In re Petition for Disciplinary Action

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-1890

Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Thissen,
Anderson, JJ.

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action Filed: July 22, 2020
against Michael J. Quinn, a Minnesota Office of Appellate Courts
Attorney, Registration No. 0089011.

________________________

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Binh T. Tuong, Senior Assistant Director, Office of Lawyers
Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Michael J. Quinn, Rochester, Minnesota, pro se.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. The referee’s findings that respondent attorney misappropriated client funds
and committed other misconduct are not clearly erroneous.
2. Based on the circumstances of this ca se, the appropriate discipline for an
attorney who misappropriated a client’s filing fee, failed to safeguard the filing fee, failed
to promptly return the filing fe e to the client, failed to ad equately communicate with two
clients, and failed to fully coop erate with the Director’s inve stigations is an indefinite
suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for 18 months.
Suspended.

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O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.
The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (Director) filed
a petition for disciplinary action against respondent Michael J. Quinn. The Director alleged
that Quinn misappropriated client funds, failed to safeguard client funds, failed to promptly
return client funds, failed to communicate with his clients, and failed to cooperate with the
Director’s investigations. We appointed a referee, who concluded that Quinn committed
the alleged misconduct and recommended an indefinite suspension with no right to petition
for reinstatement for 18 months.
Quinn challenges the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions that he committed
misconduct. The Director agrees with the referee’s findings a nd recommendation. We
conclude that the referee did not clearly err in her findings of fact or conclusions that Quinn
committed misconduct. We further conclude th at the appropriate discipline for Quinn’s
misconduct is an indefinite suspension with no right to petition fo r reinstatement for
18 months.
FACTS
Quinn was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in 1973. He had two past episodes
of discipline before this matter. In 2000, Quinn received a public reprimand for engaging
in the unauthorized practice of law while his license was suspended for failing to comply
with continuing legal education requirements and failing to pay his attorney registration
fees. In re Quinn , 605 N.W.2d 396, 396 (Minn. 2000) (order). In 2008, he received an

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admonition for failing to clearly communicate the basis or rate of his fee and expenses to
a client.
The misconduct here stems from two client matters and the Director’s disciplinary
investigations into those matters. In November 2012, R.F. asked Quinn to represent him
in a bankruptcy matter. Quinn and R.F. orally agreed to a flat fee arrangement for $2,106:
$1,800 for legal fees 1 and $306 for the bankruptcy fili ng fee. R.F. felt pressured by a
judgment for nearly $40,000 that Capital On e had against him and told Quinn that he
wanted to file a bankruptcy petition as soon as possible. R.F. gave Quinn a check for
$2,106 at that first meeting, which Quinn deposited into his Wells Fargo business account.
Given R.F.’s urgent request, Quinn intended to prepare the bankruptcy petition over
the weekend while R.F. completed his credit counseling—a necessary step to filing the
bankruptcy petition—so that Qu inn could file the petition the next business day. Quinn
completed the 50-page petition, but R.F. never returned to Quinn’s office; nor did R.F.
complete his credit counseling.
On February 11, 2013, R.F. contacted Quinn to notify him that he was interested in
negotiating a settlement of his de bt with Capital One, rather than continuing with the
bankruptcy proceedings. Quinn agreed to pursue a settlement, but the parties never
discussed or memorialized a fee arrangement for this additional work.

1 The legal fees here were to include mee ting with the client, pr eparing the petition,
attending a hearing, and any other action that would be required. Quinn stated before the
referee that preparing the petition is the “main legal work” for a representation like the one
that R.F. sought here.

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During 2013, R.F. sent a number of emails to check on the status of the settlement.
Quinn replied to some of these emails, but not all of them. In October 2013, R.F. sent an
email stating, “If you do not anticipate being successful [in settling with Capital One],
maybe we should just cancel our agreement and you can refund what I paid you less any
fees accrued.”
Then, in January 2014, R.F. sent another email suggesting that they “just pull the
plug on it,” and asked Quinn to refund any amounts owed and send an expense record.
Quinn replied, noting that he had completed the bankruptcy pe tition. Quinn also said he
would “pull the file” to check the records and follow up regardin g the amount owed to
R.F., but Quinn never did so.
In January 2016, R.F. again emailed Quinn, this time stating th at it had been “two
years” since Quinn stated that he would check his file and discuss a refund. R.F. offered
to settle the matter in exchange for a full refund. Quinn replied that he thought that he had
followed up with R.F. and offered to refund the filing fee.
By January 2017, Quinn still had not refu nded the filing fee, so R.F. filed a
complaint with the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility. In June 2018, after the
investigation had been ongoing and the Director had reminded Quinn to place the filing fee
in trust, Quinn refunded the filing fee to R.F. by check w ith “[r]eturn filing fee” on the
memo line.
The referee concluded that Qu inn failed to safeguard clie nt funds, failed to follow
up with R.F. as promised, misappropriated client funds, and failed to refund fees after the
termination of representation. According to the referee, th is conduct violated Minnesota

