In re the Marriage of: Gena Maria Kramp, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1874

In re the Marriage of: Gena Maria Kramp,
Respondent,

vs.

Clayton Henry Kramp,
Appellant,

Cass County,
Intervenor.

Filed February 10, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-FA-06-1591

John E. Valen, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kristian Lee Oyen, Savage, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
In this appeal and cross-appeal, appellant father and respondent and cross-appellant
mother challenge the district court’s ruling on mother’s motion for custody modification.
We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2006, the district court dissolved the marriage of a ppellant Clayton
Henry Kramp (father) and respondent and cross-appellant Gena Maria Kramp (mother).
The district court awarded the parties joint physical and joint legal custody of the ir minor
children, A.K., born in 2001 and now an adult; J.K., born in 2002; T.K., born in 2003; and
S.K., born in 2006. In 2007, the district court modified custody, grant ing father sole
physical and sole legal custody, based in part on mother’s chemical-dependency issues. In
2009, the district court once again modified custody, granting the parties joint legal
custody. Father retained sole physical custody.
In its fi ndings supporting the 2006 dissolution judgment and decree , the di strict
court expressed concern that father’s sister, M.M., had interfered with the parties’ parenting
in a manner that was not in the children’s best interests. Specifically, the district court
found:
[O]ne of the biggest impediments to joint custody may be the
interference of [ father’s] sister. Although she may have the
interests of the children in mind, the Court finds her skewed
viewpoint and aggressive beha vior toward the [mother] does
not serve the best interests of the children. Continued
interference with the parenting by persons other than the

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parties could be sufficient grounds to terminate any joint
custody determination.

In the 2009 modification order, the district court once again expressed its concerns
regarding M.M.’s involvement in family affairs. The district court noted that M.M. “has
continued to be excessively involved in the affairs of the parties and has at times sought to
sabotage the parent-child relationship between [mother] and the children ,” “has acted on
behalf of [ father] in legal affairs and has acted in the role of a substitute parent to the
detriment of the relationship between the children and their mother ,” and has “used the
children as pawns in an effort to control the affairs of [father] and the children.” The district
court found that “[t]he efforts of [M.M.] in seeki ng to minimize the contact by [m other]
with the children have impaired [their] emotional development.”
In 2018, mother moved for custody modification, requesting sole physical custody
of A.K. and T.K. Father opposed the motion, and mother filed an amended motion seeking
sole physical custody of all four child ren. The district court determined that mother had
made a prima facie case of endangerment and granted her request for an evidentiary
hearing.
On the day of the evidentiary hearing, the district court privately interviewed the
children individually to determine their custodial preferences. During t he hearing, the
district court heard testimony from mother, mother’s husband, mother’s sister -in-law, the
children’s maternal grandmother, father, and a county social worker who had investigated
a physical incident that had occurred between father’s girlfriend, S.B., and A.K.

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The district court also received an audio recording of a five-hour “family meeting”
with the children that occurred after mother filed the custody -modification motion .
Father’s sister M.M. led the meeting, in a purported effort to “fix the family.” The district
court granted mother’s custody-modification motion in part, relying heavily on the
recorded meeting, which the district court described as “a five -hour haranguing of the
children.” The district court noted that the recording was a “significant piece of evidence
because of what occurred during the meeting” and that the “statements made demonstrate
the environment in Father’s household had been bad for a long time.”
The district court’s findings describe th e “family meeting” in great detail. The
district court found that M.M. told the children that “she was providing a professional
service in her capacity as a social wor ker.” She described the endangerment standard for
custody modification “in an attempt to show [the children] that the Court [would] not grant
an evidentiary hearing” and that mother’s custody -modification motion was “illegal.”
M.M. had A.K. read out loud “what sound[ed] like [her] CV” and told the children that as
a parenting-time expeditor and consultant, she has “the same authority as a f----n’ judge”
and “exceptional” credibility with the court.
The district court explained that during the meeting, M.M.’s “unconditional support
of Father and her deep animosity toward Mother resulted in [her] either intentionally o r
carelessly misrepresenting facts and the law to the children” and that M.M. “impressed
upon the family her knowledge of the law,” but “repeatedly misrepresented the law to the
family.” As A.K. read an affidavit that she had prepared in support of her mother’s motion,
M.M. told the children that “the judge won’t accept the affidavit” and that “[n]o judge is

