In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: N. E. J. and M. D. H., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1900

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: N. E. J. and M. D. H., Parents.

Filed April 15, 2019
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-18-600

Jason Steck, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant M.D.H.)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kathryn M. Timm, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Anoka County Social Services)

Jena Schuler, Ramsey, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order terminating his parental rights .
Because the record supports the district court’s findings that a statutory ground for
termination exists and termination is in the children’s best interests, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant M.D.H. (father) and N.E.J. (mother) are the biological parents of two
sons, R.J.H., born May 2011, and D.K.H., born July 2012. Father and mother never

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married, and father was granted sole legal and sole physical custody of the two boys in
May 2013.
In a pproximately May 2014, father began residing with K.M.B., who had twin
daughters, born in January 2010. Father and K.M.B. had a daughter, K.B.H., born in April
2016. At the commencement of these proceedings, father, R.J.H., D.K.H., K.M.B., K.B.H.,
and K.M.B.’s twin daughters resided together.
On December 21, 2017, respondent Anoka County Social Services (county) filed a
petition, alleging that R.J.H. and D.K.H. were in need of protection or services (CHIPS).
On January 3, 2018, the county filed an amended CHIPS petition, alleging that the children
were placed on a 72 -hour police hold on December 18, 2017, following an incident in
which K.M.B. stabbed father during an argument while the children were present.
According to the amended CHIPS petition, three teenaged children, who were residing with
father and K.M.B., stated that the couple “argued the previous evening” because father had
been “using ‘dope,’” and that the argument continued the next day, culminating in father’s
stabbing. The amended petition also alleged that father and K.M.B. have an extensive
history of domestic violence and abuse of controlled substances, and that father and K.M.B.
acknowledged that they had recently used methamphetamine.
Following an uncontested facts trial on January 18, 2018, the district court
adjudicated R.J.H. and D.K.H. CHIPS and ordered father to comply with a case plan.
Father’s case plan required him to address chemical-dependency and psychological issues,
attend parenting classes, refrain from using controlled substances, and submit at least two

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UA’s per week. The primary purposes of the case plan were for father to achieve sobriety
and improve his mental health to enhance his understanding of his sons’ needs.
On May 9, 2018, the county filed a petition to terminate father’s and mother ’s
parental rights (TPR) to R.J.H. and D.K.H. under Minn. S tat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)
(2018).1 The TPR petition alleged the following four statutory bases for termination: (1) the
parents substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the
duties imposed upon them by the parent and child relationship; (2) the parents are palpably
unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship; (3) reasonable efforts under the
direction of the district court, following the children’s placement out of the home, have
failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home placement; and (4) the children
are neglected and in foster care. After mother’s voluntary termination of her parental rights
to R.J.H. and D.K.H., the matter proceed ed solely on the county’s petition to terminate
father’s parental rights to R.J.H. and D.K.H.
At trial, the following witnesses testified for the county: social worker Krista Bean;
guardian ad litem (GAL) Jena Schuler; psychologist Dr. Stephanie Bruss; parenting -
assessment therapist Jennifer Itskovich; Maple Grove Police Officer Aaron Schonning;
parenting educator Sue Haugen; chemical -treatment counselors Chasidy Chamberlin and
Joshua Wedeneier; mental -health practitioners Kaitlin Martiny and Nate Vojtech; family
therapist Claire Baumgartner; Joel Marquette, foster dad of R.J.H. and D.K.H.; and clinical

1 Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights and is not a party to this appeal. K.B.H.,
the child born to father and K.M.B., is not part of these proceedings.

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psychologist Dr. Gabe Watson. Witnesses for father included father, his parents, K.M.B.,
K.M.B.’s mother, and Stephanie Boeckel, a mutual friend of father and K.M.B.
Based upon witness testimo ny, along with the exhibits entered into evidence, the
district court concluded that the county proved by clear and convincing evidence all four
statutory grounds for termination of father’s parental rights. The court found that father
“has demonstrated that he does not have the capacity to parent or to engage in exhaustive
efforts to improve his ability to parent.” The court also found that father had an “extensive
history of chemical use, addiction, domestic violence between him and [K.M.B.], inability
to follow Court orders, inability to remain sober, and arrests.” The court further noted that
father “has demonstrated a lack of concern or awareness of his children’s” mental -health
issues. Finally, the court determined that it “is in the best interest of [R.J.H.] and [D.K.H.]
that the parental rights of [father] be terminated.” The court therefore granted the county’s
petition to terminate father’s parental rights to R.J.H. and D.K.H.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
The decision to terminate parental r ights is discretionary with the district court. In
re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 –37 (Minn. 2014). We review “the
termination of parental rights to determine whether the district court’s findings address the
statutory criteria and whether the district court’ s findings are supported by substantial
evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 2008) . A factual finding is clearly erroneous “if it is either manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a

