In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. A. H.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1821

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. A. H.

Filed July 1, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Schellhas, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-JV-17-2175

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant C.A.H.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Tracy M.
Smith, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his adjudication of delinquency and the district court’s award
of restitution. We reverse and remand.

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FACTS
Appellant C.A.H., born in 2004, is a resident of Oklahoma and temporarily resided
in Minnesota. During a night in June 2017, C.A.H. threw a large rock at the window of a
motorcycle store in Mankato and destroyed inventory, by tipping over seven motorcycles
on the showroom floor and damaging two of the store’s trucks. Law enforcement arrested
and Mirandized C.A.H., who admitted that he broke into the store and damaged the store
and its property because he “was bored.”
Respondent State of Minnesota charged C.A.H. with one count of third -degree
burglary, one count of first -degree damage to property, and one count of fleeing a peace
officer. On June 14, 2017, with advice of counsel, C.A.H. entered into a plea agreement
whereby he would plead guilty to criminal damage to property, and the state would dismiss
the remaining counts. The district court questioned C.A.H. about the trial rights that he was
waiving by entering a plea, and C.A.H. offered a factual basis for his guilty plea. The court
accepted C.A.H.’s plea and dismissed the remaining counts. On June 28, the court
conducted a disposition hearing . The general manager for the cri me victim testified that
the store faced “a potential loss of $147,000” due to the damage caused by C.A.H. The
court stayed adjudication of C.A.H. for 12 months, placed him on probation, and ordered
him to write an apology letter and to pay restitution of $2,232.50 to the store and
$27,424.95 to the store’s insurers. The court allowed C.A.H. to return to his home state of
Oklahoma with his mother.
In May 2018, a Blue Earth County probation officer filed a probation -violation
report, alleging that C.A.H. ha d failed to write an apology letter and had paid nothing

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toward the court -ordered restitution. The district court scheduled a probation -violation
hearing on June 27, but C.A.H. failed to appear, and the court rescheduled the hearing. On
October 9, C.A.H. again failed to appear, and t he court was advised that C.A.H.’s
nonappearance was because his mother was in the process of a divorce and had no funds
to get him to court. The court revoked C.A.H.’s stay of adjudication, adjudicated him
delinquent, and ordered a “civil judgment for restitution.”
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
C.A.H.’s restitution challenge
C.A.H. challenges the district court’s award of restitution, arguing that the court did
not consider his ability to pay and failed to make proper findings of fact. We reject C.A.H.’s
arguments because he failed to properly challenge restitution before the district court.
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” In re
Welfare of J.J.P. , 831 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 2014) . “In juvenile-delinquency matters,
restitution is governed by both the restitution provision of the juvenile-delinquency statute
. . . and the general restitution statute.” In re Welfare of I.N.A., 902 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn.
App. 2017), review denied (Minn. Nov. 28, 2017). A district court may order restitution if
it finds a juvenile offender delinquent or enters a stay of adjudication . See Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.198, subds. 1 (5) (2016) (allowing court to order restitution if it finds a juvenile
delinquent), 7(a) (2016) (allowing court to “enter an order in accordance with the provision
of subdivision 1” of section 260B.198, following a stay of adjudication); see also I.N.A.,
902 N.W.2d at 642 (concluding that district court may order child to pay reasonable

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restitution without finding of delinquency during stay of adjudication). “An offender may
challenge restitution, but must do so by requesting a hearing within 30 days of receiving
written notification of the amount of restitution requested, or within 30 days of sentencing,
whichever is later.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2016) (emphasis added).
Here, on June 28, 201 7, the district court ordered C.A.H. to pay restitution, and
C.A.H. neither objected to nor challenge d the restitu tion order. We therefore do not
consider C.A.H.’s challenge to the court’s restitution order. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd.
15a (2018) (“‘Must’ is mandatory.”); see also Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn.
1996) (“This court generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district
court.”); In re Welfare of C.L.L., 310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (refusing to consider
constitutional issue because arguments were not raised in the district court).
District court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate C.A.H.
C.A.H. next argues that because the district court failed to review his case after 180
days, it violated Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (2016), and therefore lacked subject -
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate him delinquent. We agree. “Subject-matter jurisdiction is
a court’s power to hear and determine cases that are presented to the court.” State v. Losh,
755 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 2008). Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised by
either party at any time, and j urisdiction cannot be conferred on the court by waiver or
consent. In re Welfare of C.S.N. , 917 N.W.2d 427, 431 (Minn. App. 2018). The state
concedes that the district court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction to adjudicate C.A.H.
delinquent. While appellate courts generally accept a party ’s concessions, they need not
do so when the party has made a concession on a threshold issue that presents a question

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of law. See State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Minn. 1999) (addressing issue of
custody despite parties’ stipulation that suspect was in custody ). We therefore review this
argument to ensure it is in accordance with the law.
Minnesota Statutes section 260B.198, subdivision 7(a), provides:
[W]hen a hearing has been held as provided for in section
260B.163 and the allegations contained in the petition have
been duly proven but . . . before a finding of delinquency h as
been entered, the court may continue the case for a period not
to exceed 180 days in any one order. The continuance may be
extended for one additional successive period not to exceed
180 days, but only with the consent of the prosecutor and only
after the court has reviewed the case and entered its order for
the additional continuance without a finding of delinquency.

(Emphasis added.) Section 260B.198, subdivision 7(a), “sets out the procedure to stay the
adjudication of a juvenile case.” C.S.N., 917 N.W.2d at 431.
In C.S.N., this court concluded that section 260B.198, subdivision 7(a), “plainly
limits a court to only issue one continuance, up to 180 days, and requires a court’s review
prior to extending that continuance for another 180 days.” Id. (emphasis added). This court
further concluded that when a court fails to review a juvenile-delinquency case prior to
extending a continuance for another 180 days, a district court “loses jurisdiction to
adjudicate a juvenile delinquent.” Id. at 433; see also Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd.
4(F) (“A probation revocation proceeding to adjudicate the child on any allegation initially
continued without adjudication must be commenced within the [two 180-day] period[s] . .
. or [a] juvenile court’s jurisdi ction over the charges terminates.”). This court therefore
concluded that the district court lost subject -matter jurisdiction over the delinquency
proceeding “because it improperly continued the case without adjudication for two 180 -

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day periods at the original time of disposition and never reviewed his case during the first
180-day period, in violation of section 260B.198, subdivision 7 . C.S.N., 917 N.W.2d at
433. This court reversed C.S.N.’s delinquency adjudication and remanded the case for
dismissal of the delinquency petition. Id. at 433–34.
Here, at C.A.H.’s disposition hearing on June 28, 2017 , the state argued against a
stay of adjudication, raising the practical difficulty of C.A.H. having to travel to Minnesota
for a review hearing before extension of the stay of adjudication. When the district court
addressed the issue with C.A.H’s counsel, counsel stated, “No, there’s no need for another
hearing. It’s just to ask for that second Order to be filed before the s ix months is up , . . .
[W]e’d be willing to waive the requirement of a second Order in this case, if the court
would consider the one year stay.” The court therefore stayed adjudication for two 180-
day periods, noting that “[i]t’s been placed on the record that there is a waiver of the six
month hearing,” and the court did not conduct a review hearing within 180 days of the stay
of adjudication. But jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the court by waiver or consent. Id.
at 431.
Because the district court did not conduct a review hearing within the first 180 days
of C.A.H.’s stay of adjudication, it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate C.A.H. delinquent on
October 9, 2018. We therefore reverse C.A.H.’s adjudication of delinquency and remand
for dismissal of the delinquency petition.
Reversed in part and remanded.