State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1904

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Omar Kwabena Walford,
Appellant.

Filed September 30, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-15-4027

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Atto rney, Peter R. Marker, Assistan t County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appella t e Publ i c De f e nde r , J e s s i ca Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
I n t h i s a p p e a l a f t e r r e m a n d t o the district court for an evide ntiary hearing to
determine whether there was an irreparable breakdown in the rel ationship between

2
appellant and his public defender, appellant argues that the di strict court erred in
determining that there was no br eakdown in the attorney-client relationship sufficient to
entitle appellant to the appointment of substitute counsel. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant with four counts of assault. The district court appointed
a public defender to represent appellant. Appellant’s trial was scheduled for December 14,
2015. The district court continued the trial several times, for reasons including scheduling
conflicts, to provide appellant’s public defender an opportunit y to gather more evidence,
and because appellant’s public defender was on medical leave fo r a period of time. On
January 17, 2017, appellant requested to discharge the office o f the public defender and
proceed pro se. Appellant told the district court that there w a s a b r e a k d o w n i n h i s
relationship with his public defender that could not be repaired. Appellant acknowledged
that another attorney would not b e appointed for him. The dist rict court accepted
appellant’s petition to proceed pro se and discharged the office of the public defender.
Following a court trial, the district court found appellant guilty of three of the four
charges, entered judgment, and se ntenced appellant. Appellant appealed. In an order
opinion, we concluded that the district court abused its discretion by failing to determine if
appellant’s allegations concerning an irreparable breakdown in his relationship with his
public defender were true and se rious enough to justify the app ointment of substitute
counsel. State v. Walford , A17-1396, at *5 (Minn. App. July 31, 2018). We concluded
that the district court’s statem ent that the appointment of sub stitute counsel was between
appellant and the public defender’s office, and not an issue for the court, was an incorrect

3
statement of the law. Id. at *4. We remanded the case to the district court with “directions
to conduct an inquiry into [appellant’s] statement that there was an irreparable breakdown
in the attorney-client relationship.” Id. at *7. We explained that, if the district court finds
that there was not an irreparable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that affected
the public defender’s ability or competence to represent appellant, then appellant’s waiver
of counsel was voluntary a nd his conviction stands. Id. at *7-8. But if the district court
finds that there was an irreparable breakdown in the attorney-c lient relationship that
affected the public defender’s ability or competence to represent appellant, the district court
should determine whether appellant is entitled to a new trial. Id. at *8.
At the evidentiary hearing on rem and, appellant testified conce rning the claimed
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Appellant testi fied that he met with his
public defender at her office sometime between his first appear ance and the omnibus
hearing, during which meeting the two watched a video and discussed the case. Appellant
testified that he told his public defender at this meeting that he was in custody in Florida
when the charged offense occurred or, if he was not in Florida, that witness C.J. would
indicate that the complaining witness was untruthful. Appellan t testified that his public
defender looked into the issues. She contacted K.H., for whom appellant had worked in
Florida, and learned that appellant was not in custody in Florida at the time of the offense.
S h e a l s o s p o k e w i t h C . J . A p p e l l ant opined that his public defe nder should have
subpoenaed K.H., but never did. Appellant was also concerned that his public defender’s
conversation with C.J. was not in the presence of an investigator.

4
Appellant stated that “the beginn ing of the end of the trust le vel” happened at a
February 2016 hearing where his public defender told appellant that he could face 129
months if he was convicted after trial, or 60 months consecutiv e for each victim. The
district court asked appellant i f the possible sentence was for all of the pending cases or
just this one, and appellant replied that he only had one pending case at that time.
Appellant was in custody in Ramsey County between August and September 2016
for a different matter concerning which his public defender fro m this case was also
representing him. Appellant testif ied that his public defender visited him with an
investigator to discuss the cases. Appellant arrived at his No vember 2016 court date and
was surprised that his public defender was not there. Appellan t recounted being released
in December from Hennepin County to Rice County. Upon being re leased from Rice
County, he was released to Ramsey County for an arson charge. Appellant was told he did
not qualify for a public defender when he already had one repre senting him on two cases,
so he contacted his public defender. Appellant testified that he expected that his public
defender “would have me put on a docket for the next day or two or whatever and that
d i d n ’ t h a p p e n . ” A p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e a s k e d h i s p u b l i c defender to contact his
attorneys about cases in Dakota and Washington Counties, which she did.
Appellant testified that his pub lic defender visited him with a n investigator while
he was in custody for the arson charge and “at that time things blew out of control with her
and I.” Appellant testified that he “was upset at the time” an d “felt like it was the end of
the world for me.” Appellant testified that he believed nothing was being done on his other
two cases by his public defender, and when she “came to see me at the jail in December of