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whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 –61 (Minn. 2008)
(quotation omitted). This court will affirm the termination of parental rights if clear and
convincing evidence supports at least one statutory ground for termination, termination is
in the best interests of the child, and the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family. In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005).
I. Statutory bases for termination of father’s parental rights
The district court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported
termination of father’s parental rights under four statutory grounds: (A) following the
children’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court
have failed to correct the conditions leading to the placement, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5); (B) neglecting to comply with the duties imposed upon him by the parent -
child relationship, Minn. St at. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) ; (C) that father is palpably unfit
to be a party to the parent -child relationship, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) ; and
(D) the children are neglected and in foster care, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8).
Father challenges the adequacy of the evidence and the court’s findings in support of the
statutory grounds for terminating his parental rights.
A. Reasonable efforts, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)
Father argues that the district court erred by terminating his parental rights under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). A district court may terminate parental rights under
that section if clear and convincing evidence shows that reasonable efforts, under the
direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out -of-
home placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). The law presumes that reasonable

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efforts have failed upon a showing that (1) a child under age eight has resided outside the
parental home for six months, (2) the court has approved an out -of-home placement plan,
(3) the conditions leading to the child’ s out-of-home placement have not been corrected,
and (4) the social services agency made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunite the
family. Id. Father disputes only element four.2
During a TPR proceeding, the district court must make specific findings that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, including findings regarding the
nature and extent of the efforts. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2018) . Reasonable
efforts are “services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine
assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W. , 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007)
(quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). The services offered must be:
“(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the
child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and
timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2018) .
“Whether the county has met its duty of reasonable efforts requires consideration of the
length of time the county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of
H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). What
constitutes “reasonable efforts” depends on the facts of each case. In re Welfare of S.Z. ,
547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996).

2 Because Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) , requires a reasonable-efforts analysis as
part of the statutory basis for termination of parental rights, we do no t provide a separate
analysis of the county’s reunification efforts.

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Here, the district court determined that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify
father with his children. To support this determination, the court found that the county’s
reunification efforts were premised on father’s completion of a case plan dated January 18,
2018. The court found that the case plan required father to “undertake a psychological
evaluation, attend and successfully complete individual therapy . . . , attend and
successfully complete parenting education . . . , and undergo a parenting assessment and
follow all recommendati ons.” The court also found that the case plan required father to
“undertake a chemical dependency evaluation, remain chemical free, take a least two UAs
per week, and remain law abiding.” The court determined that these services offered by the
county satis fied the requirements of section 260.12(h), but that despite the services
provided, “reunification is not a viable option because the conditions that lead to the out -
of-home placement have not been adequately corrected.”
Father argues that the county’s reunification efforts were not reasonable under the
circumstances because, although domestic violence was identified “as the proximate cause
of both the children’s trauma and their removal from the home,” the county “intentionally
and repeatedly refused to provide domestic-violence services.” As the district court found,
and we acknowledge, father and K.M.B.’s “history of domestic violence” was a “primary”
reason for the removal of the children. But the court also found that father’s
methamphetamine use was the other “primary” reason for the children’s removal from the
home. In fact, the fight between father and K.M.B., which ultimately led to father’s
stabbing and the removal of the children from the home, started because K.M.B. was upset
at father for being “out ‘getting high.’” The court found that in light of father’s chemical

