In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: M. B. B. and K. C. M., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1778

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
M. B. B. and K. C. M., Parents.

Filed April 22, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-JV-18-69

Jennifer L. Thon, Steven D. Winkl er, Jones Law Office, Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant-mother M.B.B.)

Jenna M. Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (for respondent
Southwest Health and Human Services)

Amy Bohnen, Sleepy Eye, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Brat vold, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg , Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant-mother M.B.B. appeals from the district court’s orde r and judgment
terminating her parental rights to her son, B.E.M. Mother argu es that the district court
abused its discretion by failing to grant her continuance reque st to determine whether
B.E.M. is an “Indian child” as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1963 (2012), and the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), Minn.

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Stat. §§ 260.751-.835 (2018). She also argues that the record does not support the district
court’s finding of a statutory basis for termination of mother’s parental rights or that such
termination is in B.E.M.’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
Mother is the biological parent of B.E.M., born 11 weeks premat ure on May 14,
2013. B.E.M. spent ab out two months in the hospital after his birth. Mother was not
married. B.E.M. is described as having special needs and is de velopmentally delayed.
Mother has been B.E.M.’s custodial parent, but for some time co -parented B.E.M. with
D.J. D.J. is not B.E.M.’s father.1
Beginning in August 2013, Redwood County became involved with mother after
receiving reports of child maltreatment. Concerns over several years included that mother
was not meeting B.E.M.’s medical and dietary needs, that physical altercations occurred in
B.E.M.’s presence, and that mother left the child with the chil d’s maternal grandmother,
M.F., and mother did not return for several days.
The county became further involve d and concerned when mother’s struggles with
alcohol-abuse and mental-health issues became apparent. From 2013 to 2014, mother was
convicted six times of consumptio n of alcohol by an underage pe rson. In January 2016,
police responded to a domestic assault at mother’s home. Mother was intoxicated and had
hit D.J. in the face several times. Police arrived at mother’s home around 3:00 a.m. and
found B.E.M.—then about two and a half years old—awake and appa rently having been

1 B.E.M.’s father, K.C.M., voluntarily terminated his parental rights in July 2018 after the
county filed the termination-of-parental-rights petition in this case.

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present during the assault. Officers learned that mother offer ed B.E.M. a drink of vodka.
Mother was later convicted of dom estic assault from that incident, and the county began
providing child-protection-case-management services to the family.
Redwood County social worker K.H . completed two family assessme n t p l a n s i n
2016. The plans outlined several goals for mother and steps sh e could take to meet those
goals, including abstaining from alcohol, completing a mental-h ealth assessment,
remaining law abiding, working with a parent mentor, and securi n g e m p l o y m e n t . T h e
county also referred B.E.M. to a “Help Me Grow” education program, but mother did not
follow through with that referral.
In May 2016, the county attempted a drop-in visit at mother’s home. When the
social workers were driving up to the home, they saw three-year -old B.E.M. leave the
home. He was wearing only a diaper and unaccompanied by any adult. The social workers
observed that B.E.M. was outside and unattended for about five minutes, after which the
social workers went to mother’s door. Mother told the social w orkers that they could not
come inside because she had friends over.
K.H. attempted to make appoin tments with mother, but there wer e times when
mother refused to meet, and other times when mother would be sleeping when visits were
attempted. In August 2016, and because mother was not making progress, the county filed
a child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition and the district court appointed
a guardian ad litem (GAL) for B. E.M. Mother admitted that B.E. M. was in need of
protection or services, and B.E.M. was adjudicated as CHIPS in October 2016. The county
was granted protective supervision, and mother completed mental -health, chemical-use,

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and diagnostic-treatment assessme n t s , m e t w i t h a p a r e n t m e n t o r , and started individual
therapy.
The county had difficulty staying in contact with mother. By November 2016,
mother had stopped attending individual therapy but was meeting B.E.M.’s educational
needs. In January 2017, the GAL and K.H. attempted to meet with mother. The GAL and
K.H. spent 45 minutes at mother’s home, but mother spent all bu t 5 minutes in the
bathroom.
Later, in May 2017, mother was taken to the hospital after M.F . reported to 911 that
mother was unresponsive due to her consumption of alcohol. Dur ing this time, mother
believed that a friend was watching B.E.M. The county became f urther concerned with
mother’s ability to parent in the summer of 2017 after police responded to another incident
at mother’s home at 3:00 a.m. because a child was screaming abo ut a broken iPad. The
social worker and GAL also made a home visit where mother’s hom e was observed to be
in a state of disarray.
The county requested emergency p rotective care (EPC) in July 2 017, alleging that
B.E.M. was no longer in a safe, supervised environment. The district court placed B.E.M.
in foster care. After B.E.M. was removed from the home, the county developed an out-of-
home placement plan (OHPP) for mother. Mother made initial progress on the OHPP. She
was employed, attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, pro viding a daily
schedule, making meetings, and maintaining contact with the county.
Mother began having supervised visits with B.E.M., but there w ere problems. New
Horizons visitation center had be en supervising visits between mother and B.E.M., but

