State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1748

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Travares Ladell Cyrus,
Appellant.

Filed September 30, 2019
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-9273

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of being an ineligible person in possession of a
firearm and ammunition on the grounds that (1) the circumstantial evidence was
insufficient to convict him because there is a rational hyp othesis inconsistent with guilt,
(2) the district court committed plain error affecting his substantial rights by admitting a
witness’s prior consistent statement when the witness’s credibility was not challenged and
the prior statement was not helpful in assessing credibility, (3) the district court committed
plain error affecting substantial rights by permitting the probation officer to provide
opinion testimony that the gun on th e video was the same one found in the search, (4) the
cumulative effect of the errors deprived appellant of a fair trial, and (5) the district court
erred when it imposed sentences for two convictions under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2016).
We affirm.
FACTS
In Dec ember 2017, Ramsey County probation officer Sean Corfits made an
unannounced visit to the apartment appellant T ravares Ladell Cy rus shared with his
grandmother, F.C. Cyrus was on probation at the time. Approximately one hour after the
visit, Corfits saw a video that Cyrus had posted to the social media application Snapchat.
In the video, Cyrus was in a bedroom , and there was a handgun on the floor. Corfits
contacted the St. Paul Police Department because Cyrus is ineligible to possess a firearm.
Officer Thomas Diaz accompanied Corfits to Cyrus’s apartment. It took Cyrus
between 30 seconds and two minutes to open the door. Cyrus and his girlfriend were

3
present, but F.C. was not home at the time. When the officers told Cyrus the reason for
their visit, he asked the officers questions about searching the apartment . The officers
heard Cyrus tell his girlfriend that the officers could search his bedroom but no other areas
of the apartment. Cyrus informed the officers that they were not allowed to search his
grandmother’s bedroom.
In the course of searching Cyrus’s bedroom, Corfits found a box of ammunition in
the closet. Officer Diaz then called F.C. and asked her permission to search the rest of the
apartment for firearms . F.C. consented to th e search. While searching F.C.’s bedroom,
the officers observed a red towel between the mattress and box spring. The officers
removed the towel and found a handgun with ammunition in its magazine wrapped inside
it.1 Corfits believed that it was the same handgun that had been in the Snapchat video, but
Cyrus denied knowledge of the gun or the ammunition. The officers placed Cyrus under
arrest. Officer Diaz later interviewed F.C. She stated that she did not own any guns, had
no knowledge of any guns being in the house, and that Cyrus must have put the gun under
her mattress that morning. She also said that Cyrus’s girlfriend sometimes stayed at the
apartment in Cyrus’s room.
Cyrus was charged with two counts of possession of a firearm or ammunition by an
ineligible person: one count for the firearm and one count for the box of ammunition. The
state later amended its complaint to add a third count of ineligible person in posse ssion of
a firearm/ammunition for the ammunition found in the magazine of the gun.

1 The ammunition found in the closet did not fit the gun found under F.C.’s mattress.

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The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Corfits, Officer Diaz, and F.C. testified.
A Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) forensic scientist also testified about the results
of DNA swabs from the gun and the ammunition, which were inconclusive. Over Cyrus’s
objections, the district court allowed three recordings to be played for the jury: the Snapchat
video that Corfits saw, a jail call that Cyrus made after his arres t, and F.C.’s statement to
Officer Diaz on the day of the search.
The jury found Cyrus guilty on all three counts. The district court imposed two 60-
month sentences for counts one and three, to be served concurrently, but did not pronounce
a sentence for count two. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Cyrus challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions of
possession of the firearm and the box of ammunition as an ineligible person. Upon review
of a claim of insufficient evidence, we review the record to determine “whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction is sufficient to allow
the jurors to reach their verdict.” State v. Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 2004). We
also
assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. We will not disturb
the verdict if the jury, while acting with proper regard for the
presumption of innocence and regard for the requiremen t of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude
that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.

Id. at 25-26 (citations omitted).

