In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1721

In re the Marriage of:

Sandra Sue Grazzini-Rucki, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

David Victor Rucki,
Respondent,

County of Dakota, intervenor,
Respondent.

Filed June 17, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-11-1273

Sandra Sue Grazzini-Rucki, Dunedin, Florida (pro se appellant)

Lisa M. Elliott, Elliott Law Offices, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnes ota (for respondent David
Victor Rucki)

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, James W. Donehower, Assistant County
Attorney, West St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Dakota County)

Considered and decided by Smith , Tracy M., Presiding Judge; La rkin, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this child-support dispute b e t w e e n a p p e l l a n t S a n d r a S u e G r azzini-Rucki and
respondents David Victor Rucki and Dakota County, appellant cha llenges (1) a child-
support magistrate’s (CSM) modification of Grazzini-Rucki’s child-support obligation and
(2) the CSM’s imposition of a payment agreement as a condition of reinstating Grazzini-
Rucki’s driver’s license, which had been suspended for failure t o p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t .
Because her arguments are time-barred or fail to demonstrate a reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
As described below, Grazzini-Rucki challenges three orders, fi led in May, July, and
August 2018. We begin, however, with an October 2016 order, which sets the stage for the
later, challenged orders. On Oct ober 13, 2016, Grazzini-Rucki w as ordered to pay Rucki
$975 per month for child support. At that time, Grazzini-Rucki had been convicted of, and
was awaiting sentencing for, deprivation of parental rights. Th erefore, the order provided
that Grazzini-Rucki’s support obligation would be suspended until she was released from
incarceration, whereupon a review hearing would be held to deci de whether the support
obligation should be reinstated.
May order
Grazzini-Rucki was released from her incarceration related to t hat offense, and, in
2018, Rucki requested a review hearing and reinstatement of the child-support obligation.
A CSM held the review hearing on May 3, 2018; Grazzini-Rucki di d not appear or
participate because she was again incarcerated from March 27 to May 15, 2018, in

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connection with an unspecified matter. The CSM filed an order on May 7, 2018 (the May
order), deciding that Grazzini-Ruc ki’s child-support obligation as established by the
October 13, 2016, order would be reinstated effective June 1, 2018. Grazzini-Rucki neither
requested district court review of the May order nor appealed from it; instead, on May 31,
2018, Grazzini-Rucki filed a motion to modify the May order. Along with the modification
motion, she also filed a motion to reinstate her driver’s license, which had been suspended
in 2015 due to child-support arrearages.
July order
A second CSM held a hearing in July 2018, continuing Grazzini- Rucki’s motions
but addressing procedural issues. After confirming that Grazzini-Rucki was appearing pro
se, the CSM gave Grazzini-Rucki d etailed instructions on the in formation that Grazzini-
Rucki was expected to produce before the hearing on her motions. The CSM reiterated the
instructions in a written order filed July 19, 2018 (the July o rder). Specifically, Grazzini-
Rucki was ordered (1) “to provide verification of her income fr om any and all sources,”
(2) “to provide verification of any disability that she is clai ming as a reason why she is
unemployed,” and (3) “to provide information on all applications for employment she has
made from January 1, 2018 to date.” Rucki was likewise directed to provide his income
information.
August order
The hearing on the merits of Grazzini-Rucki’s motions was held before the second
CSM on August 7, 2018. Grazzini-R ucki did not comply with any o f the directions from
the July order. Rucki also did not submit any current financial information, saying that he

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was consciously making the choice not to do so because of Grazzini-Rucki’s past practice
of disseminating his financial information; instead, he claimed that his income was at the
same level as in 2016. The CSM filed an order on August 21, 201 8 (the August order). In
it, the CSM imputed income to both parties—the CSM found Grazzi ni-Rucki to have the
ability to work full-time at minimum wage and, drawing an adverse inference from Rucki’s
refusal to supply information, found Rucki’s income to be doubl e the amount that he
claimed. The CSM modified Grazzini-Rucki’s child-support obligation, ordering Grazzini-
Rucki to pay the minimum support obligation of $50 per month fo r the period of June 1,
2018, through September 2018, a nd $215 per month as ongoing bas ic support effective
October 1, 2018. Also, the CSM r einstated Grazzini-Rucki’s driv e r ’ s l i c e n s e a n d
established the August order as the “payment agreement” required by statute when ordering
reinstatement of an obligor’s driver’s license.1
Grazzini-Rucki appeals the Ma y, July, and August orders.
D E C I S I O N
I. The May order was not timely appealed.