5
2016, I wasn’t happy.” Appellant was concerned why it was the second or third time she
came to see him with an investigator, and why the public defender had not done additional
investigation. According to appellant, his public defender cou ld not explain why she did
not give a witness list to the court, and when he asked why she had not investigated his
case, she could not answer the question. At that point, appell ant recalled that he put his
hand up and said “I’m not talking to you.” Appellant admits he was upset, and that his
anger may have frightened his public defender. Appellant told the district court that his
public defender “packed up all her stuff and said you’re not going to treat me that way.”
Appellant testified that, in light of another order for protect ion involving his wife,
appellant was scared that his public defender was going to get him charged with terroristic
threats. Appellant did not talk to his public defender after t hat meeting. He asked the
managing attorney of the public defender at the January 17, 201 7 scheduled trial date to
tell his public defender that he apologizes for his behavior and that he meant no harm. But
he also told the managing attorney that he does not want to get into a situation with his
lawyer again. Appellant testifie d that he told the managing at torney that there was an
irreparable breakdown in the relationship and that he did not want to deal with a person to
whom he cannot express himself and of whom he was afraid. Appe llant asked for a new
attorney. The managing attorney told him that this issue would be between him and the
judge.
Appellant claimed that his public defender should have followed -through on his
request to interview his wife and daughter, because they would be able to testify that the
complainant was being untruthful about appellant’s wife and daughter being present during

6
the alleged offense. Appellant a rgued at one point that his pu blic defender “got involved
in too many discussions” and should have given him “a chance to speak to the investigator
man to man.”
In response to questioning by the state, appellant testified that, during the period of
time in question, he had a matter pending in “[e]very county in t h e m e t r o a r e a ” a n d
represented himself in all of those cases despite a public defender being provided in every
case. But then appellant stated that he never fired a public defender, and when asked if he
worked to completion with a public defender on any of those cas es, he said he could not
recall anything beyond this case, nor could he talk about any o ther cases because he was
appealing all of them.
In analyzing whether the public defender’s ability and competence was affected by
her relationship with appellant, the district court identified two major issues that appellant
raised: “One, she lied to him. Two, he was fearful of her.”
Concerning the first issue, the district court found that appellant’s testimony that his
public defender lied about the sentence he faced was insufficiently supported because there
was no transcript or record of his public defender telling him that his maximum sentence
was somewhere around 110 months.1 The district court found that, while appellant may
have disbelieved or disagreed with the possible sentence, his p ublic defender did not lie
about the sentence. The district court explained that there wa s also no indication in the
record concerning whether the at torney’s estimate of appellant’ s possible exposure was

1 Appellant testified that his public defender told the judge appellant could face around 129
months.

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limited to just this case. The d istrict court concluded that any misunderstanding between
appellant and his public defender did not rise to the level that the public defender was either
not competent or not able to represent appellant.
As to the second issue, the district court understood appellant’s fear as arising from
two circumstances: first, that appellant was concerned that hi s public defender could
somehow use an order for protection in a different case against him, and second, that
appellant was dissatisfied with his public defender’s use of an investigator when meeting
with him. The district court st ated, “If the concern is an ord er for protection, the Court
finds that a little far-fetched. If the concern is that [his public defender] would make up an
accusation against [appellant], then the use of a third party witness seems to be kind of the
best practice.” It concluded that appellant’s concern was not “terribly credible” but, “more
importantly, it doesn’t rise to t he level that [they] had an ir reparable breakdown in their
communication.”
The district court found that there was not an irreparable breakdown of the attorney-
client relationship. Instead, there was personal tension and d eep dissatisfaction with
appellant’s public defender, “though it’s hard for this court t o imagine what [his public
defender] could have done in terms of her professional obligations to [appellant] to remedy
that to [appellant’s] satisfaction.” As a result, the district court found that appellant gave a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and voluntarily chose to
represent himself.
This appeal followed.

