In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: M. Z., Parent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1917

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
M. Z., Parent.

Filed May 20, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-17-5407

Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant-father M.Z.)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and
Public Health Department)

Deaundres Diez Wilson, Wilson Law Office, P.A., Minneapolis, Mi nnesota (for
respondent-mother K.Z.)

Sandy Zarembinski, Minneapolis, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg , Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant M.Z. appeals from the district court’s termination o f his parental rights
(TPR), arguing that the record i s insufficient to support the d istrict court’s finding that
termination of his parental rights is in the best interests of the child. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant and K.Z. (mother) are the biological parents of T.Z. (daughter). Appellant
and mother were married at the time of daughter’s birth and remain married.
In October 2017, officers from the Minnesota Bureau of Crimina l Apprehension
(BCA) executed a search warrant to obtain evidence of child por nography stored on
appellant’s cell phone and laptop computer. The BCA located se veral stored images of
sexually explicit child pornography. Officers interviewed appe llant, who admitted to
viewing child pornography. He denied that he knew he had ever stored or downloaded the
pornographic images. Appellant told the officers he spent time on an internet website that
served as a platform to chat about sexual fantasies, including father/daughter incest.
Appellant told the officers that one of his chats involved a conversation about sex acts that
another male would perpetrate on daughter. Appellant had other conversations that
concerned his then-17-year-old d aughter (A.Z.), wherein he disc ussed A.Z. engaging in
sexual activity with other men. 1 Appellant admitted that he ha d provided photos of A.Z.
to other men more than ten times and at one point provided anot her individual with the
physical location where A.Z. worked and provided him with A.Z.’s phone number.
Appellant left the family home at the request of child protect ive services shortly
after the BCA executed the sear ch warrant. Appellant voluntari ly began sex-addiction
therapy and treatment. Appellant’s initial intake took place o n November 3, 2017, with
Michael Kogan-White, M.A. Appellant reported that he knows he has a pornography

1 A.Z. is no longer a minor, and this appeal does not concern appellant’s legal relationship
with A.Z. “Daughter” as used herein refers to T.Z., the subject of the TPR.

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addiction and that his viewing child pornography was an escalat ion of his addiction.
Appellant denied pedophilia. Appellant reported that he began viewing pornography as a
child but his addiction worsened and became more compulsive in the last five years.
Appellant returned to see Mr. K ogan-White after completing a “ Sex Addiction
Evaluation Packet.” Mr. Kogan-Wh ite determined that appellant meets the diagnostic
criteria for sexual addiction an d recommended further treatment , including sex-offender
treatment if required by the court or if further evaluation ind icates that appellant has
pedophilia.
Hennepin County filed a petiti on to terminate appellant’s pare ntal rights on
November 16, 2017, alleging that appellant is palpably unfit to parent and had committed
a crime that would require his r egistration as a predatory offe n d e r i f h e w e r e t o b e
convicted.
In December of 2017, appellant u nderwent therapy with Sharri R ogers, LMFT.
Appellant recounted to Ms. Rogers that he has had a pornography problem since the age of
five. Ms. Rogers noted on February 7, 2018, that he actively p articipates in therapy, he
appears to be very amenable to treatment, and that she believes appellant does not currently
pose a threat by having contact with daughter.
Appellant completed his first psy chosexual evaluation in Februa r y 2 0 1 8 w i t h
Dr. Stefan Bailis. Appellant took a polygraph that supported h is denial of having
inappropriate sexual contact with minors under the age of 15. Dr. Bailis confirmed
appellant’s sexual addiction and ruled out pedophilic disorder.

