Reinol Godines Vergara, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1749

Reinol Godines Vergara, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 10, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-15-427

Charles Clippert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, David W. Hunt, First Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his postconviction petition seeking a reduction
of his agreed -to ag gravated sentence for aiding and abetting intentional second -degree

2
murder. He contends his sentence is unreasonable because it is the same sentence his more-
culpable accomplice received. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 15, 2015, 90-year-old Earl Olander was found beaten to death in his rural
Carver County home. Olander suffered impact injuries to the back of his head, ear , lip,
and shoulder. Law enforcement officers discovered him with his hands duct-taped behind
his back, and his ankles loosely bound. The condition of the tape and an arc of blood on
the floor demonstrated that Olander had struggled to free himself after the assault.
Appellant Reinol Godines Vergara and Edson Celin Benitez Dominguez were later
linked to the crime through evidence foun d in an apartment where Dominguez had lived.
They were arrested, and each admitted to being present in Olander’s home on the night in
question. The state charged both men with aiding and abetting second -degree intentional
and unintentional murder. A grand jury subsequently indicted them for aiding and abetting
first-degree murder.
Vergara and Dominguez both agreed to plead guilty to one count of aiding and
abetting intentional second-degree murder, in exchange for the state’s dismissal of the other
charges and imposition of a 450 -month prison sentence .1 In his plea petition, Vergara
stated that he was making no claim of innocence. And he waived his right to a jury trial as
to sentencing, admitting that the following facts support an aggravated sentence:
(1) Olander was particularly vulnerable due to his age, and Vergara knew or should have

1 This is an upward durational departure from the presumptive sentence of 261-367 months.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2014).

3
known of his vulnerability; (2) Olander was treated with particular cruelty because of the
injuries inflicted upon him and the fact that he was “duct taped and left in a helpless
position on the floor of his living room as his brain swelled and he bled to death” and “may
have been alive for up to two days until he died”; (3) Vergara selected Olander because his
advanced age made him easier to victimize; and (4) the crime was committed in Olander’s
zone of privacy, his home.
At his plea hearing, Vergara acknowledged that Olander hired him to paint his
home. Through that contact, Vergara learned the layout of Olander’s home, and became
aware of his personal property. But Vergara attempted to minimize his involvement in the
burglary and murder. He described Dominguez’s need for money and admitted that he
offered Olander as a target because he was old and frail, and lived alone in an isolated area.
When they arrived at the home, Vergara noticed that Dominguez had duct tape, a shotgun,
and another small gun . Vergara asked why the guns were necessary if the burglary was
“going to be a quick in and out.” Dominguez assured him it would be a quick job; Vergara
allowed him to enter the home despite knowing that the presence o f guns could result in
death. After waiting in the car for 20-30 minutes, Vergara became concerned that things
were taking too long. So he covered his face with a mask, approached the home, and called
out for Olander. He heard nothing and eventually loca ted Dominguez, who told him to
search the kitchen. Vergara did so, but did not look for Olander. Vergara returned to the
car. Five minutes later, Dominguez entered the car with the two bags, stating that Olander
was okay and that he could untie himself. Vergara admitted that Olander was intentionally
murdered and that the murder was a foreseeable consequence of the burglary. The district

4
court accepted Vergara’s plea, noted the aggravating factors, and imposed the agreed-upon
aggravated sentence.
Vergara petitioned for postconviction relief , contending that his sentence “is
unreasonable and unjustifiably disparate because he is less culpable than [Dominguez].”
The district court2 denied the petition in a thorough memorandum drawn from the reco rd
evidence of Vergara’s involvement in the crime. After noting the evidence provides a basis
for finding Vergara guilty of the dismissed first-degree murder charges, the district court
determined there was no support for Vergara’s contention that he is less culpable than
Dominguez. The court cited this court’s rejection of Dominguez’s parallel argument,
quoting our statement that “[b]ecause the case was not tried, we will never know if one
man was less culpable than the other.” Dominguez v. State , No. A17-1703, 2018 WL
3097708, at *3 (Minn. App. June 25, 2018) , review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2018). And
the district court reviewed sentencing guidelines data from 2010 -2015, concluding that
Vergara’s sentence is “proportional compared to similarly situated defendants.” Vergara
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
We review the denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion, and reversal
is warranted only if “the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clea rly
erroneous factual findings.” Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).

2 The same district court judge took Vergara’s plea and considered his postconviction
petition. We refer to the judge as the district court.

5
Vergara argues that his sentence is unreasonable because he is less culpable than
Dominguez, who received the same sentence. We may review a sentence to determine
whether it is “unreasonable” or “unjustifiably disparate.” Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b)
(2014). In doing so, we consider the defendant’s sentence in relation to the sentence his
accomplice received. State v. Vazquez, 330 N.W.2d 110, 11 1-12 (Minn. 1983). And we
compare the sentence to those imposed on other defendants convicted of the same or
similar offenses. Id. at 112. We are not persuaded that Vergara’s sentence is unreasonable
under either measure.
First, the record does not support Vergara’s contention that he is less culpable than
Dominguez. Because Vergara and Dominguez both pleaded guilty while insisting that the
other person administered the fatal blows, there will never be a finding of fact on this point.
But Vergara admitted aiding and abetting the murder in several significant ways. He alone
identified Olander as a burglary target. He provided gloves to Dominguez so he would not
leave fingerprints behind, wore a mask when he entered the home to avoid detection by
Olander, and made no effort to check o n Olander despite concern for his welfare.
Moreover, t he evidence supporting three of the four departure grounds—knowledge of
Olander’s particular vulnerability, decision to rob Olander because of his infirmity, and
decision to target him in his zone of privacy—are more closely linked to Vergara than to
Dominguez. While neither man admitted committing the fatal assaultive acts, they both
agreed that they are responsible for these acts and Olander’s resulting death. They received
the same agreed-to sentence based on the same criminal-history score. On this record, we
are persuaded that Vergara’s sentence is not unreasonable or unjustifiably disparate relative

6
to Dominguez’s sentence. See State v. McClay , 310 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Minn. 1981)
(“Where two sepa rately tried codefendants with identical criminal history scores are
convicted of the same offense based on the same behavioral incident and the basis for
departure in the two cases is identical, the extent of the departure should be identical in
both cases.”); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.A. (2014) (listing reduction in sentencing disparity
as a purpose of the sentencing guidelines); Dominguez, 2018 WL 3097708, at *4-5.
Second, Vergara’s sentence is not unfair when compared with sentences imposed
on other defendants. T he district court compared Vergara’s sentence for second -degree
murder with sentencing data collected over a contemporaneous five -year period for
defendants convicted of similar offenses. See Vazquez, 330 N.W.2d at 112 (stating that
“equality and fairness in sentencing . . . involves comparing the sentence of the defendant
with those of other offenders”). The district court concluded that Vergara’s sentence was
proportionate to the sentences imposed on similar offenders. Vergara does not ch allenge
this determination on appeal, and we see no error.
On this record , we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying
Vergara’s postconviction petition seeking sentencing relief.
Affirmed.