State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1750

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lowrell Royal Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed September 16, 2019
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-7925

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul City Attorney, Lynel R. Nelson, Assistant City Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of gross misdemeanor domestic assault, arguing
that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused its discretion by allowing
the state to introd uce hearsay statements regarding his prior acts of domestic abuse. We
affirm.
FACTS
On September 3, 2017, A.J. called 911 to report that she was on her way to the
emergency room to seek medical treatment for “marks and bruises” on her arm caused by
her bo yfriend, appellant Lowre ll Royal Anderson. A.J. told the 911 dispatcher that
Anderson “just keeps jumpin’ on me,” that he had hit and threatened her, and that she left
the house because she was scared. A.J. also reported that Anderson had told her she “better
not call the police” or he would “beat [her] un til they got here.” A.J. provided the 911
dispatcher with her current location, and officers were sent to the scene.
Officer Lori Goulet of the St. Paul Police Department responded to the 911 call.
A.J. told Officer Goulet that Anderson had become upset and hit her because he believed
that she was “trying to meet up with another man.” Officer Goulet observed a scratch on
A.J.’s arm that was dried over with blood but did not observe any other signs of injury at
that time. Officer Goulet issued a “pickup and hold” for Anderson for suspicion of
misdemeanor domestic assault. Officer Goulet then took A.J. to United Hospital because
A.J. indicated that she was pregnant and not feeling well.

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Officer Justin Tiffany of the St. Paul Police Department interviewed A.J. at the
hospital. A.J. was “crying and very distrau ght.” She stated that she had been in a fight
with Anderson and he had kneed he r in the abdomen. Officer Tiffany then asked A.J. if
she believed Anderson would ever seriously injure her, because the information would help
him to address the severity of the situation and the urgency of law enforcement’s response.
A.J. responded that in December 2016 Anderson had kneed her in the abdomen sev eral
times, which resulted in a lacerated liver that required emergency surgery.
A.J. was examined by several medical professionals. Whitney Ivancic, R.N.,
checked A.J. in at the emergency room and brought her to an examination room. A.J. was
upset and indicated that she had been assaulted by her significant other. Ivancic paged a
forensic-nurse service because the situation involved a potential domestic assault. Leah
Gapinski, M.D., also conducted a brie f examination. Dr. Gapinski observed bruising and
swelling on A.J.’s arms and decided to order an x -ray to rule out fractures. Dr. Gapinski
also ordered an ultrasound because A.J. was pregnant and reported that she had been hit in
the abdomen. The x-rays were negative for fractures and the ultrasound did not reveal any
injuries to A.J.’s abdomen or the fetus.
A.J. next spoke with Kimberly Farley, R.N., a forensic -nurse examiner. Farley
conducted a domestic -violence examination of A.J. As part of the examination, Farley
asked A.J. if she had experienced domestic violence in the past. She indicated that she had,
and recounted the incident in December 2016 in which Anderson kneed her in the side,
causing her to suffer a lacerated liver that required emergency surgery. A.J. then provided

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an account of what had happened that night , and Farley photographed the bruising and
swelling on her arms.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Anderson with gro ss misdemeanor
domestic assault, and the case was tried to a jury. A.J. testified and recanted her statements
to law enforcement and medical professionals that Anderson had assaulted her. She
testified that she made up the allegations because she was upset with Anderson because
she believed that he was having an affair. Officer Goulet, Officer Ti ffany, Ivancic, Dr.
Gapinski, and Farley all testified that A.J. had reported that Anderson had assaulted her,
and all but Ivancic testified that they observed injuries on A.J.’s arms. Over Anderson’s
objection, Officer Tiffany and Farley offered testimon y regarding the December 2016
incident in which Anderson assaulted A.J. and caused a lacerated liver. At the close of its
case, the state introduced the court file of a matter from 2 005 into evidence. The 2005
court file contained an application and supp orting affidavit for an order for protection
(OFP) against Anderson filed by S.K. in a separate matter and a copy of the OFP that was
subsequently granted. The state did not comment on the exhibit after introducing it.
The jury found Anderson guilty. The district court sentenced Anderson to 365 days
in jail, ordered that he serve 180 days, stayed 185 days, and placed him on probati on for
two years. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district] court and will
not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203
(Minn. 2003). The appellant bears the burden of establishing that the district court abused