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Appellant was charged on March 12, 2018, with multiple counts o f possessing
pornographic works involving a minor in violation of Minn. Stat . § 617.247, subd. 4(a)
(2016). Appellant pleaded guilty in May 2018. A presentence i nvestigation (PSI) report
was prepared. Appellant complete d a second psychosexual evalua tion, this one with
Dr. Mary Marth, in August 2018. Dr. Marth could not rule out p edophilia without more
information. Dr. Marth recommended that appellant complete sex-offender treatment and
that appellant not live with any minors or be in a supervisory/ direct care role of minors
until approved by his treatment team.
In the course of the PSI, appellant reported that he became numb to the pornography
he was viewing and began seeking material such as bestiality, S&M, and rape. Appellant
admitted viewing child pornography, fantasizing about then-17-year-old A.Z., and that his
target interest age is 11 to 14 years, including both males and females. When asked if he
was aroused by pictures of A.Z., appellant said, “[a] little bit. She is a beautiful girl with a
beautiful body.” He expressed bizarre curiosity about A.Z.’s a natomy.2 A p p e l l a n t
admitted to being aroused by the likes of an online chat sessio n involving other men’s
fantasies of sexually violating appellant’s wife and daughter.
The PSI commented that Dr. Bailis did not have a complete pictu re of appellant’s
behavior. Dr. Bailis did not hav e any collateral information d etailing appellant’s
purposeful engagement in sexual chatting that progressed from h is spouse, to his teen

2 We abridge the details of appellant’s expressions of sexual in terest in minors as
unnecessary for purposes of this opinion.

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daughter, to his pre-pubescent c hild. Without this insight, Dr . Bailis concluded that
appellant’s use of child pornography was merely a need for novel stimuli.
The PSI summarized that appellant’s “decision to violate society’s most sacred bond
of protecting one’s own children as a means to arousal is difficult to reconcile.” It opined
that appellant’s clear sexual interest in incest-themed material jeopardized the safety of his
family. The PSI also stated that appellant’s objectification and sexualization of his spouse
and daughters requires interventio n greater than a sexual-addic tion program. The report
recommended a five-year stayed sentence with a ten-year conditi onal release period.
Recommended conditions of probation included that appellant have no contact with minors
except as authorized by probation and treatment, and have conta ct with daughter only if
supervised as authorized by probation and/or child protection.
Appellant was convicted on Septem ber 17, 2018, of four counts o f possessing
pornographic works involving a mi nor in violation of Minn. Stat . § 617.247, subd. 4(a).
The district court sentenced ap pellant to 30 months in prison, stayed for five years, on
probation conditions including t hat appellant serve 180 days at t h e w o r k h o u s e a n d
complete a sex-offender-specific treatment program and other co nditions required by
probation. The district court restricted appellant’s contact w ith minors as the PSI
recommended.
Kimberly Trembley, the social worker assigned to appellant’s child-protection case,
testified at trial in favor of terminating appellant’s parental rights. Ms. Trembley testified
about appellant’s psychosexual ev aluations. Ms. Trembley was c oncerned that the first
evaluation did not appear to have many collateral contacts, and it stated that appellant was

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not attracted to teenagers, but further testing demonstrated th at appellant still was so
attracted. Ms. Trembley testified that the conversations appellant had with other men about
his daughters that came out in the second evaluation were also concerning, in addition to
what she perceived as appellant’s failure to acknowledge the gravity of the safety risk his
behaviors created for his family. Appellant shared the locatio n of his eldest daughter and
photos of his family to men on the internet, and engaged in sexual fantasies about his own
family members with men who are also offenders. Ms. Trembley testified that the largest
factor in moving forward to terminate appellant’s parental righ ts is the PSI, which
recommended that appellant not live with or have any direct sup ervisory contact with
minors and noted that appellant h as not completed treatment to address his specific
addictions and fantasies.
Ms. Trembley testified that appe llant has had supervised visits with his daughter,
including at mother’s home. Ms. T rembley testified that the vi sits went well and there
were a few reports that daught er is confused about why appellan t was not in the home.
Ms. Trembley took into account th e bond that daughter has with appellant when making
her ultimate recommendation in favor of terminating appellant’s rights.
The guardian ad litem (GAL) also t estified at trial and support ed terminating
appellant’s parental rights. The GAL testified that she was familiar with the chats in which
appellant engaged. She said tha t appellant’s characterization of the chats as fantasies
minimizes the nature of the chat s; appellant used the internet to inform a man who is
sexually interested in minors where A.Z. works, and when that man told appellant that she
was not there, appellant responded by identifying the days when A.Z. would be at work.

