In re the Marriage of: Donald William McIsaac, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1914

In re the Marriage of: Donald William McIsaac, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Nadine S. Roberts,
Appellant.

Filed March 16, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bryan, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-FA-17-687

Elizabeth A. Storaasli, Mark L. Knutson, Dryer Reed Peterson Bray Storaasli & Knutson,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Christopher A. Dahlberg, Dahlberg Law Office, P.A., Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
In this dissolution appeal, we review three challenges to the district court’s division
of property. First, appellant/cross-respondent wife challenges the division of a retirement
account with Fidelity Investments (the Fidelity IRA). Second, respondent/cross-appellant
husband challenges the division of his bonus compensation. Third, husband challenges the

2
district court’s division of personal property, including various purses and jewelry . We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Appellant/cross-respondent Nadine S. Roberts (wife) and respondent/cross-
appellant Donald William McIsaac (husband) married on December 19, 2003 . Husband
filed a petition for dissolution of marriage without minor children on July 26, 2017 . The
district court held a pre-trial conference on February 2, 2018 , and used that date as the
valuation date for the majority of the assets. The district court divided the marital estate in
an initial order on July 19, 2018, but issued an amended order on September 25, 2018. In
both orders, the district court addressed the property at issue on appeal: the Fidelity IRA,
husband’s 2017 and 2018 bonus compensation, and the parties’ collection of purses and
jewelry.
I. Division of the Fidelity IRA
Husband opened a Fidelity IRA in July 2004 , seven months after the parties’
marriage. The Fidelity IRA was worth $508,588.65 at the time of the valuation date in
2018. The district court’s only finding as to the division of the IRA was as follows:
“Fidelity IRA-Petitioner ($114,096.84: dividends and interest calcul ated to be marital).”
The Fidelity IRA has the following three components: (1) the original funding sources or
principal; (2) the appreciation of the original principal ; and (3) the interest and dividends
associated with the account. On appeal, wife challenges the district court’s order relating
to each of these components , and a rgues that the district court made the following three
errors: (A) it did not determine whether husband adequately traced his nonmarital interest

3
in the original principal of the Fidelity IRA ; (B) it did not determine whether husband
actively managed the Fidelity IRA; and (C) it adopted husband’s incorrect calculation of
the amount of marital dividends reinvested into the Fidelity IRA.
A. Tracing of Husband’s Nonmarital Interest in the Original Principal
Husband introduced at trial an exhibit relating to the origination of the Fidelity IRA:
IRS Form 5498 for tax year 2004.1 This exhibit shows that, at some point in calendar year
2004, husband contributed a total of $95,688.34 in rollover contributions from four
separate sources: “Fidelity Cash Reserves,” “Fidelity Contrafund,” “General Electric Co.”
and “PACCAR Inc.” The exhibit shows that no other sources funded the Fidelity IRA
principal in 2004. The exhibit also shows that, as of December 31, 2004, the account had
increased in value, ending the year with a fair market value of $116,112.91. There is no
evidence in the record regarding that increase in value or tying it to any original source.
In a ddition, the parties introduced testimony and evidence regarding husband’s
dissolution fr om his previous wife because hu sband’s previous divorce decree, dated
October 20, 2003, includes a reference to a “PACCAR” retirement account, but makes no
mention of any General Electric investments. As noted above, husband and wife were
married two months after the judgment was entered.2

1 The 2004 Form 5498 was completed by Fidelity to be furnished to the IRS.
2 The timing of the previous dissolution relative to the parties’ marriage carries importance
here. Husband could acquire nonmarital assets that would be absent from the previous
decree only if the acquisition occurred after the valuation date in the previous dissolution
and before December 19, 2003, the date of the parties’ marriage.