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Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4(a)(4), 2 1.15(a),3 1.15(c)(4),4 1.15(c)(5),5 1.16(d),6 and
8.4(c).7
In another client matter, C.L. retained Quinn to assist her in filing for bankruptcy in
2014. C.L. testified that, af ter the bankruptcy petition was filed, she did not hear from
Quinn for 19 months. During that time, Qu inn received the final report prepared by the
trustee and the notice that the discharge of debtors was granted in C.L.’s bankruptcy case,
but he never sent a copy of these documents to C.L. or communicated with her about her
matter. A sworn copy of the service lists from the United States Bankruptcy Court for each
document showed that C.L. received the documents. Quinn admits to relying on the trustee

2 “A lawyer shall . . . promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information . . . .” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(a)(4).

3 “All funds of clients or th ird persons held by a lawyer or law firm in connection
with a representation shall be de posited in one or more identifia ble trust accounts . . . .”
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a).

4 “A lawyer shall . . . promptly pay or deliver to the client or third person as requested
the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client or
third person is entitled to receive . . . .” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(c)(4).

5 “A lawyer shall . . . except as specified in Rule 1.5(b)(1) and (2), deposit all fees
received in advance of the legal services being performed into a trust account and withdraw
the fees as earned.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(c)(5).

6 “Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as . . . refunding any advance
payment of fees or expenses that has not been earned or incurred.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct
1.16(d).

7 “It is professional misconduct for a lawy er to . . . engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation . . . .” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c).

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and the bankruptcy court to send the necessary materials to C.L. The referee concluded
that this conduct violated Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(a)(3).8
Finally, Quinn failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigations into these two
matters. Between December 2017 and May 2018, the Director made four different requests
for Quinn’s bank statements concerning the R.F. matter. Each time, Quinn either failed to
respond or replied that he was still searching for the bank statements.
In June, the Director set up a meeting to discuss the investigation. The Director
asked Quinn to bring the releva nt bank records or bank info rmation so that Quinn could
sign an authorization form to release the records. Quinn brou ght some information
concerning his account, but not the statements. At the meeting, he also declined to sign an
authorization to release the records.
The Director sent another letter to remind Quinn of his obligations to provide his
bank statements, but Quinn agai n failed to reply. The Dire ctor renewed her request, but
Quinn did not respond. The Di rector ultimately sought a s ubpoena to ac quire the bank
records necessary to continue the investiga tion. The bank produced the records on
August 8, 2018, more than 8 months after the Director had originally requested the records
from Quinn.
Quinn also failed to timely and substantively reply to an April 25, 2018 letter from
the Director’s office concerning the C.L. matter. Then, after Quinn met with the Director

8 “A lawyer shall . . . keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter . . . .” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(a)(3).

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in June concerning his misconduc t, he failed to timely respond to requests for follow-up
information about the C.L. matter.
The referee concluded that Quinn violated Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct
8.1(b)9 and Rule 25, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR).10
The referee found that four factors aggravated Quinn’s misconduct: (1) his history
of prior discipline; (2) his failure to exhi bit remorse; (3) his substantial experience
practicing law; and (4) his failure to cooperat e with the public disciplinary proceedings.
The referee found no mitigating factors. Based on these conclusions, the referee
recommended that Quinn be indefinitely suspended with no right to petition for
reinstatement for 18 months.
ANALYSIS
I.
When a party orders a transcript—as Quinn did here—“the referee’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law are not binding.” In re Glasser , 831 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn.
2013). Even so, we give defe rence to the referee’s factual findings and will only reverse
them if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A referee’s findings ar e clearly erroneous only

9 “[A] lawyer . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from a[]. . . disciplinary authority . . . .”
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(b).