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going to believe this s --t.” To support her claim that she understood the law regarding
affidavits, M.M. told the children that she was a notary and knew “everything” about being
a notary. M.M. also said, “Sorry to burst your f ----n’ bubble again. Guess who’s not a
notary? Your mother.” M.M. told the children they were “not going to live with [their]
mom, ever” and that she would “rather see [them] in a jail cell every single day than at
[their] mom’s.”
The district court noted that M.M.’s “expletive of choice was ‘f-----g’ and she made
liberal use of it. ” M.M. repeatedly used that exp letive in her negative statements about
mother, telling the children, “I’m not a f ----n’ evil, conniving two-faced f----n’ b---h like
your mother,” that she was “sick and f-----g tired of [mother’s] s--t hurting other people,”
and that the children had “no f----n’ s--t ‘n clue what [M.M.] [had] been put through at the
hands of [their] Mother.” M.M. told the children that she had spent “sixty-thousand f-----g
dollars fighting” mother, that the children did not understand how much it would cost father
“to go to court” to “defend this,” and that the money “could be spent on something else.”
On the recording, M.M. is heard saying:
You guys did this, do you understand that? [A.K.], look
at me. Do you understand that? . . . Your dad has to go to court
on April 23rd. Do you know what it’s going to cost him to go
to court and defend this? Anybody have a clue what it’s going
to cost? Because he has to. . . . [T]he law says you must appear
in court. See it? [A.K.]? F-----g listen because you’re p-----g
me off! And you know what, I’m not [S.B.], I’m not going to
whoop your a-- and I’m not going to f-----g fight with you. I’ll
just sit here and make your li fe f-----g miserable. Own what
you done! The law says, you appear in court. [Father], you be
here. To go to court what does your dad need? An attorney
and $4,000 dollars, right? So once again, thank you [A.K.] and

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[T.K.] and [mother] for taking $4,000 away from this family
that could be spent on something else.

M.M. told the children that mother “is mentally unhealthy and unstable,” and that
mother “don’t give jack s--t about [the children].” M.M. also criticized A.K., stating that
A.K. had been playing “little junior f-----g mom,” and insulted A.K.’s efforts with respect
to her siblings. M.M. also told A.K. that she should feel bad for putting S.K. in the situation
of having to “go to f ----n’ court.” When A.K. defended herself and S.K. supported her,
M.M. became even more combative. For example, when A.K. expressed concern
regarding father’s inability to address the conflict s in his home, M.M. told A.K. that she
“would hit [her]” if A.K. w ere her child. The district court noted that based on those
statements, it was clear that “Father struggles to parent these children.”
During the meeting, the family discussed father’s girlfriend, S.B. The district court
found that the environment in father’s home had given rise to conflict between A.K. and
S.B., but that “Father was unable or unwilling to do anything about it.” Based on the
representations M.M. made about S.B. during the meeting, the district court found that S.B.
“has serious , untreated mental health issues” and that her presence in the home
“destabilizes the environment for the children.”
At the end of the meeting, M.M. told the children that they were no longer permitted
to possess anything mother had given them, except for cell phones. However, M.M. told
the children they could not use the phones to contact mother, were prohibited from talking
about mother and her family members, and that if they violated the prohibitions, they would

7
lose their phones until they move out of the house at age 18. Specifically, M.M. told the
children:
Material stuff from mom’s house, cell phones, material
items, all the stuff from mom’s house that toxifies this family
needs to be gone. There is no more discussing of mom in this
house . . . unless it’s a safety concern. If it’s a safety concern,
then we need to hear about it. Until that happens, you guys no
longer have permission to discuss her in this house during this
family’s time. That includes the drive down here, the drive up
there, school events. If it’s your dad’s time, we don’t want to
hear about it. Nobody wants to hear about it. Is that clear?

