Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC 814 N.W.2d 25
- Rowe v. Department of Employment & Economic Development 704 N.W.2d 191
- Skarhus v. Davanni's Inc. 721 N.W.2d 340
- Eley v. Southshore Investments, Inc. 845 N.W.2d 216
- Christgau v. Fine 27 N.W.2d 193
- Kangas v. Industrial Welders & Machinists, Inc. 814 N.W.2d 97
- Kennedy v. American Paper Recycling Corp. 714 N.W.2d 738
- Smith v. Masterson Personnel, Inc. 483 N.W.2d 111
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1866
Tami Kraker,
Relator,
vs.
CentraCare Health System Melrose,
Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.
Filed July 22, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 36339713-5
Tami Kraker, Melrose, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Lee B. Nelson, Anne Froelich, Department of Employment and Econ omic Development,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)
CentraCare Health System, Melrose, Minnesota (respondent employer)
Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman , Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, rel ator Tami Kraker challenges the decision of an
unemployment-law judge (ULJ) dismissing her unemployment-benefi t s a p p e a l a s
untimely. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator was discharged from her job at Centracare Health Syste m for “multiple job-
performance issues.” Relator applied for unemployment benefits with respondent
Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED). DEED mailed a
determination of ineligibility to relator on March 21, 2018, in forming her that she was
ineligible to receive unemploym ent benefits because she had bee n discharged for
employment misconduct. The letter notified relator that the in eligibility determination
“will become final unless an app eal is filed by Tuesday, April 10, 2018.” The letter
explained that the “filed” date is the postmark date, if mailed , or the date received by the
Unemployment Insurance Program, if transmitted electronically. The letter also informed
relator that “[t]he recommended method for filing an appeal is by internet” and that relator
could complete an appeal by logging into DEED’s online system a nd “following the
prompts.”
On March 30, relator attempted to file an appeal through DEED’ s online system
using a public library computer. However, relator did not complete all of the fields needed
to submit the appeal. According to relator, the computer’s tim e limit expired while she
was using the DEED system. While completing the online process , relator wrote down a
3
copy of the statement that she h ad entered into the computer, b ut did not mail or fax that
statement, or any other statement explaining her disagreement w ith the ineligibility
determination, to DEED by the April 10, 2018 filing deadline.
On April 25, 2018, relator phoned a DEED representative, who i nformed relator
that DEED had not received an appeal from relator—either on March 30 or any other date.
Relator then submitted a handwritten appeal to DEED by facsimile on April 26, 2018—16
days after the filing deadline.
A ULJ dismissed the April 26 appeal as untimely. Relator requ ested that the ULJ’s
decision be reconsidered. After receiving relator’s request for reconsideration, the ULJ set
aside the prior dismissal and ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether relator’s appeal
was timely filed. Another ULJ conducted the evidentiary hearin g. Relator testified that
when she attempted to submit the appeal online, she remembered “clicking through”
several screens while completing the information, but was never notified by the system that
an appeal had been successfully filed.
A f t e r t h e h e a r i n g , t h e U L J d e t e r m i n e d t h a t r e l a t o r ’ s a p p e a l w as untimely, the
determination of ineligibility was final, and therefore the ULJ did not have jurisdiction to
issue a decision on the merits. Relator requested reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed the
earlier decision.
This appeal followed.
4
D E C I S I O N
Relator argues that the ULJ erred in dismissing her April 26 a ppeal as untimely.
She argues that her actions on March 30 should be considered su fficient to preserve that
date as the date of a timely appeal.1
The timeliness of an appeal presents a question of law, which w e review de novo.
Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC , 814 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. App. 2012);
Rowe v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 704 N.W.2d 191, 194 (Minn. App. 2005). On review
of a ULJ’s findings of fact, “we will not disturb the ULJ’s fac tual findings when the
evidence substantially sustains them.” Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc. , 721 N.W.2d 340, 344
(Minn. App. 2006). We may affirm the ULJ’s decision or remand for further proceedings.
