State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1879

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brian Dale Preston,
Appellant.

Filed August 5, 2019
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-17-3014

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, River D. Thelen, Assistant County Attorney,
Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and de cided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions for driving after cance llation—inimical to
public safety, driving while impaired, and possession of methamphetamine, arguing that
the district court erred by finding that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to
stop his automobile. Because the record supports the district court’s finding, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2017, Deputy Bender was monitoring traffic when appellant, Brian
Preston, drove past him. Deputy Bender was unable to read appellant’s vehicle’s license
plate number because it was obstructed by a dangling light. After getting close enough to
read the license plate number, Deputy Bender contacted central dispatch and learned that
the registered owner’s driver’s license had been cancelled as inimical to public safety.
Deputy Bender initiated a traffic stop. He then approached the car and recognized
the driver as appellant. Deputy Bender was familiar with appellant and knew his driver’s
license was also cancelled. Appellant was arrested . Deputy Bender then searched the
vehicle and found numerous smoking devices, marijuana, and an open container of
alcoholic iced tea. Appellant admitted to smoking methamphetamine six hours earlier. A
search warrant was obtained and executed, and appellant’s blood tested positive for
methamphetamine.
Respondent State of Minnesota subsequently charged appellant with driving after
cancellation—inimical to public safety under Minn. Stat. § 171.25, subd. 5 (2016); third-

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degree driving while impaired under Minn. Stat. § 169A.26, subd. 1(a) (2016); and fifth-
degree possession of methamphetamine under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2016).
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the stop was
not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion. The district court denied appellant’s
suppression motion because the obstruction of the license plate “was [a] sufficient basis to
stop the vehicle driven by [ appellant].” After a stipulated-facts trial pursuant to Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4 , the district court found appellant guilty on all three charges .
Appellant challenges the denial of his suppression motion, arguing that Deputy Bender
lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop.
D E C I S I O N
Whether reasonable suspicion exists to support a traffic stop is a mixed question of
fact and law. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 487 (Minn. 2016). This court reviews the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error, but reviews whether those findings support
reasonable suspicion de novo. Id. This court gives deference “to a district court’s findings
of fact and [this court] will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Evans,
756 N.W.2d 854, 870 (Minn. 2008).
When making an investigatory stop of a vehicle, a police officer must have
“‘specific and articulable facts’ establishing ‘reasonable s uspicion’ of a motor vehicle
violation or criminal activity.” State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 1981).
If an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, even one that is insignificant, there is an
objective basis for an investigatory s top. State v. George , 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn.

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1997). The district court found that the dangling light, which obstructed the view of the
license plate, provided Deputy Bender with a basis to stop appellant.
Minnesota law prohibits obstructing the view of a license plate. “The person driving
the motor vehicle shall keep the plate legible and unobstructed . . . so that the lettering is
plainly visible at all times.” Minn. Stat. § 169.79, subd. 7 (2016). In finding that appellant
violated this traffic l aw, the district court relied on a photograph of the license plate and
testimony from Deputy Bender. The photograph, taken at the time of the traffic stop, shows
a light dangling over the last three letters of the license plate. One letter is obstructed and
another letter is partially obstructed. Further, Deputy Bender testified that the light made
the license plate “difficult to see.” Because the record supports the district court’s factual
finding that the license plate was obstructed and this provided Deputy Bender with a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop appellant’s vehicle, we affirm.
While not material to our decision, we note in passing that t he district court stated
in its order that because Deputy Bender “did not observe whether the driver of the vehicle
matched the description of the registered owner ,” knowledge of the registered owner’s
revoked driver’s licen se was insufficient to support the traffic stop. This is incorrect.
Knowledge of a registered owner’s revoked driver’s license is enough to provide an officer
with a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle as long as the officer remains
“unaware of facts which would render unreasonable the assumption that the owner is
driving the vehicle.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1996) (emphasis added).
Affirmed.