Grazzini-Rucki challenges variou s aspects of the May order. Bu t, as the county
correctly points out, appeal from the May order is time-barred. T h e t i m e t o a p p e a l a n
appealable order is 60 days from service by a party of written notice of the filing of the
order. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104. 01, subd. 1. The record contai ns an affidavit of service
for the notice of filing of the May order. Service on all couns el of record was perfected

1 See Minn. Stat. § 518A.65(e)(2) (2018), discussed infra in section II.

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through the electronic filing system on May 9, 2018. Grazzini-R ucki does not challenge
that service. Grazzini-Rucki could have appealed the May order within 60 days, or she
could have timely filed a motion for review and stopped the running of the 60-day time for
appeal while the motion was pending. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 2. But Grazzini-
Rucki did not employ any of those procedural devices; instead, she filed a new motion to
modify her child support obligation on May 31, 2018, and did no t appeal the May order
until October 2018. A motion to modify support does not extend the time for appeal of the
order sought to be modified. See id. (listing motions that extend the time for appeal); Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 104.01 1998 advisory comm. cmt. (stating that m otions to modify “no
longer extend the time in which to appeal”). Grazzini-Rucki’s challenge of the May order
in the current appeal is untimely.
Moreover, even if an error in the May order were timely, the a sserted error is
harmless. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); Goldman v.
Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008) (citing this aspect of Minn. R. Civ. P. 61).
On Grazzini-Rucki’s motion to modi fy the May order, the CSM iss ued the new order in
August 2018. The August order overrode the May order, and the two orders have the same
effective date—June 1, 2018. Therefore, any challenge to the May order is moot, and any
error harmless.
II. The CSM did not reversibly e rr in reinstating Grazzini-Rucki’s driver’s license
and establishing the payment agreement.

In the August order, the CSM es tablished a driver’s license pa yment agreement.
Under the agreement, Grazzini-Ru cki’s driver’s license was imme diately reinstated and

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Grazzini-Rucki was held to “complete and timely payment of supp ort” beginning
October 1, 2018. Grazzini-Rucki argues that the CSM should have reinstated her driver’s
license without reservation—i.e ., without requiring “complete a nd timely payment of
support.” Each of her specific arguments will be addressed in turn.
A. Consent to the payment agreement

Grazzini-Rucki argues that, in reinstating her driver’s licens e, the CSM should not
have held her to the obligations of the August order because th e order was not a payment
agreement that she agreed to. O n “a motion for reinstatement of t h e d r i v e r ’ s l i c e n s e ”
brought by a child-support obligor, “if the . . . child support magistrate orders reinstatement
of the driver’s license, the . . . child support magistrate must establish a written payment
agreement pursuant to section 518A.69.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.65(e )(2) (2018) (emphasis
added); see Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15a (2018) (“‘Must’ is mandatory.” ); Greene v.
Comm’r of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 721 (Minn. 2008) (citing this definition). The
CSM acted in accordance with section 518A.65(e)(2) by imposing the payment agreement
when reinstating Grazzini-Rucki’s driver’s license.
Grazzini-Rucki argues that the Aug ust order could not be a “pay ment agreement”
because she did not agree to its terms. Even if the statute required Grazzini-Rucki’s consent
to a payment agreement and the CS M erred by not securing it, th e error is harmless. Had
the CSM not established the paym ent agreement, Grazzini-Rucki’s reinstatement motion
would have been denied and her license would have remained suspended. See Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.65(e)(2). In addition, the payment agreement does not re quire Grazzini-Rucki to
pay any of the arrearages that led to the suspension; it only requires her to make complete

