State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1720

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Craig Stevens Handeland,
Appellant.

Filed June 24, 2019
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-12-2074

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joe Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Erica Madore, Assistant County Attorney, Milaca,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Sche llhas, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
The central issue before us is how much—if any—custody credit is due to appellant
Craig Stevens Handeland for time spent in custody in other Minn esota jurisdictions, on

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separate charges, before the execution of his driving while impaired (DWI) sentence. This
issue includes whether days spent in secure treatment, while un dergoing competency
restoration in an unrelated case, should be accorded credit as well. Handeland further
challenges the district court’s decision to revoke his probatio n and execute the imposed
sentence.
We conclude that the district court erred in granting only eight days of custody credit
to Handeland in connection with his newly executed DWI sentence . And we remand to
the district court to consider whether, applying the test for i ntrajurisdictional custody
(custody within Minnesota), Handeland is further entitled to cr edit for time spent in local
jails and secure treatment while on probation prior to its revocation. But as to the probation
revocation itself, the district court properly applied the law and acted within its discretion.
Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
In September 2012, appellant Craig Stevens Handeland drove through the streets of
Princeton while drunk. Handeland’s past includes a litany of c onvictions for DWI and
underage drinking and driving. His alcohol content at the time of this arrest was 0.22. He
was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, felony DWI.1
After his plea, the Mille Lacs County District Court sentenced Handeland to
42 months in prison in early 2013. But the judge stayed execut ion of the sentence and,

1 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2012).

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after ordering Handeland to serve 180 days in jail, placed him on probation for seven
years.2
Handeland’s probation progressed smoothly for several years. Then, in April 2016,
Benton County officials arrest ed him for first-degree DWI 3 after he drove an all-terrain
vehicle (ATV) in a ditch under the influence of methamphetamine . But the district court
in Benton County found Handeland incompetent to stand trial and ordered him into the
state’s competency restoration program. 4 Handeland was admitted to Anoka Metro
Regional Treatment Center where he was diagnosed with schizophr enia, treated for his
condition, and received competency-restoration services. That November, Handeland was
found competent to stand trial, and his Benton County criminal case therefore resumed.
Handeland ultimately pleaded gu ilty to the Benton County DWI of fense in
Apr i l 2 0 18. But be t we e n t he No vember competency determination and the April plea,
Handeland was arrested on two se parate fifth-degree controlled- substance offenses and
spent additional days in local jails related to those offenses.
At the June DWI sentencing in Benton County, the district court granted Handeland
a downward dispositional departure. Accordingly, the district court sentenced Handeland

2 Ninety days of Handeland’s jail term was to be served on electronic alcohol monitoring.
He served 60 days in jail.
3 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2014).
4 To ensure that a defendant is competent to understand and part icipate in criminal
proceedings, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a medical-examination
process when competency is in dou bt. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subds. 3, 4. If the court
determines the defendant is not competent, the criminal proceed ings are suspended, and
the civil commitment process can be instituted. Id., subd. 6(b). When and if the defendant
becomes competent, the criminal proceedings are resumed. Id., subd. 6(a).

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to 60 months in prison, stayed e xecution of the sentence and pl aced him on probation for
seven years. The court awarded him 194 days of jail credit.
This Benton County sentence brings us back to where we began these facts: in Mille
Lacs County. For the incident in Benton County had led authorities in Mille Lacs County
to file a probation-revocation re port earlier in 2018. And in August 2018, the parties
appeared for a probation-violati on hearing there. The departme nt of corrections
recommended in its probation-violation report that the stay of execution on Handeland’s
Mille Lacs County DWI be vacated and that he was entitled to 159 days of jail credit against
the executed sentence. The district court revoked Handeland’s probation, concluding that
public safety needs substantially outweighed the preference for probation given
Handeland’s numerous DWIs and a ttendance problems in community treatment.
Handeland’s sentence was executed on the Mille Lacs County DWI, and he was committed
to the commissioner of corrections for 42 months. The court awarded him only eight days
of custody credit against this sentence.
Handeland appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Handeland contends that he is entitled to have 389 days of additional custody credit
applied to his executed Mille Lacs County sentence, comprised of 60 days at the Mille Lacs
County jail, 194 days largely related to the intervening Benton County DWI sentence, and
135 days at the Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center while bei ng restored to
competency following the rule 20 examination. He further argue s that the district court
erred by revoking his probation on the Mille Lacs County DWI.

