In re Petition for Reinstatement of Richard A. Sand,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-1795

Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam
Dissenting, Moore, III, J.

In re Petition for Reinstatement of Richard A. Sand, Filed: December 16, 2020
a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0095540. Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Edward F. Kautzer, Ruvelson & Kautzer Ltd., Roseville, Minnesota,

Daniel S. Kufus, Kufus Law, LLC, Roseville, Minnesota, and

Joshua S. Casper, Casper Law, PLLC, Roseville, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Jennifer S. Bovitz, Managing Attorney, Office of Lawyers
Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. Based on our independent review of the record, the panel’s conclusion that
petitioner has undergone the requisite moral change is not clearly erroneous.
2. Because petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that he has
satisfied the requirements for reinstatement to the practice of law in Minnesota, we
reinstate petitioner, subject to a 3-year period of probation.
Petition granted.

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O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.
In 2012, we disbarred petitioner Richard Sand . In 2018, Sand filed a petition for
reinstatement to the practice of law. After considering Sand’s petition and evidence, a
panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibilit y Board recommended that he be
reinstated, concluding that Sand had proven b y clear and convincing evidence that he had
undergone the requisite moral change. The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional
Responsibility and Sand agree with the panel.
Based on our independent review of the record, we hold that the panel’s fa ctual
findings are not clearly erroneous. Because Sand has shown by clear and convincing
evidence that he has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement to the practice of law in
Minnesota, we grant the petition and reinstate Sand, subject to a 3-year period of probation.
FACTS
Sand was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in 1979. From 1979 to 2011, Sand
worked in private practice on criminal defense and related civil forfeiture proceedings.
Since August 2013, Sand has worked as a paralegal at Sand Law, LLC, a practice owned
by his two sons.
In August 2011, Sand was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison for aiding and
abetting wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and engaging in a monetary
transaction in criminally derived property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. In summary,
Sand participated in a criminally fraudulent scheme by submitting false loan applications
in the name of his mother and then diverting the loan funds for his own purposes. Sand
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also used criminally derived funds to purchase a cashier’s check. Sand was ordered to pay
$1,100,000.00 in restitution to Bank of America, and $189,481.54 in restitution to U.S.
Bank.
On March 22, 2012, we disbarred Sand for his criminal conduct, which violated
Rule 8.4(b) and (c) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. In re Sand, 932
N.W.2d 791, 791 (Minn. 2012) (order). On December 3, 2012, after serving approximately
14 months of his sentence, Sand was released from prison. In December 2013, the Director
received an additional complaint against Sand. At the time, the Director declined to
investigate the additional complaint because we had already disbarred Sand.
On November 6, 2018, Sand filed a petition for reinstatement under Rule 18 of the
Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility . Following this, the Director investigated
the additional complaint that she had received in December 2013. She concluded that the
additional complaint alleged the same or similar type of misconduct as the underlying
misconduct giving rise to Sand’s disbarment.
A panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board held a hearing regarding
Sand’s petition for reinstatement. During that hearing, Sand and a longtime friend testified.
By a 2-1 vote, the panel concluded that Sand had “proven by clear and convincing evidence
that he has undergone a significant moral change since committing the misconduct such
that he is now fit to be reinstated to the practice of law,” and recommended that Sand be
reinstated. Subsequently, we ordered the parties to provide us with a transcript of the
hearing and to file briefs addressing the standards for reinstatement. Both Sand and the
Director agree with the panel’s recommendation.
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ANALYSIS
We h ave the sole responsibility for determining whether an attorney should be
reinstated to the practice of law in Minnesota. In re Kadrie, 602 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn.
1999). An attorney “seeking reinstatement bears the burden of establishing that
reinstatement should be granted.” In re Stockman, 896 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn. 2017).
To determine whether reinstatement is appropriate, “[w]e independently review the entire
record.” In re Singer, 735 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Minn. 2007). Although the panel’s
recommendations are considered, they are not binding. See, e.g., In re Williams, 433
N.W.2d 104, 104 (Minn. 1988) (reinstating attorney where the panel recommended denial).