4
Finally, husband offered conflicting testimony at trial. Initially, when husband was
asked whether the General Electric stock was premarital, husband answered, “absolutely.”
When asked when he purchased the General Electric stock, however, husband testified, “I
have no idea.” Husband then stated that, in about August or September of 2004, he either
rolled over or purchased the General Electric stock. Husband also answered, “no,” w hen
asked if he had any tracing documents showing that the General Electric stock was
premarital. The district court did not make any factual findings regarding whether husband
adequately traced the originating contributions in the Fidelity IRA. Nor are there any
findings regarding whether the General Electric investment was acquired before or after
December 19, 2003 (the date of the parties’ marriage).
B. Husband’s Management of the Fidelity IRA
By the time of the valuation date for the parties’ dissolution (February 2, 2018), the
value of the Fidelity IRA had more than quintupled and was valued at $508,588.65. During
the trial, the district court received as evidence selected monthly statements for the Fidelity
IRA and testimony of the parties regarding management of the Fidelity IRA. For instance,
when asked at trial wheth er he was involved in the management of the Fidelity IRA,
husband answered, “Well, I did the trades.” There is no evidence that anyone else managed
the Fidelity IRA. In addition, in his trial testimony, husband estimated that he spent an
average of one hour a month investing and managing the Fidelity IRA. Wife contested this
estimate and characterized husband’s activity as comparable to a professional day-trader.
The selected monthly statements for the Fidelity IRA indicate that during the
parties’ marriage, husband made hundreds of transactions using the funds i n the Fidelity

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IRA, including some periods of regular activity buying and selling stock, and other periods
of relative inactivity. For example, the November 2008 statement for the Fidelity IRA
shows twenty unique investment transactions over six different days.3 The January 2009
statement shows $184,498.80 in securities bought and $166, 126.31 sold. The April 2 009
statement shows $195,757.16 in securities bought and $183,003.44 sold. The January 2010
statement shows $1,313,916.38 in securities bought and $1,073,208.74 sold. The March
2010 statement shows $910,964.78 in securities bought and $1,116,191.37 sold. In some
months, such as in January and March of 2010, husband bought and sold the entire value
of the Fidelity IRA multiple times. The statement s also show that husband’s trades
included large and small amounts. For example, the March 2010 sta tement shows that
husband made more than two dozen separate purchases of securities that exceeded $10,000
and an additional 13 pur chases of securities for a mounts less than $10,000. In addition,
some transactions involved all or nearly all of the entire value of the Fidelity IRA . For
instance, the Fidelity IRA had a beginning value of $145,148.23 as of November 1, 2008.
On November 3, 2008, husband made a transaction in the amount of $135,256.97 . On
November 21, 2008, husband made a purchase valued at $125,220.95 and a sale valued at
$129,678.32. Husband made another large purchase valued at $125,170.95 just a few days
later on November 24, 2008. On appeal, husband agrees that, during the 168 months the
parties were married, he made a total of 351 trades reflected on these selected monthly

3 The separate transactions may have been part of a larger, global order, but filled through
multiple and distinct sellers and/or buyers. The evidence in the record does not clearly
establish which transactions can be grouped into a single order. For our purposes, we will
consider the number of separate transactions and do not group the separate transactions.

6
statements. Neither party presented evidence regarding how much of the appreciation (if
any) resulted from husband’s investment management.
C. Calculation of Dividends and Interest
The district court determined that, as of the valuation date in 2018, the Fidelity IRA
included a total of $114 ,096.84 corresponding to “ dividends and interest .” The district
court characterized this amount as marital. To arrive at this amount, the district court
credited the expert testimony offered by husband. The expert testified that the Fidelity IRA
included $131,771.70 in marital dividends and interest. The expert also explained that
husband used dividends from the Fidelity IRA funds during the marriage to purchase Ford
stock. The expert determined this led to a marital loss and testified that because the share
price of Ford stock had gone down, the amount of marital dividends should be reduced by
$17,674.86. On cross -examination, the expert stated that he based his testimony on
husband’s analysis, and not on his own independent calculations.
II. Division of Husband’s 2017 and 2018 Bonus Compensation
Husband received large annual amounts of bonus compensation during calendar
year 2017 ($625,000), calendar year 2016 ($381,500), and calendar year 2015 ($336,875).
The district court concluded that these previous bonuses show that “large bonuses have
become a routine practice at Cirrus for [husband].” Husband does not challenge the district
court’s consideration of bonus compensation relating to these years, but appeals the district
court’s allocation of bonus compensation to be received in 2018 and 2019.
The district court initially awarded wife an equal share of “any bonus awarded by
Cirrus to husband for the year 2018, whether paid in 2018 or 2019 or later.” The district