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The two issues before us call for divergent standards of review . Once the district
court determines the circumstances of the custody the defendant seeks credit for (a factual
finding we review for clear error), it must “then apply the rul es to those circumstances.”
State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Minn. 2008). A sentencing court has no discretion
in this award of custody credit, and we review its determination de novo. State v. Clarkin,
817 N.W.2d 678, 687 (Minn. 2012). On the other hand, the distr ict court has broad
discretion in determining whether sufficient evidence exists to revoke probation, and this
court will reverse only if there is a clear abuse of that discr etion. State v. Austin , 295
N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). With these parameters in mind, we address each issue
in turn.
I. The district court erred in its calculation of Handeland’s c ustody credit.
Between his 2012 Mille Lacs County arrest for DWI and the 2018 execution of his
42-month sentence for that DWI, Handeland spent approximately 3 89 days in custody.
Those days largely fall into thr ee buckets: the days spent in t he Mille Lacs County jail
related to the 2012 DWI; the days spent in local jails related to other convictions (primarily
an additional DWI arrest and conviction in Benton County) and days spent in examination
and treatment as part of his competency restoration. To proper ly calculate Handeland’s
custody credit, we first address the Mille Lacs County jail tim e , c l e a r l y r e l a t e d t o t h e
underlying DWI conviction. Next, because both the second and t hird buckets of days
involve unconnected cases, we the n turn to the issue of how to evaluate credit for
intrajurisdictional custody. Fin ally, we address the custody-c redit standards for secure
treatment for competency-restoration purposes.

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60 days in Mille Lacs County Jail
This initial issue is straightforward: whether Handeland is entitled to jail credit for
time spent in the local jail after his arrest (five days) and a fter the judge ordered him to
spend time in the Mille Lacs County jail as part of his origina l sentence (an additional 55
days). The answer is “yes” on both accounts. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure
clearly state that a criminal defendant is entitled to jail credit for time spent in custody “in
connection with the offense or behavioral incident being sentenced.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
27.03, subd. 4(B) (emphasis added). As the state concedes on appeal, although these days
were not discussed at Handeland’s probation-violation hearing, they clearly were time
spent in custody in connection with the original sentence and s hould count as custody
credit.
Credit for Time Spent in Custody on Unconnected Cases
The straightforward analysis for time spent in the Mille Lacs C ounty jail is
juxtaposed against the relative complexity of the next issue: c redit for custody on
unconnected cases. Although the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure dictate credit for
time spent in custody on the unde rlying case (here, the sentenc e for Handeland’s 2012
Mille Lacs County DWI), it is silent regarding time spent in custody on other charges. But
appellate caselaw across the past three decades fills this gap, as we address below.
Before the adoption of the sentencing guidelines in 1981,5 those convicted of a crime
in Minnesota were not entitled to any credit for time spent in custody prior to their

5 The Minnesota Legislature estab lished the sentencing guideline s commission in 1978,
and tasked it with creating the sentencing guidelines, meant to be advisory to the district

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conviction. See State v. Kotlarek , 155 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Minn. 1968) (interpreting the
applicable statute as granting no power to give a defendant credit for time spent in custody
from arrest until sentencing). A nd in the years closely follow ing the adoption of the
sentencing guidelines, caselaw continued to focus on whether th e time in jail was served
in connection with the offense of conviction against which credit was sought. See State v.
Vaughn, 361 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn. 1985) (holding that the district court properly refused
to award jail credit for time se rved in connection with a prior , unrelated conviction).
Similarly, in State v. Brown , where the issue centered on time the defendant spent in
custody out-of-state, the supreme court concluded th at the defendant was only entitle d to
custody credit if the time in jail was “in connection with” the Minnesota charge. 348
N.W.2d 743, 747-48 (Minn. 1984).
Brown and its progeny continue to limit credit for time in custody ou tside of
Minnesota boundaries. State v. Roy , ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2019 WL 2203545, at *2
(Minn. May 22, 2019). However, as the supreme court recently reiterated, this bright-line
approach does not apply to custody within Minnesota. Id. As the court explained:
In evaluating credit for intrajurisdictional custody, we seek to
avoid four potential concerns: “de facto conversion of a
concurrent sentence into a c onsecutive sentence; indigent
persons serving effectively longer sentences as a result of their
inability to post bail; irrelevant factors . . . affecting the length
of incarceration; and manipula tion of charging dates by the
prosecutor so as to increase the length of incarceration.

