State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1885

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jasment Lamont Taylor,
Appellant.

Filed September 16, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-17-970

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Se nior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F . Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, J udge; and
Klaphake, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
On appeal from his convictions o f escape from custody, fleeing police in a motor
vehicle, and obstructing legal process, appellant Jasment Lamon t Taylor—who is serving
an unrelated sentence in Wiscons in—argues that the district cou rt erred by failing to
dismiss the charges against him because he was not brought to trial within the 180-day time
period dictated by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Because we conclude that Taylor
waived his right to challenge the disposition time period by failing to object when his trial
was scheduled beyond the 180-day period, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2016, a driver was stopped by a uniformed officer for speeding. The
officer approached the driver’s side window and asked the drive r for his license and
insurance information. Because the driver did not have a driver’s license, he provided the
officer with a paystub showing the name of appellant Jasment La mont Taylor and a birth
date. Upon contacting dispatch, the officer learned that Taylo r had an active Wisconsin
warrant. After an additional officer arrived, officers told Ta ylor that he was under arrest
because of the active warrant. When an officer tried to open h is car door, Taylor put the
car into gear and drove away. The two officers followed in their squad cars as Taylor drove
through downtown Rochester at speeds of 80 to 100 miles per hour.
After hearing about the car chase on dispatch, a Rochester pol ice officer set up spike
strips that would puncture and deflate the car’s tires. Taylor drove over the spike strips,

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resulting in a flat tire. When Taylor continued driving throug h a populated area of
downtown Rochester, the officers stopped pursuing the car because of safety concerns.
Taylor’s car was later discovered in the median of a road in d owntown Rochester.
But Taylor was not in or near the car. Inside the car, officer s found a Wisconsin
identification card with Taylor’s name on it and several other cards. Taylor was charged
with six crimes—felony escape from custody, fleeing a peace off icer in a motor vehicle,
obstructing legal process, reckle ss driving, failure to provide proof of insurance, and
speeding. And a warrant was executed for Taylor’s arrest in Minnesota and border states.
Several months later, in Novemb er 2017, the Olmsted County Att orney was
contacted via letter by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections , where Taylor was
incarcerated on unrelated convictions. This letter indicated t hat the warrant for his arrest
had been received and lodged as a detainer. Included with the letter was Taylor’s signed
request for final disposition of the Minnesota charges. 1 Olmsted County district court
received this request on Decembe r 4, 2017. And on December 11, 2017, the assistant
county attorney signed the pros ecutor’s acceptance of temporary custody offered in
connection with Taylor’s request for disposition of the detainer.
At Taylor’s first appearance, the district court appointed his trial counsel. The state
informed the court of Taylor’s detainer request at this hearing . And Taylor indicated that

1 A written request for final dis position functions as a request for the disposition of “all
untried indictments, informations, or complaints” that underlie any detainer lodged by any
jurisdiction within the state to which the request is forwarded . M i n n . S t a t . § 6 2 9 . 2 9 4 ,
subd. 1, art. III(d) (2018).

