State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1832

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jacob Ochan Yien,
Appellant

Filed September 16, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-17-1583

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeV os, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Christopher A. Delong, Special Assistant Public Defender, Dorsey & Whitney LLP ,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm appellant’s conviction for ineligible person in possession of ammunition
because sufficient evidence supports the conviction.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jacob Ochan Yien with three
counts of ineligible person in possession of ammunition (ineligible possession), one count
of theft, two counts of receiving stolen property, and one count of motor-vehicle theft. The
complaint alleges that on April 24, 2017, victim R.B. reported that his vehicle, containing
a .22-caliber rifle and ammunition, was stolen. On April 25, law enforcement found Yien
hunched over the driver’s seat of the stolen vehicle on the side of a ro ad; when searching
the vehicle, officers found the rifle and a box of ammunition. At a bench trial, Yien
stipulated to having a second-degree-burglary conviction. Relevant to this appeal, the court
found Yien guilty of one count of ineligible possession of ammunition and sentenced him
to 60 months.1
D E C I S I O N
“When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we carefully examine the record
to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit
the fact[-]finder to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable

1 The court also found Yien guilty of one count of theft, two counts of receiving stolen
property, and one count of motor-vehicle theft; the court sentenced him to 19 months
concurrent for motor-vehicle theft. Yien does not challenge these convictions and t he
sentence.

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doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900
(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the v erdict, and it must be assumed that the fact -finder disbelieved any
evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The verdict will not be
overturned if the fact -finder, upon application of the presumption of innocence and the
State’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have
found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Yien’s conviction relies on circumstantial evidence. Under the circumstantial -
evidence test, appellate courts “identify the circumstances proved and independently
consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those circumstances, when
viewed as a whole.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Minn. 2017). “To sustain a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the circumstances proved as a whole must be consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Under this test, the fact -finder “is in a unique position to determine
the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence before it.” Id. at 600.
To convict Yien of ineligible possession of ammunition , the state had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he had been convicted of a crime of violence and that he
possessed ammunition. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1(2), 2(a) (2016) (listing elements
of offense). A “crime of violence” includes second-degree burglary. Minn. Stat. § 624.712,
subd. 5 (2016). Here, Yien stipulated to being convicted of second-degree burglary, and
that the ammunition was found in the vehicle, therefore the only disputed element is

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whether he knowingly possessed the ammunition. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601 (“To
convict [defendant] of possession of [ammunition] by an ineligible person, the State was
required to prove in relevant part that he knowingly possessed the [ammunition].”).
Possession may be actual or constructive. Id. at 601. Constructive posses sion is
proved when the state shows “that the police found the item in a place under the defendant’s
exclusive control to which other people normally did not have access,” or “if police found
the item in a place others had access, the State must show that there is a strong probability
. . . that at the time the defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and
control over it.” Id. In order to show that a defendant consciously or knowingly exercised
dominion and control over an item, the state “must prove more than . . . mere proximity,”
it “must prove that the defendant had an ability and intent to exercise dominion and control”
over the item. Id. at 601 -02. The purpose of the constructive -possession doctrine is to
establish possession in
those cases where the state cannot prove actual or physical
possession at the time of arrest but where the inference is
strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed the
[item] and did not abandon his possessory interest in the [item]
but rather c ontinued to exercise dominion and control over i t
up to the time of the arrest.

State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975).
The first step of the circumstantial -evidence test is “to winnow down the evidence
presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict, resulting
in a subset of facts that constitute the circumstances proved.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600
(quotation omitted). Her e, as the district court found, the circumstances prove that:

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(1) during the early morning of April 25, 2018, a police officer found Yien “hunch [ed]
down” in a Jeep Grand Cherokee; (2) when the officer checked the plates of the Jeep, it
came back as a stol en vehicle; (3) a box of .22 caliber ammunition was found on the
backseat floorboard of the vehicle underneath grocery items placed over the ammunition
by Yien; and (4) R.B. stored the ammunition inside the center console.
Next, we “independently consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole.” Id. at 601. We conclude that t he
circumstances, when viewed as a whole, are consistent with a reasonable inference that
Yien constructively possessed the ammunition. Yien at least saw the box of ammunition 2
either when he moved it from the center console to the floorboards or when he placed his
groceries down, and he did not abandon the ammunition, thus supporting a finding that he
had the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over it. See State v. Barnes, 618
N.W.2d 805, 813 (Minn. App. 2000) (concluding sufficient evidence supported controlled-
substance offense where defendant’s effects were found “in close proximity” to the
substance); cf. Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611 (“Because defendant did not have exclusive
possession of the automobile, one [cannot] automatically infer fr om the mere fact that
[drugs were] found in the automobile that the [drugs] belonged to defendant.”).
Yien argues that when a viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved are
inconsistent with a finding of guilt: that he did not know of the box of ammunition or what

2 The stipulated-to picture of the box of ammunition shows a thin box made from what
appears to be cardboard with a cover reading “.22 long rifle 325 rounds,” and on the front
reading “federal ammunition” “Target grade performance” “325 rounds.”

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it contained . At trial, for the first time, Yien claimed that he borrowed the car from a
“random individual” named “D” to go get groceries for grilling out. Yien testified that he
drove home and had some drinks, admi tting to being drunk that night; he then drove the
vehicle to buy groceries and put them in the back seat. Yien denied opening the center
console and seeing or knowing the box of ammunition was present. But the district court
here found “[Yien]’s story [] incredible and, frankly, unbelievable ,” and this court must
“preserve[] the [fact -finder]’s credibility findings.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600. We
therefore reject Yien’s argument because, based on the court’s credibility finding, it
presumes as one of the circumstances proved at trial the testimony expressly rejected as
“unbelievable” by the district court, acting as the fact-finder.
In sum, the circumstances proved here are consistent with guilt and do not lead to
any inconsistent inferences that Yien did not constructively possess the box of ammunition
found in the stolen vehicle. See State v. Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 769-71 (Minn. App. 2000)
(affirming conviction where officers found defendant passed out in rental car, a gun
sticking out beneath his leg, and defendant claimed that he had never seen the gun), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001). Accordingly, Yien’s claim of insufficient evidence fails, and
we affirm.
Affirmed.