courts. 1978 Minn. Laws. ch. 723, art. 1, § 9, at 765-66. Unl ess there are “identifiable,
substantial, and compelling circumstances” to depart, the distr ict courts are expected to
follow the sentenci ng guidelines. State v. Soto , 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014)
(quotation omitted).

8

Id. (quoting Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 379); see State v. Goar , 453 N.W.2d 28, 30
(Minn. 1990) (broadly granting jail credit for all time spent i n custody in Minnesota
between an individual’s arrest and sentencing, even on cases that were unrelated).
Having reviewed the governing approach to intrajurisdictional credit, we turn to the
time Handeland spent in other local jails. This constitutes 19 4 days—primarily related to
the Benton County DWI—between h is original Mille Lacs County se ntencing and his
probation revocation five years later. The majority of these d ays were recognized in the
probation-violation report, but—p erhaps relying on the wording of Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 27.03—the district court awarded credit for none of them. To deny
credit without evaluating these days in light of the intrajuris dictional approach described
above was error.
Still, the state seeks refuge in two arguments. First, the sta te contends that
permitting this custody credit would result in “an unfair double credit,” because Handeland
already received credit for them on his Benton County sentence. We disagree. Because
Handeland’s Benton County sentence is stayed, he has yet to receive the benefit from the
jail credit. As the department of corrections initially recomm ended, this custody credit
should have been applied to Handeland’s executed sentence.6
Second, the state argues that custody credit is improper when i t is obtained from a
subsequent first-degree DWI. The state points to Minnesota Sta tutes section 169A.28,

6 Handeland’s Benton County DWI sentence is not an issue before us on appeal, therefore
any unfair double credit that he may have received on his Benton County file is a matter to
be corrected by the district court, not this court.

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subdivision 1(a)(1) (2014), which mandates consecutive sentences for each conviction that
a driver incurs arising out of separate courses of conduct. 7 And if the sentences are
consecutive, then custody credit should only be awarded once. Townsend v. State , 834
N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 2013). Handeland disagrees. He contend s that the mandate for
consecutive sentences does not apply to felony DWIs. Minn. Sta t. § 169A.28, subd. 1(b)
(2014).
But we need not address this underlying dispute. Here, there i s no indication that
the Benton County District Cour t intended Handeland’s 2016 sent ence to be consecutive
to his Mille Lacs County sentence. Clarkin directs this court, for purposes of custody
credit, to presume the sentence was concurrent when the record is silent as to whether the
district court intended sentences to be concurrent, consecutive, or a departure from either.
817 N.W.2d at 686-87. And this r ecord is silent. Consistent w ith this presumption, we
conclude that Handeland’s senten ces are concurrent for purposes of applying the
intrajurisdictional-custody-credit analysis. Accordingly, the district court erred by failing
to credit Handeland, without further evaluation, with all of the time he spent in local jails
from his arrest on April 29, 2016 until his sentence was executed on August 1, 2018.
Custody Credit for Court-Ordered Competency Restoration
Having addressed the standard for assessing custody credit for time spent in jail on
unconnected offenses, we turn to a more nuanced issue: that of time spent in a secure

7 “The court shall impose consecu tive sentences when it sentence s a person
for . . . violations of section 169A .20 (driving while impaired ) arising out of separate
courses of conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.28, subd. 1(a)(1).

