned Limay, which prov ided personal care attendant services to
clients on medical assistance. She agreed th at she billed the state for hours that did not
exist, that this was a false representation, and the fraud amounted to more than $35,000.
And Mumed registered Limay under someone else’s name because she knew she was
ineligible to enroll it in medi cal assistance, based on her pa st involvement with AAA.
Mumed’s testimony established a sufficient fact ual basis for her plea to theft by false
representation.
Second, to support her conviction for iden tity theft, the state had to prove that
Mumed used another’s identity with the intent to commit, aid, or abet unlawful activity and

7
that the loss was over $35,000. See Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subds . 2, 3(5) (2014). Here,
Mumed agreed that she used a personal care attendant’s personal identity and information
to bill medical assistance for “theft purpose s,” which amounted to more than $35,000.
These admissions establish a sufficient factual basis for her plea to identity theft.
Still, Mumed argues that sh e did not commit the crimes because one of Limay’s
alleged employees “did in fact meet with her in the [s]pring of 2013.” But even if Mumed’s
assertion was true, a single meeting does not prove that she is not guilty. The existence of
this meeting would not establish that the alle ged employee ever worked at Limay or that
the employee worked the specific hours that Mumed submitted to medical assistance. And
if, by making this assertion, Mumed was trying to suggest that th e employee worked at
Limay, she could have supported this as sertion with other evidence, including tax
documentation, time cards, affidavits from patients served, staff schedules, or
communications about shifts. She did not. Mumed failed to meet her burden to show that
her plea is invalid.
Moreover, the core of this fraud was that Mumed was running Limay under
someone else’s name so that it could be eligible for payments from medical assistance. If
the government had been aware that Mumed was the owner and operator of Limay, it would
not have paid any Limay claims through medical assistance. Therefore, while the minutiae
of each fraudulent claim is relevant, the crux here is that all of Limay’s claims—even if
made for the correct staff and the correct hou rs—were fraudulent. Consequently, even if
Mumed was right about the alleged employee meeting with her, that assertion does not cast

8
doubt on the overarching criminal conduct here. This argument does not render Mumed’s
plea inaccurate.
Voluntariness
Mumed also argues that her plea was not voluntary because she “only” pleaded
guilty after her attorney “promi se[d]” her “that he would get her a sentence that did not
include a term in prison.” The requirement that guilty pleas be given voluntarily ensures
that a defendant does not plead guilty because of improper pressures. Trott, 338 N.W.2d
at 251. If a plea rests “on a promise or agreemen t of the prosecutor, so that it can be said
to be part of the inducement or consider ation, such promise must be fulfilled.”
State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 522 (Minn. 2003 ) (quotations omitted). But a court
should not set aside a guilty plea “merely because the accused has not achieved an
unwarranted hope.” Schwerm v. State, 181 N.W.2d 867, 868 (Minn. 1970).
According to Mumed, her attorney promised her that she would not be sentenced to
any prison time if she pleaded guilty. But this assertion is contrary to a wealth of evidence
in the record. First, in her preplea interview, Mumed stated that she “just can’t go to jail”
and that she knew she “did something bad” but that she “shouldn’t have to go to jail for it.”
These statements demonstrate that Mumed knew that she was facing incarceration for her
offenses.
And in her signed plea petition, Mumed acknowledged that there was no agreement
with the state as to sentenci ng, but that the maxi mum penalty was 20 years in prison for
one of the four counts. The petition also noted that defense counsel would move for a

9
durational and dispositional departure at sentencing. And Mumed acknowledged that no
one, including her attorney, had made any promises to her to induce her plea.
At the plea hearing, Mumed agreed that there was no agreement as to her sentence
and that the state would request that she serv e a 48-month prison sentence. At the end of
the hearing, the district court told Mumed, “you need to be prepared to go into custody [at
sentencing]; not saying that’s what’s going to happen, but you need to be prepared that you
could be starting—serving a sentence that day.” And her attorney responded, “[a]nd I’ve
explained that, and I’ll explai n that to her too, [y]our [h]onor.” All of these
acknowledgements that Mumed was facing, a nd likely to serve, prison time belie her
argument that her attorney promised her otherwise.
In addition, to support th e state’s response to Mumed’s motion to withdraw her
guilty plea, Mumed’s trial attorney submitted an affidavit describing their communications
and his advice. He stated that he discussed with Mumed the possible sentences she faced
if she pleaded guilty and that he did not ev er promise her that sh e would not receive a
prison sentence. He also explained to her that the state was requesting that she serve prison
time and that he would file a motion for a sentencing departure. The attorney’s statements,
which are consistent with the rest of the record, explicitly refute Mumed’s argument here.
Overall, Mumed’s assertion that she should serve probation instead of prison time revealed
itself to be more of an unwarranted hope than an unfulfilled promise.
One Minnesota Supreme Court case, in par ticular, provides additional support for
our conclusion here. In Trott, the appellant asserted that defense counsel promised him
probation if he pleaded guilty. 338 N.W.2d at 252. The court noted that if counsel had

10
indeed made an unqualified promise of probation that was not fulfilled, then the appellant
should be entitled to withdraw his plea. Id. But because the Trott appellant’s assertion of
a promise was contrary to the record, including his plea pe tition, his testimony, and his
counsel’s testimony, the district court’s finding that there was no promise was justified. Id.
Here, Mumed made a similar assertion. And like in Trott, the record here—
including Mumed’s plea petition, her testimony, her preplea interview, and her attorney’s
affidavit—indicates that defense counsel did not make an unequivocal promise of no prison
time to her. Accordingly, th e postconviction court’s findings are consistent with the
relevant caselaw and are supported by the r ecord. The court did not, therefore, err by
denying Mumed relief on this basis.
In sum, despite her arguments otherwise, Mumed’s guilty plea was both accurate
and voluntary. And because she failed to sh ow a manifest injustice, the postconviction
court did not err by concluding that she is not entitled to withdraw her plea.
Affirmed.