Sheldon James Armstrong, III, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1867

Sheldon James Armstrong, III, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 26, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CR-14-1392

Sheldon James Armstrong III, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary denial of his petition for postconviction relief,
alleging newly discovered evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2015, appellant Sheldon Armstrong was convicted of attempted first -degree
murder, kidnapping, second-degree assault, and motor -vehicle theft. This court affirmed
his convictions. State v. Armstrong , No. A15 -0924 (Minn. App. Apr. 18, 2016), review
denied (Minn. June 29, 2016). Two years later, Armstrong petitioned for postconviction
relief, claiming newly discovered evidence of “false/inaccurate trial testimony of many of
the state’s key witnesses” and “juror/jurors misconduct.” The district court den ied the
petition, and Armstrong did not appeal. In September 2018, Armstrong filed a second
postconviction petition, asserting that he ha s newly discovered evidence in the form of a
September 2016 Facebook message from the victim stating that he lied in “ blaming”
Armstrong and “a couple jurors helped,” and an April 2017 message with substantially the
same content. The district court again denied relief, reasoning that the claim is
procedurally barred and facially insufficient. Armstrong appeals.
D E C I S I O N
We review the summary denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.
Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018). A district court abuses its discretion
if “its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in
the record.” Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).

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If a petitioner’s claim was raised in a previous postconviction petition, or could have
been raised, the Knaffla rule bars consideration of the claim in a subsequent pet ition.
Doppler v. State, 771 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 2005) (citing State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d
737, 741 ( Minn. 1976)). A district court may deny a Knaffla-barred claim without an
evidentiary hearing. Crow, 923 N.W.2d at 10.
Armstrong’s newly-discovered-evidence claim is procedurally barred. He does not
dispute that he was aware of the claim when he filed his first postconviction petition .
Indeed, the language of the 2017 petition, while vague, appears to reference the September
2016 Facebook message. As such, Armstrong either raised his newly-discovered-evidence
claim in the earlier petition, or he knew of but failed to do so, precluding him from raising
it now unless the claim is novel or the earlier omission was excusable. See id. Armstrong
asserts neither exception to the Knaffla bar.
Moreover, Armstrong’s petition is facially deficient. A postconviction petitioner
seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must show, in relevant part, that
the evidence is not merely “cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful,” and that it likely would
“produce an acquittal or a more favorable result .” Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695
(Minn. 1997). If a petitioner fails to allege facts that , if proved, would satisfy these
requirements, a postconviction court may deny relief without an evidentiary hearing. Id.
Armstrong’s petition does not meet the Rainer standard. He contends only that the victim
acknowledged committing perjury by “blaming” Armstrong and receiving “help” from two
jurors. Nothing about these vague messages suggests that, if proved, they are likely to
produce an acquittal in a new trial.

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Because Armstrong’s postconviction petition is procedurally barred and fa ils to
present even a fact issue, the district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily
denying relief.
Affirmed.