In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Brittani Lowling-Forler.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1884

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Brittani Lowling-Forler.

Filed April 29, 2019
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-PR-18-2707

Evelyn Schneider, Evelyn Schneider Law Office, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant)

Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Jennifer E. Ryan, Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges her commitment as mentally ill, argu ing that the district
court’s findings do not support her commitment. We affirm.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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FACTS
Appellant Brittani Lowling-Forler was judicially committed as mentally ill in 2009
in Massachusetts, in September 2017 in Itasca County, and again on February 26, 2018, in
Itasca County. On September 2, 2018, Lowling-Forler was hospitalized and, on September
3, she was placed on a 72-hour hold and entered a psychiatric unit where she underwent a
psychological examination. At that time, she was experiencing hallucinations and reported
that she was “at war over the last month and undergoing agony, suffering, and complete
torture.” A physician’s statement described Lowling-Forler as being unable to care for
herself, delusional, and disorganized. Alleging that Lowling-Forler lacked the capacity to
make decisions regarding her prescribed medications, Itasca County petitioned for judicial
commitment and the appointment of a substitute decision-maker. Following a preliminary
hearing on September 11, the district court granted Itasca County’s motion , appointed a
substitute decision -maker, and ordered that Lowling-Forler be confined until a
commitment hearing. The court appointed two examiners: Dr. Craig Stevens and Dr. Sara
Vaccarella.
Dr. Stevens evaluat ed Lowling-Forler and reported that throughout her
hospitalization, she was often delusional and paranoid. Lowling-Forler described the
hospital as a “looney tune rape house ,” where “male energy” made her sick. She reported
being tired of “crotch monkeys” and was unable to maintain a logical conversation. She
had multiple incidences of lashing out at staff members. Dr. Stevens found that Lowling-
Forler suffered from a “significant psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, [and] perception
which grossly impair[ed] her judgment, behavior and capacity to recognize reality.” And

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she exhibited a decreased ability to care for herself. Dr. Stevens recommended commitment
because Lowling-Forler was mentally ill , as defined by Minnesota statute . Dr. Stevens
opined that b ecause Lowling -Forler “d[id] not view herself as mentally ill or needing
psychiatric care, and ha [d] no desire to accept hospitalization voluntarily, there [wa]s no
appropriate lesser restrictive alternative to meet her treatment needs.”
Dr. Vaccarella al so examined Lowling-Forler and found that she presented with
“paranoid and delusional thought content, [and] disorganized speech and behavior.”
Lowling-Forler told Dr. Vaccarella that “she does not believe she is mentally ill.” Dr.
Vaccarella also recommended commitment because Lowling-Forler was diagnosed with
“schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type” and less-restrictive alternatives were inappropriate
“due to [] Lowling-Forler’s lack of insight into her mental illness and lack of adequate
discharge planning.”
At the commitment hearing, Lowling-Forler stipulated to the examiners’ reports and
asked to read a letter to the court. Following the hearing, the district court found that
Lowling-Forler was mentally ill , that less-restrictive alternatives were inappropriate, and
ordered that she be committed for no more than six months.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Lowling-Forler does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but argues that
the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact to support the commitment order.
She contends that the findings do not meet the requirements set forth by Minnesota’s civil-

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commitment statute , and that the court erred by ordering commitment without specific
findings that she was a danger to herself or others.
On review, we are “limited to an examination of the [district] court’s compliance
with the statute, and the commitment must be justified by the findings based upon evidence
at the hearing.” In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). We review the record in
the light most favorable to the district court’s decision, and will not set aside the findings
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
To support commitment, the district court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that a patient is mentally ill and there are no suitable alternatives to commitment.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (2018). Where commitment is ordered, the district court
“shall find the facts spec ifically, and separately state its conclusions of law.” Id., subd. 2
(2018). The findings of fact must “specifically state the proposed patient’s conduct which
is a basis for determining that each of the requisites for commitment is met. If commitment
is o rdered, the findings shall also identify less restrictive alternatives considered and
rejected by the court and the reasons for rejecting each alternative.” Id.
Here, the district court’s order reflects that, b y stipulation of the parties, the court
admitted the verified commitment petition into evidence and, by reference, incorporated
the contents of the petition as findings in the commitment order. Also, by stipulation of the
parties, the court admitted into evidence the reports of Drs. Stevens and Vaccarella and, by
reference, incorporated the contents of the reports as findings in the commitment order.
The court noted in the order that it had reviewed Lowling -Forler’s letter of September 11,
2018, and had heard a second letter written by her, which her attorney read to the court.

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The court noted that Lowling-Forler’s diagnosis was bipolar I disorder, manic, and it found
that the diagnosis was supported by Lowling -Forler’s conduct and medical condition, as
described in the verified petition for commitment. Based on the contents of the petition,
both court -appointed examiners’ reports, and Lowling -Forler’s testimony, the court
concluded the evidence was clear and convincing that Lowling -Forler was mentally ill, as
defined in Minn. Stat. § 253B.02 (2018). The court described various less -restrictive
alternatives to commitment , such as, dismissal of commitment petition; voluntary
outpatient care; voluntary admission to a treatment facility; appointment of a guardian or
conservator; or release before commitment, and the court rejected them because they would
not meet Lowling -Forler’s treatment needs . The court therefore concluded that the least -
restrictive alternative that met Low ling-Forler’s needs was judicial commitment to the
Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services.
We may review the record to find support for the district court’s decision. See Cty.
of Morrison ex. rel Gutzman v. Watland , 448 N.W.2d 71, 73 (Minn. App. 1989) (stating
that when appropriate factors were considered by district court, appellate courts may
independently review the record to find support for court ’s decision) (citing Bowman v.
Brooklyn Pet Hosp., 247 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. 1976)).
A person who is mentally ill is defined by statute, in pertinent part, as:
Any person who has an organic disorder of the brain or a
substantial psychiatric disorder of thought . . . which grossly
impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to
reason or understand, which is manifested by instances of
grossly disturbed behavior or faul ty perceptions and poses a
substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others as
demonstrated by:

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(1) A failure to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter,
or medical care as a result of the impairment; [or]
(2) An inability for reasons other than indigenc e to
obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical
care as a result of the impairment and it is more
probable than not that the person will suffer
substantial harm, significant psychiatric
deterioration or debilitation, or serious illness,
unless ap propriate treatment and services are
provided.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13. Here, the record contains substantial evidence of Lowling-
Forler’s inability to obtain food, necessary shelter, or medical care as a result of her mental
illness, and that she therefore posed a danger to herself . The examiners’ reports describe
specific instances of Lowling-Forler’s conduct that evidenced that she was mentally ill.
She repeatedly denied that she was mentally ill, and the evaluating doctors noted that this
denial rendered her unable to reliably care for her needs. According to Dr. Stevens, when
Lowling-Forler was admitted to the hospital, “she was in a very difficult condition
physically, had not slept in days, and was dirty and disheveled and was largely talking
nonsense. . . . it is quite unlikely that [she] could provide for her own housing, food, or be
able to interact with other people.” Lowling-Forler told staff that she wanted to burn down
her home, and staff observed her to have auditory, visual, and tactile hallucinations. Dr.
Vaccarella noted that Lowling-Forler was highly dependent on others to provi de for her
daily needs, and without continued support, she would likely decompensate.
We conclude that t he district court’s findings adequately support the commitment
order, including that Lowling-Forler is a danger to herself, and we therefore affirm.
Affirmed.