State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1641

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Meng Vang,
Appellant.

Filed July 29, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-366

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorne y , T h o m a s R . R a g a t z , A s s i s t a n t County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

John Arechigo, Arechigo & Stokka, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jess on, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Meng Vang was charged with terroristic threats, fifth-degree assault, and
false imprisonment, based on an incident in which he restrained S.T. in a bathroom in her
home. Following a jury trial, Vang was found guilty and convicted of false imprisonment

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and was acquitted of the other charges. In this direct appeal, Vang argues that (1) the district
court abused its discretion by not removing a juror who raised a question about the
interpretation of a witness’s te stimony during trial, (2) the e vidence was insufficient to
support his false-imprisonment conviction, and (3) the district court abused its discretion
by not granting a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. We affirm.
FACTS
Vang was charged with making terroristic threats in reckless disregard of the risk of
causing terror in another, assault in the fifth degree, and false imprisonment, following an
incident that occurred in the home of S.T. and her husband, A.Y ., in January 2018. S.T.
and A.Y. had some guests over for dinner and karaoke. Their gue sts included, among
others, R.C.; and two people whom another guest brought along but who were not invited
directly—K.Y. and Vang. Vang was a stranger to S.T.
Two versions of what happened at the gathering were presented at trial. According
to respondent State of Minnesota, S.T. went to use the toilet but, after entering the bathroom
and locking the door, noticed that Vang was also in the bathroo m. Vang then said that he
loved S.T. She asked him to leave. S.T. opened the door, but Vang pushed it shut, relocked
it, hit S.T. in the face, and th en shoved her backward. S.T. fe ll into the shower door,
breaking it. Vang then said that he was going to have sex with her and tried to touch her.
S.T. began crying and yelling for help. A.Y. was outside the ho use with R.C. and K.Y.,
and when he came in he heard his wife calling for help. A.Y. us ed a tool to unlock the
bathroom door from the outside and got into a fistfight with Va ng. After A.Y., R.C., and
K.Y. were able to get Vang out of the house, A.Y. called 911.

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Though Vang himself did not testify, his version of events was introduced to the
jury by the testimony of K.Y. and by a recording of a police interview with Vang. In Vang’s
telling, he thought that S.T. was inappropriately flirting with R.C. Vang spoke with K.Y.
about what he noticed. While K.Y. noticed the same thing, he told Vang not to get involved.
Nonetheless, Vang asked S.T. to talk, and she voluntarily went with him into the bathroom.
Vang then asked if she was cheating on A.Y. with R.C., told her that she should not do
that, and tried to show her a video that he had taken which he said showed S.T. being too
affectionate toward R.C. S.T. then slapped the phone and left the bathroom. A.Y. did not
have to unlock the bathroom door because Vang unlocked it after A.Y. tried to open it. But
when Vang tried to leave the bath room, A.Y. and R.C. started fi ghting with him. It was
during this fighting that the shower door was broken.
The jury found Vang guilty of false imprisonment but not guilty o f m a k i n g
terroristic threats or assault. Before sentencing, Vang moved f or a downward durational
departure—he sought sentencing as a gross misdemeanor although the offense is a felony.
But the district court adhered to the sentencing guidelines, ordering a stay of imposition of
sentence and three years’ probation. Vang appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abu se its discretion by keeping M.X.-Y. on the jury.

Vang’s first argument is that the district court erred in handl ing a situation when a
juror expressed concerns about the interpretation of S.T.’s testimony during trial.
S . T . t e s t i f i e d i n H m o n g t h r o u g h a n i n t e r p r e t e r . O n t h e s e c o n d day of S.T.’s
testimony, one of the jurors, M.X.-Y., who spoke Hmong, approached the clerk and raised