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he wanted “to remain here and not go back to Wisconsin until we get this matter resolved.”
At Taylor’s next hearing, he again informed the district court of his detainer request.
In April 2018, Taylor asserted his right to a speedy trial, an d though he was given
an opportunity to address other matters pertinent to scheduling the trial, Taylor declined to
do so. The Olmsted County Court Administrator issued a notice of hearing to both parties
on April 26, 2018, indicating that the jury trial was scheduled for June 11, 2018. This trial
date was reiterated when the district court issued a written pretrial order dated May 9, 2018
stating that Taylor’s trial was s cheduled to begin on June 11, 2018. And at the pretrial
hearing, on June 5, 2018, the district court inquired as to whe n Taylor’s detainer would
expire. Taylor’s counsel stated that although he did not know the exact date the detainer
would expire, he believed it would expire after the June 11 trial date.
On the first day of his trial, Taylor asserted that the trial was untimely because the
state had not tried him within the time allotted under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
After concluding that Taylor initiated the detainer, the district court determined that Taylor
waived the 180-day trial period because he had accepted the June 11 trial date and did not
raise any objection during the six-week period between the scheduling of the trial date on
April 26, 2018 and the commencement of the trial.
The jury found Taylor guilty of escape from custody, fleeing a peace officer in a
motor vehicle, and obstructing legal process. And the district court sentenced Taylor to an
executed term of 19 months for the escape from custody convicti on and to an executed
concurrent term of 21 months for the conviction of fleeing police in a motor vehicle. Taylor
appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact among 48 states, the
federal government, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolving one
jurisdiction’s outstanding criminal charges against a prisoner who is incarcerated in another
jurisdiction. State v. Dickerson, 777 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 30, 2010). Minnesota is a party to the agreement. Minn. Stat. § 629.294,
subd. 1 (2018). The agreement’s purpose is to require prompt d isposition of outstanding
charges so that persons incarcerated in other jurisdictions rec eive a speedy trial on those
charges. State v. Burks, 631 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Minn. App. 2001).
Under the agreement, “if a prisoner requests final disposition of out-of-state charges
for which a detainer2 has been lodged against him, the prisoner shall be ‘brought to trial’
on the out-of-state charges within 180 days after the request is received or the charges will
be dismissed.” State v. Kurz , 685 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn. A pp. 2004) (quoting Minn.
Stat. § 629.294, subd. 1, arts. III(a), V(c)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2004). And the
180-day time period is also subj ect to waiver, either personall y by the defendant or by
defense counsel. State v. Wells, 638 N.W.2d 456, 460 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 19, 2002). That wa iver is not limited to explicit or affirmative conduct, but
may also be implicit, such as when defense counsel agrees to a trial date beyond the 180-
day time limitation. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-18, 120 S. Ct. 659, 663-66 (2000);

2 “A detainer is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a
prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or
to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent.” Carchman v. Nash ,
473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3403 (1985).

6
Wells, 638 N.W.2d at 461. We review de novo whether a prisoner waiv ed the 180-day
time period under the agreement. Wells, 638 N.W.2d at 460.
Taylor argues that his charges must be dismissed because his ca se was not tried
within 180 days from wh en his detainer request was received by the prosecutor and the
district court. The district c ourt found that the 180-day peri od began on
December 11, 2017, indicating the detainer expired on June 9, 2018. Trial began two days
later. And the record shows that Taylor’s trial was scheduled for the June 11, 2018 trial
date on April 26, 2018, that Taylor received a notice of hearing, the trial date was reiterated
in a written pretrial order issued by the district court on May 9, 2018, and at the pretrial
hearing on June 5, 2018, the district court again stated the tr ial would commence on
June 11, 2018. Neither Taylor nor defense counsel, who were bo th present, objected to
that scheduling. Accordingly, we conclude that when defense counsel failed to object to a
trial scheduled beyond the 180-day period, the defense implicitly waived the agreement’s
time limitations. See Hill, 528 U.S. at 115, 118, 120 S. Ct. at 664, 666.
Still, Taylor argues that his defense counsel did not discover the violation of the
IAD until the day of trial. In support of his argument, Taylor draws this court’s attention
to Wells, 638 N.W.2d at 460. In Wells, this court determined that because “[t]he record
demonstrate[d] that defense co unsel repeatedly and willingly ac cepted treatment
inconsistent with IAD time limita tions,” the defendant waived s uch time limitations.
638 N.W.2d at 461. And Taylor asserts that because defense counsel did not know of the
IAD violation until the day of trial, no waiver occurred. But the record demonstrates that
if defense counsel did not know exactly when the 180-day period expired, the lawyer

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should have been aware the expiration date was approaching. On April 26, 2018, Taylor
received the notice of hearing for the June 11, 2018 trial. An d the district court issued a
pretrial order on May 9, 2018, indicating that Taylor’s trial w ould commence on
June 11, 2018. Further, at the J une 5, 2018 pretrial hearing, the district court specifically
asked defense counsel when the detainer expired and if the June 11 trial date would work.
Defense counsel responded that he thought the detainer expired “after that,” but he was
“not sure when the detainer [expired].” All three of these not ices occurred prior to the
expiration of the detainer.3 As a result, we conclude that defense counsel implicitly waived
the IAD’s time limitations. See Hill, 528 U.S. at 115, 118, 120 S. Ct. at 664, 666.
Affirmed.

3 Taylor’s detainer was also mentioned at the January 19, 2018 f irst appearance hearing
and the February 7, 2018 initial appearance hearing. Both defense counsel and Taylor were
present at these hearings.