When neither party orders a transcript, but we later order the parties to provide the
transcript, the panel’s factual findings are not conclusive; rather, we review them under a
clearly erroneous standard. See In re Lieber, 834 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Minn. 2013) (applying
clear-error standard of review to findings following receipt of court-ordered transcript of a
reinstatement hearing).
I.
To secure reinstatement, a petitioner must prove “by clear and satisfactory
evidence . . . that [he] has undergone such a moral change as now to render him a fit person
to enjoy the public confidence and trust once fortified.” In re Wegner, 417 N.W.2d 97, 98
(Minn. 1987) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether
an attorney should be reinstated, proof of moral change “is the most important factor.”
Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 857.
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To prove moral change, an attorney must show (a) “remorse and acceptance of
responsibility for the misconduct,” (b) “a change in the [attorney’s] conduct and state of
mind that corrects the underlying misconduct that led to the [discipline],” and (c) “a
renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law.” In re Mose, 843 N.W.2d 570, 575
(Minn. 2014). The evidence of this moral change “ must come not only from an observed
record of appropriate conduct, but from the petitioner’s own state of mind and his values.”
In re Swanson, 405 N.W.2d 892, 893 (Minn. 1987).
The panel found that Sand “demonstrated the required moral change” to be
reinstated to the practice of law. We agree.
A.
The panel found Sand remorseful and that he accepted responsibility for his
misconduct. Sand testified that, initially, “I felt like I was unjustly targeted because I was
a lawyer and because I was a public official, and that’s why I was prosecuted. . . . I felt that
I was the victim.” Sand talked about how his incarceration began a process that allowed
him to see his wrongs and accept responsibility. “It was through that process and through
the recognition that . . . it was my behavior, not somebody else’s behavior. . . . It was my
responsibility as an attorney to avoid criminal conduct, immoral conduct, [ and] unethical
conduct. It was my responsibility, and it wasn’t that somebody else was doing it to me.”
Sand testified that he apologized to his mother for using her in his fraudulent scheme and
that after being released from prison, he chose to return to the same community so that he
could redeem himself . Sand testified that whenever anyone has asked him about his
criminal conduct, he tells them “how [he] did wrong” and “how badly [he] feels” about it.
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Our independent review of the record supports the panel’s finding that Sand credibly
showed remorse and accepted responsibility for his misconduct.
B.
Next, Sand must prove a “change in [ his] conduct and state of mind that corrects
the underlying misconduct that led to the [discipline].” Mose, 843 N.W.2d at 575
(emphasis added). The panel made several findings regarding Sand’s change in conduct
and his state of mind.
Concerning change in conduct, the panel made numerous findings about Sand’s
substantial progress in addressing his chemical use issues, all of whi ch are supported by
the record. See Lieber, 834 N.W.2d at 204 (considering panel’s findings on disbarred
attorney’s “substantial progress . . . in addressing his alcoholism” when concluding that he
had established moral change). Sand was addicted to alcohol and pain medication, but did
not recognize the scope of his chemical dependency issues until his incarceration. While
in prison, Sand c ompleted a 9- month treatment program and participated in cognitive
behavioral therapy . When released from prison, Sand completed a 6- month outpatient
treatment program. Sand has maintained sobriety since August 2011, and currently follows
a daily regimen of the Catholic Advance Movement as his pathway for maintaining
sobriety.
The panel also found that Sand provided testimony related to his changed conduct.
Sand testified, “As I said before, I kind of identified, when I was in [prison in] Duluth,
three areas that I thought were really important to continue to address in my life, and that
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is: Honesty, humility, and patience. And I keep trying to reinforce those things in my life
on a daily basis.”
Finally, the panel’s findings regarding the additional complaint the Director
investigated demonstrate a change in Sand’s conduct. This complaint involved real estate
transactions that Sand entered into with a client that caused the client to suffer financial
losses. Sand voluntarily agreed to repay the client, has made monthly payments to this
client, and is working with a lawyer to enter into a contractual repayment schedule with
this client.
The dissent concludes that Sand has not established changed conduct, mostly
because the only testimony the panel relied upon was Sand’s. This is correct, but we have
never held that a petitioner must present corroborating testimony to secure reinstatement.
Generally, the panel and our court have considered the quality of a petitioner’s evidence,
rather than the existence of a specific type of evidence. Reliance on third-party testimony
might have strengthened Sand’s request for reinstatement, but the panel heard directly from
Sand and concluded that his testimony alone was sufficiently compelling to satisfy all