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concerns that the interpreter was summarizing S.T.’s testimony on at least one point. The
district court, with the attorneys but outside the presence of the jury, took two steps to
determine what to do.
First, the district court questioned S.T. and the interpreter about the adequacy of the
interpretation. Both S.T. and the interpreter indicated that they believed they were speaking
the same dialect, did not have difficulty understanding what th e other was saying, and
believed the other understood what they were saying. Additionally, the interpreter denied
summarizing S.T.’s testimony, saying that “[p]retty much everyt hing was literally
interpret[ed].” Further, S.T. tes tified that she understood som e English and believed that
the interpreter was saying her answers word for word.
Second, the district court asked M.X.-Y. about what she heard and instructed her to
rely only on the English-language interpretation of S.T.’s testimony. The court asked M.X.-
Y. generally what her concerns were. M.X.-Y. said that she believed the interpreter skipped
over some details in the testimony and that she believed that S.T. could tell the interpreter
was summarizing and that S.T. had become frustrated. M.X.-Y. said that she would be able
to follow the evidence as it came in in English and would not tell the other jurors about her
personal understanding of S.T.’s Hmong-language testimony. But when pressed by defense
counsel, she was less sure, saying that her recollection might be based on what S.T. was
saying in Hmong and that it might be hard for her not to pay at tention directly to S.T.’s
testimony. On further questioning by the prosecutor, M.X.-Y. sa id that she understood
English, knew what the interpreter was saying, would be able to rely on what the interpreter
said when deliberating, and would not share her own interpretation with other jurors.

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After hearing from M.X.-Y., the defense attorney asked for her to be removed from
the jury, citing her statement that her recollection might be based on what S.T. said rather
than what the interpreter said . The prosecutor argued in respon se that M.X.-Y. had said
that she paid attention to the interpretation and had been “pretty quick and confident to say
that she could rely just on the English interpretation.” The district court did not decide at
that time whether to remove the juror, and the trial continued.
Just before submitting the case to the jury, the district court again discussed with the
parties whether M.X.-Y. should remain on the jury. The prosecut or argued that M.X.-Y.
should remain because her respons es to his question indicated t hat she could base her
decision only on the English interpretation of S.T.’s testimony. Defense counsel argued the
opposite, contending that the juror had “a completely separate source of information in her
deliberations” from the other jurors and that it would be bette r to have an alternate juror
deliberate. The district court found that M.X.-Y. was credible when she said that she could
follow the court’s instruction a nd base her deliberation only o n the English-language
version of the testimony. The district court did not remove M.X.-Y.
Though not clearly differentiate d, Vang’s argument is actually composed of three
subarguments: first, a challenge to adequacy of the interpretation; second, an argument that
M.X.-Y. should have been removed because she could not rely on the English
interpretation; and, finally, an argument that she should have been removed for bias.
A. Adequacy of the interpretation

Vang’s first argument is that M.X.-Y. was not, but should have been, given the
opportunity to tell the court what, exactly, she believed had b een misinterpreted. Vang’s

6
only basis for this assertion is an analogy to People v. Johnson, 120 Cal. Rptr. 372, 373-74
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975), a case decided by the California Court of Appeal, which is not binding
on this court and is, at best, persuasive authority. See Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co. , 344
N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1984) (stating that foreign authority is not binding, but may be
persuasive). But Johnson is not even persuasive given the facts here.
In Johnson, the appellants offered evidence that may have tended to show
inaccuracies in the interpretati on of certain critical testimon y. 120 Cal. Rptr. at 373. The
district court refused to admit the evidence, and the appellate court ruled that it was error
to bar the evidence. Id. at 373-74. Here, however, Vang did not argue to the district c ourt
that it should evaluate the nature of the misinterpretations reported by M.X.-Y., nor did he
attempt to introduce evidence showing the nature of the mistranslations. In fact, though the
off-the-record discussion was not memorialized, it appears to h ave been Vang’s counsel
himself who suggested to the dis trict court that M.X.-Y. should b e i n s t r u c t e d n o t t o
specifically describe the purported misinterpretations. The dis trict court asked M.X.-Y. a
general question about her concern with the interpretation, and , as M.X.-Y. started to
answer, defense counsel asked for a bench conference, after whi ch the district court
instructed M.X.-Y. not to tell the court “exactly . . . what [s he] heard that was different.”
Vang cannot argue that the dist rict court should have admitted certain evidence when no
one ever tried to introduce it. This court cannot assume that M .X.-Y.’s description of the
purported discrepancies would have been material or that the ex clusion of such evidence
was prejudicial. See State v. Anderson, 395 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that
the appellant had forfeited review of the admissibility of a videotape because of the absence

7
of an offer of proof). To the extent Vang argues that the distr ict court erred by not
discovering the nature of the purported misinterpretations, his argument fails.
B. Nonreliance on the English translation