The second you are in your dad’s care it (cell phone)
becomes dad’s f----n’ property. That’s how the law works. If
your dad wants to take every one of t hose phones and smash
those f-----g things, he can legally do it and there is nothing she
can do about it. Anyone know why? Cause it’s in his
possession and in his home on his property.

Now, your dad and I talked about this. He does not want
you guys to not have cell phones. He can’t afford cell phones
right now. He realizes it’s a big part of your life, but there is
no more contacting m om on dad’s time. There is no more
snapchatting, there is no more calling, and there is no more of
any of that stuff. None. No more. If you want to talk to mom,
you may use the house phone and call her anytime you want.
That is the only thing he is required to do by the law, right?

If anyone violates the rule about contacting mother, they
lose their phone. Done. If your phone is used for inappropriate
things, to support the unhealthy stuff your mom does, what
does that mean? Recording stuff, taking pictures of things,
making drama and sending it. No phone.

The district court found that the “ban on possessing anything Mother has given
them, talking about M other or other family members, use of phones their Mother gave
them, [and] contacting Mother in any way, significantly endangers the children’s emotional
health and development.” The district court also found that “[a]lthough Father rarely spoke

8
during the five plus hour ‘family meeting,’ his instigation of the meeting and his failure to
intervene on the children’s behalf was harmful to the children.” The district court
acknowledged father’s testimony that “he thought it was not appropriate for [M.M.] to tell
the children they would nev er be in M other’s custody,” but the district court noted that
father “did not speak up” at any time when M.M. “emphatically stated the children would
never be in Mother’s custody.” The district court also noted that father thought the meeting
was a “good meeting” and “an effective way to cope with family issues.”
The district court reiterated its concern regarding M.M.’s involvement in family
affairs, explaining that despite its “repeated warnings about the negative impact [M.M.’s]
involvement was having on the children, [M.M.] was invited to Father’s home the day after
receiving Mother’s motion to modify custody .” The district court noted that M.M. was
aware of “the Court’s Orders in this case” and “the Court’s warnings to Father about her
involvement, yet [she] continued to interject herself into the family a nd between Mother
and the children.” The district court explained that “[M.M.’s] conduct shows that the
Court’s earlier warnings about the detrimental effect of [her] involvement with this family
were prescient, but compl etely ignored by Father.” The dis trict court summarized its
concern as follows: “Father’s conduct in both rushing to seek [M.M.’s] assistance despite
prior warnings from the Court, as well as Father’s acquiescence in [M.M.’s] statements
and conduct, establish [his] inability to recognize and prevent harm to the children.”
The district court concluded that there had been “significant changes in
circumstances,” explaining:

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The most significant [change] has been the breakdown of the
family unit within Father’s household to the point that the
children feel that Father does not communicate with them, does
not listen to them and that the family does not do anything as a
family anymore. The impression is each member of Father’s
household feeling isolated from the others, and F ather not
knowing how to improve the situation. Father’s effort to
improve his household was to call [M.M.] for help. This is a
choice the Court repeatedly warned him to avoid.

Another substantial change in circumstance is the
requested change in custody by two teenage children who have
declined in their academic endeavors while in Father’s
custody.

The significant changes in Mother’s life stand in stark
contrast to the decline in Father’s household. In addition to
having maintained her sobriety for many years, Mother has
made other positive changes in her life including obtaining her
Bachelors an d Masters Degrees, becoming Counseling
Supervisor of the CD program . . . , marrying and having two
more children . . . whom she is raising with her husband . . . .