10 “It shall be the duty of any lawyer wh o is the subject of an investigation or
proceeding under these Rules to cooperate with the District Committee, the Director, or the
Director’s staff, the Board, or a Panel, by complying with reasonable requests . . . .” Rule
25(a), RLPR.

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when we are left “ ‘with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ”
Id. (quoting In re Albrecht, 779 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn. 2010)).
Quinn contests some of the specific f actual findings of the referee and her
conclusion that he misappropriated client fu nds. Taken as a whole, Quinn principally
asserts that he did not misappropriate R.F.’s funds for at least three reasons. First, he argues
that because he anticipated filing the bankruptcy petition the next business day, he needed
to deposit the filing fee funds into his busine ss account because he pays the fee with his
personal credit card. Second, he maintains that he had enough earned fees in his trust
account to cover the filing fee fro m the time he received it until he returned it. Third, he
asserts that he and R.F. discussed using th e filing fee for the extr a work performed in
negotiating a settlement w ith Capital One. The Director disagrees and argues that the
record fully supports the referee’s findings.
A lawyer misappropriates funds when “funds are not kept in trust and are used for
a purpose other than one specified by the client.” In re Taplin , 837 N.W.2d 306, 311
(Minn. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the record shows
that, without a written fee agreement, Quinn took a flat fee for a bankruptcy matter, which
included advanced legal fees and $306 for a filing fee, and de posited these funds into his
business account. Quinn prep ared but never filed a bankrup tcy petition for R.F. And on
many occasions between January 2013 and June 2018, the balance in Quinn’s business
account dropped below $306. Quinn therefore used the a dvanced filing fee for other

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purposes, which we have held amounts to misappropriation. 11 See In re Hulstrand ,
910 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Minn. 2018) (finding that an attorney misappropriated funds when
he deposited filing fees into a business acc ount and used the “filing fees for his own
expenses and purposes other than filing [the] bankruptcy actions”). Quinn’s claim that this
conduct is not misappropriation because he always had sufficien t earned fees in his trust
account to cover R.F.’s filing fee is unsupported by any evidence in the record and contrary
to the legal definition of misappropriation.12
Quinn’s argument that he earned the filing fee by doing extra work for R.F. in
negotiating a settlement with Capital One is al so unsupported by the record and our case
law. Although Quinn asserts that he and R.F. discussed using the filing fee to pay for the
additional work involving the settlement, he cited no record evidence that supports his
contention. In fact, the record contains an unsigned standard consultation agreement that
states that Quinn char ges $100 per hour for extra work . Quinn’s attempt to shift the

11 The dissent contends that we should not view misappropriation so technically and
instead determine that Quinn’ s actions only amount to on e act of misappropriation.
Important here, however, is that each time the shortage occurred, R.F.’s money was at risk.
Of course the risks are much higher when more money is involved, but in any event,
“[b]orrowing from client funds, no matter how temporary or no matter how seemingly safe,
is misappropriation and is not to be countenanced.” In re Fairbairn, 802 N.W.2d 734, 743
(Minn. 2011) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

12 Quinn’s argument that he deposited the filing fee into his business account because
he anticipated using the money the next busin ess day to pay the bankruptcy filing fee,
which required him to use his personal credit car d, is also unavailing. When filing fees
must be paid by credit card, “the better way to safeguard client funds [is] to pay the filing
fee from the attorney’s . . . business account with a debit card, and then use trust account
funds to reimburse the attorney for that payment.” In re Tigue, 900 N.W.2d 424, 430 n.7
(Minn. 2017).