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after mother violated a bag-check policy, New Horizons suspended visits. The county then
took over the responsibility for supervising visits.
In October 2017, mother was making some progress on the OHPP. S h e w a s
working with a parent mentor and staying in contact with the co unty. Despite progress,
mother did not provide any evidence that she was working to mai ntain her sobriety and
told the county that she was not interested in sobriety and did not find it to be an issue. In
November 2017, following an altercation between mother and D.J, mother was arrested for
assault. She was intoxicated at the time.
The county completed two more OHPPs in December 2017 and March 2018. The
OHPPs were created to continue addressing concerns with mother’s alcohol abuse, mental-
health issues, employment, and housing. By February 2018, mother had stopped all work
on her case plan, including mental-health services offered by t he county and individual
therapy. She was unemployed and had not visited B.E.M. since J anuary. In February,
mother also had an outstanding warrant and was eventually arrested.
A July 2018 parenting assessment detailed that, despite mother ’s positive assertions,
there had been few meaningful changes since the May 2017 assess ment. The assessment
noted that mother “minimizes” the effects of her alcohol use and that although she “states
she is motivated for her son to come home, . . . her actions contradict this.”
In June 2018, the county file d a petition to terminate mother’ s parental rights to
B.E.M. The county alleged that , under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 ( 2018), the statutory
grounds for termination were (1) subdivision 1(b)(2), substantial, continuous, or repeated
refusal or neglect to comply with the duties imposed upon the p arent by the parent-child

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relationship; (2) subdivision 1(b )(4), that mother was palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent-child relationship; (3) subdivision 1(b)(5), reasonable efforts failed to correct the
conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement; and (4) subdivision 1(b)(8), that
the child is neglected and in foster care.
Mother denied the petition. In July 2018, before the terminat ion-of-parental-rights
(TPR) trial, mother tested positive for THC (a violation of her probation) after police
stopped a car in which she was a passenger. The next day, moth er was hospitalized after
attempting suicide. A few days later, mother was charged for a June incident where she
was intoxicated and allegedly strangled another female until th e victim was unconscious.
In August, police again responded to mother’s residence after M .F. reported that mother
was causing a disturbance.
A TPR trial was held over the course of two days in September 2018. Mother’s
attorney requested additional time to determine whether B.E.M. was an “Indian child” as
defined under ICWA and MIFPA. Two tribes had determined that B.E.M. was not eligible
for enrollment and confirmed that with the county. M.F. testif i e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t s h e
thought that B.E.M. would be eli gible for enrollment with one o f the tribes. The district
court denied mother’s request for additional time.
At trial, mother testified that she had recently started takin g parenting classes, had
gotten a driving-instruction pe rmit, and had moved into a new a partment. She had also
received her high-school equivale ncy certificate and was partic ipating in AA meetings.
S h e b e l i e v e d t h a t s h e w o u l d b e a b l e t o c a r e f o r B . E . M . T h e d i strict court also heard

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testimony from the GAL, K.H., a child-protection investigator/c ase manager, and other
members of mother’s family and acquaintances.
Following trial, the district court determined that the county had proved, by clear
and convincing evidence, that (1) mother had failed to comply with parental duties, (2) the
county’s reasonable efforts had failed to correct the condition s leading to B.E.M.’s
placement, (3) B.E.M. was neglected and in foster care, and (4) termination of parental
rights was in B.E.M.’s best interests. The district court orde red that mother’s parental
rights to B.E.M. be terminated. In an amended order, the distr ict court found that the
county had also proved that mother was palpably unfit to be a p arty to the parent-child
relationship.
This appeal by mother followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. Whether a child is an “Indian child” under ICWA and MIFPA is based on a
t r i b a l - e n r o l l m e n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d b e c a u s e t h e t w o t r i b e s i d entified by
mother had determined that B.E.M. was not eligible for enrollment, the district
court acted within its discretion when it denied mother’s continuance request.