moral change requirements, including changed conduct. Moreover, the Director did hear
directly from third parties, as part of her investigation. Those conversations are
summarized in the Director’s report. Based on the record and the panel’s ability to best
understand the quality and credibility of Sand’s testimony, we have no reason to conclude
otherwise.
Concerning change in state of mind, the panel found significant change over time,
and Sand testified extensively about this change. Sand testified, “I thought I was a big shot
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and I thought I was bulletproof . . . . [But] I am different now.” Sand explained that he
needed to go to prison, and through treatment and therapy, to recognize he lacked humility
and needed to change. A panel member asked Sand, “How is your mindset different now?”
Sand replied, “I’m satisfied with my lot in life to that extent. I’m not interested in doing
any real estate. I did a successful real estate subdivision on my property, and I thought,
‘Hey, I’m a genius. You know, I could do this again.’ I don’t want to be a genius
anymore.” As previously stated, “What better evidence of [a petitioner’s] state of mind
than his own words and thoughts.” In re Swanson, 405 N.W.2d 892, 893 (Minn. 1987).
Sand has proven a change in his conduct and state of mind that addresses the misconduct
that led to his disbarment.
C.
Lastly, Sand must demonstrate “a renewed commitm ent to the ethical practice of
law.” Mose, 843 N.W.2d at 575. Considerations of “an attorney’s plan to return to the
practice of law or implement systems to avoid future misconduct are factors that may be
relevant to whether an attorney has shown a renewed commitment to the ethical practice
of law.” In re Severson, 923 N.W .2d 23, 32 (Minn. 2019). The p anel made no findings
specific to Sand’s renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law. The record contains
sufficient evidence of Sand’s renewed commitment, however.
First, in his current employment as a paralegal, Sand meets weekly with his sons,
the managing lawyers of the firm, to ensure that he is accountable and compliant with his
ethical obligations to clients. Second, Sand notified the Director that if he were to be
reinstated, he plans to transition from his current paralegal position to an associate attorney
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position with his sons’ law firm. That Sand has a specific employment plan for reentry
into the profession weighs in his favor. See Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 861–62 (concluding
attorney had demonstrated a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law, in part, by
having a job offer as an associate at a firm with attorneys who would mentor him). We
conclude that Sand has demonstrated a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law.
Accordingly, we conclude that the panel’s determination that Sand has undergone the
requisite moral change is not clearly erroneous.
II.
Although we have described moral change as the “decisive” factor, In re Reutter,
474 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Minn. 1991), and the “most important factor,” Stockman, 896
N.W.2d at 857, we have also made clear that “evidence of moral change is not our only
consideration.” Kadrie, 602 N.W.2d at 870. Following a conclusion on moral change, we
weigh five additional factors: (1) petitioner’s recognition of the wrongfulness of his
conduct, (2) petitioner’s intellectual competency to practice law, (3) the existence of
physical or mental illness or pressures that are susceptible to correction, (4) the length of
time since the misconduct and discipline , and (5) the seriousness of the original
misconduct. Id. The panel made findings on all of these factors.
Moral change and recognition of the wrongfulness of past conduct, as an additional
factor, are “intertwined” and “considered . . . together.” In re Dedefo, 781 N.W.2d 1, 8
(Minn. 2010). T he panel found that Sand sincerely recognized the wrongfulness of his
misconduct.
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Concerning competency to practice law, we consider whether a petitioner has
“remained acquainted with legal matters.” Lieber , 834 N.W.2d at 209 (citation omitted).
Sand established that he has worked as a paralegal since 2013, completed his continuing
legal education reporting requirements, and recently received a satisfactory score on the
uniform bar and multistate professional responsibility examinations. The Director has no
concerns regarding Sand’s competence to practice law.
Concerning pressures susceptible to correction, as we previously noted, Sand
presented evidence and credibly testified as to how he misused alcohol and codeine when
he committed his misconduct, but has been sober since August 2011 and understands that
sobriety will be essential to maintain an ethical lifestyle. We agree that sobriety will be
essential for Sand to maintain an ethical practice and lifestyle.
Concerning length of time, we disbarred Sand more than 8 years ago, and he pleaded
guilty to the f ederal charges more than 9 years ago. We conclude sufficient time has
elapsed for reinstatement to be appropriate. 1 See Lieber, 834 N.W.2d at 208 (reinstating
attorney who had been disbarred for 8 years and whose misconduct occurred 9 years ago);
In re Ramirez, 719 N.W.2d 920, 921–22 (Minn. 2006) (reinstating attorney 9 years after
disbarment).