As to the children’s best interests, the district court noted that both A.K. and T.K.
had expressed a desire to live with mother and found that their preferences were reasonable.
It concluded that the best interests of A.K., T.K., and S.K. would be “served by a
modification of physical custody,” but that given J.K.’s individual circumstances, it was in
his best interests to remain in father’s physical custody.
Regarding endangerment, the district court concluded that “[t]he children’s present
environment significantly endangers their emotional health and impai rs their emotional
development,” noting that “[t]he antagonism to Mother and instability in Father’s
household presents a significant endangerment to the children’s emotional health and
development” and that father had “taken no action to correct the problems other than

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bringing in [M.M.] in direct contradiction of previous Court warnings about the harm her
involvement could do to the children.” The district court reasoned:
The April 8, 2018 , “family meeting” that Father feels
went well consisted largely of [M.M.] yelling, swearing and
attacking [A.K.] and Mother. [M.M.] was dismissive of the
concerns expressed by the children, particularly as they related
to the relationship between Father and [S.B.]. The “family
meeting” was damaging for the children and sought to further
alienate the children from Mother. Involving [M.M.] was
harmful, yet Father continued to rely upon her to help with
parenting challenges. Father’s testimony regarding the “family
meeting” shows a detrimental lack of insight into the harm
caused by this language and behavior.

Father’s passivity is a significant concern. He says
almost nothing during the five -hour “family meeting.” At no
point did Father stand up for any of the children. That role is
filled on multiple occasions by [A.K.], who stands up to
[M.M.] on behalf of herself and her siblings. [A.K.] has been
forced into the role of parent because of Father’s passivity and
the parents’ inability to effectively communicate and
cooperate. Father must assume the greater weight of the
responsibility for forcing [A.K.] into this surrogate parenting
role. One of the positive consequences of this is that [A.K.]
has a close r elationship with [S.K.]. Separating [S.K.] and
[A.K.] would be detrimental to the wellbeing of both girls, and
it is important they remain together.

Father’s passivity is not limited to the April 8, 2018,
“family meeting.” Father acknowledges being aware of the
deterioration of the family environment and his significant role
in the breakdown of his relationship with the children. He cited
no strategy to deal with the decline.

. . . .

Given Father’s refusal to heed the Court’s past warnings
regarding [M.M.] and the negative impact she is having on the
children, there is no reason to believe he would operate any
differently in the future. There has been an ongoing, concerted,
aggressive, manipulative and threatening effort by [M.M.] to

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turn the children against Mother. This has been supported and
encouraged by Father to the endangerment of the children’s
emotional and mental health.

In determining whether the benefit of the change outweighed the harm to the
children, the district court concluded that as to A.K. and T.K., “it is clear that the benefit
of a change will outweigh the difficulties that are inherent in any significant adjustment,”
but that it was “more difficult” to as sess the harm for S.K. and J.K. The district court
determined that ultimately, S.K.’s separation from A.K. would be “more detrimental” and
that “the long-term benefits of a change will outweigh what may be a particularly difficult
short-term adjustment to Mother’s household.” The district court also noted that J.K. had
a strong desire to remain involved in his present school and that despite the environment
at father’s home, his academic performance had not declined. It concluded that the
“adverse impacts o f a change in custody for [J.K.] are greater than any benefit” and that
the “impact of the separation from his siblings can be mitigated by having the children
together on weekends and during the summer.”
The district court granted mother sole physical custody of A.K., T.K., and S.K., but
allowed father to maintain sole physical custody of J.K. The parties retained joint legal
custody of the children . Father appeals and mother cross -appeals, both challenging the
district court’s ruling regarding physical custody of the children.1

1 The district court also decided issues regarding child support and parenting time. Those
decisions are not challenged on appeal.

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D E C I S I O N
“Appellate review of custody determinations is limited to whether the [district] court
abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly
applying the law.” Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 ( Minn. 1985). The district
court’s findings must be sustained unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. “When
determining whether findings are clearly erroneous, an appellate court views the record in
the light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings.” In re Custody of N.A.K. , 649
N.W.2d 166, 174 (Minn. 2002). And “appellate courts defer to [district] court credibility
determinations.” Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000). In
reviewing a custody determination, the law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court
to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.” Id. at 477.
The district court may not modify a prior custody order unless it finds, upon the
basis of facts that have arisen since the prior order or that were unknown to the court at the
time of the prior order, that “a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the
parties and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.18(d) (2018). A party seeking an endangerment-based modification of custody
must show: (1) the circumstances of the child or custodian have changed; (2) modification
would serve the child’s best interests; (3) th e child’s present environment endangers his
physical health, emotional h ealth, or emotional development; and (4) the benefits of the
change outweigh its detriments with respect to the child. Id. (d)(iv); Crowley v. Meyer ,
897 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Minn. 2017); Geibe v. Geibe , 571 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. App.
1997).