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its discretion and that he was thereby prejudiced. Id. The erroneous admission of evidence
is harmless and therefore not prejudicial if “there is no reasonable possibility that the
wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Holliday , 745
N.W.2d 556, 568 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
First, Anderson argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting A.J.’s
statements to Officer Tiffany and Farley regarding the December 2016 incident in which
she suffered a lacerated liver that required emergency sur gery. He argues that the
statements are inadmissible hearsay because they do not meet the requirements of any of
the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The district court determined that A.J.’s statement to
Officer Tiffany was admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 803(3), which provides an exception
to the hearsay rule for a “statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain,
and bodily health), but not in cluding a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered.” The district court determined that A.J.’s statement to Officer Tiffany was
admissible under rule 803(3) because the statement related to “current emotional,
sensation, physical condition, [A.J.’s] state of mind in particular as it went to the threat that
was posed to her while Mr. Anderson remained at large, and that it did constitute an
emergency at that point.”
The state contends that the statement was admissible because it related to her
existing mental state “insofar as it colors her existing mental and emotional state.” But
rule 803(3) requires that the statement be “of” the declarant’s then -existing mental state,
not one that provides context for it. Moreover, the statements w ere not spontaneous, but

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rather in response to Officer Tiffany’s questioning that was intended to help him assess the
severity of the situation and determine the appropriate response for law enforcement.
Accordingly, they were not made by A.J. to express her state of mind, but rather in the
course of Officer Tiffany’s questioning as part of his investigation. On this record, we
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by admitting A.J.’s statement to Officer
Tiffany under rule 803(3).
Second, Anderson argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
A.J.’s statement to Farley regarding the December 2016 incident. The district court
determined that A.J.’s statement to Farley was admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 803(4),
which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements that are “made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” Minn. R. Evid.
803(4).
Anderson contends that A.J.’s statement to Farley regarding the 2016 incident was
not reasonably pertinent to diagnose or treat the injury she suffered on September 3, 2017—
a scratch to the arm. We agree. When A.J. spoke with Farley , she had already been
examined by Dr. Gapinski and undergone x-rays and an ultrasound to diagnose and treat
the current injury. The statement regarding the December 2016 incident was made during
the domestic -violence examination conducted by Farley, which involved answering
general questions about past experience with domestic abuse. The statement was therefore
not reasonably pertinent to diagnosing or treating the scratch on her arm. Accordingly, the

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district court abused its discretion in determining that the statement was admissible under
rule 803(4).
Third, Anderson argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining
that a court file containing documents regarding a 2005 OFP issued against Anderson was
admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 803(8). Rule 803(8) allows for the admissions of
records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form,
of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of
the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases and petty misdemeanors
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings except petty
misdemeanors and against the State in criminal cases and petty
misdemeanors, factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law.

The district court determined that the 2005 court file constituted a “certified public record”
and therefore was admissible under rule 803( 8). But rule 803(8 ) requires more than the
fact that the documents constitute a “certified public record,” and we agree that the 2005
court file contains statements that exceed what is contemplated by the rule. The 2005 court
file contains S.K.’s application for an OFP and supporting affidavit that make multiple
allegations that Anderson had threatened and assaulted her. The district court reasoned
that there had been a hearing on the application for an OFP , and therefore Anderson had
the opportunity to confront and cross -examine S.K. about the statements. But he did not
have the opportunity to do so in front of the jury in the present case.
On this record, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
into evidence A.J.’s statements to Officer Tiffany and Farley and the 2005 court file. But

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that does not end our analysis. Because we have determined that the district court erred in
admitting the evidence, we must next determine if the error was harmless. An error is
harmless if “there is no rea sonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict.” Holliday, 745 N.W.2d at 568 (quotation omitted).
When determining whether erroneously admitted evidence substantially affected the jury’s
verdict, “we consider whether the district court provided the jury a cautionary instruction,
whether the State dwelled on the evidence in closing argument, and whether the evidence
of guilt was strong.” State v. Williams, 908 N.W.2d 362, 365-66 (Minn. 2018) (quotation
omitted).
Here, the district court provided the jury with a cautionary instruction before the
introduction of both statements regarding the December 2016 incident and the 2005 court
file. The state only made one reference to the December 2016 incid ent during the closing
argument and did not comment on the 2005 court file, either at the time it was introduced
or during closing argument. And the evidence against Anderson was strong. During the
911 call, A.J. reported that she was going to the emergency room bec ause Anderson had
hit her and caused scratches and marks on her arm s. At trial, Officer Goulet, Officer
Tiffany, Ivancic, Dr. Gapinski, and Farley all testified that A.J. had reported that Anderson
had assaulted her, and all but Ivancic testified that they observed injuries on A.J.’s arms.
On this record, we conclude that the erroneously admitted evidence did not
significantly affect the jury’s verdict. The error was therefore harmless, and Anderson is
not entitled to a new trial.
Affirmed.