Mother argues that the district court should have granted her r equest for additional
time to establish that B.E.M. is an “Indian child” under ICWA and MIFPA.
Whether the district court erred in applying ICWA procedures is a question of law
that we review de novo. See In re Welfare of Child of S.N.R., 617 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn.
App. 2000) (the district court’s determination that a child was an “Indian child” is a
question of law reviewed de novo), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2000). Underlying
ICWA are concerns of “abusive child welfare practices that resu lted in the separation of

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large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster
care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.” In re Welfare of R.S ., 805 N.W.2d 44, 49
(Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted); see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
State courts have “no jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding” involving an
Indian child who “resides within or is domiciled within the chi ld’s tribe’s reservation.”
R.S., 805 N.W.2d at 49. For an Indian child who neither resides wi thin nor is domiciled
within the tribe’s reservation, “ICWA establishes minimum [f]ed eral standards for
proceedings in state courts.” Id. (quotation omitted); see 2 5 U . S . C . § 1 9 0 2 . “ T h o s e
minimum standards require . . . that the child’s tribe be given notice of the proceedings, . .
. that the child’s tribe have the right to intervene, . . . and that the parents of the Indian
child, if indigent, have the right to court-appointed counsel.” R.S., 805 N.W.2d at 49
(citations omitted); see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(c), 1912(a)-(b).
There are two prerequisites to invoking the
requirements of the ICWA. First, it must be determined that
the proceeding is a “child custody proceeding” as defined by
the Act. Once it has been determi ned that the proceeding is a
child custody proceeding, it must then be determined whether
the child is an Indian child.
J.A.V. v. Velasco, 536 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Minn. App. 1995) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 547
N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1996). Under ICWA, a “child custody proceeding” includes an action
to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii).
An “Indian child” for purposes of ICWA is “any unmarried person who is under age
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) . . . eligible for membership in
an India n tribe and is the biological child of a member of an I ndian tribe.” 25 U.S.C.

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§ 1903(4). MIFPA defines “Indian child” as “an unmarried perso n who is under age 18
and is: (1) a member of an Indian tribe; or (2) eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.”
Minn. Stat. § 260.755, subd. 8. Under MIFPA, “[a] determination by a tribe that a child is
a member or is eligible for membership in the Indian tribe is conclusive.” Id.
Because mother’s precise challenge is to the district court’s denial of her request for
a continuance, we review that denial for abuse of discretion. Torchwood Props., LLC v.
McKinnon, 784 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn. App. 2010). But if a district court misapplies the
law, it abuses its discretion. In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 654 (Minn.
App. 2018).
Before the CHIPS petition was fi led in this case in August 201 6, and based on
information from mother about B.E.M.’s potential tribal membership, the county provided
notice to both the White Mountain Apache Tribe and the San Carlos Apache Tribe. Mother
had identified those two tribes as ones in which B.E.M. might be eligible for membership.
The notices identified B.E.M., mo ther, and father, and the fact s concerning B.E.M.’s
potential eligibility for tribal me mbership. K.H. testified th at both tribes determined that
B.E.M. was not eligible for enrollment. The White Mountain Apache Tribe responded that
it had “no records . . . to verify that [B.E.M.] is an enroll[e d] member” and that, although
mother is an enrolled member, B.E.M.’s blood quantum was insuff icient to make B.E.M.
eligible for membership. The San Carlos Apache Tribe also dete rmined that B.E.M. was
not eligible for enrollment as a member of the tribe.
At trial, M.F. testified that mother’s biological father is en rolled in the San Carlos
Apache Tribe and that, once mother and her biological father took a paternity test, mother