Vang’s second argument is that his conviction must be reversed because M.X.-Y.
may have relied on S.T.’s Hmong-language testimony rather than on the English-language
interpretation of that testimony. He argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion by
not dismissing M.X.-Y. after she indicated that she understood and recalled S.T.’s Hmong-
language testimony and that she might have difficulty relying only on the English-language
interpretation of the testimony.
Neither Vang nor the state cites any Minnesota caselaw governing when a juror who
understands non-English testimony that is being translated for the record must be removed,
and our review reveals none. Nonetheless, we believe that it is appropriate to draw an
analogy to cases concerning juro r consideration of extra-record evidence. A similar
analogy was used by the supreme court in State v. Bowles, in which the court treated “race-
based pressure” within the jury as if it was evidence from outside the record that was relied
upon by the jury. 530 N.W.2d 521, 536 & n.22 (Minn. 1995). Othe r states treat a juror’s
ability to directly understand n on-English testimony as an extr a-record source of
knowledge. See, e.g., People v. Cabrera , 281 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that it was juror misconduct for a juror (1) to not rely on the appointed interpreter’s
translation, and (2) to share her own interpretation with other jurors, with citation to cases
prohibiting juries from relying on outside evidence); State v. Powers, 164 N.W. 856, 857-
58 (Iowa 1917) (comparing the pr esence of German-speaking juror s who had said they

8
would rely on German-language testimony rather than its English interpretation to a Texas
case where jurors engaged in personal inspection of purportedly stolen property outside the
courtroom, because both would result in “a verdict upon facts . . . known only to the jury,
not publicly developed on the trial”).
“An impartial trial requires that conclusions reached by the tr ier of fact be based
upon the facts in evidence and prohibits the trier of fact from reaching conclusions based
on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d
238, 249-50 (Minn. 2005) (citation omitted). If the untranslate d testimony of a non-
English-speaking witness is considered extra-record evidence, removal of a bilingual juror
who is not willing and able to use only the English-language testimony as translated by the
interpreter may be required in order to ensure that a verdict i s made based only on the
record evidence.
But even under this theory, Vang’s argument fails because the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it credited M.X.-Y.’s affirmation that she would rely only on the
English interpretation. Appellate courts are “especially defere ntial” to district courts’
determinations of ju rors’ credibility. State v. Munt , 831 N.W.2d 569, 576 (Minn. 2013).
Vang notes that M.X.-Y. was “hesitant” when saying that she could rely only on what the
interpreter said and said that it would be “kind of hard for” her to focus on the interpreter’s
words because she also understood S.T.’s testimony directly. Bu t when the state
subsequently questioned M.X.-Y., she definitively affirmed that she was paying attention
to the interpreter, knew what he was saying, would not share th e Hmong-language
testimony with the other jurors, and would rely on the English interpretation. Vang has not

9
shown this court any reason that would justify reversing the di strict court’s credibility
determination. The district cour t did not abuse its discretion by declining to remove
M.X.-Y. from the jury.
C. Bias

Vang’s final argument relating to the interpretation of S.T.’s testimony is that
M.X.-Y. exhibited actual bias in favor of S.T. and that her pre sence on the jury violated
Vang’s Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an impartial jury. Vang’s assertion turns on
M.X.-Y.’s statement that she believed S.T. was frustrated by the perceived mistranslations
and that M.X.-Y. understood that frustration.
Vang did not argue to the district court that M.X.-Y. was actua lly biased. It is an
unsettled question whether the pl ain-error rule permits review of an unpreserved, but not
expressly waived, claim of juror bias. State v. Geleneau, 873 N.W.2d 373, 382 n.3 (Minn.
App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2016). But we need not address that question
here. The parties do not argue it, and deciding it would make no difference to the outcome:
even if the plain-error doctrine applies and Vang is permitted to argue that M.X.-Y. was
actually biased, the district court did not plainly err by keeping M.X.-Y. on the jury.
To show plain error, a defendan t must establish “(1) an error, (2) that is plain, and
(3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 279
(Minn. 2015). If all three prongs of the plain-error test are s atisfied, “we may correct the
error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or p ublic reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted).

