State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1707

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Myron Alexander Bruss,
Appellant.

Filed November 25, 2019
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-9288

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman , Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges his judgment of conviction for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor committed
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misconduct during closing argument by mischaract erizing evidence, vouching for the
victim’s credibility, and disparaging the d efense. We conclude that no prosecutorial
misconduct occurred. Appellant also attempts to raise additional issues in his pro se
supplemental brief, but fails to identify a legal error, cite the record, or support his
arguments with any legal authority. Thus, we decline to consider the issues raised in
appellant’s pro se supplemental brief. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Myron Alexander Bruss’s conviction is for the sexual abuse of his
daughter, M.B., who was born in 1993. Bruss also has a son, A.B., born in 2000; he
parented both children with his ex -wife, S.B. Bruss and S.B. separated when M.B. was
nine or ten years old and divorced in 2005. After the separation, b oth children initially
resided with S.B. in Delano. In April or May 2007, when M.B. was 13 years old, she and
A.B. moved into Bruss’s Minneapolis home to attend school. In July 2008, the children
returned to live with S.B. They have not resided with Bruss since July 2008.
Dr. Adamski was M.B.’s primary physician from birth to age 21 or 22, and, among
other things, treated her for Tourette’s Syndrome and anxiety. In about June 2014, when
M.B. was 20 years old, Dr. Adamski noticed an increase in M.B.’s tics and anxiety and
referred M.B. to a therapist. On June 16, 2014, M.B. told her therapist, Dr. Reed, that Bruss
had sexually abused her during the time that she lived with him . The next day, M.B.
experienced her first seizure. Just before the seizure, M.B. left work because she felt
nauseous. M.B.’s mother testified that M.B. was having “massive tics, which she’s never
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had before.” Police stopped M.B., who was driving. M.B. began to seize and was taken by
ambulance to the hospital.
M.B. suffered seizures over the next few days , including a seizure while at her
primary-care clinic. Treating physicians ultimately determined that M.B. was experiencing
“psychological nonepileptic seizures.” M.B. sought care from Dr. Sa, a psychologist, in
November 2015. Dr. Sa diagnosed M.B. with post -traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
reported M.B.’s sexual abuse to law enforcement in October 2016.
The state filed a complaint against Bruss in April 2017, alleging four counts:
first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2006),
penetration of a person under the age of 13 years by an actor more than 36 months older
(count one); first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a),
sexual contact with a person under the age of 13 years by an actor more than 36 months
older (count two); first -degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342,
subd. 1(b) (2006), penetration of a person between the ages of 13 and 16 by an actor more
than 48 months older and in a position of authority (count three); and first-degree criminal
sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(b), sexual contact with a person
between the ages of 13 and 16 by an actor more than 48 months older and in a position of
authority (count four).
The dis trict court heard pretrial motions in February 2018 . Relevant to the
issue on appeal, the state sought to admit expert testimony from Dr. Adamski and Dr. Sa.
Bruss’s attorney objected, arguing that Dr. Sa should not be permitted to opine that M.B.’s
symptoms are consistent with or caused by sexual abuse. The district court ruled that Dr. Sa
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could testify regarding whether M.B. had suffered trauma , but was “not permitted to
vouch” or opine whether M.B.’s trauma was from sexual abuse. The district court reserved
its ruling on whether Dr. Sa could testify that M.B.’s symptoms were consistent with sexual
abuse.
The five-day jury trial began May 30, 2018. The state called M.B., A.B., S.B.,
Dr. Sa, Dr. Adamski, a forensic interviewer from CornerH ouse, and a law-enforcement
detective. In addition to the facts described above, M.B. testified that during the
approximately 15 months she lived with him, Bruss penetrated her anus with his penis,
used a vibrator on her vagina, digitally penetrated her vagina, and ma de her perform oral
sex on him. M.B.’s medical records were received into evidence and reflected that she had
no history of seizures before June 2014, when she first disclosed abuse to Dr. Reed.
The st ate elicited testimony from Dr. Sa about whether M.B.’s symptoms were
consistent with sexual abuse. Defense counsel objected and the district court ruled that