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responsibility to R.F.—specifically, that R.F. agreed to the extra fees in a phone
conversation—is also unpersuasive. R.F. testified that the parties did not discuss a payment
of additional fees for trying to reach a settlement with Capital One, and the referee was free
to credit this testimony. See In re Walsh, 872 N.W.2d 741, 749 (Minn. 2015) (“We defer
to a referee’s findings on such matters as ‘credibility, demeanor, and sincerity.’ ” (quoting
In re Murrin, 821 N.W.2d 195, 207 (Minn. 2012))).
Moreover, we have previously rejected th e argument that an a ttorney should be
allowed to keep an advanc ed filing fee based upon quantum meruit . See In re Tigue ,
900 N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. 2017) (“[A]lthou gh Tigue may have be lieved that he was
entitled to keep the $400 filing fee under the quantum meruit provisions of his retainer
agreement, his testimony to that effect doe s not render the referee’s finding clearly
erroneous.”). The record shows no signed retainer agreement and the referee did not clearly
err in finding that the parties did not agree to an additional payment for Quinn’s work in
negotiating a settlement for R.F. The referee’s finding that Quinn misappropriated R.F.’s
funds therefore was not clearly erroneous.
To the extent that Quinn asserts othe r arguments related to C.L. and his
noncooperation with the Director, we find those unpersuasive and unsupported by the
record. Instead, the record supports the referee’s findings and conclusions concerning the
C.L. matter and Quinn’s noncooperation. We th erefore conclude that the referee did not
clearly err in any of her rema ining findings of fact or conc lusions that Quinn violated
various rules of professional conduct.

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II.
The parties disagree as to the appropriate discipline here. Quinn asserted at oral
argument that he should receive “something le ss than 90 days,” but the Director agrees
with the referee’s recommendation to indefinitely suspend Quinn for at least 18 months.
“The purpose of discipline for professional misconduct is not to punish the attorney
but rather to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct
by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” In re Bonner, 896 N.W.2d 98,
107 (Minn. 2017) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We consider four
factors in determining the appropriate discipline: “1) the nature of the misconduct, 2) the
cumulative weight of the violations of the rules of professional conduct, 3) the harm to the
public, and 4) the harm to the legal profession.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To impose consistent disc ipline, we also consider aggravating and
mitigating factors, as well as similar cases. Id.
“Although we give significant weight to the referee’s recommendation for
discipline, we are the sole arbiter of the discipline to be imposed.” In re Fairbairn ,
802 N.W.2d 734, 742 (Minn. 2011) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A.
We first consider the nature of Qui nn’s misconduct. Misappropriation is
“particularly serious misconduct and usually warrants disbarment absent clear and
convincing evidence of substa ntial mitigating factors.” Hulstrand, 910 N.W.2d at 442
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although “the misappropriation of
small amounts of money is [not ] somehow defensible,” we have said that “the amount of

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the misappropriation is an appropriate c onsideration in determining sanctions.” In re
Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 264 n.1 (Minn. 1997). Here, Quinn misappropriated a small
amount—$306—but his misconduct is serious nonetheless.13
Quinn also failed to communica te with his clients and fa iled to cooperate with the
Director’s investigation. Each instance is serious misconduct that independently warrants
discipline. See Hulstrand, 910 N.W.2d at 443; In re Capistrant, 905 N.W.2d 617, 620–21
(Minn. 2018). Particularly serious here was Quinn’s lack of respon se to the Director’s
request for his bank statements. The Direct or made four requests for Quinn’s bank
statements and requested that Quinn sign an authorization to release his bank information,
which he refused to sign. In fact, Quinn never provided the bank statements—the Director
only acquired them after issuing a subpoena to his bank. Quinn also repeatedly failed to
timely and substantively reply to the Director’s requests concerning information about the
C.L. matter.
B.
Next, we consider the cumulative weight of Quinn’s disciplinary violations.
Hulstrand, 910 N.W.2d at 443. We distinguish between “a brief lapse in judgment or a
single, isolated incident and multiple instances of mis[conduct] occurring over a substantial
amount of time.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation om itted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

13 Quinn also failed to safeguard R.F.’s f unds by placing the filing fee into his business
account, rather than his trust account. The dissent does not recognize that this misconduct
is also serious. See In re Eskola, 891 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2017) (noting that the failure
to safeguard client property is serious misconduct).