1 Citing In re Swanson, 343 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. 1984), the dissent concludes that the
time between Sand’s completion of probation and his pursuit of reinstatement is “too
limited.” Unlike here, however, the petitioner in that case failed to satisfy his dispositive
moral change showing. See id. at 664. The time elapsed since probation ended was simply
an additional basis for the denial.
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Lastly, and intentionally, we end our reinstatement analysis focusing on the
seriousness of Sand’s misconduct. “While a court should be slow to disbar . . . , it should
be even more cautious in re-admitting an attorney to a position of trust.” In re Smith, 19
N.W.2d 324, 326 ( Minn. 1945). In attorney discipline matters, our prime concern is
protection of the public, protection of Minnesota’s judicial system, and deterring other
attorneys from engaging in misconduct. In re Rebeau, 787 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Minn. 2010).
We fully acknowledge the seriousness of Sand’s m isconduct and the legitimate
concerns raised by the dissenting panel member and our colleague. Unbeknownst to his
own mother, Sand admitted to exploiting her—by using her creditworthiness—to facilitate
his criminal scheme. Sand was ordered to pay over $1.2 million i n restitution for his
crimes. Simply put, Sand’s misconduct was worthy of disbarment.
With that said, the underlying misconduct in reinstatement petitions involving
disbarred attorneys will always be quite serious. We have “reinstated attorneys to the
practice of law who have been disbarred for misappropriating client funds, stealing, or
dishonesty in general.” In re Anderley, 696 N.W.2d 380, 385 n.6 (Minn. 2005) . If
disbarment were permanent in every case, “[Rule 18] would be a cruel hoax.” Ramirez,
719 N.W.2d at 924 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted). In other words, the seriousness of his
misconduct weighs against Sand’s reinstatement, but does not preclude it.
Based on the Director’s support of reinstatement and our independent review of the
record, we hold that Sand has met his burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence
that he satisfied each of the requirements for reinstatement to the practice of law. We
reinstate Sand to the practice of law, require him to make payment of his annual registration
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fee within 30 days of the date of this opinion, and place him on probation for a period of 3
years, subject to the following conditions:
(1) Petitioner shall abide by the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct;