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facility for purposes of competency restoration in one of these unconnected offenses. The
state asserts that neither rule nor precedent justifies this ad ditional extension of custody
credit. Handeland, on the other hand, points to the same rule and precedent to argue that
credit is due. To address this question, we begin with rule 20 of the Minnesota Criminal
Rules of Procedure. We then cons ider relevant caselaw, beginni ng with the case relied
upon by both parties: State v. Bonafide, 457 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. App. 1990). Finally, we
apply this precedent to Handeland’s situation.
Rule 20.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provid es for a two-step
process when competency is questioned. First, an examination period to determine if the
defendant is incompetent, mean ing he either lacks the ability t o rationally consult with
defense counsel or is incapable of understanding the criminal proceedings or participating
in the defense. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subds. 2, 4(a). Second, if the individual is found
incompetent, a period of treatme nt (often under commitment and in a secure facility)
ensues to restore competency. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 6 . And the final provision
of rule 20.01 addresses credit for related confinement. That subdivision states:
If the defendant is convicted, any time spent confined to a
hospital or other facility for a mental examination under this
rule must be credited as time served.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 11 (emphasis added).
As the state suggests, the rule only dictates jail credit for the examination period.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 11. But our inquiry does not en d with this rule. As this
court explained in Bonafide, the language of the rule may simply not address—rather than
affirmatively exclude—credit for competency-restoration treatment during a commitment.

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457 N.W.2d at 213. And to examine this issue of credit for treatment, the Bonafide court
first looked at the supreme court’s expansion of custodial credit, in light of “the philosophy
behind the rule.” Id. at 214. This court also, citing other state court decisions, explained
that “the degree of deprivation of liberty in a mental commitme nt facility is equivalent to
a jail or prison facility.” Id. And this court took note of the ABA Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standard, which provides that a defendant detained for examination of competence
“or treatment . . . to effect competence to stand trial should receive credit against any
sentence ultimately imposed for t he time of such pretrial confi nement.” Id. at 215. As a
result, the Bonafide court interpreted rules 20.01 and 27.03, subd. 4, as requiring credit
against sentence for custodial time spent in a secure hospital under a rule 20 presentence
commitment procedure. Id.8
We see no reason to retreat from Bonafide, to the more restrictive reading of rule 20
the state suggests. Our decision is guided by precedent regard ing custody credit in the
almost 30 years since that decision. In Asfaha v. State, the supreme court concluded that
where a residential treatment f acility imposed “essentially the same limitations on a
person’s freedom as a jail . . . [f]airness and equity require that jail credit be granted in such
cases so as to not elevate form over substance.” 665 N.W.2d 52 3, 527-28 (Minn. 2003).
The supreme court also relied upon the principle of uniformity when directing district

8 The state, relying on comment 3.C.04 to the sentencing guideli nes, argues that credit is
only appropriate for time spent in jails, workhouses, and regio nal correctional facilities.
But as this court stated in Bonafide, these comments are not promulgated or approved by
the supreme court. 457 N.W.2d at 213.

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courts to award jail credit where “the level of confinement and limitations imposed are the
functional equivalent” of a workhouse or jail. Id. at 528.9
Turning to Handeland’s experience in competency restoration, we begin with his
rule 20 competency examination, w hich took place in the Benton County jail. With his
incompetency determined, Handeland was sent 10 to Anoka Metro Regional Treatment
Center for competency-restorati on services. Sometime between h is time in secure
treatment at Anoka and the court hearing in November 2017—where the court declared
Handeland competent to stand tria l—Handeland spent time in trea tment at Touchstone
Intensive Residential Treatment program as well. He does not s eek custody credit for his
time at Touchstone.
Applying the holding of Bonafide, we conclude that Handeland is entitled to custody
credit for time spent in a secure state hospital, including Ano ka, under a rule 20
presentence-commitment procedure, just as he would receive credit for the underlying jail
time related to the Benton County DWI. Accordingly if, applyin g the
intrajurisdictional-custody analysis outlined above, the district court awards credit for local
Benton County jail time accrued du ring Handeland’s probation, then it should also credit

9 While the supreme court in Johnson denied custody credit for time spent in confinement
for a civil commitment, in part b ecause the commitment was unre lated to the current
criminal charges, that case is distinguishable. 744 N.W.2d at 380. It involved an individual
under commitment as a sexual offender who was later convicted o f terroristic threats and
assault against staff members at the treatment facility, not treatment to restore competency
in a rule 20 setting. Id.
10 The court order committing Handeland to Anoka is not part of this court record.