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I.
Father contends that the district court abused its discretion in partially granting
mother’s custody-modification motion and challenges the district court’s resolution of each
of the endangerment-based modification factors . However, the majority of father’s
arguments do not assign specific error and instead presume that this court will reweigh the
evidence and find facts on appeal . As an appellate court, this court’s responsibility i s to
correct errors, not to retry the case. Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63,
68 n.2 (Minn. 1979). This court exceeds its scope of review if it “ usurp[s] the role of the
[district] court by reweighing the evidence and finding its own fac ts.” Sefkow v. Sefkow,
427 N.W.2d 203, 210 ( Minn. 1988). In addition, “on appeal error is never presumed. It
must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal. . . . [T]he burden of
showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546
(Minn. 1949) (quotation omitted). With those principles in mind, we turn to father’s
arguments.
Change in Circumstances
A change in circumstances under Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) “must be significant and
must have occurre d since the original custody order; it cannot be a continuation of
conditions existing prior to the order.” Geibe, 571 N.W.2d at 778. “What constitutes
changed circumstances for custody-modification purposes is determined on a case-by-case
basis.” Sharp v. Bilbro , 614 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2000).

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Father generally argues that mother relied on preexisting circumstances as support
for her motion, such as father’s use of inappropriate languag e, father’s pursuit of poor
relationships with women, and mother’s pursuit of sobriety and an education. But the
district court’s finding of changed circumstances was primarily based on the “breakdown
of the family unit within Father’s household, ” which was on display in the “family
meeting.”
Father’s brief acknowledges that the district court’s change -in-circumstances
finding was based on the “recorded five-hour family meeting.” Father complains that “the
District Court also noted in several pages equally incredible, sometimes dramatic and
grandiose claims that [M.M.] made in the presentation of the meeting, much of it
exaggerated beyond belief.” Father next summarily states that “[t]his Court should reverse
the District Court on its finding a change in circumstances has occurred.”
If father means to suggest that the district court erroneously weighed the recording,
his assignment of error fails for two reasons. First, this court does not reweigh evidence
on appeal. See Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d at 210. Second, the district court in no way
exaggerated M.M.’s officious and inexcusable behavior at the “family meeting.” The
meeting was recorded, the recording was m ade part of the record, and it wa s accurately
described in the district court’s findings.
In sum, the district court did not err in finding a change in circumstances.
Best Interests
“In addition to the substantial change in circumstances, the modification must be
necessary to serve the children’s best interests.” Gustafson v. Gustafson, 376 N.W.2d 290,

15
293 (Minn. App. 1985). In evaluating the best interests of the child for purposes of
determining custody, “the [district] court must consider and evaluate all relevant factors,”
including the 12 factors in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2018). In reviewing a custody
determination, the law “leaves scant if any room for a n appellate court to question the
[district] court’s balancing of best -interests considerations.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at
477.
Father does not assign specific error to the district court’s best-interests findings or
analysis. Instead, he presents his view of the children’s best interests and concludes that
the best -interests factors do not support the district court’s custody determination.
Essentially, father invites this court to reweigh the evidence and determine the best interests
of the children. We cannot do so. See Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210.
The district court properly considered and explained its reasoning regarding each of
the best-interests factors, including A.K.’s and T.K.’s desire to live with mother. See Minn.
Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(3) (providing that one of the best -interests factors the district
court must consider is “the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an i ndependent, reliable
preference”); see also Ross v. Ross, 477 N.W.2d 753, 756, 757 (Minn. App. 1991) (stating
that “[t]he choice of an older teenage child is an overwhelming consideration in
determining the child’s custody or in deciding whether he is endangered by preserving the
custodial placement he opposes” and that “[t]here is serious question when dealing with a
child of this age whether trial courts can practically contradict the ch ild’s choice even if it

