In re the Marriage of: Michael James Pudlick, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1652

In re the Marriage of:
Michael James Pudlick, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Tammy Jean Pudlick,
Respondent.

Filed November 4, 2019
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-14-8322

Patrick C. Burns, Erik F. Hansen, Elizabeth M. Cadem, Burns & Hansen P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Tammy Christensen, Excelsior, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Worke, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his child-support- modification motion, arguing
that the district court failed to apply the child-support-modification statute when the parties
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entered into a stipulated agreement that deviated from the guidelines support amount.
Appellant also argues that the district court erred by failing to address the children’s best
interests. We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2011, the district court filed a stipulated judgment and decree that
incorporated the marital termination agreement between appellant -father Michael James
Pudlick and respondent-mother Tammy Jean Pudlick. The parties have two joint children.
Based on their agreement, the district court awarded joint legal and joint physical custody
of the children, with mother receiving 57% of parenting time and father receiving 43% of
parenting time. The parties stipulated that no basic support would be paid by either party
and agreed that it was in the children’s best interests to deviate from the child-support
guidelines and to instead use an expense-sharing model.
At the time of the stipulation, father’s parental income for determining child support
(PICS) percentage was 35% and mother’s was 65%. The expense-sharing model called for
the parties to share various childcare costs and expenses. The district court approved the
deviation and found that while father would have had to pay mother basic child support
had the child-support guidelines been applied, the expense-sharing model was in the
children’s best interests. Both parties were represented by counsel, advised of their legal
rights, and acknowledged that the agreement was fair, just, and equitable.
In August 2014, father moved to modify child support following commencement of
the parties’ stipulated equal parenting-time schedule. Father requested that the district
court modify child support in accordance with the guidelines and that mother pay one-half
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of extracurricular activities. He argued that his increase in parenting time, the increase in
the disparity between the parties’ incomes, and a change in who provided health insurance
constituted a substantial change in circumstances.
The district court denied father’s 2014 modification motion. The district court
found that the application of the child-support-modification statute was not helpful because
the parties agreed in the 2011 stipulation to use a different child-support model from the
one adopted by the legislature. The district court reasoned that the parties’ 2011 stipulation
would have been rebuttabl y presumed to be unreasonable and unfair the day after it was
entered. Therefore, the district court considered whether the current order was
unreasonable and unfair in light of the parties’ current financial circumstances, expenses,
and the amount of time the children were in each parties’ custody.
The district court noted that when father would have been required to pay child
support to mother, and the expense-sharing model benefitted him, he was in favor of that
method of support. The district court recognized that father changed his position towards
the use of the expense-sharing model once it no longer benefitted him and concluded that
the parties should continue to use the expense- sharing model because father presented no
facts to support why the existing order was unreasonable or unfair.
Father moved for amended findings or a new trial. The district court held a review
hearing in June 2015. The parties agreed to follow a more detailed expense-sharing model,
which allocated the children’s expenses according to the parties’ respective PICS
percentages, and agreed to appoint a parenting consultant for two years to address any
financial disputes relating to the agreement. Both parties were represented by counsel and
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acknowledged that they were advised of their legal rights and expressed their willingness
to be bound by the agreement.
In January 2016, the district court entered the stipulation and order. The district
court found that the parties agreed that it was in the children’s best interests to deviate from
the child-support guidelines and it was their intent to allocate their children’s expenses
based on their PICS percentages. The district court also ordered the parties to review their
PICS percentages each year.
In April 2018, father moved to modify child support so that he was awarded
guidelines child support. Father argued that there had been a substantial change in
circumstances because mother’s income had increased, she had job security, his expenses
had increased due to a non-joint child, and the expense-sharing model exacerbated their
co-parenting conflicts.
The district court denied father’s motion and ordered the parties to pay for the
children’s expenses based on their respective PICS percentages. In deny ing father’s
motion, the district court agreed with the 2014 order that the application of the child-
support-modification statute was not helpful to determine whether modification was
appropriate because of the stipulation, and instead focused on whether the current order
was unreasonable and unfair. The district court found that, while there had been a number
of changes in circumstances, including an increase in mother’s income, the expense-
sharing model was not unreasonable or unfair because the parties’ stated intent of the
expense-sharing model was to allocate the children’s expenses based on their respective
PICS percentages. This appeal followed.
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D E C I S I O N
We review the district court’s denial of father’s modification motion for an abuse
of discretion. See Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013). While the
district court has broad discretion in ordering a modification of child support, it abuses its
discretion when it acts outside the statutory limits set by the legislature or resolves the
matter “by reaching a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on
record.” Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 2002).
A child-support order may be modified on a showing of a substantial change in
circumstances that makes the order unreasonable and unfair. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2(a) (2018) (listing circumstances constituting substantial change). The
circumstances that may warrant modification include a “substantially increased or
decreased gross income of an obligor or obligee,” and a “substantially increased or
decreased need of an obligor or obligee.” Id. , subd. 2(a)(1), (2). Father, as the moving
party, bears the burden of proof in this support-modification proceeding. See Bormann v.
Bormann, 644 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. App. 2002).
While the existence of a stipulation does not bar later consideration of whether a
change in circumstances warrants modification, a district court should “carefully and only
reluctantly” alter its terms. O’Donnell v. O’Donnell, 678 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Minn. App.
2004). In the case of a stipulation,
[b]arring a showing of an actual substantial change in
circumstance that makes the terms of the order unfair and
unreasonable, granting a child support modification simply on
the basis that it is 20% and $50 less than the guidelines would
be contrary to the parties’ agreement and the judgment of the
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court. To modify in this setting would produce an unfair and
unreasonable result.1