caselaw permitted Dr. Sa to testify about whether a victim’s traits or characteristics “are
consistent or inconsistent wit h sexua l abuse” and that Dr. Sa’s testimony about M.B.’s
symptoms was not vouching.
The forensic interviewer testified that she conducted a CornerHouse interview of
M.B. and, at times, M.B. had a childlike affect in “the words that she used and the way that
she used them.” The recording of the interview shows that M.B. displayed minimal tics
until the interviewer inquired about sexual abuse. At that point, M.B. began to cry, her tics
escalated, and she hyperventilated. During the interview, M.B. stated Bruss touched her
breasts, penetrated her anus with his penis, digitally penetrated her vagina, forced her to
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perform oral sex on him, and that he performed oral sex on her. The district court received
a recording of the forensic interview into evidence and the jury viewed the recording .
Bruss testified in his own defense and denied any abuse occurred.
Before the case was submitted to the jury, the state dismissed counts one, two, and
four. On June 5, 2018, the jury convicted Bruss of count three, first-degree criminal sexual
conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(b), penetration of a person between the ages
of 13 and 16 by an actor more than 48 months ol der and in a position of authority. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument.
Bruss did not object during or after the prosecutor’s closing argument and raises
prosecutorial misconduct for the first time in this appeal. When an appellant seeks review
of prosecutorial misconduct but did not object during closing argument, we apply a
modified plain-error standard to review the issue. State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 302
(Minn. 2006). An appellant must demonstrate an error occurred, that the error was plain ,
and if those elements are established, then the burden shifts to the state to show the conduct
did not affect the appellant’s substantial rights. Id. An error is plain if the prosecutor’s
conduct “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct” and it is “clear or obvious.”
Id. If the three elements of the modified plain -error test are met , this court must decide
whether it should address the error “to ensure fairness and the integri ty of the judicial
proceedings.” Id.
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Bruss argues the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by
“mischaracterizing the evidence, vouching for the complainant’s credibility, and
disparaging the defense.” We discuss each argument in turn.
A. Mischaracterizing expert evidence
The prosecution’s closing argument “may include conclusions and inferences that
are reasonably drawn from the facts in evidence.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 551
(Minn. 2010). But “a lawyer may not speculate without a factual basis.” State v. Peltier,
874 N.W.2d 792, 804 (Minn. 2016) . When this court reviews a closing argument for
prosecutorial misconduct, “we look to the closing argument as a whole, rather than to
selected phrases and remarks.” State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008).
Bruss argues the prosecutor mischaracterized expert evidence, contending that she
argued during closing that M.B.’s seizures were a “direct result of sexual abuse .” We
disagree with Bruss’s description of the prosecutor’s closing argument. The prosecutor did
not state that M.B.’s seizures were a “direct result” of sexual abuse; in fact, the prosecutor
stated, “You can’t say [M.B.] has seizures; ergo, she was s exually assaulted as a child.”
When the prosecutor’s argument is read in context, the prosecutor argued that the jury
should infer M.B.’s seizures corroborated her statements that Bruss sexually abused her.
This is not misconduct because the prosecutor was entitled to argue that the jury should
draw an inference based on record evidence. See Matthews, 779 N.W.2d at 551. Here, the
prosecutor disavowed a causal relationship between the sexual abuse and the seizures but
nonetheless properly argued corroboration based on evidence that M.B.’s first seizure
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occurred immediately after she first disclosed Bruss’s conduct to her therapist and that
M.B.’s medical records documented no history of seizures before June 2014.
Bruss also argues the prosecutor’s closing argument mischaracterized the evidence
by arguing that the sexual abuse was the “ only trauma” that M.B. had experienced when
she had her first seizure. Bruss points to the following statements by the prosecutor:
And what did Dr. Sa further tell you? That [M.B.’s]
presentation is not inconsiste nt with a person who
suffered sexual abuse as a child. That is the only trauma
[M.B.] has disclo sed. That is the only trauma [M.B.] has
discussed and is working through. There is no other trauma
other than the repeated sexual assault by her father when she
was a child.

