State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1839

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Darcel Louis Magee,
Appellant.

Filed April 6, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Cochran, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-17-799

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney , Anna Light, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal-Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Segal, Judge; and
Peterson, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Darcel Louis Magee challenge s the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions of first-degree criminal damage to property and second-degree
assault with a dangerous weapon. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
In February 2017, Magee went to visit hi s relative, O.S. A scuffle ensued that
resulted in injuries to O.S. and damage to a neighboring property. The state charged Magee
with second-degree assault w ith a dangerous weapon (firear m); first-degree criminal
damage to property (damag e exceeding $1,000); unlawful possession of a firearm; and
second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon (car). The matter proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, O.S. testified that Magee came to visit him at his home. During the visit,
Magee asked O.S. if O.S.’s s on was going to testify at an up coming trial. O.S., annoyed
by Magee’s questions, asked Magee to leave. Magee went to the door, turned around, and
stated that he was “not going anywhere.” O.S. put Magee in a chokehold and pushed
Magee out of the house.
Magee got into the car that he drove to O.S.’s house, which was parked in the
driveway. Magee then yelled to O.S. that he was going to kill him. O.S. became angry,
went up to the car, and then punc hed Magee in the face. O.S. testified that he punched
Magee because he believed that Magee was about to pull a gun on him. After being
punched, Magee jumped out of the car and ran around it. O.S. chased Magee, telling Magee
that he should hurt him. Ma gee got back inside the car and shut the car door, but O.S.

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opened it. Magee then put the car in reverse and floored the gas pedal. At the time, O.S.
was trapped on three sides by the car, the car door, and a fence that was directly next to the
car. O.S., with no avenue of retreat, fell to the ground. The open car door dragged O.S.
down his driveway approximately fifteen feet. O.S. sustai ned injuries including bruising
and ripped tendons.
Magee’s car continued past O.S. The car travelled across a city street, over a curb,
and into a neighbor’s fence, tearing the fence down in the process. The car also damaged
the neighbor’s yard with deep wheel marks. The damage exceeded $1,000. Magee drove
away from the scene.
The jury found Magee not guilty of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon
(firearm), and guilty of the re maining counts. Magee appeal ed. The direct appeal was
stayed to permit Magee to pursue postconvic tion proceedings. Th e postconviction court
vacated Magee’s unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm conviction and resentenced Magee to
executed sentences of 12 months and one da y for criminal damage to property, and
21 months for second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon (car), to run concurrently.
After resentencing, this appeal was reinstated.
D E C I S I O N
Magee challenges his convictions of first-degree criminal damage to property under
Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(3) (2016), and second-degre e assault with a dangerous
weapon under Minn. Stat. § 609.2 22, subd. 1 (2016). Magee ar gues that the evidence is
insufficient to support either conviction. We address the su fficiency of th e evidence of
each conviction in turn.

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I. The circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove that Magee intended to
damage property.

Magee first argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he intentionally damaged the neighbor’s property. To convict Magee of criminal
damage to property, the state must prove that Magee “intentionally” caused damage to the
physical property of another and that the damage exceeded $1,000. Minn. Stat. § 609.595,
subd. 1(3). The parties agree that Magee damaged the property and that the damage
exceeded $1,000. The issue on appeal is whether Magee had the specific intent required
to convict under the statute. Here, “intentionally” means that “the actor either has a purpose
to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act performed by the actor,
if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2016).
When a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we conduct a “painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when view ed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, wa s sufficient to permit the jurors to reach their verdict.”
State v. Caine, 746 N.W.2d 339, 356 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). Generally, we will
not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and the requirement of proof beyond a re asonable doubt, could reasonably conclude
that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. State v. Chavarria-Cruz ,
839 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Minn. 2013).
Because the state offered only circumstan tial evidence to pr ove the element of
intent, we apply a heightened two-step test to determine whether the state presented
sufficient evidence of intent. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 264 (Minn. 2016). First,

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we identify the circumstances pr oved, deferring to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of
these circumstances, and reject ing evidence in the record that conflicts with the
circumstances proved by the state. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017).
“Second, we examine the reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved, giving no deference to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable
inferences.” Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 264. In making this determination, “we do not review
each circumstance proved in isolation.” State v. Andersen , 784 N.W.2d 320, 332
(Minn. 2010). Instead, we consider the circ umstances as a whole to determine whether
they form a “complete chain” that “leads so directly to th e guilt of the defendant as to
exclude beyond a reasonabl e doubt any reasonable infe rence other than guilt.”
State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). The conviction is sustained if the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances prove d, as a whole, are
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. Id.
Viewing the evidence in the lig ht most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances
proved at trial in relation to the criminal-damage-to-property charge are as follows: Magee
put the car in reverse, floored the gas pedal, sped down the drivew ay, hit the neighbor’s
fence, and damaged the neighbor’s lawn. Ju st before the damage occurred, O.S. had
punched Magee and chased Magee around the ca r. Magee left quickly because he was
trying to run away from the scene. The damage exceeded $1,000.
These circumstances proved are consistent with an inference of guilt. As the state
points out, Magee’s intent to damage the property can be inferred from his knowledge that