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and timely payment of child support as set out in the August or der. With or without a
payment agreement, violation of a support obligation can result in suspension of the
obligor’s driver’s license. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.65(a) (2018). Grazzini-Rucki has not
shown how she was prejudiced by the imposition of the August or d e r a s a p a y m e n t
agreement in the reinstatement of her driver’s license.
B. Notice

Grazzini-Rucki also argues that the underlying suspension of h er driver’s license,
which occurred in 2015, was illegal because it violated her due-process rights. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.65(b) (2018) provides:
If . . . the [child-support] obligor is in arrears in court-ord ered
child support . . . payments . . . in an amount equal to or greater
than three times the obligor’s total monthly support . . .
payments and not in compliance with a written payment
agreement pursuant to section 518A.69 that is approved by the
court, a child support magistrate, or [a] public authority
[responsible for child support enforcement], the public
authority shall direct the commissioner of public safety to
suspend the obligor’s driver’s license.

Before the public authority can direct suspension of the obligor’s driver’s license, however,
“the public authority must mail a written notice to the obligor at the obligor’s last known
address, that it intends to seek suspension of the obligor’s dr iver’s license and that the
obligor must request a hearing wi thin 30 days in order to conte st the suspension.” Minn.
Stat. § 518A.65(c) (2018); cf. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC , 884 N.W.2d 601, 606
(Minn. 2016) (“Procedural due process . . . requires any notice to be reasonably calculated
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action bef ore depriving them of life,
liberty, or property.” (quotations omitted)).

8
Grazzini-Rucki’s due-process argument is that the child-suppor t office did not send
her a written notice prior to the suspension. “Factual disputes regarding the adequacy of
notice are reviewed for clear error, while the legal adequacy o f any notice that may have
been given is revi ewed de novo.” Cook v. Arimitsu , 907 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Minn. App.
2018), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018). “When determining whether [factual] findings
are clearly erroneous, the appellate court views the record in the light most favorable to the
[district] court’s findings,” Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App.
2000), and reverses only if it “is left with the definite and f irm conviction that a mistake
has been made,” Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284 (quotation omitted).
The CSM did not make a finding whether the child-support offic e had in fact sent
Grazzini-Rucki a notice prior to the suspension. But the only reasonable determination that
the CSM could make on this record is that the requisite notice was in fact provided. A
child-support officer stated in an affidavit that, on May 16, 2015, “the Dakota County Child
Support Office sent a Notice of Intent to Suspend Driver’s Lice nse to [Grazzini-Rucki].”
A copy of the notice was attached to the affidavit, which shows that the notice was sent to
the office of the person who was Grazzini-Rucki’s attorney at t he time. Also, Grazzini-
Ruc ki us e d t he a t t or n e y’ s of f i c e a s he r ow n m a i l i ng a ddr e s s . Based on this record, the
child-support office unquestionably complied with Minn. Stat. § 518A.65(c). Contrary to
Grazzini-Rucki’s argument, the fact that the notice was not docketed in the court file is of
no import. Nothing in the statute , or the due-process jurisprud ence, required the child-
support office to file the notice with the district court. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.65 (2018).

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This record shows that Grazzini-Ru cki was adequately notified o f the suspension of her
driver’s license, and, therefore, that the suspension did not violate her due-process rights.
C. Ability to pay

Third, Grazzini-Rucki argues that the CSM abused her discretio n by establishing
the payment agreement because Grazzini-Rucki does not have the ability to pay according
to the agreement. Minn. Stat. § 518A.69 (2018) provides that the “child support magistrate
. . . shall consider the individual financial circumstances of each obligor in evaluating the
obligor’s ability to pay any propo sed payment agreement and sha ll propose a reasonable
payment agreement tailored to the individual financial circumst ances of each obligor.”
Here, the CSM, in establishing the payment agreement, did not seek to hold Grazzini-Rucki
accountable for any of the arrear ages that resulted in the susp ension in 2015. All that is
required from Grazzini-Rucki under the agreement is to comply with her new child-support
obligation. Therefore, whether th e payment agreement complies w ith Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.69 depends on Grazzini-Ru cki’s ability to pay child supp ort according to the
A u g u s t o r d e r . A s d i s c u s s e d b e l o w , t h e r e c o r d s u p p o r t s t h e C S M ’ s determination that
Grazzini-Rucki has the ability to pay the child support. The CSM did not make a reversible
error in determining the terms of the payment agreement.
III. The CSM did not abuse her di scretion in modifying the May order.