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Here, although Quinn’s misconduct concerned only two clients, he committed many
instances of misconduct over a substantial am ount of time. His misappropriation of the
filing fee occurred over more than 4 years a nd happened each time his business account
dropped below $306. During that time, he also failed to respond to several requests from
R.F. to refund the filing fee. In addition, Quinn failed to communi cate adequately with
C.L., and he repeatedly failed to cooperate with the Director’s two investigations over the
course of 8 months.
C.
We next consider the harm that Quinn caused to the public and to the legal
profession. In doing so, we look to the number of the clients harmed and the extent of their
injuries. Id. Here, two clients were affected by Qu inn’s behavior. R.F. was financially
harmed by Quinn’s misconduct. Although a relatively small am ount of money was
involved and R.F. was not permanently depr ived of his funds, it took the filing of a
disciplinary complaint and more than 4 years before Quinn refunded the filing fee. Quinn’s
harm to C.L., however, was minimal. His lack of communication did not affect the
substantive merits of her claim, and the reco rd shows that she did receive notice of her
bankruptcy discharge from the court.
The harm to the public in general and to the legal profession was substantial.
“[M]isappropriation of client f unds by its nature harms the public at large and the legal
profession, because it betrays the trust the client places in an attorney.” Tigue, 900 N.W.2d
at 432. Moreover, failing to cooperate with the Director’s investigation “undermin[es] the
integrity of the attorney disc iplinary system and weakens the public’s perception of the

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legal profession’s ability to self-regulate.” Hulstrand, 910 N.W.2d at 443–44 (alteration
in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
D.
In arriving at the appropriate discipline, we must examine whether any aggravating
or mitigating factors are present. See Fairbairn, 802 N.W.2d at 744. The referee found
four aggravating factors and no mitigating factors.
The referee first concluded that Quinn’s disciplinary history was an aggravating
factor. Prior disciplinary history is an aggravating favor, and a particularly weighty one if
the prior discipline was for similar misconduct. See In re Tigue , 843 N.W.2d 583, 587
(Minn. 2014). Quinn’s prior disciplinary history consists of a public reprimand in 2000 for
the unauthorized practice of law while fee-suspended and failing to comply with continuing
legal education requirements, and a 2008 ad monition for failing to clearly communicate
the basis and rate of Quinn’s fee and expenses to his client. Because Quinn’s disciplinary
history is not for similar misconduct, and be cause it is not recent, we do not weigh this
factor heavily.
Second, the referee found that Quinn “declined to acknowledge the wrongfulness of
his misconduct and exhibited no remorse.” Before the referee, Quinn did not acknowledge
the wrongful nature of his conduct or the impa ct that it had on othe rs, nor did he express
regret for it. Instead, Quinn attempted to explain his actions, and he shifted responsibility

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to others, blaming R.F., for example, for how long it took to refund the filing fee.14 See In
re Voss, 830 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Minn. 2013) (recognizing lack of remorse and the shifting
of responsibility as an aggrava ting factor). We therefore cons ider his lack of remorse an
aggravating factor.
Third, the referee found that Quinn’s failu re to cooperate with the disciplinary
proceedings after the Director filed her pe tition aggravated Quinn’s misconduct. An
attorney’s noncooperation with the public di sciplinary proceedings is an aggravating
factor. Hulstrand, 910 N.W.2d at 444 (“Although we cannot ‘double count’ the same acts
of noncooperation as bot h substantive misconduct and an aggravating factor, we may
consider a lawyer’s failure to cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings before the referee
as an aggravating factor.”). Quinn failed to reply to the Director’s petition and motion to
deem the allegations admitted. It was only after we deemed the allegations admitted and
the Director had filed a memorandum on the appropriate discipline that Quinn then
obtained counsel and filed a motion to reopen and to appoint a referee. But because Quinn
has since participated in the proceedings, we do not give this aggravating factor great
weight.
Finally, the referee considered Quinn’s substantial experience in the practice of law
as an aggravating factor. This determination is appropriate. See Tigue, 900 N.W.2d at 432

14 Before us, Quinn continued to state that others were responsible for his misconduct.
At one point during oral argument, he claime d that he thought a “girl” in his office had
taken care of the accounting for the R.F. matter.

