State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1813

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jazmyne Amanda-May Shinabarger,
Appellant.

Filed December 9, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-18-418

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota; and

Dan McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
After a court trial, the Steele County District Court found Jazmyne Amanda -May
Shinabarger guilty of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon. The district court’s

2
finding of guilt is based on evidence that , during a confrontation with another woman,
Shinabarger held a knife near the woman’s face and made jabbing motions. We conclude
that the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Shinabarger intended
to cause the woman fear of imminent bodily harm. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On March 4, 2018, Shinabarger entered a retail store in the city of Owatonna and
saw M.P., whom she previously had considered her best friend. Shinabarger was angry at
M.P. because M.P. recently had missed Shinabarger’s daughter’s birthday party , despite
being the girl’s godmother. The two women quarreled and Shinabarger held a knife close
to M.P.’s face.
The state charged Shinabarger with second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2016). The case was t ried to the district
court in June 2018. The state presented the testimony of eight witnesses. Shinabarger
testified on her own behalf and called one other witness in her defense. The most pertinent
portions of trial testimony are summarized below.
The state’s primary witness was M.P., who testified as follows: She was shopping
at a retail store with a friend when she saw Shinabarger enter the store. Shinabarger
confronted her near the checkout area. After exchanging words with Shinabarger, M.P.
tried to leave the store, but Shinabarger would not allow her to pass . M.P. put her hands
on Shinabarger’s body and shoved her. A four- to five-inch folding knife fell to the floor.
M.P. previously had not seen the knife. Both Shinabarger and M.P. reached for the knife,
but Shinabarger grabbed it first. Shinabarger picked up the knife and held it in front of her

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with the point of the blade pointing upward and the sharp edge of the blade facing toward
herself. Shinabarger was “maybe a half foot away” f rom M.P. and held the knife near
M.P.’s face. M.P. felt scared. M.P. grabbed Shinabarger’s wrist to keep her away as
Shinabarger pushed toward her. After the store manager and another customer intervened,
Shinabarger walked out of the store. As she left, she waved the knife in the air and loudly
said, “Yeah, I have a knife.”
Another customer, who was standing a few feet from M.P. near the checkout area,
testified that Shinabarger initiated the confrontation. The customer pushed a shopping cart
between Shinabarger and M.P. to interrupt the confrontation.
A store manager testified that she successfully separated the two women as they
were arguing. She saw that Shinabarger had a knife. She told Shinabarger to leave the
store, which she did.
During the defense case, Shinabarger testified as follows: Shortly before entering
the store, while in the parking lot, she received a knife from a cousin as collateral for a
loan. She put the knife in her coat pocket. She was not aware that M.P. was inside the
store before she entered with her cousin. Upon seeing M.P. in the store, Shinabarger
approached her to confront her about the birthday party. M.P. shoved Shinabarger, causing
the knife to fall out of her pocket onto the floor. Shinabarger picked up the k nife, which
had “popped open” on the floor. She held the knife upright in front of her because she saw
M.P. and another woman walking toward her , then gestured with the knife and told the
women “to back off” and leave her alone. Shinabarger demonstrated her movements while
on the witness stand. In its findings of fact , the district court described Shinabarger’s

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movements as “jabbing motions.” Shinabarger left the store when the store manager told
her to leave. She gave the knif e back to her cousin in the parking lot . Police officers
arrived soon thereafter and arrested her.
At the conclusion of the trial, the district court orally found Shinabarger guilty. The
district court filed a written order two weeks later . In the order , the district court found
that Shinabarger confronted M.P. with the knife in her hand or up her sleeve with the blade
open. The district court found that Shinabarger used the knife to make “jabbing motions”
toward M.P.’s face from a distance of one foot or less. The district court acknowledged
discrepancies in the testimon y of the state’s witnesses but concluded that “[t]hese minor
differences do not impact the credibility of the witnesses on the central issues in this case.”
Finally, the district court rejected Shinabarger’s claim that she brandished the knife in self-
defense.
The district imposed a sentence of 21 months of imprisonment but stayed execution
of the sentence and ordered Shinabarger to serve 150 days in jail. Shinabarger appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Shinabarger argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction.
The state alleged that Shinabarger assaulted M.P. with a dangerous weapon. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2016). The statutory definition of “assault” includes “an
act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1) (2016). The phrase “with intent to” means “that the actor either
has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if
successful, will cause that result.” Id., subd. 9(4). Second-degree assault by causing fear