Grazzini-Rucki did not seek the d istrict court’s review of the orders that she is now
appealing. On appeal from a chil d support magistrate’s order th at has not been reviewed
by the district court, this court uses the same standard to review issues as would be applied
if the order had been issued by a district court. Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Minn.

10
App. 2009). Whether to modify child support is within the broad discretion of the district
court. Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. App. 2017); see Haefele v. Haefele,
837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013) (stating that, generally, appellate courts “review orders
modifying child support for abus e of discretion”). A district c ourt abuses its discretion if
its decision is based on a misapplication of the law, is contra ry to the facts, or is contrary
to logic. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d at 77.
A. The support amount

Throughout her brief, Grazzini-R ucki argues that she does not have the ability to
pay the child support ordered. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.42, subd. 1(a) (2018). (“It is a
rebuttable presumption that a child support order should not exceed the obligor’s ability to
pay.”). In support of that general contention, she makes three sub-arguments.
1. Imputation of income

Grazzini-Rucki first argues th at the CSM should not have imput ed to her any
income. Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1 (2018) provides:
If a parent is voluntarily unemployed, underemployed, or
employed on a less than full-time basis, or there is no direct
evidence of any income, child s upport must be calculated
based on a determination of potential income. For purposes of
this determination, it is rebutta bly presumed that a parent can
be gainfully employed on a full-time basis.

The CSM found that Grazzini-Rucki was voluntarily unemployed because Grazzini-Rucki
failed to provide any verifica tion of the reasons why she was u nemployed despite the
CSM’s explicit direction to do so.

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It is undisputed that Grazzini-R ucki is unemployed, and “[w]he ther a parent is
voluntarily unemployed is a finding of fact, which we review fo r clear error.” Welsh v.
Welsh, 775 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Minn. App. 2 009). Grazzini-Rucki argued to the CSM that
she is not employable because of her six felony convictions and because she was homeless
and lacked a means of transportation. Grazzini-Rucki also stated that she did not have food
“to maintain the energy to put one foot in front of the other” and that she suffered from
injuries impairing her ability to work. The CSM did not ignore Grazzini-Rucki’s assertions;
the CSM found that, given Grazzin i-Rucki’s criminal history, Gr azzini-Rucki could not
earn the same level of income as she had prior to the felony convictions. However, finding
“no reported job search efforts” in between and after Grazzini- Rucki’s incarcerations and
“no evidence that [she] is mentally or physically unable to wor k full time,” the CSM did
not accept Grazzini-Rucki’s statements that she could not obtain any kind of employment.
Grazzini-Rucki does not argue tha t, contrary to the CSM’s findi ng, her statements are
corroborated by other evidence. Grazzini-Rucki’s claim that her g o o d - f a i t h j o b - s e a r c h
efforts were unfruitful, or that her predicament prevented her from even trying to search
for a job, relies solely on her own statements. Therefore, the issue becomes a matter of
Grazzini-Rucki’s credibility. Appellate courts do not “decide issues of witness credibility,
which are exclusively the province of the factfinder.” Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512,
514 (Minn. App. 2004). The CSM’s finding that Grazzini-Rucki is voluntarily unemployed
is not clearly erroneous.