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The GAL testified that, while appellant has a good relationship with daughter, it would not
be safe for daughter if appellant returned home.
Appellant’s brother-in-law testif ied at trial and opposed termi nating appellant’s
parental rights. He testified generally to the positive bond that appellant and daughter have
and that appellant is a good father. Appellant’s mother-in-law also testified at trial and
opposed termination of appella n t ’ s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . S h e t e s t i fi e d t h a t s h e h a s k n o w n
appellant to be a good father and that appellant has a special bond with daughter. Neither
witness has concerns about daughter’s safety with appellant.
Appellant testified at trial and acknowledged that he came into possession of child
pornography that was sent to hi m by a man appellant encountered in an incest-fantasies
chatroom. Appellant testified that he sent photographs of A.Z. —in a bathing suit and in
her volleyball uniform—to others in the chatroom on at least te n occasions. Appellant
testified that he had several co nversations about other men hav ing sex with his youngest
daughter. Appellant acknowledged viewing pornography on his cellular device on a couple
of occasions since the BCA raid of his home and seizure of his computer. Appellant
expressed remorse for his actions and his resolve to do whatever it takes to be a good father,
including sex-offender treatment.
Mother testified at trial that she believes daughter would be safe if appellant returned
to the home. But mother also acknowledged that appellant’s sec ond psychosexual
examination did not rule out ped ophilia. She agreed that, if s he were to discover that
appellant meets the criteria for pedophilia, she would concede that it is not safe for him to
return home.

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The district court terminated father’s parental rights to daughter.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate courts review the termination of parental rights “to determine whether the
district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and wh ether the district court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clea rly erroneous.” In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). A factual finding is
clearly erroneous “if it is eith er manifestly contrary to the w eight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750
N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). We review the district court’s
ultimate decision to terminate p arental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of
Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 900-01 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn.
Jan. 6, 2012); see In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136-37 (Minn. 2014)
(stating that whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the termination of parental
rights is in the child’s best interests is a discretionary matter with the district court).
Parental rights may only be terminated for grave and weighty reasons. In re Welfare
of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012). A juvenile court may terminate
the parental rights of a parent when at least one statutory gro und for termination is
supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the child’s best interests.
R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137.
The district court concluded that two statutory grounds for ter mination were met.
Appellant was convicted of a crim e listed in Minn. Stat. § 260. 012(g)(5) (2018)—

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possession of child pornography in violation of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a), requiring
that appellant register as a predatory offender—that satisfies a statutory basis for
termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9) (2018). The district court also
concluded that appellant is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship
because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct directly relating to the parent and child
relationship that renders the par ent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care
appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018).
On appeal, appellant does not challenge the district court’s de terminations that
statutory grounds for termination were met, and that the county was relieved of its duty to
make reasonable efforts to reunify appellant and daughter. He makes no argument that he
was entitled to reasonable efforts at reunification.3 Appellant argues only that the evidence
is insufficient to support a fi nding that termination of appell ant’s parental rights is in the
best interests of daughter.
The child’s best interests are the paramount consideration in a termination
proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C. 001, subd. 2(a) (2018). The co urt balances three factors
to determine the child’s best interests: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent and

3 As a general rule, the county must make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child
if the parent will be able to c are for the child within a fores eeable time. In re Welfare of
S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996) (noting that if a parent wi ll be able to care for a
child within a foreseeable time, the district court should establish a supervised plan to give
custody to the parent and declin e to terminate rights). But th e county was relieved of its
obligation to provide reasonable efforts to reunify daughter and appellant under Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(a)(6) (2018), and appellant does not challenge that t he county was improperly
relieved of providing reasonable efforts.