16
was shown to be misguided”). We discern no error in the district court’s best-interests
findings and analysis.
Endangerment
“The existence of endangerment must be determined on the particular facts of each
case.” Sharp, 614 N.W.2d at 263 (quotation omitted). “Endangerment requires a showing
of a significant degree of danger, but the danger may be purely to emotional development.”
Geibe, 571 N.W.2d at 778 (quotation and citation omitted). Emotional abuse and isolation
from relativ es may constitute endangerment , id. at 779 -80, as may a custodial parent’s
efforts to undermine the children’s relationship with the noncustodial parent, Smith v.
Smith, 508 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Minn. App. 1993), or to paint a parent in a poor light ,
Newstrand v. Arend , 869 N.W.2d 681, 691 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn.
Dec. 15, 2015).
Father asserts that M.M.’s involvement with the children “does not constitute
emotional or physical harm .” He also asserts that because mother “provided no
psychological evidence or medical evidence that the children were harmed by [M.M.] ,” it
would be merely speculative “to conclude that the children suffered mental, emotional, or
other harm.”
On this record, it is not difficul t to understand why the district court found
endangerment based on significant emotional harm . As the district court determined, the
“antagonism to Mother . . . presents a significant endangerment to the children’s emotional
health and development.” Despite being aware of the harm, “Father [took] no action to

17
correct the problems other than bringing in [M.M.] in direct contradiction of previous Court
warnings about the harm her involvement could do to the children.”
Father contends that although the meeting was “approximately five hours long [and]
did contain some obscene language and insults directed toward [m other],” it “was largely
a constructive conversation asking the children to specify how they felt, and allowed the
children to provide feedback o n how their feelings could benefit from [father] making
changes in his actions.” The recording belies that description. However, father’s
inaccurate description of the “family meeting” supports the district court’s finding that
father’s “acquiescence in [M.M.’s] statements and conduct, establish [his] inability to
recognize and prevent harm to the children.”
Father’s lack of understanding regarding the children’s emotional well -being is
shown by his assertion that his conduct did not endanger the children because he “was not
the individu al who was disparaging [mother] ” and that there is “no evidence that
demonstrates that [he] and [M.M.] collaborated to script the dialogue in advance to
disparage [mother] .” As the district court noted, it had repe atedly warned father that
M.M.’s involvement could harm the children. Yet father opted to allow M.M. to confront
his children regarding mother’s motion for custody modification. The district court
correctly reasoned that the “ongoing, concerted, aggressive, manipulative and threatening
effort by [M.M.] to turn the children against Mother ,” which has “be en supported and
encouraged by Father,” endangers “the children’s emotional and mental health.”
Lastly, father argues that mother “failed to show that d eclining grades or school
attendance is somehow related to [father’s] conduct.” The lack of such evidence does not

18
invalidate the district court’s endangerment finding. As the district court reasoned, father’s
decision to subject the children to five hou rs of indefensible verbal abuse by M.M. in
response to mother’s motion to modify custody adequately establishes endangerment in the
form of emotional harm. One need not be a child psychologist to conclude that the children
were emotionally harmed not only by father’s decision to enable M.M.’s verbal abuse, but
also by his decision to sit as a silent witness to it.
In sum, the district court did not err in finding endangerment.
Balancing the Harms
Stability in custody generally is in a child’s best interests. In re Weber, 653 N.W.2d
804, 811 (Minn. App. 2002). Father argues that “the current custodial arrangement is
extremely stable and structured, has been so for approximately at least 11 years, and [is] in
the children’s best interests.” But when the status quo is more harmful than beneficial, a
change is warranted. Tarlan v. Sorensen , 702 N.W.2d 915, 924 (Minn. App. 2005). A
finding that a child’s current environment endangers the child can implicitly support a
determination that the benefits of changing that environment outweigh the detriments of a
transition. See Geibe, 571 N.W.2d at 778 (observing that “balance of harms” may be
implicit in other factors).
Father also argues that because “n o physical abuse occurred, the District Court
abused its discretion.” Father relies on two cases that involved physical abuse. See
Gustafson, 376 N.W.2d at 292 -93 (concluding that the district court did not err in
determining that there was a change in c ircumstances based on allegations that mother’s
boyfriend had sexually and physically abused the children); see also Leyh v. Stelzer, 398