Id. at 477. A stipulation provides t he “baseline circumstances against which claims of
substantial change are evaluated.” Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1997).
This court has held that a stipulated judgment, supported with findings, may rebut a
presumption of unfairness and u nreasonableness in a support- modification proceeding.
See O’Donnell, 678 N.W.2d at 477.
We can easily resolve father’s first argument that the district court erred by holding
that the statutory mechanism for child-support modification in section 518A.39 does not
apply because the parties previously stipulated to a deviation from the guidelines child
support. Father is incorrect that the district court held that the statutory mechanism for
modification of child support does not apply to a stipulated deviation. Rather, the district
court recognized that the modification statute was not helpful to determine whether
modification was appropriate due to the parties’ agreement to deviate from the child-
support guidelines. T he district court recognized that the stipulation provided a baseline
from which to identify whether there had been a substantial change in circumstances.
Therefore, the district court did not fail to apply the child-support-modification statute.
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion when it found that the
stipulation was not unreasonable and unfair despite father showing a substantial change in
circumstances due, namely, to mother’s increased income. Despite the district court

1 The rebuttable presumption that child support that deviates from the guidelines by 20%
and $50 higher or lower than the current order is unfair and unreasonable has since changed
to 20% and $75. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(1) (2018).
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finding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding the stipulation fair and reasonable given the parties’ use of a
stipulated agreement rather than the child-support guidelines.
First, both parties were represented and adequately apprised of the circumstances
surrounding the 2016 stipulation at the time it was entered. Father has made no allegation
of fraud, mistake, or duress.
Second, an increase in mother’s income was foreseeable at the time father entered
into the stipulated agreement. This court has recognized that circumstances which are
foreseeable to the parties when they enter into a stipulated agreement are insufficient to
support modification. See id. at 476. At the time father entered into the agreement, he was
aware that mother’s gross monthly income and PICS percentage were higher than his.
Here, the district court found that the intent of the 2016 stipulation was to share the
expenses of the children so the annual expense allocation results in a division based on
each parties’ PICS percentage. In addition, the district court ordered that the parties review
their PICS percentages annually. These terms, which formed the basis of the stipulation,
recognized that the parties’ incomes could change. Because the stipulated agreement
included a mechanism to adjust the allocation of the children’s expenses, an increase in
mother’s income was foreseeable.
Finally, father has failed to show how an increase in mother ’s income affected his
ability to meet the needs of his children. Father produced no evidence and made no
argument concerning the stipulation’s adequacy to provide for the needs of his children.
See Frank-Bretwisch v. Ryan, 741 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. App. 2007) (“[T]he fairness
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and reasonableness of the [child-support order] goes to matters beyond the interests of each
parent, to the paramount consideration of the children’s best interests. This observation
becomes critical in circumstances . . . when the primary argument against modification
regards the . . . stipulation of the parties . . . .”). Here, father’s arguments focused on
mother’s increased income, her job stability, his unsupported assertion that he had
increased expenses due to a non-joint child, and the conflict that resulted from the expense-
sharing model. As father failed to demonstrate that the changed circumstances made the
existing stipulation inadequate to meet his children’s needs, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying his modification motion.
As a final matter, the parties argue about the statutorily required findings regarding
the children’s best interests when there is a deviation from the child -support guidelines.
The district court implicitly addressed the children’s best interests. This court “may treat
statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the findings.” Prahl v. Prahl, 627
N.W.2d 698, 703 (Minn. App. 2001). The district court found that if it granted father’s
motion and ordered guidelines support, the parties would still have to reconcile
unreimbursed medical and dental expenses and it would eliminate the requirement that the
parties share in the children’s expenses. These findings implicitly recognize that the
stipulation benefitted the children because it provided a workable mechanism to provide
for their expenses. Therefore, the district court adequately addressed the children’s best
interests.
Affirmed.