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2. Calculation of potential income

Grazzini-Rucki also argues that, to the extent that the CSM co uld impute income to
her, the amount was erroneously calculated. Minn. Stat. § 518A. 32, subd. 2 (2018)
provides:
Determination of potential income must be made according to
one of three methods, as appropriate:
( 1 ) t h e p a r e n t ’ s p r o b a b l e e a r n i n g s l e v e l b a s e d o n
employment potential, recent work history, and occupational
qualifications in light of prev ailing job opportunities and
earnings levels in the community;
(2) if a parent is receiving unemployment compensation
or workers’ compensation, that parent’s income may be
calculated using the actual amount of the unemployment
compensation or workers’ compensation benefit received; or
(3) the amount of income a parent could earn working
30 hours per week at 100 percent of the current federal or state
minimum wage, whichever is higher.

The CSM found that Grazzini-Rucki could work 40 hours a week at Florida’s minimum
wage.
Grazzini-Rucki argues that the C SM should have determined her potential income
based on working 30 hours a week, implying that the CSM could u se minimum wage in
the calculation of potential income only under subdivision 2(3) of section 518A.32. But
she does not explain why Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 2, must be construed that way. An
assignment of error in a brief based on “mere assertion” and not supported by argument or
authority is forfeited unless prejudicial error is obvious on m ere inspection. Scheffler v.
City of Anoka , 890 N.W.2d 437, 45 1 (Minn. App. 2017), review denied (Minn. Apr. 26,
2017). Nothing in the plain langu age of Minn. Stat. § 518A.32 ( 2018) prohibits the court
from determining, based on a parent’s “employment potential, re cent work history, and

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occupational qualifications,” that the parent has the capacity to earn minimum wage
working 40 hours a week. Minn. St at. § 518A.32, subd. 2(1). Thu s , t h e C S M d i d n o t
commit an obvious error by finding that Grazzini-Rucki’s potential earnings level was full-
time employment at minimum wage.
3. Living expenses

Third, Grazzini-Rucki argues that the CSM abused her discretio n by finding that her
living expenses were paid by others. The CSM stated that Grazzi ni-Rucki’s “monthly
living expenses are unknown,” but the CSM did not find that the y were paid by others. It
is Rucki whose living expenses the CSM found were paid by others. Grazzini-Rucki does
not argue that she provided the CSM any information on her living expenses or that some
hypothetical amount should have been imputed to her. On this re cord, the CSM did not
abuse her discretion in making her findings about Grazzini-Ruck i’s living expenses. See
Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. A pp. 2003) (“[A] party cannot
complain about a district court’s failure to rule in her favor when one of the reasons it did
not do so is because that party failed to provide the district court with the evidence that
would allow the district court to fully address the question.”) , review denied ( M i n n .
Nov. 25, 2003).
In sum, Grazzini-Rucki fails to demonstrate that the CSM abused her discretion in
determining the amount of Grazzini-Rucki’s modified child-support obligation.
B. The July order

Grazzini-Rucki argues that the C SM sent a copy of the July ord er, which laid out
the information to be produced by the parties, to the wrong add ress and that she did not

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receive the July order before the August hearing. She goes on t o argue that, instead of
proceeding with the hearing, the CSM should have granted a cont inuance to allow her to
adequately prepare. However, at the August hearing, the CSM sta ted that the July order
had been sent to the address that Grazzini-Rucki identified as her mailing address at the
July hearing. Nothing in the record suggests that the CSM sent the July order to the wrong
address.
Moreover, even if the July orde r was sent to the wrong address for Grazzini-Rucki,
it is not clear how she was prejudiced by the mistake. The July order largely reiterated the
CSM’s instructions to Grazzini-Rucki at the July hearing. The order called for nothing out
of ordinary—it was a list of thi ngs that Grazzini-Rucki needed to provide to support her
motion. It would be unreasonable to conclude that Grazzini-Ruck i did not know how to
corroborate the claims she was making because she did not have the July order in front of
her. Grazzini-Rucki establishes no reversible error on this issue.
C. Rucki’s financial information