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Handeland with time spent in treatment during custody at Anoka Metro Regional
Treatment Center before Handeland’s competency was restored.
In sum, when calculating the amount of custody credit due Hande land on remand,
the district court should award 60 days of custody credit for t he time Handeland spent in
the Mille Lacs County jail, and determine custody credit due Handeland, including for his
time spent in local jails on unre lated charges and time spent i n secure treatment during
custody at Anoka Metro Regiona l Treatment Center, in accordance w i t h t h e
intrajurisdictional custody approach.
II. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y r e v o k i n g H a ndeland’s
probation.

Before revoking probation, the dis trict court “must (1) designa t e t h e s p e c i f i c
condition or conditions that were violated; (2) find that the v iolation was intentional or
inexcusable; and (3) find that need for confinement outweighs t he policies favoring
probation.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). In assessing the third
Austin factor, the supreme court has stated that district courts “should refer” to the
following American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice:
Revocation followed by impris onment should not be the
disposition . . . unless the court finds on the basis of the original
offense and the intervening conduct of the offender that:

(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public
from further criminal ac tivity by the offender;
o r
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectivel y be provided if he is
confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of
the violation if proba tion were not revoked.

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State v. Modtland , 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d
at 251).
“The decision to revoke cannot be a reflexive reaction to an ac cumulation of
technical violations but requires a showing that the offender’s behavior demonstrates that
he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251
(quotations omitted). There must be clear and convincing evide nce that a probation
violation exists. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subds. 2(1)(c)b, 3(1). “The [district] court has
broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and
should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d
at 249-50.
Handeland contends that the district court abused its discretio n by revoking his
probation because evidence did not establish that the need for confinement outweighed the
policies favoring probation. He argues that his new offense wa s due to previously
undiagnosed schizophrenia, which would be better treated in the community than in prison.
To support this argument, he points to the stay of execution that was granted in his Benton
County DWI case two months earlier as proof that community programming was sufficient
and that he was “flourishing” after being diagnosed and receiving treatment for his mental
illness for the first time.
But when it came to the issue of whether treatment could be effectively provided in
the community, the Mille Lacs Coun ty judge appropriately turned to Handeland’s
probation officer. The judge inquired about Handeland’s current treatment. That officer

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testified that Handeland was on the verge of being expelled fro m his dual-diagnosis
mental-health program for lack of attendance. He explained that Handeland “has currently
only attended three of the twelve sessions for aftercare . . . and if he misses another one
he’ll be discharged from the program.” Given this information, some of which appears to
have occurred after the Benton County judge’s stay of execution, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that—given a pattern of DWI s over the course of 15
years and Handeland’s attendance problems in treatment in the community after receiving
a sentencing departure—the balance between probation and the ne ed for confinement
favored protecting the public from Handeland’s behavior.11
Because it appropriately weighed the need for Handeland’s confinement against the
policies favoring probation, the d istrict court acted within it s discretion in revoking
Handeland’s probation. But it erred in determining the amount of custody credit due to
Handeland against his newly exec uted DWI sentence. Rather than eight days of credit,
Handeland was entitled to the time spent in jail on the underlying offense. In addition, the
district court must evaluate Ha ndeland’s request for credit for time spent in jail and in

11 Handeland also argues that the Benton County DWI was distingui shable from his prior
DWIs because it involved driving an ATV in a ditch while impaired by methamphetamine,
whereas his previous DWIs all involved driving a car on a road while impaired by alcohol.
But the district court, acting well within its discretion, foun d no distinction between the
substance leading to the Benton County DWI, which was the seven th impaired-driving
offense in Handeland’s lifetime. Nor does Handeland point to a ny authority that a
distinction between substances creates the potential for an abuse of discretion in revoking
probation.

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custody at Anoka Metro Regional T reatment Center while undergoi ng competency
restoration before execution of his Mille Lacs County DWI sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.