7
court later amended this language sua sponte, emphasizing the word “earned,” and
clarifying that husband owed wife one -half of any bonus compensation “ earned in 2017
and paid or payable in 2018 or anytime thereafter” and that husband also owed wife one -
half of seven-twelfths of any bonus compensation “ earned in 2018 and paid or payable i n
2019 or anytime thereafter.” The district court reasoned that wife had an interest in bonus
compensation earned by husband up until the date of the dissolution decree on July 19,
2018. The district court provided no reason why it looked to the dissolut ion date instead
of the valuation date for purposes of allocation of husband’s bonus compensation.
III. Unequal Award of Jewelry and Handbags
During the marriage, wife acquired a collection of jewelry and designer handbags.
The district court determined that these items were marital property and awarded the entire
collection to wife. The district court also concluded that the unequal division of these gifts
was equitable given the large disparity of incomes between the parties and due to the fact
that they were given as gifts to wife from husband. To support that conclusion, the district
court found that Wife is employed as a flight attendant with gross annual income of $63,000
per year and that husband has gross annual salary income of $310,903.87 per year (plus
bonus compensation). In its discussion on spousal maintenance, t he district court made
detailed factual findings regarding the length of the marriage , the age, health, station,
occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employabil ity, estate,
liabilities, needs, opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets, and income of each
party. The district court also made findings of fact regarding the contribution of the parties

8
in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation in the amount or value of the
marital property.
D E C I S I O N
I. Division of the Fidelity IRA

A. Tracing of Husband’s Nonmarital Interest in the Original Principal
Wife argues that the district court erred by implicitly finding that husband
adequately traced his nonmarital interest in the Fidelity IRA. Because husband failed to
introduce any evidence regarding the acquisition of the General Electric investment, we
reverse the district court’s implicit finding. The entire amount of the Fidelity IRA is a
marital asset.
Property acquired by a spouse during a marriage is presumed to be marital property.
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (20 18). This presumption applies “regardless of whether
title is held individually or by the spouses in a form of co -ownership.” Id. “The
presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property is nonmarital
property.” Id. For nonmarital property to maintain its nonmarital status, it must either be
“kept separate from marital property or, if commingled with marital property, be readily
traceable.” Wopata v. Wopata, 498 N.W.2d 478, 484 (Minn. App. 1993) . “When marital
and nonmarital assets have been commingled, the party asserting the nonmarital claim must
adequately trace the nonmarital funds in order to establish their nonmarital character. ”
Kerr v. Kerr, 770 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. App. 2009). The party seeking to trace an asset
to a nonmarital source “is not held to a ‘strict tracing’ standard, but need only show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the asset was ‘acquired in exchange for’ nonmarital

9
property.” Doering v. Doering, 385 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. App. 1986); see also Risk ex
rel. Miller v. Stark, 787 N.W.2d 690, 697 ( Minn. App. 2010) (“[T]racing property to its
nonmarital source does not require intricate detail.”), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).
Generally, we “exercise independent review” over a district court’s classification of
property as marital or nonmarital, although “deference is given to the district court’s
findings of fact.” Gottsacker v. Gottsacker , 664 N.W.2d 848, 852 (Minn. 2003) (citing
Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997)). More precisely, the determination of
whether the party asserting the nonmarital claim has adequately traced the nonmarital funds
is a question of fact, reviewed for clear error. See Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800. If we are
“left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,” we may find the
district court’s decision to be clearly erroneous, notwithstanding the existence of evidence
to support such findings. Id. (quoting In re Trust Known as Great N. Iron Ore Props., 243
N.W.2d 302, 305 (Minn. 1976)).
Our review of the adequacy of husband’s tracing evidence is similar to the issue that
came before this court in Risk ex rel . Miller v. Stark, 787 N.W.2d at 697. In Miller, the
respondent4 adequately traced Miller’s nonmarital interest in the funds used to make the
down payment on a piece of real property, even in the absence of evidence tying the down
payment to a nonmarital source. Miller, 787 N.W.2d at 697. In Miller, respondent testified
that that neither Stark nor Miller had any income or other alternative source for the down
payment than Miller’s nonmarital funds. Id. We affirmed the district court’s conclusion

4 The respondent in Miller was the estate of the deceased wife, Mary Elizabeth Miller, in
the dissolution proceedings. The appellant was Miller’s former husband, Jarrin E. Stark.