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is a specific -intent crime. State v. Fleck , 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 -09 (Minn. 2012) . “The
crime is in the act done with intent to cause fear, not in whether the intended result is
achieved.” State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1998).
Shinabarger’s argument has three parts.
A.
Shinabarger argues that “the district court’s findings and verdict should be reversed
because the court failed to make sufficient findings on the intent element.” Specifically,
she argues that the district court “never found that Shinabarger’s actions were done with a
specific intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death as required for a
conviction.”
In a court trial in a felony case, a district court must make a general finding of guilt
and written findings of the essential facts. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(a)-(b). “If the
court omits a finding on any issue of fact essential to sustain the general finding, it must be
deemed to have made a finding consistent with the general finding .” Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.01, subd. 2(e) . Accordingly, the omission of a finding on a particular issue is
“immaterial.” State v. Townsend , 925 N.W.2d 280, 286 n.2 (Minn. App. 2019), review
granted (Minn. May 14, 2019). If a district court does not make a specific fin ding
concerning whether the defendant had the requisite inten t, “such intent can be assumed to
be included in the general finding.” State v. Totimeh, 433 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn. App.
1988), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 1989).
Thus, the district court did not err by not making a specific finding on the issue of
intent.

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B.
Shinabarger also argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that
Shinabarger made “jabbing motions” with the kn ife when she held it near M.P.’s face.
Shinabarger refers to paragraph 11 of the district court’s order, in which the district court
found as follows:
Ms. Shinabarger testified she pointed the knife at Ms. [P.], but
that the blade edge was pointing toward herself and the dull
edge was toward Ms. [P .]. Given the jab bing motions she
demonstrated and that the point of the knife was clearly at Ms.
[P.]’s face at a distance of a foot or less, the direction of the
blade edge (were the Court to believe this testimony) would do
little to minimize the fear experienced by the person who was
her intended target.

Shinabarger contends that the district court’s finding is contrary to the testimony of M.P.
and the store manager, both of whom testified that Shinabarger di d not make stabbing
motions with the knife. The state responds by arguing that the district court is permitted to
disregard M.P.’s testimony and that the district court’s finding is properly “based on
Appellant’s own physical demonstration of how she brandished the knife.”
The district court did not expressly cite any witness with respect to its finding that
Shinabarger made “jabbing motions” with the knife. But the trial transcript confirms that
Shinabarger made a gesture to communicate to those present in the courtroom what she did
during the confrontation with M.P. On direct examination, as Shinabarger was describing
the incident, her attorney said, “You described holding the – you made a motion as if –
. . . .” Shinabarger then said, “I had the knife up like this (indicating), and I had told [M.P.]
to back the f--k up and leave me alone . . . .” Neither Shinabarger’s attorney nor the

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prosecutor sought to develop the record further with a description of Shinabarger’s physical
demonstration. In that situation , an attorney should “describe[e] all conduct, gestures,
inaudible responses, [and] nonverbal behavior” of the witness, preferably by asking the
district court for permission “to have the record reflect what occurred. ” See Roger
Haydock & John Sonsteng, Trial 146 (1991).
The absence of a verbal record, however, does not mean that the district court’s
finding that Shinabarger made “jabbing motions” is clearly erroneous. The district court’s
finding is corroborated in part by Shinabarger’s verbal testimony that “I had the knife up
like this” and the court reporter’s insertion of “(indicating).” Shinabarger has not cited any
authority for the proposition that the absence of a verbal description of a witness’s physical
demonstration precludes a fact-finder from relying on the physical demonstration or, more
importantly for this case, precludes an appellate court from considering the physical
demonstration when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. We are not aware of any
such caselaw. In the absence of such caselaw, we are inclined to defer to the district court,
which presided over the court trial as the fact -finder and, thus, surely was paying careful
attention to the witness’s testimony and any physical gestures. Deference in this situation
is justified because the district court “was able to observe [Shinabarger’s] testimony and
demeanor, as well as any gestures that [she] used to describe [her] conduct.” See State v.
Stempfley, 900 N.W.2d 412, 418 (Minn. 2017). We defer whether or not the advocates or
the district court ma de a contemporaneous record of the nonverbal information on which
the district court relied. Furthermore, when reviewing for clear error, this court typically
will not reverse unless it has a “definite and firm conviction” that an error occurred. State

8
v. Poehler, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2019 WL6334370, at *3 (Minn. Nov. 27, 2019); see also
Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000) . Given the record in
this case, we do not have such a conviction.
Thus, the district court did not clearly err by finding that Shinabarger made “jabbing
motions” with the knife near M.P.’s face.
C.
Shinabarger’s primary argument is that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient
to prove that she intended to cause M.P. fear of immediate bodily harm. On appeal, the
parties do not dispute that a knife is a dangerous weapon, that Shinabarger possessed a
knife when she approached M.P., and that Shinabarger held the knife close to M.P.’s face.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the state introduced sufficient evidence to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Shinabarger intended to cause M.P. fear of immediate bodily harm.
More specifically, the issue is whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Shinabarger either ha d the purpose of causing M.P. fear of immediate bodily harm or
believed that her act would cause that result. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subds. 9(4), 10(1).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ordinarily undertake “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient” to support the conviction . State v.
Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We “assume that the
factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict.” State v. Palmer ,
803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We do not disturb a verdict if the
fact-finder, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement

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of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
The above-stated standard of review applies so long as a conviction is based on
direct evidence. State v. Hors t, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016). Direct evidence is
evidence that is “based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a
fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is “evidence from
which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id.
(quotation omitted). A conviction depends on circumstantial evidence if proof of the
offense, or a single element of the offense, is based solely on circumstantial evidence. See
State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 307 (Minn. 2014). In this case, the parties agree that
the state’s proof of Shinabarger’s intent depends on circumstantial evidence.
Accordingly, we apply the heightened standard of review applicable to the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, which consists of a two -step analysis. First, we
identify the circumstances proved. State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). “In
identifying the circumstances proved, we assume that the [factfinder] resolved any factual
disputes in a manner that is consistent ” with the verdict. Id. Second, we “examine
independently the reasonableness of the inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved” and “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.
(quotations omitted). The circumstantial -evidence standard of review applies in both

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appeals after a jury trial and appeals after a court trial. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6
(Minn. 2018).
At the first step of the analysis, we identify the following circumstances that are
relevant to the question whether Shinabarger specifically intended to cause fear of
immediate bodily harm in M.P.: Shinabarger had a pre-existing hostility toward M.P.
because M.P. had missed Shinabarger’s daughter’s birthday party. Shinabarger saw M.P.
in a store. Shinabarger had a folding knife in her possession when she entered the store.
Shortly after entering the store, Shinabarger approached M.P. and yell ed and screamed at
her. M.P. shoved Shinabarger. The knife fell to the floor and unfolded. Both M.P. and
Shinabarger reached for the knife, but Shinabarger g rabbed it first. Shinabarger stepped
toward M.P. and held the knife less than a foot from M.P.’s face . Shinabarger made
“jabbing motions” with the knife. M.P. felt scared when Shinabarger brandished the knife.
M.P. grabbed Shinabarger’s wrist and pushed her back.
At the second step of the analysis, we “determine whether the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88 (quotations omitted). Shinabarger
contends that the state’s evidence is inconsistent with guilt because it does not allow an
inference that Shinabarger intended to cause M.P. fear of immediate bodily harm . The
state contends that Shinabarger’s intent to cause fear may be inferred from the fact that she
carried a knife before confronting M.P. , brandished the knife, and jabbed it near M.P.’s
face. We agree with the state that one reasonable inference from the circumstances proved
is that Shinabarger intended to cause M.P. fear of immediate bodily harm . See State v.
Soine, 348 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. App. 1984) (concluding that defendant intended to

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cause fear when he waved knife near victim’s face), review denied (Minn. Sept. 12, 1984);
see also State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393 , 396 (Minn. 1998) (concluding that defendant
intended to cause fear when he fired a gun at victims’ home); State v. Kastner, 429 N.W.2d
274, 275-76 (Minn. App. 1988) (concluding that defendant intended to cause fear when
she pointed scissors and screwdrivers at victim and made hostile statements), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 16, 1988).
At the second step of analysis, we also determine whether the circumstances proved
are “inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d
at 88 (quotations omitted). Shinabarger contends that the circumstances proved are
consistent with a rational hypothesis that she intended to defuse the situation and to leave
the scene. She contends that this hypothesis is rational in light of the evidence that the
situation was heated , that M.P. had shoved Shinabarger before the knife fell, that both
Shinabarger and M.P. reached for the knife, and that she quickly exited the store wh ile
holding the knife aloft and loudly a nnouncing that she had it. In response, the state
contends that this alternative hypothesis is inconsistent with the entirety of the
circumstances proved, especially the fact that Shinabarger stepped toward M.P. while
brandishing the knife and made “jabbing motions” with it.
We agree with the state that Shinabarger’s hypothesis of innocence is inconsistent
with the circumstances proved. Shinabarger brought a knife into the store and immediately
confronted M.P., a person against whom she had il l will. The district court found that the
knife was in her sleeve or in her hand before it fell to the floor and unfolded. The district
court also found that, after she grabbed the knife off the floor, Shinabarger held the knife

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close to M.P.’s face and made jabbing motions. These actions are inconsistent with an
intent to defuse a confrontation and leave the scene. If that were Shinabarger’s intent, she
would not have c aused the confrontation in the first place. She has not identified any
circumstance that would explain a change in her state of mind between the time she entered
the store and the time she held the knife near M.P.’s face. T he only rational hypothesis is
that, when Shinabarger held the knife near M.P.’s face and made jabbing motions, she
intended to cause M.P. fear of immediate bodily harm.
Thus, the state’s circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove that Shinabarger had
the requisite intent for the offense of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon.
Affirmed.