In re the Matter of Anthony Ray Salin, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1764

In re the Matter of Anthony Ray Salin,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Wadena County Human Services,
Respondent.

Filed September 3, 2019
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Wadena County District Court
File No. 80-CV-17-605

Anthony Ray Salin, Brainerd, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kyra L. Ladd, Wadena County Attorney, Michelle D. Mahlen, Assistant County Attorney,
Wadena, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Wadena County Human Services (WCHS) determined that appellant Anthony Ray
Salin maltreated a vulnerable adult. Because appellant abandoned his department of human
services (DHS) appeal of the maltreatment determination, and did so after being repeatedly

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warned by the human services judge that leaving the hearing would result in an
abandonment of his appeal, the district court correctly ruled that appellant abandoned his
appeal. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises out of WCHS’s determination that appellant maltreated a
vulnerable adult. In June 2013, the state charged appellant with one count of domestic
assault by strangulation, one count of domestic assault, one count of fifth -degree assault,
and one count of fourth -degree damage to property. The alleged victim of these offenses
is E.M.J., a vulnerable adult. Appellant and E.M.J. have one joint child . A ppellant and
E.M.J. were in a romantic relationship at the time of the offenses.
Because th e incidents involved a vulnerable adult, WCHS investigated. In
September 2013, WCHS determined t hat appellant maltreated E.M.J. In September and
October 2013, appellant requested WCHS reconsider its maltreatment determination.
WCHS denied those requests. Appellant appealed the maltreatment determination to DHS.
In January 2014, the first human services judge suspended the appeal pending the
criminal proceedings that arose out of the same conduct . By October 2014, all of
appellant’s criminal charges were dismissed.
In May 2015, appellant informed a second human services judge that there were
ongoing district court proceedings related to the circumstances that lead to the
maltreatment determination. The second human services judge ordered that appellant’s
DHS appeal be “suspended until the completion of the district court proceedings.”

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In April 2016, appellant’s DHS appeal was taken out of suspension and eventually
reassigned to a third human services judge. T he final appeal hearing was scheduled for
November 17, 2016 at the Wadena County Courthouse.
In October 2016, appellant requested to continue and suspend the November 17,
2016 hearing , claiming that the guardianship proceeding and the CHIPS proceeding
involving appellant and E.M.J.’s joint child were both ongoing. The third human services
judge granted the continuance but denied appellant’s request to suspend the case .
The third human services judge commenced a hearing on the appeal on January 18,
2017. At the end of the first day, the matter was set for an additional hearing date on April
24, 2017, but later continued to July 10, 2017.
When the hearing continued on July 10, appellant asked that he be allowed to appeal
directly to the distr ict court as an interim appeal. The third human services judge denied
this request, told appellant that the hearing would continue and that appellant could then
appeal to the district court. This exchange followed:
Appellant: Okay, well then the mo -, t he hearing can move on
forward without me because I know what my rights are
and the laws are, as well as the said vulnerable adult’s
rights are and they are being violated. I do not trust your
judgment. I’m going to walk out the door now and you
can mail me your determination after you get the 2017
neuropsychological assessment, which you already put
in correspondence. Thank you, your honor, have a good
day.

HSJ: Do you understand [appellant] that if you leave the
hearing I will treat your, I will treat your appeal as being
abandoned and I’ll issue a dismissal accordingly. I want
to make sure you understand that.

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Appellant: Then I’m requesting that this be send [sic] to me and I
provide it to my attorney, so we can reconsider with the
commissioner because there has been several
complaints provided on you and notarized complaints
from the said vulnerable adult as well as mysel f, based
on your orders and overruling everything including state
law.

HJS: Do you understand what I’m telling you, that if you
leave, I’ll have no choice - -

Appellant: This can only be used against me in a direct care case - -

HSJ: Do you understand that - -

Appellant: - - so I’m taking the chance.

HSJ: So you understand that if you leave here and refuse to
proceed with the hearing despite my ruling in the
motion, you’re understanding I’ll treat this as
abandoned and dismiss it? Do you understand that?