8
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court erred in determining that he was not entitled
to the appointment of substitute counsel.
The decision to grant or deny a request for substitute counsel lies within the
discretion of the district cour t and will not be reversed on ap peal absent an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Clark, 722 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. 2006). “A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of t he law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the assistan ce of counsel. U.S.
Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. The state has an obligation to provide counsel
for indigent defendants. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45, 83 S. Ct. 792, 796-
97 (1963). “The right to counsel includes a fair opportunity to secure an attorney of choice,
but an indigent defendant does not have the unbridled right to be represented by the
attorney of his choice.” State v. Worthy , 583 N.W.2d 270, 278 (Minn. 1998). If the
defendant “voices serious allegations of inadequate representation, the district court should
conduct a searching inquiry before determining whether the defe ndant’s complaints
warrant the appointment of substitute counsel.” State v. Munt , 831 N.W.2d 569, 586
(Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). A district court should only appoint substitute counsel
for an indigent defendant where “exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely
and reasonably made.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“[E]xceptional circumstances ar e t h o s e t h a t a f f e c t a c o u r t - a p p ointed attorney’s
ability or competence to represent the client.” State v. Gillam, 629 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn.

9
2001). What constitutes an exceptional circumstance has not been specifically defined, but
a defendant’s general dissatisfac tion with appointed counsel do e s n o t a m o u n t t o a n
exceptional circumstance. E.g., Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 586; State v. Fagerstrom , 176
N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1970). Nor does personal tension in the attorney-client
relationship amount to an exceptional circumstance that would e ntitle a defendant to
substitute counsel. State v. Voorhees , 596 N.W.2d 241, 255 (Minn. 1999). The district
court characterized the attorney-client relationship here as pe rsonal tension and
dissatisfaction.
Appellant expressly disclaims a ny argument concerning the publi c defender’s
competence. Appellant argues that there were exceptional circu mstances affecting the
public defender’s ability to represent him and that he was therefore entitled to appointment
of substitute counsel. Specifically , he argues that his unrebu tted testimony at the
evidentiary hearing established th a t t h e r e w a s a b r e a k d o w n i n the attorney-client
relationship that affected his public defender’s ability to represent him. Appellant asserts
that “13 months into the representation, [the public defender] was still unprepared for trial,”
but he fails to acknowledge the legitimate continuances that were granted by reason of the
public defender’s health leave. Appellant instead characterize s her as unprepared. The
district court found no exceptional circumstances, and the record supports that finding.
Appellant also argues that his public defender was unable to represent him because
they met only once to review discovery and discuss the case. But the argument is contrary
to appellant’s own testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Appellant testified that there was
a complete breakdown in communi cation after he met with his pub lic defender in

10
December 2016 because they did not have any more contact before the scheduled trial date.
This meeting took place only a few weeks before trial and the district court found that there
was no indication that appellant’s public defender would not co ntinue to talk with him or
accept his calls. The record evidence demonstrates that it was appellant who made clear
that he refused to contact his public defender after the Decemb e r m e e t i n g , w h e r e h e
acknowledged that he had behaved inappropriately. The record d oes not support
appellant’s assertion that his public defender was unwilling to communicate with him.
Appellant marks as significant the fact that his public defende r did not appear for
the scheduled trial date. But a ppellant conversed for approxim ately an hour with the
managing attorney before trial started and claimed that he was unable to go forward with
his public defender because he did not want to speak with her. Appellant signed a petition
to proceed pro se and discharged the public defender before trial began.
The record does reflect that appe llant was generally dissatisfi ed with his public
defender and that there was pers onal tension between them. The district court so found.
The district court concluded, however, that this dissatisfactio n and tension did not affect
appellant’s public defender’s abi lity or competence to represen t appellant at trial. The
record supports the district cour t’s determination, which was w ithin its discretion. See
Gillam, 629 N.W.2d at 450 (concluding that the court-appointed attorn ey was competent
and able to represent the defend ant even though the defendant w as dissatisfied with his
representation). The district court followed our earlier remand instructions and the record
supports its decision on remand.
Affirmed.