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that this testimony sufficiently traced the wife’s nonmarital interest i n the disputed real
property. Id. While that case presents similar facts, it is readily distinguishable.
Here, as in Miller, husband failed to introduce any evidence of the acquisition of the
General Electric investment, which was an original source of the Fidelity IRA. Unlike in
Miller, however, husband also failed to introduce any evidence to eliminate the possibility
of marital funds being used to acquire the General Electric investment, and in turn, fund
the Fidelity IRA. In fact, the only exhibit in the record relating to the origination of the
Fidelity IRA cannot be used to establish the acquisition of the General Electric investment.
The IRS Form 5498 for tax year 2004 shows that, at some point in calendar year 2004,
husband contributed a total of $95,688.34 in rollover contributions from four separate
sources, including the General Electric investment. The exhibit cannot establish when
husband acquired the General Electric investment. It can only indicate that the General
Electric investment was rolled into the Fidelity IRA in 2004, during the parties’ marriage.
In addition, husband’s equivocal testimony in this case indicated that he may have
purchased the General Electric investment in August or September of 2004, many months
after the parties’ marriage and prior to rolling the investment over into the Fidelity IRA.
Form 5498, taken to gether with husband’s testimony, cannot support the district court’s
implicit finding that husband adequately established the date on which he acquired the
General Electric investment.
On this record, the district court clearly erred in finding that husband adequately
traced his nonmarital interest in the principal of the Fidelity IRA. Without this tracing
evidence, husband did not carry his burden to rebut the marital property presumption, and

11
we conclude that the entire original principal was marital. We remand the division of the
Fidelity IRA as marital property to the district court.
B. Husband’s Active Management of the Fidelity IRA
Wife also makes an alternative, two-part argument in the event that some or all of
the original principal was nonmarital.5 First, she argues that the district court should have
treated the appreciation in the value of the Fidelity IRA as marital. Second, wife argues
that husband’s trading conduct commingled that marital appreciation with any nonmarital
portions of the account. We agree with both arguments and conclude that husband’s active
management of the Fidelity IRA generated a marital interest in the appreciation of value
that occurred during the marriage . We also conclude that, even assuming husband had
adequately traced a nonmarital interest in the principal of the Fidelity IRA, his trading
activity commingled the marital appreciation with any nonmarital portions of the account.
At the time of the valuation date for the parties’ dissolution (February 2, 2018) the
value of the Fidelity IRA had more than quintupled and was valued at $508,588.65. The
district court determined that only the portion of the Fidelity IRA c orresponding to
dividends and interest was marital.6 Wife argues that the increase in value is a marital asset
because husband actively managed the account during the parties’ marriage . The district

5 Given our decision above that the Fidelity IRA was a marital asset, we are not required
to consider wife’s argument. Nevertheless, we address it here as an alternative to our
conclusion regarding the marital nature of the original principal.
6 The district court then reduced wife’s marital dividends and interest by $17,674.86, an
amount that husband’s expert claimed was a marital loss due to a change in the value of
Ford stock. Wife also argues that the district court improperly calculated this amount. We
decline to address the calculations made by the district cou rt regarding dividends and
interest in light of our conclusion that wife has a marital interest in the entire Fidelity IRA.

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court did not make specific findings regarding whether the appreciation of the Fidelity IRA
resulted from husband’s active management efforts or from general market trends.
As noted above, we generally “exercise independent review” over a district court’s
classification of property as marital or nonmarital, although “deference is given to the
district court’s findings of fact.” Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 852. Appreciation in the value
of a nonmarital asset during the marriage requires application of the active-efforts test: “In
determining whether the appreciation in the value of a nonmarital investment is marital or
nonmarital, we look to whether the appreciation is the result of active management of t he
investment, classifying active appreciation as marital property and passive appreciation as
nonmarital property. ” Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 6 50 (Minn. 2008) ; see also
Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853; Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987).
The party seeking to establish the nonmarital character of investment appreciation during
the marriage bears the burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
appreciation resulted from passive efforts, or general market forces. Baker, 753 N.W.2d
at 649-50.
In Baker, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that Dr . Baker’s role was
“insufficient to render active the appreciation in the value of the overall portfolio.” Id. at
652-53. The court described Dr. Baker’s limited efforts as follows:
Dr. Baker’s activity with respect to the accounts consisted of
selecting and occasionally changing investment advisors;
authorizing money managers to make discretionary decisions
about the investments; retaining discretion to direct
investments but exercising that discretion on only one occasion
(to invest in a business with which his son was involved); and

13
declining to withdraw from the funds although they were
available as liquid assets.

