In the Matter of the Welfare of: D. L. L., Jr.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1738

In the Matter of the Welfare of: D. L. L., Jr.

Filed April 15, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-17-1370

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Robe rt I. Yount, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent state)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his certification for prosecution as an adult on charges of first-
degree assault and first -degree aggravated robbery , arguing that the district court abused
its discretion by concluding that retaining his case in th e juvenile system would not serve
public safety. We affirm.

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FACTS
Shortly before midnight on July 23, 2017, nearly 17 -year-old appellant D.L.L., Jr.
and two companions approached 18 -year-old A.A.Y. outside a gas station and asked him
to buy them a tobacco product. A.A.Y. agreed and purchased the product with money they
provided. He then met D.L.L. and his companions in the alley behind the gas station
building. They exchanged a few words, then D.L.L. and his companions attacked A.A.Y.
They kicked and stomped on his head and torso. One of them rummaged through A.A.Y.’s
pockets and took his cell phone. They also took his shoes.
Shortly thereafter, police officers were called to the gas station, where they
discovered A.A.Y. confused and injured. He was bleeding from significant facial injuries.
A.A.Y. was transported to the hospital and diagnosed with extensive facial fractures, a
fractured clavicle, a fractured vertebra, and a brain bleed.
Police retrieved surveillance video from the gas station. T he video shows D.L.L.
and his companions all kicking, stomping, and jumping on A.A.Y.’s head and torso,
continuing even after he lay motionless on the ground. Police also obtained bus video of
D.L.L. and his companions riding from Minneapolis to the area of the assault and used the
images to identify all three.
The state charged D.L.L. with first-degree assault and first -degree aggravated
robbery and filed a motion for presumptive adult certification under Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.125, subd. 3 (2016). After considering the circumstances of the charged offenses
and evidence of D.L.L.’s abusive home environment, mental -health struggles, prior

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instances of similar and escalating delinquent behavior, 1 programming history, and
dispositional options, the district court certified D .L.L. for adult prosecution. D.L.L.
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
“A district court has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify, and this
court will not upset its decision unless its findings are clearly erroneous so as to constitute
an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of S.J.T., 736 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Minn. App. 2007)
(quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2007). We review questions of law
de novo and findings of fact for clear error. In re Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 34-35
(Minn. 2014). “We will not disturb a finding about whether public safety would be served
by retaining the proceeding in juvenile court unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. at 35.
Under Minnesota law, if a child was at least 16 years old at the time of the alleged
offense and the offense is one that would result in a presumptive commitment to prison, it
is presumed that the child will be certified to stand trial as an adult. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125,
subd. 3. The child bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by “clear and convincing
evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety.” Id.
When assessing whether retaining a proceeding in the juvenile system serves public
safety, the district court must consider six factors:
(1) the seri ousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any

1 In September 2015, D.L.L. and some other teenagers accosted a woman on a light rail
platform; he used a Taser on her and stole her cell phone. In May 2017, D.L.L. committed
another theft and assault, “beating” the victim and causing “serious facial injuries.”

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aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;
(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense, i ncluding the level of the child’ s participation in
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any
mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;
(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;
(4) the child’ s programming history, including the
child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and
(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Id., subd. 4 (2016). The district court must give “greater weight” to the seriousness of the
offense and the child’s prior record . Id. And it must, for purposes of determining
certification, presume the charges against the child and the factual allegations of the
petition are true. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 38.
Because D.L.L. was 16 years old at the time of the offenses and the charges carry a
presumptive prison sentence, adult certification is presumed in this case. The district court
determined that D.L.L. did not rebut that presumption based on findings that all six factors
favor certification. D.L.L. does not dispute that the first three factors, including the two
given the greatest weight, favor certification. In particular, he does not dispute the district
court’s determination that the offenses were “undeniabl[y]” grave and involved three
aggravating factors—D.L.L. committed the offenses as a part of a group of three, the victim
was particu larly vulnerable, and the victim was treated with particular cruelty. But he
nonetheless contends that the district court abused its discretion because his programming
history, the fourth factor, and dispositional prospects, the fifth and sixth factors , f avor
retention of his case in juvenile court. We are not persuaded.

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First, even if the challenged findings are flawed, D.L.L. identifies no authority for
the proposition that a district court abuses its discretion by ordering presumptive
certification when half of the public -safety factors, including those to be weighed most
heavily, undisputedly favor certification. Cf. In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 682
(Minn. App. 2012) (stating that “the matter must be certified” when certification is
presumed and the juvenile “fails to provide sufficient evidence regarding each of the
statutory factors” (quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013).
Second, D.L.L. has not demonstrated error in the district court’s analysis of his
programming history. The district court accurately noted that D.L.L. has a “significant”
and largely unsuccessful programming history. Starting in 2015, D.L.L. completed six
months of home -school programming and a “ gang reduction program,” but “neither had
any impact on his behaviors.” He was placed in detention five times and was on home
electronic monitoring three times—including at the time of the current offense s.2 And
while D.L.L. had been in detention for more than a year at the t ime of the certification
hearing, he had only demonstrated “meaningful participation” in the programming during
the preceding “couple of months .” D.L.L. does not dispute these facts, but contends the
district court inappropriately “blame[d]” him “for prio r lapses in programming under
different circumstances and at a different age.” We disagree. The district court’s findings
address numerous lapses over a span of less than two years. It did not abuse its discretion

2 He absconded from home monitoring by cutting off his ankle bracelet.

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by determining that minimally positive recent programming history was insufficient to
make this factor, overall, weigh against certification.
Third, the district court thoroughly considered D.L.L.’s dispositional prospects —
the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile system and the
dispositional options available for him. See In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 711
(Minn. 2008) (considering fifth and sixth factors together). The district court found that
D.L.L. has made some progress in his current juvenile pla cement and probably would
benefit from long-term programming, which he is unlikely to receive in prison. But it noted
that D.L.L.’s progress was recent and slow—D.L.L. had completed only three of six levels
after one year in a program that typically takes nine months to one year. The court
expressly acknowledged the “tension between rehabilitation and public safety ,” but
ultimately concluded that a juvenile disposition would not adequately protect public safety
and would “understat[e] the seriousness of the offense[s].” Given the very serious offenses
with which D.L.L. is charged, and the aggravated manner in which he committed them,
combined with D.L.L.’s demonstrably poor programming prospects, we discern no clear
error by the district court’s findings that factors 4, 5, and 6 favor certification.
The circumstances of this case are troubling in many respects. In addition to
examining the extremely violent nature of the offenses, t he district court thoughtfully
considered the role D.L.L.’s chaotic and abusive home environment played in both
contributing to his violent behavior and undermining his chances for successful
programming. B ut the district court ultimately focused, as it must, on the public -safety
concerns presented by D.L.L.’s increasingly vi olent behavior and demonstrated

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recalcitrance. See P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 685 (stating that “public safety is the touchstone
of the analysis ”). On this record, we conclude that t he district court did not abuse its
discretion by ordering D.L.L.’s presumptive certification for adult prosecution.
Affirmed.