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would be enrolled in the San Carlos Apache Tribe instead of the White Mountain Apache
Tribe. M.F. asserted that the San Carlos Apache Tribe required a quarter blood quantum,
and that once mother met that requirement, B.E.M. would also be eligible for enrollment
because he would have a three-eighths blood quantum. M.F. testified that she was working
on gathering paperwork to confirm enrollment, but that she had difficulties in doing so
because mother and M.F. planned to travel to Arizona to complete the enrollment process.
Based on M.F.’s assertion that B.E.M. may be eligible for enro llment in the San
Carlos Apache Tribe, mother asked the district court to continu e the proceedings. The
district court denied mother’s r equest because it had “conclusi ve information from both
tribes that [B.E.M.] right now is not enrolled or eligible for enrollment.”
Despite M.F.’s testimony that she thought that B.E.M. might be eligible for
enrollment, the facts of record a re that both tribes had determ ined that B.E.M. was not
eligible for enrollment. For a child to be an “Indian child” under both ICWA and MIFPA,
the child must be eligible for enrollment in a tribe. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Minn. Stat.
§ 260.755, subd. 8. And whether a child is eligible for enrollment is a determination made
by the tribe. See S.N.R., 617 N.W.2d at 81 (noting that, under the Bureau of Indian Affairs
Guidelines, the determination by a tribe whether a child is or is not eligible for membership
is conclusive). Accordingly, when the district court denied mother’s continuance request,
both tribes had determined that B.E.M. was not eligible for tribal membership.2

2 Despite M.F.’s assertion that B.E.M. might be eligible for mem bership in a tribe, the
record contains nothing concerning the eligibility criteria of either of the tribes in question.
On this record, we cannot assess whether B.E.M. would be eligible for membership in the

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On this record, we are unable to determine that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied mother’s continuance request. See In re Welfare of Children of M.L.A., 730
N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that a district court does not err when it declines
to apply ICWA where there is no evidence that the children are eligible for membership in
any Indian tribe). Appellant has not met her burden of demonstrating error on appeal. See
Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944).
Because we discern no abuse of t he district court’s discretion in denying mother’s
continuance request, we address wh ether the record supports the district court’s statutory
grounds for termination of mother’s parental rights.
II. The district court’s statutory bases for terminating mother ’s parental rights
and its findings are supported by the record.

If at least one statutory basis for termination is present, whether to terminate parental
rights is discretionary with the district court. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d
127, 136-37 (Minn. 2014). “We r eview the district court’s findings in a TPR proceeding
to determine whether they address the statutory criteria for termination and are not clearly
erroneous . . . in light of the clear-and-convincing standard o f proof.” In re Welfare of
Children of K.S.F. , 823 N.W.2d 656, 665 (Minn. App. 2012). “A finding is clearly
erroneous if it is manifestly contrary to the weight of the evi dence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted).

S a n C a r l o s A p a c h e T r i b e . A n d b e c a u s e m o t h e r i s n o t a m e m b e r , we could not assess
B.E.M.’s eligibility regardless of the criteria for membership.

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“We defer to the district court’s decision on termination if at least one statut ory
ground for termination is supporte d by clear-and-convincing evi dence and termination is
in the [child’s] best interests.” Id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it improperly
applies the law.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 93 (Minn. App. 2012),
review denied (Minn. July 17, 2012). We will affirm the district court’s te rmination of
parental rights when a statutory ground for termination is supp orted by clear and
convincing evidence, termination is the best interests of the child, and the county has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
After the TPR trial, the district court determined that there was clear-and-convincing
evidence to terminate mother’s parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2),
(5), and (8). The district court also concluded that the county had made reasonable efforts
to reunify, and that the termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of
B.E.M.
In the TPR petition, the county alleged that mother was palpably unfit to be a party
to the parent-child relationship under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). The district
court, in an amended order, found that the county had also proved, by clear-and-convincing
evidence, that mother was palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship.
Because we conclude that at least two statutory grounds are supported by the record,
we do not address the remaining statutory grounds for terminati on. In re Children of
T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005 ) (“Only one ground must be pr ove[d] for
termination to be ordered.”).

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A. Failure to Comply with Parental Duties
Mother argues that the district court’s termination of her parental rights for failure
to comply with her parental duties is unsupported by the record. She argues that the record
fails to support the absence of a mother-child bond, that mothe r failed to provide a
structured-and-supervised environment, that mother provided ina dequate shelter, or that
mother failed to meet the child’s educational and developmental needs. Mother also argues
that the district court’s findings are not supported by the record because her alcohol-abuse
and mental-health issues do not presently impair her ability to parent.
An individual’s parental rights ma y be terminated if she has “s ubstantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed” upon
her by the parent-child relationship. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Those duties
include providing “food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary
for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and development.” Id. This statutory
ground for termination requires th e social services agency to m ake reasonable efforts to
correct the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement. Id. The district court must
find that, at the time of termination, the parent is not presently able and willing to assume
her responsibilities and that the parent’s neglect of these dut ies will likely continue in the
future. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 90. A parent’s “[f]ailure to satisfy requirements of a court-
ordered case plan provides eviden ce of a parent’s noncompliance with the duties and
responsibilities under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2).” K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d at 666.
The record demonstrates that mother’s alcohol abuse and her men tal-health issues
significantly impair her ability to parent. These issues have rendered her unavailable to

