State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1617

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Erick Carl Longo,
Appellant.

Filed May 28, 2019
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Pennington County District Court
File No. 57-CR-15-473

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Seamus P. Duffy, Pennington County Attorney, Stephen Moeller, Assistant County
Attorney, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
In this appeal from resentencing, appellant argues tha t the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing. We affirm.

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FACTS
In March 2016, the state filed a 14-count complaint against appellant Erick Carl
Longo, charging him with racketeering, conspiracy to commit first - and second -degree
controlled substance crimes, and first-, second-, third-, fourth- and fifth-degree controlled
substance crimes. Following a jury trial, t he jury found appellant guilty of nine offenses
and the district court sentenced appellant to 84 months for racketeering, 15 months on the
fourth-degree controlled substance crime, 110 months on the first -degree sale crime, 134
months on the first -degree sale crime, 129 months on the second -degree controlled
substance crime, 18 months on the fifth -degree controlled substance crime, 49 months on
the second-degree controlled substance crime, 189 months on the conspiracy to commit a
controlled substance crime, and 189 months on the conspiracy to commit a controlled
substance crime. The district court ordered the s entences to run concurrently, for a total
sentence of 189 months.
Appellant challenged his convictions a nd sentences on appeal, arguing that the
district court abused its discretion by declining to sentence him under the Drug Sentencing
Reform Act (the DSR A), and by relying on the Hernandez method. See State v. Longo ,
909 N.W.2d 599, 603 -04 (Minn. App. 2018); see also State v. Hernandez , 311 N.W.2d
478, 481 (Minn. 1981) (permitting district court to apply increased criminal -history score
for the last of several serial convictions that were not part of “a single behavioral incident
or course of conduct”). This court affirmed the convictions but reversed and remanded for
resentencing, ruling that appellant was entitled to be resentenced in accordance with th e
DSRA, and concluding that the district court erred by using the Hernandez method for both

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the racketeering and controlled-substance crimes committed as part of a single behavioral
incident. Longo, 909 N.W.2d at 613.
During resentencing, the district court sentenced appellant to 117 months for
racketeering, 15 months on the fourth-degree controlled substance crime, 90 months on the
first-degree sale crime, 69 months on the second -degree controlled substance crime, 12
months and one day on the fifth-degree controlled substance crime, and 27 months on the
second-degree controlled substance crime. The district court did not pronounce sentence
on the first-degree sale crime or on the conspiracy offenses. The district court ordered the
sentences to run concurrently, for a total sentence of 117 months. This appeal follows.1
D E C I S I O N
I. District Court’s Sentencing Decision
Appellant challenges the district court’s sentencing decision. We review a sentence
imposed by the district court for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214,
229 (Minn. 1995). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines limit a district court’s sentencing
discretion by prescribing a sentencing range that is p resumed to be appropriate. State v.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014). Any number within that range is a presumptive
sentence under the guidelines. State v. Delk , 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010),
review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). Presumpt ive sentences are seldom overturned and

1 The state did not file a brief or otherwise oppose this appeal. This court ordered the
appeal to proceed under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03 (providing that if a respondent fails
to file a brief, the case shall be determined on the merits).

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we will reverse the imposition of a presumptive sentence only in “rare” cases. State v.
Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
Racketeering is a severity-level-nine offense and carries a presumptive duration of
98 months’ imprisonment, with a lower range of 84 months and an upper range of 117
months. The district court originally sentenced appellant to 84 months for racketeering,
which was the lower end of the presumptive sentencing range. On remand, the district
court sentenced appellant to 117 months for the same crime . Appellant argues that ,
although his sentence remained within the presumptive range, the district court abused its
discretion by increasing the penalty from the bottom of the box to the top of the box.
Generally, the district court is in the best position to weigh sentencing options. See
Massey v. State, 352 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16,
1984). But we recognize the “general rule of law” that, o n resentencing after appeal, a
district court may not impose a stricter penalty than the one originally imposed. State v.
Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 767 -68 (Minn. 1999); see also State v. Wallace, 327 N.W.2d
85, 88 (Minn. 1982) (prohibiting district court from imposing “a more severe penalty than
the sentence which it previously imp osed”); State v. Prudhomme , 228 N.W.2d 243, 246
(Minn. 1975) (holding that after a sentence has been set aside, a district court must not
resentence defendant to a longer sentence for the same crime); State v. Holmes, 161 N.W.2d
650, 656-57 (Minn. 1968) (prohibiting court from imposing a more severe sentence after
defendant’s successful appeal results in remand for a new trial). This rule exists to prevent
the district court from punishing a defendant for appealing a conviction, and to ensure that
the defendant feels free to exercise the right to appeal. Prudhomme, 228 N.W.2d at 247