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(finding that the attorney’s 40 years of pr actice was an aggravati ng factor). Quinn has
practiced law for over 45 years, the last 20 of which involve bankruptcy work.
The referee found no mitigating factors. Although Quinn now as serts that he is
“very remorseful,” has changed his practices, and prides himself on “doing a good job for
clients,” Quinn offers no record evidence to support these statements. No factors exist that
mitigate Quinn’s misconduct.
E.
Finally, we look to other si milar disciplinary cases to ensure consistency in our
decisions. In re Eskola, 891 N.W.2d 294, 301 (Minn. 2017). We recognize that, unless
evidence of substantial mitigating factors exists, misappropriati on typically warrants
disbarment because of its serious nature. Hulstrand, 910 N.W.2d at 442 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But we have also acknowledged that in “a few
instances [we have] imposed di scipline less than disbarment in a misappropriation case
when the record does not reveal substantial mitigating factors.” In re Matson, 889 N.W.2d
17, 26 (Minn. 2017).
In Tigue, we imposed an indefinite suspen sion with no right to petition for
reinstatement for 2 years on an attorney wh o intentionally misappropriated a $400 filing
fee. 900 N.W.2d at 430, 434. Tigue ’s misconduct also included negligently
misappropriating the funds of six clients and wa s aggravated by four factors: having a
disciplinary history for similar misconduc t; committing misconduct while on probation;
lacking remorse; and having substa ntial experience practicing law. Id. at 432. We
considered but did not place great weight upon two mitigating factors. Id. at 433.

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In Brooks, we imposed an indefinite suspen sion with no right to petition for
reinstatement for 2 years on an attorney who converted a $200 filing fee for her own use,
neglected two clients, failed to maintain tr ust-account books and records, and failed to
cooperate with the Director. In re Brooks , 696 N.W.2d 84, 86–87, 89 (Minn. 2005).
Brooks had also been disciplined on five pr ior occasions, three of which involved trust
account violations. Id. at 87. In deciding that disb arment was not the appropriate
discipline, we noted the lack of evidence of harm to clients. Id. at 89.
These cases are similar to Quinn’s. As in Tigue and Brooks, Quinn misappropriated
a single filing fee and committed other misco nduct, and several factors aggravated the
misconduct. But in Tigue and Brooks, the aggravating factors were more serious. Tigue
had been disciplined twice for similar mi sconduct and also committed his misconduct
while on probation, and Brooks had a more lengthy disciplinary history, including being
disciplined three times for similar misconduct . Tigue and Brooks eac h received 2-year
suspensions, 6 months more than the recommended discipline here.
Here, Quinn misappropriated only a small amount of money, wh ich he eventually
repaid to the client—although he took over 4 years to do so—and no other client was
harmed by his misconduct. Considering the nature and extent of Quinn’s misconduct and
the aggravating factors present, we conclude that the appropriate discipline is an indefinite
suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for 18 months.

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Accordingly, we order that:
1. Respondent Michael J. Quinn is indefinitely suspended from the practice of
law, effective 14 days from the date of this opinion, with no right to petition for
reinstatement for a period of 18 months.
2. Quinn may petition for reinstatement under Rule 18(a)–(d), RLPR.
Reinstatement is conditioned on successful completion of the written examination required
for admission to the practice of law by the State Board of Law Examiners on the subject of
professional responsibility and satisfaction of continuing legal education requirements.
See Rule 18(e)–(f), RLPR.
3. Quinn shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspension to
clients, opposing counsel, and tribunal s), and shall pay $900 in costs, see Rule 24(a),
RLPR.
Suspended.

C/D-1
C O N C U R R E N C E & D I S S E N T
THISSEN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the court that the referee’s findings that respondent Michael J. Quinn
misappropriated R.F.’s $306 filing fee, failed to communicate with C.L., and failed to
cooperate with the Dir ector’s investigation are not clearly erroneous. I disagree that an
18-month suspension is the appropriate discipline in this case. I would impose a suspension
of 6 months.
The purpose of attorney discipline is “t o protect the public, protect the judicial
system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as other
attorneys.” In re Bonner, 896 N.W.2d 98, 107 (Minn. 2017 ) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Quinn is being disciplined for his failure to (1) return $306
advanced to him as a filing fee to accomp any a 50-page bankrupt cy petition that Quinn
prepared over a single weekend but th at the client decided not to file; 1 (2) send a client a
copy of a notice of bankruptcy discharge that the bankruptcy court also sent to the client;
and (3) respond to several investigatory requests from the Director to provide a copy of his
bank statements. After reviewing the record, I conclude that an 18-month suspension is
excessive and not necessary to either protect the public fro m this attorney or deter future
misconduct which is highly unlikely to recur. I further do not see how Quinn’s conduct
seriously threatens the functioning of the j udicial system. Rather, such a lengthy

1 There is no allegation that Quinn di d not earn the $1,800 fee to prepare the
bankruptcy petition. In addition, there is no dispute that Quinn later pursued a settlement
of the client’s debts with the creditor at th e client’s request. Several years later, Quinn
refunded the $306 filing fee after the client filed a complaint with the Director.

