David Allen Caroon, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1893

David Allen Caroon, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 28, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-06-6378

David A. Caroon, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Gary W. Bjorklund, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
David Allen Caroon is serving a 20 -year sentence for conspiracy to commit first -
degree murder. At his sentencing hearing in 2007, the district court awarded him 342 days
of jail credit. In 2018, Caroon filed a motion seeking an additional 303 days of jail credit.

2
The district court denied the motion. We conclude that Caroon is not entitled to additional
jail credit and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS
In April 2006, the state charged Caroon with three counts of harassment and
stalking, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subds. 2, 5 (2004). Caroon was detained in
the St. Louis County jail pending trial. On September 10, 2006, a nother inmate informed
a law enforcement officer that Caroon had offered to pay him $10,000 to murder Caroon’s
former wife or girlfriend. On September 14, 2006, a law enforcement officer met with the
other inmate and equipped him with a hidden microphone. Later that day, the other inmate
and Caroon had a conversation, which was record ed, in which Caroon attempted to hire
the other inmate to murder Caroon’s former wife or girlfriend and suggested ways of doing
so.
On Octobe r 6, 2006, the state charged Caroon with conspiracy to commit first -
degree murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.175, subd. 2(2), .185(a)(1) (2006).
Caroon was detained pending trial. In July 2007, a jury found him guilty. On August 20,
2007, the district court imposed a sentence of 240 months of imprisonment, with credit for
342 days in custody between the date of the recorded conversation, September 14, 2006,
and the date of the sentencing hearing. On appeal, Caroon sought a new trial but did not
challenge his sentence. T his court affirmed. See State v. Caroon , No. A07 -2011, 2009
WL 112859 (Minn. App. Jan. 20, 2009), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). Caroon
later sought post -conviction relief but was unsuccessful. See Caroon v. Stat e, No. A12 -
0552, 2012 WL 4774674 (Minn. App. Oct. 9, 2012), review denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 2013).

3
In May 2018, Caroon filed a pro se motion seeking an additional 303 days of jail
credit. We construe the motion to be a motion to correct sentence. See Minn. R. Crim. P.
27.03, subd. 9. In October 2018, the district court denied the motion. Caroon appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Caroon argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for additional jail
credit.
“A criminal defendant is entitled to jail credit for time spent in custody in connection
with the offense or behavior al incident being sentenced.” State v. Clarkin , 817 N.W.2 d
678, 687 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B).
A defendant may, in certain circu mstances, be entitled to jail credit for time spent in
custody on another charge before he was charged with the offense of conviction. State v.
Folley, 438 N.W.2d 372, 374 -75 (Minn. 1989). Specifically, a defendant in custody on
another charge is entitled to jail credit toward a sentence on a subsequent conviction for
any period of time in which
(1) the State has completed its investigation in a manner that
does not suggest manipulation by the State, and (2) the State
has probable cause and sufficient evidence to prosecute its case
against the defendant with a reasonable likelihood of actually
convicting the defendant of the offense for which he is charged.

Clarkin, 817 N.W.2d at 689. “The defendant has the burden of establishing t hat he is
entitled to jail credit for any specific period of time.” Id. at 687. Whether a defendant is
entitled to jail credit is a mixed question of fact and law. Id. This court applies a clear -
error standard of review to a district court’s findings of fact relevant to jail credit and a de
novo standard of review to a district court’s legal analysis. Id.

4
In this case, a t the August 20, 2007 sentencing hearing, the district court awarded
Caroon jail credit for the entire time period between the date of the recorded conversation,
September 14, 2006, and the date of the sentencing hearing . In denying Caroon’s motion
in October 2018, the district court found that the state acquired probable cause to prosecute
Caroon for conspiracy to commit first -degree murder on September 14, 2006, and noted
that he had not argued that the state had manipulated the timing of the completion of its
investigation. The district court reasoned that the time periods for which Caroon seeks
additional jail credit—March 20, 2005 to July 28, 2005, and April 23, 2006 to September
13, 2006—are clearly before the date on which the state acquired probable cause to charge
Caroon with the offense of which he was convicted.
Caroon contends on appeal that he is entitled to an additional 303 days of jail credit
for time he spent in custody before the state recorded his conversation with another inmate
on September 14, 2006. But he does not challenge the district court’s finding that the state
acquired probable cause to prosecute him on September 14, 2006, and he does not contend
that the s tate manipulated the timing of the completion of its investigation. He simply
contends that he should receive jail credit for a time period in 2005 during which he was
detained on an alleged probation violation in Hennepin County and for the time period in
2006 during which he was detained in St. Louis County on the harassment and stalking
charges. But those time periods are almost entirely before he even committed the crime of
conspiring to commit first-degree murder. And, as stated above, Caroon does not contend
that the state acquired probable cause to prosecute him on September 10, 2006, instead of
September 14, 2006.

5
Caroon’s argument is inconsistent with well-established caselaw. The district court
did not err in its sole finding of fact and properly applied the well-established caselaw.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Caroon’s motion seeking additional jail
credit.
Affirmed.