State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1882

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ronald Jose Brewer, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed August 12, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-29093

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the r evocation of his probation for third-degree criminal
sexual conduct, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by determining that his
need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2014, appellant Ronald Jose Brewer, Jr. pleaded guilty to third-degree
criminal sexual conduct for vaginally penetrating a sleeping woman. The district court
accepted Brewer’s guilty plea and sentenced him in accordance with a plea agreement,
staying a 180-month prison term for up to ten years. This was a downward -dispositional
departure based on the parties’ agreement and the desire to spare the victim from testifying
at trial. The probation conditions required Brewer to (1) refrain from using alcohol and
controlled substances , (2) submit to a chemical -health assessment and follow the
assessment recommendations, and (3) successfully complete sex-offender treatment.
In March 2016, Brewer’s probation officer filed a probation-violation report after
Brewer tested positive for cocaine use and left chemical-dependency treatment. The
probation officer re commended that Brewer complete ch emical-dependency treatment .
The district court continued Brewer on probation with the same terms and conditions.
In June , the probation officer filed another probation -violation report , citing
Brewer’s arrest for a new criminal-sexual-conduct offense and fail ure to complete
chemical-dependency treatment. After a contested hearing, the district court found that
Brewer intentionally and inexcusably violated his probation by failing to complete

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chemical-dependency and sex-offender treatment. The district court ordered him to serve
365 days at a local correctional facility, complete chemical-dependency treatment while in
custody, and complete sex-offender treatment once released. Brewer completed chemical-
dependency treatment and entered the Alpha residential sex-offender treatment program
after he was released from custody. But approximately one year later, Alpha discharged
Brewer from its program.
In February 2018, the probation officer filed a probation -violation report alleging
Brewer failed to su ccessfully complete sex -offender treatment. At Brewer’s request, the
district court continued the evidentiary hearing so Brewer’s attorney could explore other
sex-offender-treatment options. In August 2018, following a three-day contested hearing,
the district court found that Brewer intentionally and inexcusably violated his probation .
And the court found that “[c]onfinement is necessary to protect the public from further
criminal activity by [Brewer] because he is an untreated sex offender and because he
continued to threaten other people, including residents and staff.” The district court
revoked Brewer’s probation, executed his 180 -month sentence, and imposed ten years of
conditional release. Brewer appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A district court has broa d discretion to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation, and its decision is reversed only if the court clearly abuses
that discretion. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249 -50 (Minn. 1980). Before revoking
an offender’s probation, a district court must find that (1) a specific probation condition
was vi olated, (2) the violation was intentional or inexcusable , and (3) the need for

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confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Id. at 250; see State v. Modtland,
695 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Minn. 2005) (citing Austin). In assessing the third factor, the district
court should consider whether (1) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity , (2) the offender needs correctional treatment that can most
effectively be provided in prison, or (3) reinstating probation would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violation. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607. Revocation must not be “a
reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251
(quotation omitted).
Brewer challenges only the findings related to the third Austin factor: that the need
for his confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. He argues that confinement
is unnecessary because he was not involved in physical altercations, did not engage in new
criminal activity, had positively progressed through three of the four treatment phases, and
other treatment options are available in the community. We are not persuaded.
First, the record supports the district court’s finding that confinement is needed to
protect the public. Brewer’s therapist testified that Brewer broke treatment rules and
threatened other residents and staff members on numerous occasions during the year he
participated in Alpha’s treatment program. His rule viol ations included threatening and
making hurtful statements to residents, selling items to residents , and charging residents
for haircuts. Eleven residents reported feeling physically or emotionally unsafe around
him. Brewer also had many verbal altercations with Alpha staff. On one occasion, Brewer
observed a staff member enter a password into a computer. When she asked him if he was
trying to obtain the password, Brewer became irate and verbally aggressive with her, then

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physically engaged a resident who tried to intervene. Following his termination from the
program, Brewer continued to harass Alpha staff, threatened to sue Alpha, and made false
accusations about staff members having sexual relations with a resident. And Brewer
threatened his therapist, stating, “I will get you bitch.”
Second, the record supports the district court’s conclusion that Brewer “is in need
of correctional treatment, which can only be provided if he is confined at the Department
of Corrections.” At Brewer’s request, the district court continued the probation-revocation
hearing for six months to allow defense counsel to coordinate Brewer’s admission into
another treatment program. This effort was unsuccessful. Based on the evidence presented
during the hearing, t he distri ct court found that no community-based sex-offender
treatment program is willing to accept Brewer. The department of corrections has a sex -
offender treatment program.
In short, t he district court’s decision to revoke Brewer’s probation was not “a
reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251
(quotation omitted). Brewer is a n untreated sex offender. Despite nearly four years of
considerable support from his probation officer and warnings from the district court,
Brewer has not completed perhaps the most important aspect of his probation for his
criminal-sexual-conduct conviction —sex-offender treatment. The district court fully
analyzed the Austin factors, making detailed supported findings that Brewer’s need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. On this record, we discern no
abuse of discretion by the district court in revoking Brewer’s probation.
Affirmed.