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dependency issues, “the primary purposes of the case plan ” were for father to achieve
sobriety and improve his mental health to enhance his understanding of the specialized
needs of his sons. The court also found that a case plan addressing father’s chemical
dependency “was designed to be the platform” for father and K.M.B. “to overcome thei r
history of domestic violence.”
The district court’s findings are supported by the record. Social worker Bean
testified that the county recognized the domestic -abuse issues in the relationship between
father and K.M.B. but stated that “we really felt it was important that they address their
individual [mental -health] needs before they try to work together.” Bean testified that
although father and K.M.B. did a “couple of sessions of couples counseling . . . it wasn’t
something that was court ordered” becau se she “wanted [father] to be drug free and then
work on his mental health, get those two things established before he worked on his
relationship with [K.M.B.].” Indeed, the record reflects that father’s history of using
chemicals is extensive, which is demonstrated in his psychological evaluation during which
he reported that he began using marijuana at the age of eight. He also reported “recently”
using methamphetamine, and a “history of using alcohol, marijuana, synthetic marijuana,
cocaine, methamphetamine, ecstasy, ‘acid,’ hallucinogenic mushrooms, inhalants, cough
medicine, and abusing prescription pain medications.” Thus, as the court found, it was
“appropriate” for the county to focus the case plan on father’s chemical dependency “given
[father’s] history of chemical use and the familial history with his children and [mother].”
Moreover, the case plan specifically required father to communicate with K.M.B.
“respectfully and fre e from verbal and physical violence .” The case plan also required

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father to “[e]ngage in family therapy services” and work on his “family ski lls” with
Haugen, who provides “parent education and skills work with families” for the county.
These services were aimed, either directly or indirectly, at addressing the domestic -
violence issues in the home. The family -therapy and chemical-dependency services were
relevant and consistent with the needs of the family. And the services addressing father’s
chemical usage were directly aimed at correcting the conditions which led to the out-of-
home placement. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012)
(stating that reasonable efforts must be aimed at correcting conditions which led to out-of-
home placement). The district court therefore did not err by determining that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Because the county made reasonable efforts
to reunify the family, we conclude that father is unable to demonstrate that the court abused
its discretion by terminating his parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
B. Duties imposed by the parent -child relationship, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2)

An individual’s parental rights may be terminated if he or she has “substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed . . . by
the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) . Those duties
include providing “food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary
for the child’ s physical, mental, or emotional health and development.” Id. The district
court must find that, at the time of termination, the parent is not presently able and willing
to assume his or her responsibilities and that the parent’s neglect of these duties will likely
continue in the future. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 90. A parent’ s “[f]ailure to satisfy

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requirements of a court-ordered case plan provides evidence of a parent’ s noncompliance
with the duties and responsibilities under ” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) . In re
Welfare of Children of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 666 (Minn. App. 2012).
Father argues that the district court clearly erred by terminating h is parental rights
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), because the “county presented no evidence
that [his] substance abuse or mental-health problems precluded him from providing for the
children’s needs.” We disagree. As the court found, the county presented evidence that
both R.J.H. and D.K.H. have “serious mental health issues that require s pecialized
attention.” For example, the record reflects that both children have engaged in emotional
outbursts, acts of violence, and destruction of items. In addition, R.J.H. was diagnosed with
reactive-attachment disorder and attention-deficient-hyperactivity disorder, and exhibits
“rocking behavior” as a self -soothing behavior. Similarly, the record reflects that D.K.H.
“presents with difficulty regulating his emotions, shutting down, avoidance, and sleep
disturbance,” due to multiple traumatic experiences including “prenatal exposure to drugs,
being removed from his biological mother, substantiated physical abuse from his father,
witnessing his stepmother stab his father, multiple removals from his father and
stepmother, and presumably witnessing his parents’ drug use.”
The district court determined that despite their mental -health needs, father “has
demonstrated a lack of concern or awareness of his children’s” needs. The court’s
determination is supported by ample rec ord evidence. Parenting therapist Itskovich
testified that she found it “significant” that during her sessions with father, he did not
mention the boys’ mental -health concerns. Moreover, social worker Bean testified that

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“shortly after the case opened,” sh e learned that father had “picked up” R.J.H.’s Adderall
prescriptions, but failed to deliver them to the child. Bean testified that this was concerning
because father “was not on Adderall when he was going through treatment” and that
“Adderall to a meth addict is like four or five beers to an alcoholic.” The record also reflects
that father admittedly used chemicals several times throughout the pendency of this matter.
In fact, the parenting-assessment report notes that father admitted “that he has occasionally
attended visitations with the children while high,” but has also “occasionally skip[ped]
visits if he felt he was too high.” And the record reflects that father w as arrested for first-
degree controlled -substance crime in Morrison County in May 2018 , and in Hennepin
County in July 2018 . The evidence presented by the county demonstrates that father’s
substance abuse adversely affects his ability to parent his children.
In addition to his abuse of chemicals, the county presented evidence that Dr. Bruss
diagnosed father with antisocial-personality disorder. Dr. Bruss explained that an
“Antisocial Personality Disorder is characterized by a pattern of disregard for or the
violations of the rights of others,” but that there is no medication for the disorder an d that
it tends to “be more difficult to treat” because of its “chronic nature.” Dr. Bruss stated that
although some “individual therapy has been known to be effective,” she opined that given
father’s “oppositional tendencies,” his prognosis is “poor.” Moreover, f amily-therapist
Vojtech testified that father’s primary symptom was anger, and the county presented
evidence that father continues to struggle to control his anger, which was reflected in a
video admitted by the county. In the video, which was taken after the children had left a
visitation session with father and K.M.B., father became enraged at K.M.B. and appeared