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child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent and child relationship;
and (3) any competing interests of the child. In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d
703, 711 (Minn. App. 2004); see J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (“Competing interests [of the
child] include such things as a stable environment, health cons iderations and the child’s
preferences.” (quotation omitted)); J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (stating that we give
“considerable deference” to the district court’s best-interests findings).
The district court acknowledged the bond that appellant has wit h daughter and the
interest in preserving the family unit, but found these factors to be outweighed by the
compelling factor against reuni fication—daughter’s safety. The district court explained
that, while it does not doubt the sincerity of appellant’s remorse for the harm he has caused,
appellant mischaracterizes the facts. It found that appellant’ s pattern of escalating
predatory behavior—offering his first wife to strangers, then d oing the same with his
second wife, turning to incest when his second wife declined th at fantasy, then turning to
child pornography and offering information about A.Z. to other men, and even chatting
with another man about that man performing sexual acts on daugh ter and mother at the
same time—showed no signs of de-escalation, and only came to a stop when appellant was
caught. The district court also noted appellant has demonstrated predatory behavior toward
his own children. The district court explained, “[i]n light of this alarming escalating pattern
of behavior it is clear that [daughter] is at risk with [appellant], today.” The record supports
these findings.
The district court also referenced the GAL’s testimony that sex -offender treatment
could take years to complete, with an uncertain outcome. The d istrict court reasoned that

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daughter will be in appellant’s t arget 11-to-14-year-old age group at the time appellant is
no longer under court supervision in his criminal case. The district court concluded, “[t]his
is perhaps the gravest factor in terms of [daughter’s] safety, [because] at the point at which
she reaches the prepubescent developmental age, there will no l onger be any supervisory
agencies monitoring” appellant and therefore, “it is clear to t his Court that it is in
[daughter’s] best interest to terminate parental rights of [app ellant].” The record again
supports these findings.
Appellant argues that the district court should not have terminated his rights without
giving him more time to complete sex- offender treatment. At the time of the TPR trial,
appellant had completed almost one year of sex-addiction treatment, but had not yet started
sex-offender treatment because he was incarcerated. In other words, appellant argues that
there was no rush to make a TPR determination. While providing time for appellant to
complete sex-offender treatment c ould conceivably have provided a better result for all
parties, we are deferential to the district court’s best-interests findings. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d
at 92. We see no clear error in the district court’s factual f indings and see no abuse of its
discretion in determining daughter’s best interests.
The district court’s disposition relies on mother to closely mo nitor appellant’s
progress on probation and in treatment, because there is no ong oing child-protection case
concerning daughter. When appe llant’s probation ends in the cr iminal case, and despite
termination of appellant’s parental rights in this proceeding, there will be no legal barrier
to appellant having contact with daughter if mother permits it. As the district court noted,
daughter will then be of an age wh ere contact with appellant wi ll be particularly risky,

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given appellant’s criminal sexual propensities. But our review i s n o t t o determine
daughter’s best interests. Instead, our review is limited to determining whether the record
supports the district court’s findings and the exercise of its discretion. It does.
Appellant also argues that the district court should not have c redited the testimony
of the social worker because of her lack of experience as a social worker, specifically as it
relates to sex offenders.
Here again, the district court is in the best position to make credibility
determinations.4 Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (stating that
appellate courts defer to distri ct court credibility determinat ions). The district court
credited the testimony while acknowledging that social worker has “less than two years of
experience with the Department.”
Ultimately, the determination of daughter’s best interests is e ntrusted to the sound
discretion of the district court. The record supports the dist rict court’s finding that
daughter’s safety would be at risk under appellant’s care—Ms. Trembley’s testimony, the
GAL’s testimony, the second psychosexual evaluation, and the PSI, all recommending that
appellant not have unsupervised contact with minors. The distr ict court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that it is in daughter’s best interes ts to terminate appellant’s
parental rights.
Affirmed.

4 Appellant also argues that the t estimony of his brother-in-law , his mother-in-law, and
mother support appellant and wei gh against the district court’s findings. But the district
court was “not swayed” by their testimony because “all have a vested interest in preserving
the . . . family unit.”