State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1632

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Johnny Earl Edwards,
Appellant.

Filed June 17, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-17-3290

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Ass istant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina Schu lz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Sche llhas, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After being convicted of second-degree murder, appellant Johnn y Earl Edwards was
ordered to pay restitution, incl uding $1,509.30 for the cost of a u n i t u s e d t o s t o r e t h e

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victim’s belongings. Edwards appeals, arguing that the storage costs were not a direct
result of the conduct for which he was convicted, and that, in any event, the state failed to
meet its burden of proving the amount and reasonableness of tho se costs. Because the
storage unit fees were not unduly attenuated from Edwards’s criminal conduct, and because
the state’s documentation was sufficient to prove the amount of restitution was appropriate,
we affirm.
FACTS
In May 2017, appellant Johnny Earl Edwards and a codefendant went to a house in
Fridley to buy marijuana. When they arrived at the house, two men were already there—
the homeowner and the victim. A fter Edwards saw the marijuana, he decided to steal it.
When the homeowner started walking towards the door, Edwards pulled a gun out to stop
him and “be in control at the moment.” When the victim saw the g u n , h e “ r u s h e d ”
Edwards, and Edwards shot him. Edwards and the codefendant grabbed the marijuana and
left. Before police arrived at the house, the victim died.
The state charged Edwards with two counts of second-degree mur der. Edwards
pleaded guilty to second-degree felony murder. At the sentencing hearing, the district court
imposed an aggravated sentence of 363 months in prison.
At the state’s request, the district court left the issue of r estitution open for 30 days.
After requesting and receiving an extension, the state requested restitution on behalf of the

3
victim’s family in the amount of $14,865.53, including $1,509.3 0 for storage costs. 1 As
documentation for the storage co sts, the state submitted a prin tout from a credit union
statement. The printout showed seven payments for public storage.
Edwards objected to the restitu tion award and requested a heari ng. Regarding the
storage costs, Edwards stated in his affidavit that “[t]he restitution for the ‘storage’ costs is
not supported by documents as to why those costs ha[ve] a nexus to this case.” At the
contested restitution hearing, the state addressed the storage costs:
[The victim] lived with [his brother] on and off and had
belongings in [his brother’s] home. The storage costs reflected
for $1,509.30. After [the victim ] died, [his brother] gathered
his things and put [t]hem in s hort-term storage until [the
victim’s] children could go through the items.

. . . .

He didn’t want to look at [the victim’s] belongings anymore,
so he cleared out the room he was using and put those
belongings in storage.

After the hearing, the district court issued an order granting the state’s restitution
request in full. Specifically, the district court noted that “ [t]he [s]tate argued the storage
fees were reasonable because the victim’s brother had to box th e victim’s belongings and
put them in storage. The [s]tate has met its burden of establishing by the preponderance of
the evidence that the expenses are reasonable and ‘resulted fro m’ the murder.” Edwards
appeals.

1 The entire itemized list is as follows: $9,116.51 for funeral costs; $265.79 for memorial
programs; $34 for the victim’s birth certificates; $1,030 for m onuments; $2,909.93 for
funeral catering costs; and $1,509.30 for storage costs.

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D E C I S I O N
Edwards argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
$1,509.30 in restitution for storage costs. Specifically, Edwa rds first asserts that his
conduct did not directly cause the economic loss related to the cost of the storage unit. He
further contends that the state failed to prove the amount and reasonableness of the loss.
We address each issue in turn.
The district court has broad di scretion to award restitution, a nd this court will not
reverse a district court’s order absent an abuse of that discre tion. State v. Andersen, 871
N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). And the district court’s factual findings will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. But deciding “whether an item meets the
statutory requirements for restitution is a question of law tha t is fully reviewable” by this
court. State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Under the restitution statute, a victim may request restitutio n for a specific loss if
t h e d e f e n d a n t i s c o n v i c t e d o f a c r i m e . M i n n . S t a t . § 6 1 1 A . 0 4 , subd. 1(a) (2016). A
restitution request “may include, but is not limited to, any ou t-of-pocket losses resulting
from the crime.” Id. But “a loss claimed as an item of restitution by a crime vict im must
have some factual relationship to t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d — a c o m p e n sable loss must be
directly caused by the conduct for which the defendant was conv icted.” Nelson, 796
N.W.2d at 347 (quotation omitted).
Here, Edwards was convicted of second-degree murder. And whil e Edwards
concedes that his criminal conduct was the but-for cause of the storage costs, he asserts
that the connection between the storage costs and his criminal conduct is “so attenuated in