Grazzini-Rucki argues that the C SM should have held Rucki in c ontempt for his
refusal to provide current financial information. “The contempt power gives the trial court
inherently broad discretion to hold an individual in contempt but only where the contemnor
has acted contumaciously, in bad faith, and out of disrespect f or the judicial process.”
Newstrand v. Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 692 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015). “The supreme court has characterized co ntempt as an
extreme remedy, and this court has instructed that civil contempt powers must be exercised
with caution.” Id. (quotations omitted). Here, not hing in the record suggests tha t Rucki

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acted “contumaciously, in bad faith, and out of disrespect for the judicial process.” Id. He
clearly represented to the CSM that he was not going to submit his current financial
information due to Grazzini-Rucki’s past practice of wrongfully disseminating his financial
information. He then faced the a dverse inference that his incom e was double what it had
been in 2016. Assuming that child -support magistrates have the contempt power, it was
not an abuse of discretion to not hold Rucki in contempt.
D. Jurisdiction

Grazzini-Rucki argues that the a dverse inference of income dra wn against Rucki
deprived the CSM of jurisdiction to preside over this case. In general, child-support
magistrates can only hear IV-D cases. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 353.01.
“IV-D case” means a case where a party has assigned to the
s t a t e r i g h t s t o c h i l d s u p p o r t b e cause of the receipt of public
assistance as defined in section 256.741 or has applied for child
support services under title IV-D of the Social Security Act,
United States Code, title 42, section 654(4).

Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 10 (2018). Here, the CSM found that Rucki had “assigned to
the state rights to child support because of the receipt of pub lic assistance” and exercised
jurisdiction under the first prong of the definition of a IV-D case. Id. The CSM’s finding
is supported by the record: according to the affidavit of a chi ld-support officer, “Rucki
receives Medical Assistance for himself and the parties’ [two] joint children.”
But Grazzini-Rucki argues that the CSM did not have jurisdicti on to hear the case
as a IV-D case because the CSM im puted to Rucki $10,000 in gross monthly income and
h e w o u l d b e i n e l i g i b l e f o r p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e w e r e h e a c t u a l l y earning that amount. Her
argument fails. Even if actual gross monthly income in the amount of $10,000 would make

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Rucki ineligible for public assi stance, Grazzini-Rucki has not shown that imputation of
that income would have the same effect. “[O]n appeal, error is never presumed. It must be
made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing
error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65
(Minn. 1944). Inadequately briefed issues are not properly befo re an appellate court.
Melina v. Chaplin , 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) . The relationship, if any, bet ween
eligibility for public assistance and the imputation of income for purposes of IV-D
jurisdiction is not adequately b riefed, and Grazzini-Rucki has not shown that the CSM
lacked jurisdiction over the case due to an imputation of income to Rucki.
E. Credits and arrearages

Lastly, Grazzini-Rucki argues that the CSM failed to consider some child-support
credits and arrearages purportedly owed to her. Grazzini-Rucki asserts that, because the
August order reduced her monthly obligation from $975 to $215, she is “owed a credit of
$760 per month.” But, at the time of the August order, it was G razzini-Rucki’s future
obligation that was being reduced to $215. The reduction itself did not result in an
overpayment, and Grazzini-Rucki does not cite any other evidenc e of overpayment. Cf.
Minn. Stat. § 518A.52 (2018) (providing that overpayments of a child-support obligation
can be credited against past and future support obligations). The credits that Grazzini-Rucki
is claiming do not seem to exist. Also, according to Grazzini-R ucki, arrearages “owed to
[her] from the time prior to Septe m b e r 7 , 2 0 1 2 , ” were suddenly deemed paid in full,
“without [her] receiving a dime o f that money.” Specifically, s he argues that Rucki
currently owes $62,822.52 in arrearages to her. Her calculation is based on imposing

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Rucki’s support obligation of $13,673 per month for the months of May to September
2011. But, in an order dated September 21, 2011, that support a ward was subsequently
vacated due to mistake, discovery of new evidence, and fraud by Grazzini-Rucki. When
the $13,673 support payments a re removed from the equation, Ruc ki does not owe any
arrearages to Grazzini-Rucki even according to her own calculation.
Affirmed.