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parent B.E.M. on multiple occasi ons. Although mother completed some treatment and
programming, these issues were unresolved by the time of trial. The county social worker
testified at trial that mother had recently been hospitalized d ue to a suicide attempt after
consuming alcohol and pills. Mot her testified that her drinkin g has led to her to being
“blacked out.” Mother agreed tha t, on one occasion, B.E.M. was present while she was
intoxicated and had assaulted her then-boyfriend, D.J.
Mother testified that she is aware that B.E.M. has special need s, that she failed to
follow up on a “Help Me Grow” education referral, and that she missed some of B.E.M.’s
individualized education plan (IEP) meetings. K.H. testified that the next appropriate step,
following a July 2017 drop-in visit, was removal of B.E.M. from the home based on the
conditions observed. During that visit, K.H. observed generally unsanitary conditions, and
specified those conditions. Mother denied that B.E.M. had been in the home when K.H.
observed those conditions but did not substantially dispute the state of things at the time.
While mother did make some initia l progress on her case plan, o verall, her
compliance with the case plan was minimal. Over the course of the proceedings, mother
refused to meet with the GAL and K.H., failed to supply signatu res for AA and Narcotics
Anonymous meetings, and failed to complete other required steps . For the most part,
mother did not take advantage of the services the county offere d her and did not take
meaningful steps to address her mental-health and alcohol-abuse issues.
B y J u l y 2 0 1 8 , m o t h e r h a d s t o p p e d a l l w o r k o n h e r c a s e p l a n . M other’s trial
testimony that she believed the only reason B.E.M. was taken from the home was because
of K.H.’s observation that the home was in disarray supports th e district court’s finding

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that mother still has little insight into how her chemical use and mental health affect her
ability to parent, and that she has no apparent intent to address those issues.
Based on mother’s continued use of alcohol and her failure to a ddress both her
alcohol-abuse and mental-health issues, and the district court’ s findings and its
determination that mother failed to comply with parental duties are supported by the record.
B. Neglected and in Foster Care
Mother also argues that the district court’s determination that B.E.M. is neglected
and in foster care is not supported by the record. Mother argues that, because she has taken
steps to address her mental health and chemical use, the record does not establish that the
present conditions of neglect will continue.
A court may terminate parental rights under this subdivision if it finds that the child
is “neglected and in foster care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8).
“Neglected and in foster care” means a child:
(1) who has been placed in foster care by a court order;
and
(2) whose parents’ circumstances, condition, or conduct
are such that the child cannot be returned to them; and
(3) whose parents, despite the availability of needed
rehabilitative services, have fa iled to make reasonable efforts
to adjust their circumstances, condition or conduct, or have
willfully failed to meet reasonable expectations with regard to
visiting the child or providing financial support for the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 24 (2018). “In applying this ground, the court must consider
the length of time the child has been in foster care, the parent’s efforts and participation in
visitation, the agency’s efforts to facilitate reunion, and whether additional services would
facilitate reunion.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 91; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 9

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(2018) (providing a non-exclusive list of factors for a distric t court to consider in
determining whether a child is neglected). A court need not sp ecifically mention each
factor so long as its findings show consideration of them. In re Welfare of J.S., 470 N.W.2d
697, 704 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. July 24, 1991).
At the time of trial, B.E.M. had been in foster care for over a year. Mother failed to
follow up on referrals for B.E.M .’s special needs, missed visit s with him, and failed to
address her own mental-health and alcohol-abuse issues. The record supports that mother
lacks insight into how her mental-health and alcohol-abuse issu es affect her ability to
parent, and that those issues have prevented mother from parent ing or even meaningfully
interacting with B.E.M.
The record supports the district court’s determination that B.E .M. is neglected and
in foster care and that the count y “has demonstrated that [moth er’s] circumstances,
condition, or conduct is such tha t [B.E.M.] cannot be returned to her and that despite the
availability of needed rehabilitative services, [mother] has failed to make reasonable efforts
to adjust her circumstances, condition, or conduct.”3

3 The district court found two other statutory bases for termina tion of mother’s rights, as
noted previously. Our foregoing a robust review of those addit ional grounds for
termination is no indication that those bases for termination w ere not also proved. They
appear to have been proved, as the district court concluded.