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In order to convict Cyrus of possession of a firearm or ammunition as an ineligible
person under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016), the state was required to prove that
Cyrus is ineligible to possess a firearm or ammunition and that he knowingly possessed the
firearm and ammunition. State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Cy rus
stipulated to his ineligibility. Therefore, the issue is whether the evidence was sufficient
to prove that Cyrus knowingly possessed the firearm and the ammunition. Possession may
be actual or constructive. Id. Because Cyrus was not in physical possession of the firearm
or the ammunition when the officers found them , we examine whether the evidence is
sufficient to prove that Cyrus constructively possessed the firearm and the ammunition.
Constructive possession is established by proof that a defen dant exclusively
controlled the item in a place where other s did not normally have access. Id. But if the
item is found in a place where others have access, the state “must show that there is a strong
probability (inferable from other evidence) that at t he time the defendant was consciously
or knowingly exercising dominion and control over it.” Id. Two or more people can jointly
constructively possess an item. Id. at 603 n.9. In cases of joint possession, the
circumstances proved must support a reason able inference that the defendant, whether
alone or jointly at the time, was consciously exercising dominion and control over the item.
Id. Additionally, the proximity of the item to the defendant is a factor in establishing
constructive possession. State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. App. 2013).
Possession may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Sam,
859 N.W.2d 825, 833 (Minn. App. 2015). The parties dispute whether the direct - or
circumstantial-evidence standard of review controls. Cyrus contends that his convictions

6
are based on circumstantial evidence and therefore warrant heightened scrutiny. See State
v. Al -Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (holding that convictions based on
circumstantial evidence recei ve heightened scrutiny upon appellate review). The state
asserts that Cyrus’s convictions are based on direct evidence, namely Corfits ’s testimony
that the firearm that Cyrus possessed in the Snapchat video was the same firearm later
found in his grandmot her’s bedroom and Cyrus’s statement during a jail call explaining
why he was in custody: “Raiding my crib, found some hammas. My dumb a -- in the
(inaudible). I’m on Snapchat, they ended up seeing a pole (inaudible). Went in the crib
and (inaudible) found the hammas.”2
Direct evidence “is based on personal knowledge or observation . . . that, if true,
proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 477
n.11 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). Neither Corfits’s “eyewitness account” (based on
his review of the Snapchat video) nor Cyrus’s statement are sufficient to prove each
element of the offense. See Porte, 832 N.W.2d at 309 -10. Corfits did not observe the
ammunition in the Snapchat video. And while Cyrus acknowledged that law enforcement
found a firearm at his residence, he did not adm it that he possessed the firearm or the
ammunition. Accordingly, we apply the circumstantial -evidence standard of review.
Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we apply
a two-step analysis. State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013) . First, we

2 Corfits testified that “hamma” and “pole” are slang terms for gun.

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identify the circumstance proved, deferring to the jury’s “acce ptance of the proof of these
circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances
proved by the State.” Id. at 598-99 (quotation omitted). We assume that the jury “believed
the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses” and consider “only those
circumstances that are consistent with the verdict.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted).
Here, the circumstances proved are: Cyrus lived in an apartment with F.C. An hour
after visiting Cyrus at the apartment, Corfits saw a video that Cyrus posted to Snapchat. In
the video, Cyrus was wearing the same clothes that Corfits had seen him wearing when he
visited Cyrus, and there was a handgun visible on the bedroom floor . Corfits decided to
search the apartment. It took Cyrus between 30 seconds and two minutes to open the door,
which both Corfits and Officer Diaz found suspicious . Cyrus a sked questions about the
search and told the officers multiple times that they could not search F.C.’s bedroom. After
Corfits found a box of ammunition in Cyrus’s closet, F.C. consented by phone to a search
of her bedroom. Corfits an d Officer Diaz found a loaded handgun under the mattress in
F.C.’s room. Corfits testified that the gun found in F.C.’s bedroom appeared to be the same
gun that he had seen in the Snapchat video. F.C. does not own a gun and told Officer Diaz
that Cyrus must have put the gun under her mattress. Cyrus stated in the jail phone call
that he was arrested because Corfits saw a gun in the Snapchat video, searched his house,
and found the gun.
Having identified the circumstances proved, we determine
whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
We review the circumstantial evidence not as isolated facts, but

8
as a whole. We examine independently the reasonableness of
all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances
proved; including the inferences consistent with a hypothesis
other than guilt . . . . We give no deference to the fact finder’s
choice between reasonable inferences.

Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Cyrus contends that there is a rational hypothesis inconsistent with his guilt: his
girlfriend possessed the gun and the ammunition and that she hid both without his
knowledge. But there are two problems with this hypothesis. First, Cyrus raised this theory
during trial. During the testimony of the state’s witnesses and in closing argument, Cyrus
offered this alternative hypothesis, which was ultimately rejected by the jury. Second, even
if his girlfriend was in possession of the gun or the ammunition, this theory does not
eliminate Cyrus’s liability under the joint-constructive-possession doctrine. The handgun
was plainly visible in the Snapchat video that Cyrus posted and had been moved by the
time that law enforcement searched the residence just a few hours later. The officers were
suspicious of how long it took Cyrus to open the door when they arrived, and Cyrus
repeatedly told the officers that they were not allowed to search his grandmother’s room,
where the handgun was ultimately discovered. The mere fact that the girlfriend was also
present and had been there on other occasions does not change the “strong probability” that
Cyrus knowingly exercised control over the firearm and the ammunition.
B. Evidentiary Issues
Cyrus asserts that the district court committed plain error affecting his substantial
rights by admitting F.C.’s out-of-court statement as a prior consistent statement and failing
to sua sponte strike it, and by allowing Corfits to give “unhelpful opinion testimony.”

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Because Cyrus did not object to the admission of either F.C.’s prior consistent statement
or Corfits’s testimony on the grounds which he is now challenging their admissibility, the
plain-error standard of review controls.
The United States Supreme Court has established a
three-prong test for plain error, requiring that before an
appellate court reviews an unobjected -to error, there must be
(1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect
substantial rights. If these three prongs are met, the appellate
court then assesses whether it should address the error to
ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.

State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998) (footnote omitted). Error is plain when
it “is clear or obvious, which is typically established if the error contravenes case law, a
rule, or a standar d of conduct.” State v. Webster , 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted).
F.C.’s Statement to Officer Diaz
Cyrus argues that F.C.’s recorded statement to Officer Diaz was inadmissible
hearsay and that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte strike it. Hearsay is an out-
of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). But
an out-of-court statement made by a testifying witness may be admissible as non -hearsay,
and may be used as substantive evidence, if the statement is “consistent with the declarant’s
testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating the declarant’s credibility as a
witness.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
Before a prior consistent statement can be admitted, the district court “must make a
threshold determination of whether there has been a challenge to the witness’s credibility.”
State v. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Feb. 24,

10
2000). Further, the district court must determine th at the prior consistent statement was
consistent with the witness’s testimony and that it would be helpful to the jury. Id. That
did not occur here.
At trial, Cyrus objected to the admission of F.C.’s statement on other grounds. As
a result, t he district court did not have the opportunity to rule on whether or not the
statement was admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). We are not persuaded that
failure to strike F.C.’s statement wa s error that was plain. But even if it was error, Cyrus
has not met his burden of demonstrating that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the
absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v.
Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). When considering whether
erroneously admitted evidence had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict, we consider
the persuasiveness of the evidence and the manner in which it was presented. State v.
Jackson, 764 N.W.2d 612, 620 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. July 22, 2009).
Here, F.C.’s statement to Officer Diaz was largely consistent with her testimony at
trial. She consistently stated that she did not own a handgun and that the handgun
discovered in her bedroom did not belong to her. While her statement about Cyrus putting
the gun under her mattress may have been damaging, it was not particularly emphasized or
dramatic. F.C.’s statement to Officer Diaz was one sentence in a three -day jury trial. In
effect, F.C.’s statement overtly stated the inference t hat the state was asking the jury to
make. The testimony of Corfits and Officer Diaz strongly implied that Cyrus delayed
coming to the door because he was hiding the gun under the mattress. Based on all of the
evidence presented, including the testimony of Corfits and Officer Diaz, the Snapchat