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to grab a table as if he was going to throw it (although he did not) during a conversation
with her that inv olved her alleged infidelity. And the county presented evidence that
father’s inability to control his anger led to the domestic dispute between fathe r and
K.M.B., which prompted the children’s out-of-home placement.
Father’s mental-health and chemical-abuse issues continue to affect his ability to
comply with the parental duties imposed by the parent and child relationship, and father
even admitted at trial that he was “not ready to get [the children] back today” because he
was not yet “in the posit ion to do so.” The district court therefore did not clearly err by
concluding that clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of father ’s
parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). And because clear and
convincing evidence supports two of the four statutory grounds on which father’s parental
rights were terminated, we need not address the other two statutory grounds for termination
found by the court. See In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 & n.2 (Minn.
2004) (stating that only one statutory ground needs to be proven to support termination of
parental rights , and noting that it was “not necessary” to address a fourth ground for
termination where “termination of parental rights was supported by three statutory
grounds”).
II. Best interests
Father also challenges the district court’s determination that termination of his
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. This court reviews a best -interests
determination for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905
(Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).

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A termination of parental rights requires that termination be in the child’s best
interests. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018). If there is a conflict between the parent’s
interests and the child’s interests, then “the interests of the child are paramount.” J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d at 905 (quotation omitted). A best-interests analysis involves balancing three
factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the
child.” Id. (quotation omitted). But a “determination of a child’s best interests is generally
not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of a record, and . . . an appellate court’s
combing through the record to determine best interests is inappropriate because it involves
credibility determinations.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn.
App. 2009) (quotations omitted).
Father argues that the “district court’s finding that termination of [his] parental
rights was in the children’s best interests was not supported by clear and convincing
evidence.” We disagree.
A GAL has a duty to “advocate for best interests of the child.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac.
905.01(b). Here, in representing the interests of R.J.H. and D.K.H., the GAL opined that
father’s parental rights should be terminated because father (1) has “not been able to
demonstrate sustained sobriety outside of residential treatment”; (2) has “not begun to work
on domestic violence or shown an understanding of his pattern of unhealthy relationships”;
and (3) “has not shown that he’s able to provide a safe or stable home environment for the
boys.” The GAL also testified that the “children are stable now and they’ve made progress
with their mental health behaviors.” The GAL’s testimony was echoed by Marquette, the

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boys’ foster father, who testified that the boys’ behavior has improved since being in his
care. Marquette also testified that he considered father to be a “friend,” and that he has
“given [father] every chance to prove himself a good father and he has failed me in that.”
Marquette further testified that “for the boys to be successful, they would be better at our
home.”
In addition to the testimony of Marquette and the GAL, Bean testified that she has
“worked closely with the therapists and caregivers in this case,” and that R.J.H. and D.K.H.
“have made incredible progress with the consistency and predicta bility that the [foster
parents] are providing for them.” Bean also testified that since 2012, the boys “have been
marinated in chaos and trauma and I think it’s time that we are able to provide them some
stability. They need that in order to thrive and I believe that’s in the children’s best
interests.” Finally, parenting-educator Haugen testified that her prognosis of father’s ability
to parent the children was “poor” because “his life and his choices and decisions keep
putting everybody that cares about him at risk.” The district court specifically found
Haugen and the GAL’s testimony to be credible and implicitly found Bean and Marquette’s
testimony to be credible. And although father’s witnesses testified that the children’s best
interests are served by remaining with father, the court found th ese witnesses’ testimony
to be not credible. We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. See In re
Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996) (“Considerable deference is due to
the district court’s [TPR] decision because a district court is in a superior position to assess
the credibility of witnesses.”). The testimony that the court found credible supports its
determination that termination of father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

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We conclude that t he district court did not abuse its discreti on by terminating father’s
parental rights to R.J.H. and D.K.H.
Affirmed.