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(Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To allow otherwise “would have the
effect of punishing [th e] defendant for exercising his right to appeal from the sentence.”
Wallace, 327 N.W.2d at 88.
Appellant is correct that the penalty for his racketeering offense increased from 84
months to 117 months. However, appellant’s total sentencing package decreased from 189
months to 117 months. A “sentencing package” is defined as “the bottom line, the total
number of years (or . . . months) which effectuates a sentencing plan.” State v. Hutchins,
856 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. App. 2014) (citing United States v. Binford, 108 F.3d 723,
728 (7th Cir. 1997)). A sentencing package “reflects the likelihood that in sentencing a
defendant who is convicted of more than one count of a multicount indictment, the district
[court] imposes an overall punishment which takes in to account the nature of the crime,
certain characteristics of the criminal, and the interdependence of the individual counts.”
Id. We recognized in Hutchins that a sentencing package may be “unbundled,” such as
when part of the sentence is vacated, and “in order to effectuate its original sentencing
intent, the district court may ‘rebundle’ the package by resentencing the defendant.” Id.
Thus, when “a defendant ‘attacks a portion of a judgment, he is reopening the entire
judgment and cannot select ively craft the manner in which the court corrects that
judgment.’” Id. (quoting Gardiner v. United States , 114 F.3d 734, 736 (8th Cir. 1997)),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 866 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 2015)).
The record reflects that appellant’s ov erall sentencing package did not increase.
During resentencing , the district court impo sed a 117 -month sentence on appellant’s
racketeering charge. This sentence is an increase of 33 months from the original 84-month

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sentence. While appellant’s sentence moved from the lower range to the upper range of
the presumptive sentence, it is uncontested that his sentence remained within the
presumptive-sentence range. See State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 359 n.2 (Minn. 2008)
(“All three numbers in any given cel l constitute an acceptable sentence . . . the lowest is
not a downward departure, nor is the highest an upward departure.”). Further, although the
sentence for the racketeering offense increased, appellant’s total sentencing package
decreased from 189 mon ths to 117 months. Because the district court did not inc rease
appellant’s total sentencing package , we determine that it did not abuse its discretion in
resentencing.
II. Appellant’s Pro Se Arguments
Appellant raises several arguments in his pro se supplemental brief. Several of these
arguments are duplicative of arguments raised in his initial appeal , and w e decline to
reconsider arguments already considered and rejected by this court. 2 When this “court
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should cont inue to govern the same issues in
subsequent stages in the same case.” Lynch v. State, 749 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 2008)
(quotation omitted) (applying “law of the case” doctrine on appeal from denial of a
postconviction claim); see also State v. LaRose, 673 N.W.2d 157, 161 (Minn. App. 2003)
(“When an appellate court has ruled on an issue of law, the issue decided becomes law of

2 Appellant argues that the district court erroneously ranked the racketeering offense and
failed to adequately apply the amelioration doctrine. We rejected these arguments in
appellant’s original appeal and do not reconsider them now.

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the case and may not be relitigated or reexamined.” (quotations and alteration omitted)),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2004).
Appellant also argues that the sentence violates his equal -protection rights , and
urges the court to modify his sentence in the interests of justice. Appellant could have
raised these issues in his initial appeal, but failed to do so. We therefore determ ine that
these claims are Knaffla-barred. See State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976)
(noting that o nce “direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all
claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequen t petitio n for
postconviction relief”). Appellant also failed to support his remaining pro se arguments
with citation to legal authority, and we therefore deem them waived. See State v. Taylor,
869 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. 2015) (“We deem arguments waived on appeal if a pro se
supplemental brief contains no argument or citation to legal authority in support of the
allegations.” (quotation omitted)).
Affirmed.