Appellant: That, that’s up to you. I object to that too and that I
already filed a motion.

HSJ: Do you understand what I’m telling you? I understand
that you object to it, I get that.

Appellant: Okay.
HSJ: Do you understand what I’m telling you?
Appellant: Okay.
HSJ: You do.
Appellant: It, it doesn’t matter to me your Honor. You’re violating
rights.

HSJ: But do you or don’t you; do you or don’t you understand
what I just told you?

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Appellant: And then we’ll communicate with [sic] commissioner
and we’ll take it under advisement with other attorneys.

HSJ: Do you - -

Appellant: Please send the compact disc of this hearing to me - -

HSJ: - - understand - -

Appellant: - - at my address, I’ll put it in writing.

HSJ: Then - -

Appellant: Thank you, your Honor, have a good day.
HSJ: Okay, then for the record, I’ll state that I find [appellant]
understands that if he leaves here and he has left the
room, walked out of the hearing and I treat that as a
refusal to proce ed with the hearing and I treat it as an
abandonment of the appeal and I intend to issue an order
dismissing the appeal on that basis.

The third human services judge issued an order dismissing the appeal. Appellant
requested reconsideration of the dismissal—this request was denied by a reviewing human
services judge.
Appellant appealed this decision to the district court. Appellant argued that the DHS
appeal should have been suspended because district court actions arising out of the same
circumstances w ere pending. The district court upheld the reviewing human services
judge’s determination that appellant abandoned the appeal. The district court also
determined that the criminal charges against appellant were dismissed before the
suspension of the DHS appeal was lifted and that the CHIPS and guardianship files were
unrelated to appellant’s DHS appeal. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
On appeal from a district court’s review of the DHS commissioner’s order, we
“review[] the commissioner’s order independently, giving no deference to the district
court’s review.” Zahler v. Minn . Dep’t of Human Servs ., 624 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn.
App. 2001), review denied (Minn. June 19, 2001).
In reviewing the commissioner’s decision, we apply the standard of review set forth
in the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2018);
Brunner v. State of Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 285 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Minn. 1979); Zahler,
624 N.W.2d at 301. Under that standard:
[T]he court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand
the case for further proceedings; or [ ] may reverse or modify
the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have
been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences,
conclusion, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
entire record as submitted; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious.

Minn. Stat. § 14.69.
The third human services judge found that appellant abandoned his DHS appeal by
leaving the appeal hearing. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 256.0451, subd. 13 (2018), “[i]f a
person involved in a fair hearing appeal fails to appear at the hearing, the human services

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judge may dismiss the appeal.” Appellant left the hearing after being warned several times
that if appellant left the he aring, the human services judge would consider his appeal
abandoned. Appellant does not appear to challenge the dismissal of his appeal , but our
review of the third human services judge’s decision shows that it is not unlawful, arbitrary
and capricious, o r unsupported by substantial evidence. The third human services judge
properly dismissed appellant’s appeal.
Appellant makes numerous arguments, many of which are unrelated to his DHS
appeal, but he appears to contend that his DHS appeal should have remained suspended
because related district court proceedings were not yet resolved . In the interests of
completeness, we will briefly address this argument.
Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 3(b) (2018), provides that if an “action is filed in
district court while an administrative review is pending that arises out of some or all of the
events or circumstances on which the [DHS] appeal is based, the administrative review
must be suspended until the judicial actions are completed.” Based on this statute, the
second human services judge suspended appellant’s appeal while the criminal matter was
pending. Once the criminal matter was complete, the suspension was lifted.
Appellant argues that three district court proceedings should have resulted in his
DHS appeal being suspended: (1) the criminal proceedings related to his alleged assault of
E.M.J., (2) the CHIPS proceeding involving appellant and E.M.J.’s joint child, and
(3) E.M.J.’s guardianship proceedings.

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Our review of the record shows that bo th the CHIPS proceeding and E.M.J.’s
guardianship are unrelated to appellant’s DHS appeal and that the DHS appeal was
properly stayed only during the pendency of the related criminal proceedings.
Affirmed.