Mary Kate Nguyen, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1828

Mary Kate Nguyen, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 8, 2019
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-14-15511

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijo,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hoc evar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition for postconviction relief in
which she requested to withdraw her Alford plea. She appeals, arguing that her Alford plea
was neither accurate nor intelligent. We affirm.
FACTS
In the early morning hour s of September 1, 2014, a Shakopee police officer
observed an SUV parked on the shoulder of U.S. Highway 169 and appellant Mary Nguyen
on foot, signaling to passing cars. The officer stopped and spoke with Nguyen, who told
the officer that she had been driving the SUV and was involved in a crash. The police
officer smelled alcohol, and Nguyen admitted to having two or three drinks earlier in the
evening and again admitted to driving the SUV. The officer had her perform some field
sobriety tests and arr ested her under the belief that she had been driving the SUV while
intoxicated. The officer brought Nguyen to the Prior Lake Police Department and, after
reading her the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory, had her undergo a breath test. The
test revealed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.15.
Nguyen was charged with: first -degree driving while intoxicated ( DWI) for
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2014); first-degree DWI for operating a motor vehicle with a BAC
of 0.08, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2014); and driving after having
her driver’s license cancelled, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2014). In
August 2016, Nguyen entered pleas in two files. She entered an Alford plea on the second

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first-degree DWI charge (BAC over 0.08) in the present file and entered a guilty plea with
regard to a fifth-degree controlled substance charge in a different file.1 In exchange for her
pleas, the remaining charges in both files were dismissed, a third file was dismissed in its
entirety, and the state agreed not to charge her in another matter. Nguyen was given a
downward dispositional departure. On the DWI charge, she was given a stayed 84 -month
prison sentence and seven years of probation.
In March 2017, Nguyen’s probation was revoked . She filed a petition for
postconviction relief in July 2018, arguing that she should be allowed to withdraw her
Alford plea because it was neither accurate nor intelligent. The postconviction court denied
the petition. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Nguyen appeals the postconviction court’s denial of her petition for postconviction
relief. We review such a denial for an abuse of discretion. Greer v. S tate, 836 N.W.2d
520, 522 (Minn. 2013). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is
based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.”
Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). We review t he
postconviction court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Id.
Nguyen argues that she should be allowed to withdraw her Alford plea. The
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure set out two standar ds for plea withdrawal. A

1 “An Alford plea is a plea in which an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence while not
admitting guilt.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch , 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted).

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district court may allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing if it would be
fair and just to do so. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. And a withdrawal must be allowed
at any time in order to correct a manifest i njustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
Nguyen has already been sentenced, so the manifest-injustice standard applies.
“A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh , 778
N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent in
order to be valid. Id. And the validity of a guilty plea is a legal question that we review
de novo. Id. In this case, Nguyen claims that her plea was inaccurate and unintelligent.
We examine each argument in turn.
i. Accuracy
Nguyen begins by arguing that her plea was not accurate. “To be accurate, a plea
must be established on a proper factual basis.” Id. While the factual basis for a plea is
generally established by questioning the defendant, “a defenda nt may not withdraw [her]
plea simply because the court failed to elicit proper responses if the record contains
sufficient evidence to support the conviction.” Id. In other words, a guilty plea “may be
supplemented by other evidence to establish the factual basis for a plea.” Lussier v. State,
821 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. 2012).
Minnesota caselaw, recognizing that “[a]n Alford plea is not supported by the
defendant’s admission of guilt, and is actually contradicted by [her] claim of innocence,”
places special emphasis on the importance of a “strong factual basis” in the context of an
Alford plea. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007). And district courts have
been cautioned not to “cavalierly accept” Alford pleas. Id. at 648 (quotation o mitted).

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Instead, “the better practice is for the factual basis to be based on evidence discussed with
the defendant on the record at the plea hearing.” Id. at 649. This can be done “through an
interrogation of the defendant about the underlying conduct and the evidence that would
likely be presented at trial,” the introduction of witness statements or other documents at
the plea hearing, or a stipulation by the parties to factual statements in documents submitted
at the plea hearing. Id.
Additionally, since the accuracy requirement for valid pleas is in place to protect
defendants from pleading guilty to more serious offenses than they could be convicted of
were they to insist on a trial, “the defendant’s acknowledgement that the State’s evidence
is sufficient to convict is critical to the court’s ability to serve the protective purpose of the
accuracy requirement.” Id. And the supreme court recommends having the defendant
specifically acknowledge at the plea hearing that the state’s evidence is sufficient for a jury
to convict, applying the reasonable-doubt standard. Id.
Nguyen asserts that the factual basis was insufficient to support her conviction of
first-degree DWI under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5). That statute criminalizes a
person driving, operating, or being in physical control of any motor vehicle when her BAC
“at the time, or as measured within two hours of the time, of driving, operating, or being in
physical control of the motor vehicle is 0.08 or more.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5).
Nguyen argues that the factual basis was inadequate as to whether she was the one driving,
operating, or in physical control of the vehicle, and she argues that it is also lacking as to
her BAC. We examine each element.