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N.W.2d 63, 66 -67 (Minn. App. 1986) (determining that the child’s environment did not
endanger the child’s physical or emotional health in part because the child was not in
physical danger). Father’s reliance on those cases is not on point because this case involves
emotional harm. Having correctly found significant endangerment in the form of
emotional harm, t he distric t court thoroughly considered the potential impact of the
requested custody change on each child. We discern no error in the district court’s finding
that the benefits of a change would outweigh its detriments to A.K., T.K., and S.K.
In sum, the record supports the district court’s determination that all four custody-
modification factors support a change of cu stody for A.K., T.K., and S.K. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in granting mother sole physical custody of those children.
II.
In her cross-appeal, mother contends that the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to award her sole physical custody of J.K. Mother argues that “[t]his court has
not favored split custody as a general rule, and has supported the gen eral policy that the
best interests of minor children are usually served by permitting them to remain together.”
She complains that “[t]he trial court’s decision in effect elevated the importance of the
relationships between [J.K.] and his friends over hi s relationships with his siblings” and
that the district court’s approach “has no support in case law or in the statutory ‘best
interests’ factors.” She concludes that the “evidence as a whole clearly shows that all of
the children are better off if they remain together, and to separate them . . . constitutes an
abuse of discretion.”

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As a general rule, split custody is not favored , and the best interests of minor
children are served by keeping children together. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 215. “However,
the welfare of the child is paramount, and the decision to split custody is not conclusively
erroneous.” Id. The district court must make an individualized determination of each
child’s best interests. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1; see also Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452
N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1990) (“Split custody is not favored. Yet, . . . children come into
this world one by one, and in deciding their future, this, too, must be decided one by one.”);
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 215 (“Other factors . . . [may] outweigh the need for [siblings] to
reside together.”); Doren v. Doren , 431 N.W .2d 558, 561 (Minn. App. 1988) (“[W hen]
other factors outweigh the need for siblings to reside together, split custody may be
appropriate.”); cf. In re Welfare of Child of S.S .W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 731 (Minn. App.
2009) (citing to juvenile-protection and custody statutes and stating that in determining a
child’s best interests, “the district court traditionally considers the child’s unique
circumstances and individual needs” (emphasis added)).
The district court considered all four endangerment -based modification factors
when ruling on mother’s custody-modification motion regarding J.K. Even though the
district court found that “[t]he antagonism to Mother and instability in Fat her’s household
presents a significant endangerment to the children’s emotional heal th and development”
and that “[a]ll the children are adversely affected by this negative environment,” the district
court determined that it was in J.K.’s best interests to remain with father. The district court
noted that J.K. “has not requested a change in custody ,” that he “is an older teenage child
with two years left of school ,” and that he “has a strong desire to remain involved in his

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present school based upon social and athletic attachments.” The district court explained
that “[a]lthough there is reason to believe the environment in Father’s household has been
damaging to [J.K.’s] development,” the “adverse impacts of a change in custody for [J.K.]
are greater than any benefit ,” and the “impact of the separation from his siblings can be
mitigated by having the children together on weekends and during the summer.” The
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, because J.K.’s individual
circumstances were different than those of his siblings, father should retain sole physical
custody of J.K.
Once again, in reviewing a custody determination, the law “leaves scant if any room
for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best -interests
considerations.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 477. In this case, the district court properly
applied the relevant custody -modification standard, thoroughly considered the relevant
factors, and made accurate, detailed findings explaining its discretionary decision . We
discern no basis to reverse its decision to leave J.K. in father’s physical custody.
In conclusion, we commend the district court for making detailed findings that
clearly explain and support its custody decision and show its concern for the best interests
of each of these children.
Affirmed.