11
video, and Cyrus’s jailhouse call, Cyrus has not met his burden of showing that the absence
of F.C.’s statement to Officer Diaz would have had a significant effect on the verdict.
Corfits’s Testimony
Cyrus contends that the district court erred because it did not strike testimony from
Corfits that was “unhelpful” and called for scientific or technical knowledge. The
prosecutor asked, “[W]hat’s your opinion, I guess generally, on the similarities of that gun
that was found in . . . [F.C.’s] room and the video—and the firearm that was in the Snapchat
video?” Corfits responded , “From my eyes, it appeared to be the same firearm.” Cyrus
asserts that this testimony w as unhelpful because it was speculative and because the jury
was capable of reviewing the Snapchat video and determining if the gun in the video was
the same gun discovered in F.C.’s bedroom. But as the state correctly points out, similar
lay opinion testimony has been upheld by the supreme court. See State v. Hudspeth, 535
N.W.2d 292, 295 (Minn. 1995) (allowing a police officer’s opinion testimony as “inference
drawn from his observations”).
Cyrus also contends that Corfits’s testimony was inadmissible because it was based
on technical and specialized knowledge of firearms and the state did not establish that
Corfits was qualified to testify as an expert on firearms. But Corfits was merely stating his
opinion based on viewing the Snapchat video and seeing the gun. His statement did not
implicate any particular specialized or technical knowledge. As the state points out, “it is
difficult to see what specialized knowledge would be required to compare the guns in the
two photos.” We conclude that there was no error because Corfits’s testimony did not
require expert knowledge, and it was helpful to the jury.

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Cumulative Impact
Cyrus argues that the cumulative effects of the errors deprived him of a fair trial.
We may reverse for a new trial when the cumulative effect of errors denied a defendant a
fair trial. In re Welfare of D.D.R., 713 N.W.2d 891, 903 (Minn. App. 2006). Because we
conclude that the district court did not err by admitting F.C.’s statement or Corfits’s
testimony, we reject this argument.
C. Sentencing
Cyrus contends that he was impe rmissibly sentenced in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.035, subd. 1, which provides: “ if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one
offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the
offenses.” Whether an offense occurre d as part of a single behavioral incident for the
purposes of Minn. Stat. § 609.035 is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Jones, 848
N.W.2d 528, 533 (Minn. 2014). We review factual findings for clear error, and the district
court’s application of the law de novo. Id.
Cyrus asserts that his possession of the firearm and the ammunition shared a un ity
in time and place and the same objective, and thus they were part of the same behavioral
incident. But Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 3, contains an exception. It states “a prosecution
for or conviction of violation of . . . 624.713, subd ivision 1, clause (2), is not a bar to
conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the
same conduct.” Cyrus and the state a cknowledge that this issue turns on the meaning of
the phrase “any other crime .” In State v. Holmes , the supreme court interpreted the
exception to the single -behavioral-incident rule in the context of burglary and assault

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convictions. 778 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. 2010). The supreme court determined that the
“phrase ‘any other crime’ means a crime that requires proof of different statutory elements
than the crime of burglary.” Id. at 341. Because the elements of first-degree burglary and
third-degree assault are not identical, the supreme court held that multiple convictions and
sentences were proper. Id.
Here, the state was required to prove: (1) that Cyrus is ineligible to possess a firearm
and ammunition due to a previous conviction and (2) that Cyrus did possess a firearm and
ammunition. As previously stated, Cyrus stipulated to his ineligibility. As a result, in order
to convict Cyrus of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, the state had to prove
that Cyrus possessed a gun. In order to convict Cyrus of possession of ammunition by an
ineligible person, the state had to prove that he possessed ammunition. The facts in this
case make clear that Cyrus’s possession of the firearm and the ammuniti on are separate
crimes. Because we conclude that Cyrus’s possession of the firearm and t he ammunition
satisfy the exception under Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 3, to the single-behavioral-incident
rule, we affirm his sentences.
Affirmed.