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A juror may be challenged for bias if “[t]he juror’s state of m ind—in reference to
the case or to either party—satisfies the court that the juror cannot try the case impartially
and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the challenging party.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.02, subd. 5(1). “To prove actual bias, the challenging party must show that the juror
exhibited strong and deep impressions that would prevent her fr om laying aside her
impression or opinion and rendering a verdict based on the evid ence presented in court.”
State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 623 (Minn. 2015) (quotations omitted).
A reviewing court follows a two-step process to determine wheth er a juror should
have been removed for actual bias. Id. The first step requires the reviewing court to “view
the juror’s voir dire answers in context” and determine whether “the juror expressed actual
bias.” Id. If the juror did express actual bias, then the reviewing court must “determine
whether the juror was properly rehabilitated.” Id. A juror is properly rehabilitated if the
juror “states unequivocally that he or she will follow the dist rict court’s instructions and
will set aside any preconceived notions and fairly evaluate the evidence.” State v. Prtine,
784 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. 2010).
Vang’s argument fails at the first step: M.X.-Y. did not expres s actual bias.
M.X.-Y.’s statements show that she believed S.T. was frustrated by testifying through an
interpreter and that she understood that perceived frustration. M.X.-Y. did not say that she
was sympathetic toward S.T. personally, that she was predispose d to believe S.T.’s
testimony, or that her understanding of S.T.’s testimony in Hmong affected in any way her
ability to be impartial. Because M.X.-Y. did not express actual bias, the district court did

11
not err by not removing her for bias and her presence on the ju ry did not violate Vang’s
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
II. Vang’s conviction is suppor ted by sufficient evidence.

V a n g a r g u e s t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n m u s t b e r e v e r s e d b e c a u s e t h e e vidence is
insufficient to prove false imprisonment beyond a reasonable doubt.
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts
undertake a painstaking review of the record, and review the
evidence to determine whether, given the facts in the record
and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those
facts, a fact-finder could re asonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the offense charged.

State v. Barshaw , 879 N.W.2d 356, 362 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted). Appellate
courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ver dict and assume that “the
factfinder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id. at 363 (quotation
omitted).
The false-imprisonment statute pr ovides: “Whoever, knowingly la cking lawful
authority to do so, intentionally confines or restrains . . . a ny . . . person without the
person’s consent, is guilty of false imprisonment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2 (2016).
Vang breaks down the offense in t his case into the following th ree substantive elements
plus a jurisdictional element: f irst, that he “intentionally co nfined or restrained S.T.”;
second, that he “knew that he had no lawful authority” to do so ; third, that “S.T. did not
consent to the confinement or restraint”; and fourth, that his acts took place on the specified
date in Ramsey County. He concedes the second and fourth elements but argues that there

12
was insufficient evidence to show either that he confined or restrained S.T. or that she did
not consent to being confined or restrained.
S.T. testified to both of those elements. She said that, after finding Vang in the
bathroom and asking him to leave, she opened the door but he pu shed the door shut and
locked it. She indicated that he stood between her and the door so that she could not open
it. She also said that she asked Vang to open the door and that he would not let her, which
was when she started was crying and yelling. She testified that the door was eventually
opened when her husband came with a tool to open it.
Vang contends that this court should disregard S.T.’s direct evidence, which shows
both intentional confinement or restraint and lack of consent, because it is inconsistent with
the jury’s verdict on the other counts. He argues that, in orde r to find him not guilty of
terroristic threats and not guilty of fifth-degree assault, the jury must have disbelieved
S.T.’s testimony that he hit her, pushed her down, and threaten ed to sexually assault her.
Because the jury disbelieved that testimony, he argues, the jur y must not have believed
S.T.’s testimony that Vang would not let her leave the bathroom . Vang goes on to argue
that the remaining evidence, which is circumstantial, fails to rule out the inference that S.T.
was willingly in the bathroom with him.
But Vang’s argument fails without the need to reach his circums tantial-evidence
argument. “As the fact finder, th e jury is in a unique position to determine the credibility
of the witnesses and weigh the evidence before it.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600
(Minn. 2017). “A jury, as the sole judge of credibility, is free to accept part and reject part
of a witness’[s] testimony.” State v. Poganski, 257 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn. 1977). And “a

13
conviction may be based on a single person’s testimony.” State v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710,
717 (Minn. 2010). Thus, the jury was free to accept the part of S.T.’s testimony establishing
the elements of false imprisonm ent while disbelieving her testi mony as to the other
charges. Because S.T.’s testimony was direct evidence establish ing the elements of false
imprisonment, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict.
III. The district court’s refusal to depart from the sentencing guidelines was not an
abuse of discretion.