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driving in reverse at a high rate of speed could cause damage. See Barnslater v. State ,
805 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that intent to damage can be inferred
from knowledge and conduct). Here, Magee sped away from O.S.’s house, in reverse, at a
high-enough rate of speed to damage the fence and yard. And after causing some damage,
Magee fled the scene. A defendant’s actions after an alleged offense can serve as evidence
of intent. Davis v. State , 595 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Minn. 1999). Accordingly, the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt.
But we conclude that the circumstances proved demonstrate an equally reasonable
inference inconsistent with guilt: that Magee inadvertently damaged the property while
going fast in reverse. This is a reasonable inference because Magee was trying to leave
quickly after the altercation. As O.S. testified at trial, Magee was “trying to run away from
the scene.” Further, the neigh bor’s fence that Magee damaged was just across the street.
Under these circumstances, it is rational to in fer that Magee hit the property because he
was going too fast in reverse, but he did not intend to do so.
The state contends that Magee’s failure to stop to correct his driving after hitting the
neighbor’s fence shows an intent to damage the property. The state notes that Magee
“continued driving at a high rate of speed” th rough the fence and into the yard. But it is
also reasonable to infer that afte r he hit the fence, he was going so fast in reverse that he
could not stop quickly. Further, the state presented no evidence that Magee knew the fence
was there before he hit it, nor did the state pr esent any evidence that he had any desire to
damage the neighbor’s fence. Accordingly, the circumstances proved show an equally

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reasonable inference that Magee did not have the purpose to damage the property or believe
that if he drove fast in reverse he would damage the property.
We conclude that the circumstances proved at trial do not form the “complete chain”
needed to show Magee’s intent to damage property beyond a reasonable doubt because
they fail to exclude another reasonable inference consistent with innocence. Al-Naseer,
788 N.W.2d at 473. Accordin gly, we reverse Magee’s conviction of criminal damage to
property and remand to the district court to correct the warrant of commitment.
II. The evidence is sufficient to show th at Magee used the car as a dangerous
weapon.

Magee argues that the evid ence is insufficient to support his conviction of
second-degree assault. Magee’s second-degr ee assault conviction is based on direct
evidence, namely O.S.’s testimony. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599 (“[D]irect evidence is
evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact
without inference or presumption.” (quotation omitted)). When an element of an offense
is supported by direct evidence, our review is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record
to determine whether the evid ence, when viewed in the li ght most favorable to the
conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict that they did. State v. Horst,
880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016).
To convict Magee of second-d egree assault, the state ha d to prove (1) that Magee
assaulted O.S. and (2) that he used a dangerous weapon in the assault. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (defining second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon). Magee

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challenges only the second element, arguing that the state failed to prove that the car was
used as a dangerous weapon.
A “dangerous weapon,” as relevant here, is defined as a “device or instrumentality
that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death
or great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02 , subd. 6 (2016). “Great bodily harm” means
“bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement . . . or other serious bodily harm.” Id., subd. 8 (2016). To determine
“whether an object, even an inherently dangerous object, is a dangerous weapon, [we] must
examine not only the nature of the object itself, but also the manner in which it was used.”
State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1997).
Magee argues that he did not use the car as a dangerous weapon. We disagree.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the conviction, the evidence is more than
sufficient to show that the car was a dangerous weapon. Magee put the car in reverse,
slammed on the gas, sped down the driveway, and dragged O.S. for approximately 15 feet.
O.S., blocked on three sides, had no avenue of retreat. The nature of the car door, combined
with the speed and manner in which Magee dr ove the car, was likely to produce great
bodily harm. And it is the manner in which the object was used—not the injuries that O.S.
sustained—that determines whether the object is, or is not, a dangerous weapon. State v.
Weyaus, 836 N.W.2d 579, 586 (Minn. App. 2013).
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence , viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, is sufficient to prove that the manner in which Magee drove the car made it a

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dangerous weapon. As a result, Magee’s co nviction of second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.