(2) Petitioner shall cooperate fully with the Director’s office in its efforts to
ensure compliance with probation and shall promptly respond to the Director’s
correspondence by the due date provided. Petitioner shall provide the Director a
current mailing address and shall immediately notify the Director of any change of
address. Petitioner shall cooperate with the Director’s investigation of any
allegations of unprofessional conduct that may come to the Director’s attention.
Upon the Director’s request, petitioner shall authorize the release of information and
documentation to verify his compliance with the terms of this probation.

(3) Petitioner shall seek mental health treatment, chemical dependency
treatment, and financial counseling should he experience any mental health or
chemical dependency issues, or financial stressors, that may impact his ability to
practice law and provide competent and comprehensive representation to his clients
and/or handle client f unds within the requirements of the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct. Upon seeking treatment or therapy, petitioner shall
immediately notify the Director, and sign all necessary releases and authorizations
to allow the Director access to petitioner’s treatment/therapy records.

(4) Petitioner shall maintain total abstinence from alcohol and other mood-
altering chemicals, except that petitioner may use prescription drugs in accordance
with the directions of a prescribing physician who is fully advised of petitioner’s
chemical dependency before issuing the prescription. If requested, petitioner shall
provide medical authorizations to the Director to contact petitioner’s
treating/prescribing physician(s).

(5) Petitioner shall be supervised by a licensed Minnesota attorney, appointed
by the Director to monitor compliance with the terms of this probation. Petitioner
shall provide to the Director the names of four attorneys who have agreed to be
nominated as petitioner’s supervisor within two weeks from the date of this order.
Petitioner’s sons shall not serve as petitioner’s supervisor. If, after diligent effort,
petitioner is unable to locate a supervisor acceptable to the Director, the Director
will seek to appoint a supervisor. Until a supervisor has signed a consent to
supervise, the petitioner shall on the first day of each month provide the Director
with an inventory of active client files described in paragraph 6 below. Petitioner
shall make active client files available to the Director upon request.

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(6) Petitioner shall cooperate fully with the supervisor in efforts to monitor
compliance with his probation. Petitioner shall contact the supervisor and schedule
a minimum of one in- person (or virtual) meeting per calendar quarter. Petitioner
shall submit to the supervisor an inventory of all active client files by the first day
of each month during probation. Regarding each active file, the inventory shall
disclose the client name, type of representation, date opened, most recent activity,
next anticipated action, and anticipated closing date. Petitioner’s supervisor shall
file written reports with the Director at least quarterly, or at such more frequent
intervals as may reasonably be requested by the Director.

(7) If at any time during the period of probation, after giving petitioner an
opportunity to be heard by the Director, the Director concludes that petitioner has
violated the conditions of the probation or engaged in further misconduct, the
Director may file a petition for disciplinary action against petitioner in the
Minnesota Supreme Court without the necessity of submitting the matter to a Panel
or Panel Chair. Petitioner waives the right to such consideration by the Panel or
Panel Chair.