(Emphasis added.) When arguing that M.B.’s “presentation” was “not inconsistent” with
sexual abuse, the prosecutor accurately summarized Dr. Sa’s testimony. Dr. Sa was asked
on direct-examination whether M.B.’s symptoms were “consistent with someone who has
undergone a trauma” and “with someone who [has] experienced a sexual assault[,]” and
she replied “[y]es” to both questions.1 The prosecutor did not argue that Dr. Sa had opined
M.B.’s trauma was from sexual abuse, which adheres to the district court’s in limine ruling.
But Bruss contends that the prosecutor misstated the evidence by referring to
Dr. Sa’s testimony and, in the next sentence, arguing that the “only trauma” M.B. disclosed
was sexual abuse. Dr. Sa agreed on cross-examination that M.B. experienced other anxiety
“triggers” around the time of her seizures, such as roommate problems, living on her own,

1 To be clear, in his appeal to this court, Bruss does not challenge the admissibility of the
expert’s testimony. Therefore, we do not consider or address the admissibility of the
expert’s testimony.
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difficulties at work, and, much earlier, her g randmother’s death during her childhood.
Similarly, M.B. testified to struggling with work stress, relationship problems, and
roommate issues. Still, when the prosecutor’s argument is read in context, we conclude that
the prosecutor’s statements were fair argument because she asked the jury to differentiate
between “triggers,” stress, and trauma, a distinction that finds support in the testimony. We
conclude that the prosecutor did not mischaracterize expert evidence during closing
argument.
B. Vouching for M.B.’s credibility
The state may argue for or against a witness’s credibility but cannot “personally
endorse a witness’s credibility[.]” State v. Jackson , 773 N.W.2d 111, 123 (Minn. 2009).
Vouching occurs when “the prosecutor implies a guarantee of a witness’s truthfulness,
refers to facts outside the record, or expresses a personal opinion as to a witness’s
credibility.” State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131, 139 (Minn. 2012).
Bruss argues that the prosecutor vouched for M.B.’s credibility . Bruss’s appellate
brief cites the following statements by the prosecutor during closing argument:
What do you have to corroborate this? Because, again, this is
ten years ago. It’s not going to be on video, and we’re not going
to have witnesses. Ladies and gentleme n, her body is
corroboration.

. . . You can’t say she has seizures; ergo, she was sexually
assaulted as a child. But this is a piece, ladies and gentlemen,
it’s a piece that corroborates the information that she gave you.
And you heard from Dr. Sa and Dr. Adamski [the pediatrician],
despite years of medication and anxiety, years of it, eight years
of it. It is not until she discloses to her therapist that the seizures
start. And then they continued, and they have continued
through all increased moments of anxiety of [M.B.’s] life,
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including the decision to contact the police, as you heard,
including the decision to participate in a CornerHouse
interview. Her body is corroborative of what happened to her.
The parties agree that M.B.’s credibility was a central issue in this case. Bruss argues
the prosecutor vouched for M.B.’s credibility by arguing that M.B.’s seizures corroborated
her testimony about sexual abuse. This argument is very similar to Bruss’s argument that
the prosecutor mischaracterized the evidence and, for similar reasons , we reject Bruss’s
vouching argument.
First, as discussed above, the inference that the prosecutor advocated has support in
the record evidence including the sequence of events and M.B.’s medical history. Second,
the prosecutor followed the district court’s in limine ruling and explicitly stated that M.B.’s
seizures did not mean that M.B. was sexually assaulted. Third, the prosecutor did not state
her personal o pinion about M.B.’s credibility. Because the prosecutor argued the jury
should draw an inference based on record evidence, adhered to the district court’s in limine
instructions, and did not state her personal opinion , we conclude the prosecutor did not
vouch for M.B.’s credibility.
C. Disparaging the defense
“The State may argue that there is no merit in a particular defense, but it may not
belittle that defense either in the abstract or by suggesting that the defendant raised the
defense because it was the only one with any hope for success.” Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at
804. On the other hand, the state “is free to make arguments in anticipation of the defense
closing argument.” State v. Banks, 875 N.W.2d 338, 348 (Minn. App. 2016), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 28, 2016).
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Bruss contends the prosecutor improperly disparaged Bruss’s defense by stating, “I
also guarantee you, that if [M.B.] had [said] every single thing exactly the same ” in her
prior statements, defense counsel “ would stand up here and tell you that that’s evidenc e
that she’s been coached.” Bruss argues this statement is similar to a “when nothing else
will work” argument that the Minnesota Supreme Court has described as improper
disparagement. See State v. Griese , 565 N.W.2d 419 , 427- 28 (Minn. 1997) . The state
responds that the prosecutor anticip ated defense counsel’s “comment o n M.B.’s
credibility” during his closing argument.
After carefully considering the closing arguments of both parties, we conclude that
the prosecutor’s argument fairly anticipated the defense argument. The defense argued that
M.B.’s testimony w as fabricated, contending that M.B. “ knew she shouldn’t ha[ve] said
what she said in the first place and she couldn’t go back on it ,” and that M.B. had been
coached because there were “multiple interviews” by her doctors about the abuse and “we
know that she discussed it with her mother.” When considered in context, the prosecutor’s
challenged statements anticipated defense counsel’s argument about why M.B.’s testimony
lacked credibility. Thus, w e conclude the prosecutor’s argument did not disparage or
belittle the defense.
II. We decline to consider issues raised in Bruss’s pro se supplemental brief.

Legal issues raised in an appellate brief are forfeited when the “brief contains no
citation to legal authority to support his allegations.” State v. Longo, 909 N.W.2d 599, 613
(Minn. App. 2018). “Arguments are forfeited if they are presented in a summary and
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conclusory form, do not cite to applicable law, and fail to analyze the law when claiming
that errors of law occurred.” State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Minn. App. 2017).
Bruss’s pro se supplemental brief argues, first, without any detail, that witnesses
provided false information to the police and prosecution and that evidence introduced by
the prosecution w as incorrect or incomplete . Second, Bruss argues that , during the trial,
the state dismissed three counts in its complaint and the jury never received an explanation.
The pro se brief does not cite legal authority, refer to the record, or articulate a legal error.
Because Bruss’s pro se supplemental brief is conclusory and does not adequately identify
or support legal error, we deem the issues forfeited and do not consider them further.
Affirmed.