Vang’s final argument is that the district court abused its discretion by declining to
depart from the sentencing guidelines for felony false imprisonment.
In his sentencing motion to the d istrict court, Vang argued tha t the district court
should grant a downward durational departure because his conduc t was significantly less
serious than the typical case of false imprisonment and because there were other substantial
grounds mitigating his culpability. The district court ordered a stay of imposition pending
three years of probation, a sentence that conformed to the sent encing guidelines. Vang
appeals, arguing that the district court erred by not granting his motion for a downward
durational departure.
A district court may impose a gross-misdemeanor sentence for a felony conviction,
but doing so is a departure. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D .1 (2016) (“A pronounced
sentence for a felony conviction that is outside the appropriate range on the applicable Grid,
including a stayed or imposed gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor sentence, is a departure
from the Guidelines.”). A district court “has broad discretion to depart only if aggravating
or mitigating circumstances are present.” State v. Best, 449 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Minn. 1989).

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Those mitigating circumstances must be “substantial and compell ing,” meaning that they
make “the facts of a particular case different from a typical c ase.” State v. Olson , 765
N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 20 09) (quotation omitted). “Ordinar ily, a reviewing court
will not interfere” with a presumptive guidelines sentence, even if mitigating circumstances
are present. State v. Quast, 381 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn.
Mar. 14, 1986). However, there may occasionally be a “rare case” in which refusal to depart
is an abuse of discretion. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). Such a case is
not present when there are “valid reasons for adhering to the presumptive sentence.” Id.
In an attempt to show that his offense was less serious than the typical case of false
imprisonment, Vang refers to a number of cases of false impriso nment with worse facts
than these. Vang argues that he did not physically hold S.T. captive and did not physically
assault or threaten her, so his conduct is less serious than th e typical case of false
imprisonment. But he did “confine or restrain” her, see Minn. Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2, and
he did so within her own home. And, in many of the cases Vang c ites, the more offensive
conduct is generally from crimes committed in addition to false imprisonment, such as
sexual assault, State v. Muckle, A17-0029, 2017 WL 6272932 (Minn. App. Dec. 11, 2017),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 20, 2018); or burglary, State v. Mason , A08-0620, 2009 WL
1918722 (Minn. App. July 7, 2009), review denied (Minn. Sept. 16, 2009). In some cases,
the imprisonment appears to be si milar to that here, as when a high school student duct-
taped a classmate and left him in a stairwell, believing it to be an acceptable school
tradition. In re Welfare of R.W.C., C0-96-630, 1997 WL 3366 (Minn. App. Jan. 7, 1997).
Additionally, in one of the burglary cases, the restraint only ended when the police entered

15
and forcibly released the restrained party. Mason, 2009 WL 1918722, at *6. That situation
is comparable to this one, in that Vang did not release S.T. un til the other people in the
house forced their way into the bathroom and let her out. The d istrict court’s conclusion
that Vang’s conduct was not substantially or compellingly less serious than the typical case
of false imprisonment was not an abuse of discretion.
Vang also argues that his culpability was mitigated because he had innocent aims—
to speak to S.T. in private about what he believed to be inappr opriate conduct. But the
district court considered the motives he claims and viewed them as less innocent. In the
district court’s view, Vang’s motives were sexist or misogynist ic and did not mitigate his
culpability. That view was entirely reasonable. Even assuming those were Vang’s motives,
the fact that Vang imprisoned S.T. — a s t r a n g e r t o h i m b e f o r e t h at night—in order to
chastise her for her personal conduct in no way mitigates the invasion of S.T.’s freedom of
movement or the emotional and psychological harm and harm to S.T.’s dignity from being
restrained.
Vang’s imprisonment of S.T. was not significantly less serious than the typical false
imprisonment, and the district court was within its discretion in rejecting Vang’s arguments
for reduced culpability. The district court did not abuse its d iscretion by declining to
sentence Vang’s conviction as a gross misdemeanor.
Affirmed.