Petition granted.
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D I S S E N T
MOORE, III, Justice (dissenting).
While recognizing the laudable progress Richard Sand has made in his life since his
disbarment in 2012, I respectfully dissent. I do not agree that Sand has met his heavy
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence a “present ability to adhere to the strict
code of professional morality . . . .” In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. 1979). I
also disagree that sufficient time has elapsed to justify reinstatement. For these reasons, I
would not reinstate Sand to the practice of law at this time.
To secure reinstatement, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she has “undergone such a moral change as now to render him a fit
person to enjoy the public confidence and trust once forfeited.” In re Hanson, 454 N.W.2d
924, 925 (Minn. 1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
emphasized that evidence of moral change “is the ‘decisive’ factor in considering a petition
for reinstatement.” In re Reutter, 474 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Minn. 1991 ) (citation omitted).
The requisite moral change “must be such that if the petitioner were reinstated, ‘clients
could submit their most intimate and important affairs to him with complete confidence in
both his competence and fidelity.’ ” In re Kadrie, 602 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1999)
(quoting In re Herman, 197 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. 1972)). Evidence of this moral
change must come from both an observed record of appropriate conduct, and from the
petitioner’s own state of mind and his values. Hanson, 454 N.W.2d at 925. “This standard
requires stronger proof of good character and trustworthiness than is required in an original
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application for admission to practice.” In re Porter, 472 N.W.2d 654, 655 –656 (Minn.
1991).
The high standard of proof required of a disbarred attorney applying for
reinstatement is to assure us “that reinstatement would serve the public interest.” Hanson,
454 N.W.2d at 925. The clear and convincing evidence we mandate in such cases must be
“unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.” In re Griffith,
883 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted).
With this standard in mind, I disagree with the court’s conclusion to reinstate Sand
to the practice of law for two reasons. First, I do not agree that Sand has met his heavy
burden in proving changed conduct. Second, I do not agree that the time elapsed weighs
in favor of Sand’s reinstatement.
Sand pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343, and engaging in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Sand participated in a scheme to intentionally defraud financial
institutions by submitting false loan applications in the name of his mother and diverting
the loan funds for his own purposes.
In June 2016, after his release from federal prison, Sand was discharged from
probation after successfully completing his requirements. In November 2018, Sand filed
his petition for reinstatement. Upon Sand filing for reinstatement, the Director investigated
a 2013 additional complaint and concluded the conduct— taking place around 2002—
alleged the same or similar misconduct as in the underlying disciplinary matter.
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In concluding Sand has proven changed conduct, the court’s opinion relies on
Sand’s sobriety and successful completion of treatment, 1 testimony he provided to the
panel, and his voluntary agreement to pay a former client that he caused to suffer financial
loss. I agree that Sand does present some evidence of changed conduct, but disagree that
he presents a clear and convincing quantum of evidence. Sand’s evidence is scant when
compared to the evidence other successful petitioners have presented.
Not including the court’s decision today, we have only reinstated six attorneys to
the practice of law following disbarment since 1971, when the Office of Lawyer s
Professional Responsibility was established. 2 See In re Wegner, 417 N.W.2d 97 (Minn.
1987); In re Reutter, 474 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1991); In re Trygstad, 472 N.W.2d 137
(Minn. 1991); In re Anderley, 696 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. 2005); In re Ramirez, 719 N.W.2d
920 (Minn. 2006); and In re Lieber, 834 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 2013).
Setting aside Reutter, in which our grant of reinstatement followed the reversal of
the petitioner’s underlying criminal conviction by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, see
Reutter, 474 N.W.2d at 344, 346, every other petitioner presented third-party testimony 3

1 Even though sobriety can be evidence of changed conduct, our case law illustrates
that we have considered sobriety and completion of substance treatment as being most
relevant to the additional factor of whether there is a “physical or mental illness or pressures
that are susceptible to correction”—an inquiry which follows a petitioner successfully
making their moral change showing.

2 Martin Cole, Life Begins at 40, Bench & Bar Minn., Jan. 2011, at 14, 14.

3 Although the record in Wegner is unclear as to the number of third parties who
testified in support of the petitioner, the record does indicate there was “witness testimony.”

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that the panel (as well as this court) relied upon in concluding the petitioner had sufficiently
proven change. Trygstad, 472 N.W.2d at 139 (petitioning attorney presented five
witnesses, including former South Dakota Attorney General who prosecuted petitioner for
underlying crimes, to panel); Anderley, 696 N.W.2d at 383 (petitioning attorney presented
three character witnesses to panel); Ramirez, 719 N.W.2d at 920 (petitioning attorney
presented five character witnesses to panel ); Lieber, 834 N.W.2d at 200 (petitioning
attorney presented five character witnesses to panel).
In the present case, one character witness testified to the panel,4 and the panel found
the witness “offered no credible evidence on petitioner’s moral change.” This witness is a
retired attorney with whom petitioner had shared office space in the early 1980’s, but who
had limited contact with petitioner from 1987 to 2010 due to living and working in another
community. This witness acknowledged that he had never discussed the misconduct with
Sand because he did not want “to put salt in that wound.” The witness testified that it
would be difficult for him to judge Sand’s moral change because of S and’s lack of