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III. The record supports the district court’s finding that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify B.E.M. with mother.

Mother argues that the county failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify, because
“the case plans which confronted [m]other were long, vague, [an d] contained numerous
elements of questionable value.”
After a CHIPS adjudication, a county social-services agency must make “reasonable
efforts . . . to prevent placemen t or to eliminate the need for removal and to reunite the
child with the child’s family at the earliest possible time.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2018).
Reasonable efforts “are always required,” subject to a few exceptions that are not at issue
here. Id. Unless an exception exists, a district court may not terminat e parental rights
without making specific findings that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify parent
and child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.3 01, subd. 8. In determining wh ether the county made
reasonable efforts, a district c ourt must consider whether the services offered were
“(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the
child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and
timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2018).
Reasonable efforts “must go beyond mere matters of form so as t o include real,
genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of H.K. , 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990),
review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). A district court should consider “the length of the time
the county was involved and the quality of effort given.” Id.
The district court found that the county’s efforts were reasona ble, and the record
supports that finding. By the time of the TPR trial, the count y had been working with

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mother for over two years. The county created three case plans for mother and provided
mother with an abundance of resources to correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-
of-home placement, including ref errals for services, gas vouche rs and transportation to
access services, and arranging for supervised visits after New Horizons suspended
mother’s visits there. In all, the district court determined that the county had provided, or
attempted to provide, over 40 services aimed at correcting the conditions.
The county’s efforts targeted mother’s mental-health and alcohol-abuse issues and
attempted to provide mother w ith resources necessary and approp riate to her needs. The
case plans were detailed, focused on the appropriate parenting issues, and provided mother
with resources for parenting assessments, a parent mentor, individual therapy, dialectical-
behavior therapy, and an adult rehabilitative mental health services worker. And the case
plan tried to make those services more accessible to mother by providing additional
supportive services such as foster care, and supervised parenting time.
The county also continued reunification efforts even when it wa s apparent that
mother was unwilling to work on the case plan. The county’s ef forts were stalled when
mother refused to meet with socia l workers and declined some se rvices because she did
not think that she needed them. Mother argues now that the cas e plans contained
requirements that were too numerous and burdensome. The proper way to raise that issue
would have been to present the district court with alternative case-planning options. It is
for the district court to determine the appropriateness of a ca se plan. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.212, subd. 1(b)(1) (2018) (providing that an out-of-home placement plan shall be

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submitted to the court for approval). Mother did not do that. Instead, she failed to comply
with the district court approved case plans.
The record supports the district court’s determination that the county made
reasonable reunification efforts.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination of
mother’s parental rights is in B.E.M.’s best interests.

Mother argues that the district court’s best-interests determination is not supported
by the record because several witnesses testified about mother’s diligence and love for her
child. In a TPR proceeding, when a statutory basis for termina tion is proved, “the best
interests of the child must be the paramount consideration” in the district court’s decision
whether to terminate rights. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. “Even when statutory
grounds for termination are met, the district court must separa tely find that termination is
in the child’s best interests.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92.
When analyzing a child’s best interests, the district court must balance three factors:
“(i) the child’s interests in preserving the parent-child relat ionship; (ii) the parent’s
interests in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (iii) any competing interests of the
child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3); see In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d
1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). “Competing interests include such things as a stable environment,
health considerations and the child’s preferences.” R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4. “Because the
best-interests analysis involves credibility determinations and is generally not susceptible
to an appellate court’s global review of a record, we give cons iderable deference to the
district court’s findings.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (quotatio n omitted). We apply an

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abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s co nclusion that termination of
parental rights is in a child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d
895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
The district court noted that, although mother and her family “express genuine love”
for B.E.M., B.E.M. lived in an unstructured and unsupervised environment while mother
failed to address her alcohol-abuse and mental-health issues. The district court also
credited the assessor’s opinion that, if B.E.M. is reunified with mother, B.E.M. “would be
isolated, underdeveloped, [and] chronically neglected” and that reunification with mother
would be a “terrible idea.”
The district court acted within its discretion in finding that B.E.M.’s best interests
would be served by terminating mother’s parental rights.
Affirmed.