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2018). Alternatively, we ma y reverse or modify the
decision of the ULJ if a relator’s substantial rights were prej udiced. Id. We examine a
ULJ’s “findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision” to determ ine whether a relator’s
substantial rights were prejudi ced by (1) a violation of consti tutional provisions, (2) the
department’s exceeding its statu tory authority or jurisdiction, (3) unlawful procedures,
(4) errors of law, (5) findings not supported by substantial evidence, or (6) a decision that
is arbitrary and capricious. Id., subd. 7(d)(1)-(6).
1 Relator also makes arguments about DEED’s initial ineligibilit y determination
concerning her termination for employment misconduct, but because we do not reach those
issues in this appeal, those claims are not further addressed. See Eley v. Southshore Invs.,
Inc., 845 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Minn. App. 2 014) (explaining that scope of review in appeal
from summary dismissal of unemployment-benefits appeal does not extend to underlying
eligibility determination). The only question here is whether the ULJ erred in dismissing
the appeal, not the merits of the underlying appeal. See Christgau v. Fine, 27 N.W.2d 193,
199 (1947).
5
A determination of ineligibility is final unless an appeal is f iled by the applicant
within 20 calendar days. Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f) (2018). An appeal is considered
filed the day it is received by DEED if made by electronic tran smission or the postmark
date if submitted by mail. Minn. Stat. § 268.035, subd. 17 (20 18). “A written statement
delivered or mailed to the department that could reasonably be interpreted to mean that an
involved applicant is in disagree m e n t w i t h a s p e c i f i c d e t e r m i n ation or decision is
considered an appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 268.103, subd. 2(b) (2018). “No specific words need
be used for the written statement to be considered an appeal.” Id. All information
requested by the commissioner when an appeal is filed by electronic transmission must be
supplied or the communication does not constitute an appeal. Id., subd. 1(c) (2018).
If a party fails to file an appeal before the statutory time period lapses, the ULJ lacks
jurisdiction over the appeal and “must issue a decision dismiss ing the appeal as untimely
if the judge decides the appeal was not filed within 20 calenda r days after the sending of
the determination.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(c) (2018); see Rowe, 704 N.W.2d at
196 (stating that when a decision becomes final, the department is deprived of jurisdiction
to conduct further review). The ULJ may either summarily dismi ss the appeal or hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the appeal was timely. Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 1a(c).
The statutory deadline for appealing from unemployment-benefits d e c i s i o n s i s
absolute and unambiguous, and mitigating circumstances do not create an exception to the
statutory deadline. Kangas v. Indus. Welders & Machinists, Inc. , 814 N.W.2d 97, 100
(Minn. App. 2012); Kennedy v. Am. Paper Recycling Corp. , 714 N.W.2d 738, 739-40
6
(Minn. App. 2006); Rowe, 704 N.W.2d at 195; Smith v. Masterson Pers., Inc., 483 N.W.2d
111, 112 (Minn. App. 1992).
Relator argues that her appeal should be considered as having been filed on
March 30, the date when she attempted to file an appeal using DEED’s online system. But
the record does not reflect that relator successfully filed an appeal or that DEED received
her appeal on that date. At the evidentiary hearing, relator explained that she began filing
an appeal online, but did not com plete the forms on the screen allowing her to choose a
date and time for a hearing. The record supports the ULJ’s determination that those screens
would have been the screens immediately before the confirmation screen. Relator agreed
that it was possible that she missed the button that said “next ” after she completed her
appeal statement. She did not reach a screen that confirmed the filing of her appeal.
Relator did not complete the online appeal on March 30 and did not timely attempt
to file another appeal. DEED did not receive her faxed appeal until 16 days after the filing
deadline. As the ULJ noted, DEED had provided relator with cle ar notice that she must
appeal the ineligibility determination by April 10, 2018. That notice included instructions
on how to file an appeal online, by fax, or by mail. On this record, the partial information
relator entered online on March 30 cannot be construed as an ap peal. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.103, subd. 2(b) (a written statement that could reasonably be interpreted to mean that
an involved applicant disagrees with a determination is conside red an appeal). Relator
could have filed a written appeal after March 30 and until April 10. She did not.
Although DEED recommends online appeals, the online system may not be clear to
all users, and may not be the most effective system for all users. But the statutory deadlines
7
are clear. There are simply no exceptions to the rule. Becaus e relator’s appeal was
untimely, the ULJ properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to address relator’s appeal
on the merits.
Affirmed.