4 The Director also spoke with two additional character witnesses and conducted three
“additional interviews” as part of her investigation and report. Relating to the additional
character witnesses, the Director concluded, “[I]t does not appear as though petitioner’s
character witnesses have a great deal of knowledge about petitioner’s misconduct . . .
(either now or at the time of [Sand’s] indictment nine years ago).” In one of the “additional
interviews,” the Director noted Sand and the interviewee “have never spoken about
[Sand’s] misconduct directly.” Notably, neither the two additional character witnesses nor
the three additional interviewees testified before the panel. When a witness provides
information contained in the Director’s report but does not testify before the panel, we must
be “mindful” and “weigh such statements accordingly” because the witness was not
“placed under oath” or “subject[ed] to cross-examination.” See In re Singer, 735 N.W.2d
698, 701 n.1 (Minn. 2007).
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communication about the criminal conviction and what led up to it, and that he “can only
assume that he realizes that what he did was very wrong.”
Admittedly, we have not held that a petitioner must per se present third-party
testimony to prove moral change. However, when there is “little evidence of support from
members of the legal profession” or other third parties, we have previously found the
petition insufficient to earn reinstatement. In re Swanson, 343 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Minn.
1984). In other words, “[b]efore we reinstate, more than petitioner’s word . . . is required.”
In re Williams, 433 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Minn. 1988) (Simonett, J., dissenting).
Here, unlike the post-1971 petitioners who secured reinstatement following
disbarment, the panel stated it was solely “relying on petitioner’s testimony” to establish
moral change. The absence of relied upon third-party testimony alone does not necessarily
preclude Sand’s reinstatement. Nevertheless, it does meaningfully distinguish his petition
from the line of successful petitioners. In my view, our case law and rules
5 illustrate that
we find third-party testimony, particularly from members of the bar, highly probative and
an important consideration in determining whether a petitioner has met the heavy
evidentiary burden of showing moral change.
In addition to the paucity of Sand’s evidence, there are facts in the record that are
adverse to the court’s conclusion that Sand has sufficiently changed his conduct. As the

5 The Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility contemplate third-party
testimony playing an important role in our reinstatement deliberations. See Rule 18(b)(1),
RLPR (directing that after an attorney submits a petition for reinstatement, “[t]he Director
shall publish an announcement of the petition for reinstatement in a publication of general
statewide circulation to attorneys soliciting comments regarding the appropriateness of the
petitioner’s reinstatement” (emphasis added)).
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court discussed, the record indicates that Sand entered a verbal agreement to repay a former
client after Sand defaulted on payments, causing the former client to lose his home and
possessions. As part of the hearing on his reinstatement petition, the panel questioned Sand
about whether he had made an effort to get this agreement reduced to writing. Sand
testified that after his attorney forwarded drafts of an agreement to the former client, a
“couple of weeks” prior to the panel hearing, the former client told him, “Look, I’m going
through a divorce. I really don’t want to reduce this [repayment agreement] to writing until
I’ve completed my divorce.” Sand agreed to hold off on formalizing the agreement until
after his former client’s dissolution case was completed. In other words, the former client
was seeking to hide these payments as assets from his spouse for divorce purposes. Rather
than encourage the former client to report his assets, Sand acquiesced to the former client’s
unscrupulous request.
The court concludes that Sand’s decision to enter into a repayment agreement with
the former client supports his reinstatement. I reach the opposite conclusion from the court
regarding this matter. Nearly a deca de after Sand’s underlying misconduct, his
acquiescence to dishonest behavior undermines his claim that he has shown sufficient
moral change to warrant reinstatement.
Additionally, the record establishes Sand did not disclose to the Director that he
procured codeine without a prescription. Sand admitted to traveling to Canada to purchase
codeine and returning to Minnesota with the codeine. When asked by the Director why he
did not disclose that his codeine was procured illegally and without a prescription, Sand
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replied, “Because it wasn’t procured illegally. . . . [I]t was legal to purchase the codeine”
in Canada.
The dissenting panel member found Sand’s explanation to be “a blatant display of
lack of understanding what is the difference between what is right and wrong” because he
was “skirting the law” by leaving “the country to obtain a drug [Sand] cannot get in the
United States without a prescription.” I agree. Rather than be forthright about his travel
for codeine, Sand ’s explanation attempted to rationalize an action that Minnesota law
expressly prohibits—possession of codeine in Minnesota without a prescription .6 In my
view, the lack of relied upon third-party testimony and troubling facts in the record make
Sand’s claim of change far from clear or convincing.
In addition to proof of moral change, as the court correctly notes, we are required to
consider five other factors. In re Anderley, 696 N.W.2d 380, 385 (Minn. 2005). The court
found four of these additional factors weigh in Sand’s favor, with the seriousness of the
misconduct as the exception. I agree with the court that the seriousness of Sand’s
misconduct weighs heavily against reinstatement at this time. However, I do not agree
with the court’s conclusion that the length of time consideration weighs in Sand’s favor.