Id. at 652. The supreme court noted that by utilizing professional inv estment institutions,
Dr. Baker avoided the need to devote significant personal effort to managing his retirement
funds, and his role in the investments was, therefore, insufficient to render the appreciation
of the overall portfolio marital property. Id.
The efforts of husband in this case do not resemble Dr. Baker’s. First, husband did
not hire professional services to manage his accounts, but instead testified that he managed
the account himself. Second, the selected monthly statements for the Fidelity IRA admitted
at trial indicate that during the parties’ marriage, husband made 351 transactions using the
funds in the Fidelity IRA, including twenty transaction s over six different days in
November 2008. Third, in some months, husband bought and sold t he entire value of the
Fidelity IRA multiple times. We conclude that the district court clearly erred in implicitly
finding that the appreciation in the value of the Fidelity IRA resulted from passive market
forces. Even assuming we had concluded that so me or all of the original principle of the
Fidelity IRA was nonmarital, w e would reverse the district court’s clearly erroneous
implicit finding that the appreciation resulted from passive efforts.
Wife’s alternative argument has a second step. Not only d oes wife argue that
husband’s active management generated a marital interest in the appreciation of the
Fidelity IRA, she also argues that husband then commingled the marital appreciation with
any nonmarital portions of the account. We would agree. The selected monthly statements
show that husband’s trades sometimes involved only a portion of the account . For

14
example, the March 2010 statement 13 purchases of securities for amounts less than
$10,000. In other months, Husband made larger transactions involving all or nearly all of
the entire value of the Fidelity IRA, such as in November 2008, when he made transactions
in the following amounts: $135,256.97, $125,220.95, $129,678.32, and $125,170.95.
Husband offered insufficient evidence to connect any of these large or small transactions
to any nonmarital portion of the Fidelity IRA. Therefore, we would conclude that district
court clearly erred because husband’s trading activity commingled any nonmarital portions
of the account with the marital appreciation in value that resulted from his active
management of the account.7
We agree with wife’s alternative argument , and would remand the division of the
Fidelity IRA as marital property to the district court on this second, independent basis.
II. Division of Husband’s 2017 and 2018 Bonus Compensation

Husband challenges the district court’s decision to award wife a portion of the bonus
compensation that he was to receive in calendar years 2018 and 201 9. Specifically,
husband makes the following four arguments: (1) that the district court lacked authority to
modify the decree regarding the bonus compensation; (2) that the district court improperly
classified husband’s unpaid bonus income as property; (3) that husband’s bonus
compensation was too speculative for the district court to address; and (4) that the district
court applied a unique valuation date for purposes of awarding wife a portion of husband’s

7 By trading the entire value of the account, husband also necessarily included the marital
dividends and interest in these trades, further commingling marital and nonmarital interests
in the Fidelity IRA.

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bonus compensation without sufficient basis in the record. We address husband’s first two
arguments, reverse the district court’s decision to allocate husband’s 2017 and 2018 bonus
compensation, and remand for further findings. Given our decision to remand, we need
not address husband’s remaining arguments.
First, the district court had authority to modify t he initial decree. On a motion for
amended findings, “[the district court] must be free to examine all of the evidence before
[it], and then to enter amended findings as appear to [ it] warranted by [its] review of the
record as a whole.” McCauley v. Michael, 256 N.W.2d 491, 500 ( Minn. 1977). In this
case, the district court initially awarded wife an equal share of “any bonus awarded by
Cirrus to Petitioner for the year 2018, whether paid in 2018 or 2019 or later.” After
receiving both parties’ motio ns for amended findings, t he district court amended the
language that it had used in its original findings of fact . The district court, sua sponte,
clarified what it meant by the phrase “for the year 2018, whether paid in 2018 or 2019 or
later.” The district court amended this language to emphasize the word “earned” and to
order husband to pay wife one-half of any bonus compensation “ earned in 2017 and paid
or payable in 2018 or anytime thereafter” and to order husband to pay wife one-half of
seven-twelfths of any bonus compensation “earned in 2018 and paid or payable in 2019 or
anytime thereafter.” Pursuant to McCauley, the district court acted within its authority
when it sua sponte amended the language used in its initial allocation of bonus
compensation.
Second, husband cites Minnesota Statutes, section 518.003, subdivision 3a, to argue
that the district court improperly “awarded [wife] a share of the speculative future bonus