C/D-2
suspension is punitive and that is not a proper purpose for im posing discipline. See id.
(acknowledging that punishing the attorney is not the purpose of discipline for professional
misconduct).
Nature of the Misconduct
Certainly, misappropriating client funds is serious—and the 6-month suspension I
support is serious discipline. Quinn was foolish for not simp ly returning the $306 filing
fee when first asked, even if he had thought he earned it for the ti me he spent pursuing a
settlement with the client’s creditor. This whole imbroglio could have been avoided. But
fairly viewed, this was not a nefarious scheme to defraud his client out of $306. As to the
failure to send another client a notice of bankr uptcy discharge, which was also sent to the
client by the bankruptcy court, even the Director acknowledges that the violation, standing
alone, would unlikely warrant any suspension. It cannot be enough fo r us to say that a
failure to communicate is serious without looki ng at the actual facts of the case and the
facts here point to a minor violation of th e rule on client communication. The most
concerning violation here was Quinn’s repeated failure to provide the Director with bank
records. This violation suggests that some discipline is necessary, but I am unconvinced
that these violations warrant an 18-month suspension.
Cumulative Weight of the Violations
Quinn accepted one $306 filing fee from one client and failed to return it for several
years. That is one act of misappropriation. The Director, however, wants us to transform
that one act into many instances of misconduct over a substantial amount of time because
the balance in Quinn’s bank account dropped below $306 on several occasions. That is an

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example of the kind of formalistic reasoning th at makes the public dislike lawyers. But I
agree with the court that we should consider Quinn’s repeated failure to cooperate with the
Director over an 8-month period of time.
Harm to the Public and the Legal Profession
One of Quinn’s clients was harmed because, for several years, the client was left
without $306. In assessing disc ipline, it is appropriate to c onsider that harm, including a
realistic assessment of the impact that the missing $306 had on Quinn’s client. As the court
notes, Quinn’s other client was not harmed by the failure to fo rward the notice of
bankruptcy discharge.
The court considers the failure to return the $306 filing fee “substantial harm” to the
public and the legal profession. While I agree that we cannot overturn the referee’s findings
of misappropriation here as clearly erroneous, I also submit that if you told a Minnesotan
sitting in a café or paddling across a lake th e story of what happened here, she would not
characterize the misconduct as substantial and it would likely not change her trust in the
legal profession. On the other hand, failing to cooperate with the Director’s investigation
undermines the ability of the legal profession to self-regulate.
Aggravating Factors
I agree with the court that Quinn’s discip linary history is relevant but does not weigh
heavily. I also agree that Quinn’s long experience in th e area of bankruptcy work is a
relevant aggravating factor on the facts of this case. But I disagree that Quinn’s failure to
file an answer to the Director’s petition and a response to the Dir ector’s motion to deem
the allegations in the petition admitted may be used to enhance discipline for the reasons

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stated in my concurrence in In re Nelson , 933 N.W.2d 73, 76–77 (Minn. 2019) (order)
(Thissen, J., concurring).
I also disagree with the referee’s legal conclusion that Quinn’s discipline should be
enhanced because he “declined to acknowled ge the wrongfulness of his misconduct and
exhibited no remorse.” The court reasons th at we should discipline Quinn more harshly
than other lawyers who may have engaged in the same misconduct because Quinn did not
concede that he violated the Rules in the di sciplinary proceeding but rather attempted to
explain his actions and apportion responsibility to others while defending himself.
We live in a nuanced world and it is basic human nature to want to explain oneself.
Indeed, it is one of the reasons we hold heari ngs. We are disciplining Quinn for what the
referee ultimately determined to be violations of the Rules of Professional Responsibility.
Should his discipline for those violations also be enhanced because Quinn tried to defend
himself?
I find it troubling from a due-process pers pective that the court is imposing
a harsher sanction on a lawyer for asse rting in an official pleading a good-
faith defense. We should not abide by a system that disciplines a person
more harshly for defending himself agai nst the power of a State actor, but
should put the burden where it properly rests.

In re Sea, 932 N.W.2d 28, 45 (Minn. 2019) (Thissen, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

ANDERSON, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Thissen.