6 Under Minnesota law, codeine and its derivatives are controlled substances listed in
Schedules I, II, and III. Minn. Stat. §§ 152.02, subds. 2(c)(4) (codeine methylbromide),
3(b)(1)(ii)(B) (codeine), 4(e) (narcotic drugs) (2018). Accordingly, codeine is illegal to
possess in the State without a prescription. See Minn. Stat. §§ 152.023, subd. 2 (possession
of narcotic drugs), 152.025, subd. 2(1) (possession of mixture containing Schedule I-IV
controlled substances), 151.37, subd. 1 (possession of legend drug without a prescription)
(2018).
D-8
The court focuses on the 9 years since Sand pled guilty, and the 8 years that have
passed since we disbarred Sand. However, the court’s opinion does not fully consider the
short amount of time that has passed since Sand completed the terms of his federal
probation, which to me is the more pertinent timing issue. When the amount of time that
has passed since the expiration of probation is relatively short, we have previously denied
reinstatement. Swanson, 343 N.W.2d at 665 (“[T]he time passed since the expiration of
probation is too limited to merit reinstatement at this time.”). Here, 29 months—just under
two and a half years —passed between Sand completing probation and submitting his
petition for reinstatement. Less than 5 years have passed between Sand completing
probation and our decision today. As time passes, it may be true that this factor will begin
to weigh in Sand’s favor. But in my view, when probation is considered, the amount of
time that has passed here is “too limited” to merit reinstatement at this time.
Without question, Sand has taken positive steps in his life since disbarment, and his
devotion to his daily aftercare and spiritual regimen is commendable. However, as we
have stated before, and the court’s opinion correctly reminds us, our prime concern in
considering a reinstatement petition is not simply the petitioning attorney’s progress. “The
purpose of discipline is not to punish the attorney but to guard the administration of justice
and to protect the public.” Peterson, 274 N.W.2d at 925. Because our decisions to reinstate
attorneys can adversely affect the public , see, e.g., In re Lieber, 949 N.W.2d 295 (Minn.
2020) (order) (disbarring an attorney a second time because he committed additional
misconduct against clients after his initial reinstatement), we must prioritize the protection
of the public and our system of justice. T o minimize the possibility that a petitioner is a
D-9
threat to the public, we impose a heavy burden on the petitioner and exercise great caution
in readmitting attorneys to a position of public trust. In re Smith , 19 N.W.2d 324, 326
(Minn. 1945) (While we should be slow to disbar, we “should be even more cautious in
readmitting an attorney to a position of trust .”). Exercising such caution here, I would
respectfully deny Sand’s reinstatement at this time.7

7 Because the court has reinstated Sand, I agree that the supervised probationary
conditions in the court’s opinion are necessary and appropriate. In addition, with the
court’s decision to grant Sand’s reinstatement, our admonition from Lieber is likewise
befitting here: “We expect not to see again a disbarred attorney who, after reinstatement,
commits further misconduct.” In re Lieber, 939 N.W.2d 284, 297 (Minn. 2020).