16
as property,” even though “[a]n award made from ‘future income or earnings’ of one party
is ‘Maintenance.’” The district court’s findings do not explicitly address whether it
awarded a portion of husband’s bonus compensation award as a part of its overall spousal-
maintenance award or as part of its property division. Husband is c orrect that our
legislature defines future earnings and income as relevant to maintenance awards and
distinct from a division of the parties’ respective individual and collective property rights.
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subds. 3a, 3b (2018). Neither the original nor the amended decree
explains why the district court apportioned the bonus compensation as it did. The findings
are insufficient for effective appellate review, and remand is required. See Tuthill v. Tuthill,
399 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that insufficient findings require remand
for further findings); Vinnes v. Vinnes, 384 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating
that property division does not require detailed findings but findings “suffi cient to allow
appellate review”).
Therefore, we reverse the bonus compensation award and remand to the distr ict
court for further findings. The district court may reopen the record at its discretion for the
purpose of addressing husband’s bonus compensation. On remand, should the district court
consider husband’s bonus compensation as “property,” it must determine the appropriate
valuation date or dates to use in determining the marital (and potenti ally non - or post -
marital) value of the asset. 8 Should the district court, however, construe husband’s bonus

8 See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2018) (requiring the district court to make findings that
a particular valuation date is fair and equitable if it uses any date other than the date of the
initial prehearing settlement conference as the valuation date for any specific asset);

17
compensation as regular and periodic income for purposes of spousal maintenance, it
should make findings regarding why husband’s bonus compensation satisfies the statutory
definition of “income,” Minn. Stat. § 518A.29 (2018), and the district court should explain
its maintenance award in light of our concerns that public policy disfavors awarding
spousal maintenance in the form of a percent age of fu ture earnings without a specified
limit.9 On remand, the district court shall have discretion to reexamine its maintenance
award in light of how it resolves the questions regarding husband’s bonus compensation as
“property” to divide as part of the marita l estate or as “income” for purposes of awarding
spousal maintenance.
III. Division of Jewelry and Handbags

Husband challenges the district court’s award of wife’s jewelry and purse collection
to her. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirm its division
of the jewelry and handbags.
We review the district court’s division of property for an abuse of discretion .
Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 164 (Minn. 1989). We defer to the district court’s
findings of fact and wi ll not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Maurer v.

Grigsby v. Grigsby , 648 N.W.2d 716, 722 -23 (Minn. App. 2002) (addressing whether
property was acquired before or after the valuation date).
9 See McCulloch v. McCulloch, 435 N.W.2d 564, 566-68 (Minn. App. 1989) ( affirming
district court’s decision not to include 50% of future bonus compensation as spousal
maintenance); Doherty v. Doherty , 388 N.W.2d 1, 2 n.1 (Minn. App. 1986) (affirming
award of spousal maintenance, but discouraging ongoing maintenance awards that include
a base amount plus 50% of future taxable income) ; but see Novak v. Novak , 406 N.W.2d
64, 68 (Minn. App. 1987) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion by
ordering base-plus-a-percent child-support award), review denied (Minn. July 22, 1987).

18
Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001). A district court must divide marital assets
equitably. Minn. Stat. § 518.58 (2018). But an equitable division need not be equal . See
Ruzic v. Ruzic, 281 N.W.2d 502, 505 ( Minn. 1979). A district court abuses its discretion
in dividing property if it resolves the matter in a manner “that is against logic and the facts
on record.” Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984).
When dividing property in a dissolution , the district court bases its findings on all
relevant factors including:
the length of the marriage, any prior marriage of a party, the
age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
vocational skills, employabilit y, estate, liabilities, needs,
opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets, and income
of each party. The court shall also consider the contribution of
each in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or
appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property, as
well as the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker.

Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1.
Husband requests reversal because he believes that the district court divided the
purses and jewelry based solely on the parties’ income disparity and failed to make
individual findings regarding each and every other statutory factor. We conclude that the
district court did make the necessary findings to support its award of purses and jewelry to
wife. First, as husband observes, the district court found that wife is employed as a flight
attendant with gross annual income of $63,000 per year and husband has gross annual
salary income of $310,903.87 per year (plus bonus compensation). “Amount and sources
of income” is explicitly included as a facto r in Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. The district
court explicitly tied this finding to its division of the jewelry and purses. Second, husband

19
overlooks the extensive findings that the district court made regarding the length of the
marriage, the age, he alth, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, needs, and income of each party . The district court also made
findings of fact regarding the contribution of the parties in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property.10 We conclude
that these findings applied to the division of jewelry and purses and affirm this portion of
the district court’s decision. We decline to adopt a requirement that district co urts
explicitly reiterate the findings required by section 518.58 to justify the division of each
and every particular asset or liability of the marital estate.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

10 Husband does not contest these findings, or argue that the district court clearly erred in
making these findings. Instead, husband argues only that the portion of the decision
relating specifically to the division of purses and jewelry did not sufficiently address the
factors listed in section 518.58.