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With regard to the first, Nguyen asserts that “it remain[s] unclear from the hearing
transcript whether appellant drove, operated or was in physical control of the vehicle.” She
bases this argument on the fact that, at the plea hearing, she responded “yes” after her
attorney asked her “you have told me . . . that there was another driv er of that vehicle;
correct?” Nguyen claims that this creates a “conflict in the record about whether appellant
was the driver.” She also makes much of the “lack of testimony by [her] about w hether
she was the driver.”
But this line of reasoning forgets the purpose of an Alford plea, which is to allow a
defendant to plead guilty while maintaining her innocence but acknowledging that there
was sufficient evidence to convict her of the crime. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647. Because a
defendant is allowed to main tain her innocence while giving an Alford plea, it stands to
reason that she would not affirmatively admit to every element of the underlying crime.
The requirement is simply that she ackno wledge the sufficiency of the state’s evidence.
And that is precisely what Nguyen did. At the plea hearing, she acknowledged that: she
read the police reports and watched the squad car video prior to the hearing; she understood
that the police officer would testify based on those reports; despite telling her attorney there
was another driver, she never said as much to the officer at the scene, instead referring to
herself as the driver; and that, after reviewing the evidence, she agreed that there was a
substantial likelihood that she would be found guilty if she proceeded to trial.
The exhibit submitted at the plea hearing also supports the driving element.
Specifically, t he officer’s report contained within the exhibit references two separate
admissions from Nguyen that she was driving the SUV. Moreover, the district court made

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sure that Nguyen understood that the state would have to prove her guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and she agreed that “even with that high burden of proof, that there is a
substantial likelihood that a jury would convict [her].” We conclude that the factual basis
was adequate on this element.
Nguyen also argues that there was an inadequate factual basis on the element of
whether her BAC was 0.08 or more within two hours of th e underlying incident ,
emphasizing her lack of testimony regarding that element . Her BAC was not specifically
discussed at the plea hearing. But the exhibit submitted at the plea hearing supports this
element. A printout from the breath test is included and states that at 3:38 in the mor ning
Nguyen had a BAC of 0.15. And t he police officer’s report indicates the same. We
conclude that the factual basis was adequate with regard to Nguyen’s BAC being 0.15.
As for the two-hour requirement, the exhibit submitted at the plea hearing contains
multiple references to the time of the offense and arrest as being 1:44 in the morning. And
the statement of probable cause indicates that the officer first observ ed Nguyen at
approximately 1:45. Since the breath -test reading indicating a BAC of 0.15 was made at
3:38, the record indicates that the test was within two hours of the officer finding Nguyen
by the side of the highway . The record does not specify how much time had passed
between Nguyen’s driving, operatio n, or physical control of the vehicle and the officer
finding her. But an Alford plea may be accepted if, based on the factual basis, the district
court “reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of
guilty.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647 (quotation omitted). It was reasonable for the district
court to conclude that the factual basis provided at the plea hearing would support a jury

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verdict of guilty because a jury could reasonably infer from the factual basis that the officer
found Nguyen shortly after the accident and that the breath test therefore occurred within
two hours of her driving, operating, or being in physical control of the vehicle .
Accordingly, we conclude that there was an adequate factual basis on this element . And
because the factual basis was adequate on all of the elements, we conclude that the Alford
plea was accurate.
ii. Intelligence
Nguyen also argues that her plea was not intelligent. “The intelligence requirement
ensures that a defendant understands the charges against [her], the rights [she] is waiving,
and the consequences of [her] plea.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Nguyen asserts that she
was not informed of the trial rights that she was waiving by entering an Alford plea and
that the district court did not comply with Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6), which
requires the district court to ensure that “defense counsel has told the defendant and the
defendant understands” 18 different aspect s of her right to a jury trial before accepting a
plea.
Specifically, Nguyen claims that the district court did not inform her or ask her
whether: (1) her attorney told her and she understood that she had a right to a jury trial and
a unanimous verdict; (2) she was waiving her right to a jury or court trial; (3) she knew she
was presumed innocent and the standard of proof is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
(4) she was waiving her right to have witnesses testify in open court and be subject to cross-
examination; (5) she was waiving he r right to subpoena witnesses; and (6) she knew that
she had a right to remain silent at trial. But Nguyen was questioned by her attorney about

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the plea petition that she filled out. She testified that she had gone through it with her
attorney twice, understood the rights mentioned in the document, understood that she was
giving up her trial rights by pleading, had enough time to discuss the plea petition with her
attorney, and was satisfied with her attorney’s representation. The plea petition itself
covers all of the requirements in Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6). And the district court
accepted the petition. “We presume that, prior to entry of a guilty plea, defense counsel
reviews the plea petition with the defendant and the defendant understands its terms.” State
v. Byron, 683 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004).
In light of the contents of Nguyen’s signed plea petition, her testimony at the plea hearing
confirming her understanding of its contents, and the caselaw presumption that she
understood those terms, we conclude that her Alford plea was intelligently given.
Affirmed.