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its cause that it cannot be said to result from [Edwards’s] criminal act.” State v. Palubicki,
727 N.W.2d 662, 667 (Minn. 2007). We disagree.
In addressing Edwards’s argument, we are guided by the supreme court’s decision
in Palubicki. In Palubicki, the district court ordered restitution for expenses arising from
a murder victim’s children’s voluntary attendance at the defendant’s trial. 727 N.W.2d at
666. The defendant argued that t he children’s expenses in volu ntarily attending the trial
did not directly result from the crime for which he was convict ed. Id. But the supreme
court determined that the children were “in court as a direct r esult of [the defendant’s]
crime.” Id. at 667. Though the children’s attendance at trial was not man datory, the
supreme court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered
restitution for the expenses accrued by the victim’s children. Id. Here, as in Palubicki, the
challenged restitution—the storage costs—were not mandatory. But when a murder victim
is living in another person’s home, and leaves behind belonging s, it may be necessary—
though not mandatory—to move the victim’s belongings elsewhere. Here, the victim’s
brother moved the belongings to a storage unit, thereby allowin g the victim’s children to
go through them on their own accord. As such, we conclude that the connection between
Edwards’s criminal conduct and th e cost of the storage unit is not so attenuated that we
cannot determine that the storage unit cost resulted from the victim’s murder.
Still, Edwards suggests that “[a]lthough the storage costs are an out-of-pocket
economic loss, the actual costs here were incurred as a result of the emotional pain and
grief felt by [the victim’s] br other.” Restitution is not avai lable for a victim’s pain and
suffering. See State v. Colsch , 579 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn. App. 1998) (holding that

6
“restitution is limited to recovery of economic damages sustain ed by the victim”). While
the victim’s brother did not wan t to look at the belongings any more, presumably because
of grief, his grief was not the only reason he placed his brother’s items into a storage unit.
The victim’s children needed to sort through the belongings, an d a storage unit was an
appropriate option to store the items. As such, we conclude th at the district court did not
abuse its discretion by ordering restitution for the cost of the storage unit.
Finally, Edwards asserts that e ven if the storage costs were a direct result of the
murder, the state’s evidence relating to the storage expenses d oes not provide a sufficient
foundation for the $1,509.30 claim to be reasonable and appropriate.
Minnesota Statutes section 611A .045, subdivision 3(a) (2016) s tates that “[t]he
burden of demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense
and the appropriateness of a particular type of restitution is o n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . ” A n d
“[i]nformation submitted relating to restitution must describe the items or elements of loss,
itemize the total dollar amounts of restitution claimed, and sp ecify the reasons justifying
these amounts, if restitution is in the form of money or proper ty.” Minn. Stat. 611A.04,
subd. 1(a). When disputed, the amount of restitution must be p roved by a preponderance
of the evidence. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a).
In support of its restitution request, the state filed documen tation describing the
items of loss, including the storage unit cost, and the dollar amounts for each item.
Specifically, the documentation for the storage unit was a prin tout from an online credit
union account showing seven payments made between June 2017 and November 2017 for
public storage. The documentation lists the dates and amounts paid. And at the restitution

7
hearing, the state specified the justification for the storage unit costs—the victim’s brother
gathered the victim’s belongings, and placed them in a storage unit, which allowed the
victim’s children to sort through the items. Accordingly, we conclude that the state met its
burden and proved the amount of restitution by a preponderance of the evidence.2
But Edwards argues that there are no receipts for the storage c osts, only proof of
payment evidenced by a bank printout. Our consideration of thi s argument is guided by
State v. Keehn, 554 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 1996);
see also State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn. 2014) (vacating restitution award and
remanding for further fact-finding when record contained no evi dence to support damage
claim). In Keehn, a portion of the restitution request did not include an itemized listing of
expenses. 554 N.W.2d at 407. This court remanded for further findings, but noted that it
was “not requiring receipts or proof of exact purchase price, b ut rather a list, as required
by statute, with reasonable speci ficity describing the items or elements of loss and the
dollar amount of those losses.” Id. at 408. Here, as in Keehn, the state was not required to
provide receipts. And unlike Keehn, the state provided an itemized list of all expenses,
including the storage costs. Further, the bank printout provided by the state identified each
payment made for “Public Storage.” Accordingly, we conclude th at the district court did
not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution for the storage unit fees.
In sum, because the cost of the storage unit was not so attenua ted from Edwards’s
conduct, and because the documentation provided by the state was sufficient to prove that

2 Edwards does not challenge, nor did he argue at the district court, that the state provided
the reasons justifying the storage unit costs in its argument without supporting testimony.

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the amount of restitution was appropriate, we affirm the district court’s restitution order for
the cost of the storage unit.
Affirmed.